



YOUTH POLICY AND THE FUTURE OF AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AfDB	African Development Bank
ALMPs	active labor market programs
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
AU	African Union
AYC	African Youth Charter
ILO	International Labor Organization
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
NPI-Africa	Nairobi Peace Initiative Africa
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	nongovernmental organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PRSPs	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
WPAY	World Programme of Action for Youth to the Year 2000 and Beyond
YBI	Youth Business International

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study focuses on the state of youth in Africa, especially their well-being and their participation in the economy. The study undertakes a broad review of existing studies and policy frameworks on African youth and identifies the gaps, challenges and opportunities for harnessing the youth's potential. The following is a brief summary of the highlights of the study.

1. Limited data hinder the measurement of the well-being of African youth, but the available data suggest that the youth population is large and growing, and has high educational attainment and unemployment rates—with adverse consequences:

- The lack of a universal definition of “youth” makes measuring the youth problem difficult and the comparison of data across countries less reliable.
- The youth population in Africa is large (about 200 million, which is 20 percent of its population of more than 1 billion).
- Africa's relatively young population (about 42 percent of its population in 2010 was estimated to be below 15 years of age), combined with the continent's high fertility rate, is likely to magnify the so-called youth bulge. This trend could have positive consequences for Africa's development, if properly channeled.
- Youth, especially in North Africa and especially males, have higher educational attainment. However, there are large variations in educational attainment across countries and regions.
- Youth unemployment rates are relatively high, with significant regional differences and adverse consequences such as poverty, migration and diseases. Females particularly face extremely high unemployment rates.

2. Policies and actions for youth have not successfully addressed these challenges:

- Effective youth policies require dealing with challenges facing youth that include, but are not limited to, the lack of access to a high-quality and relevant education, high rates of persistent unemployment, a high incidence of chronic poverty, political disengagement and poor environmental health.
- Information on the development and implementation of youth policies in Africa are hard to find, but anecdotal evidence suggests that various countries are at different stages of the process.
- Youth policies potentially have several challenges, and the assessment of problems facing young people is complicated by data limitations. These limitations include a lack of reliable and accurate data; a lack of comparable data across countries and regions; a lack of pro-jobs and pro-youth economic growth agendas; a lack of comprehensive youth policies that are integrated into national development plans; a lack of broad macroeconomic policies and the need to mainstream youth policies; the fact that the costs of programs and sources for funding are not fully known; and the fact that governments lack the capacity to undertake comprehensive monitoring and evaluative processes.

3. The key recommendations arising from this review focus on harnessing the potential of African youth to foster economic development through their participation in the labor market and strategies to improve their living standards generally. The main strategies proposed include:

- Improving the *investment* climate by reducing the cost of doing business so as to create jobs for youth;
- Expanding *infrastructure*, especially in rural areas, to boost employment opportunities for youth;

- Harnessing *innovation*, which has the potential to increase skill formation, enhance productivity and create youth employment opportunities;
- Building *institutional* quality so that individuals and organizations are effective in responding to the needs of the youth.

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1. INTRODUCTION

One of the greatest challenges facing governments and policymakers in Africa today is how to provide opportunities for the continent's more than 200 million youth so that they can have decent lives and contribute to the economic development of their countries. According to the United Nations (2012), Africa's 2011 population was estimated at 1.05 billion and is expected to double by 2050. Africa is the youngest continent in the world: About 70 percent of its population is 30 years of age or younger. In 2011, youth, who are defined here as those between 15 and 24 years of age, constituted 21 percent of the more than 1 billion people in Africa, whereas another 42 percent was less than 15 years old. Slightly more than half of the African youth population is female, and there are more rural dwellers than urban dwellers. With such a large proportion under 15 years of age, Africa's youth population is expected to grow in the years to come while the youth population in other parts of the world shrinks.

Undoubtedly, the challenges for youth that are central to Africa's economic development are numerous and varied—they include employment, health and political participation. These issues differ among groups

within countries (by gender, education level, ethnicity and health status), and across countries and regions. Conversely, the size, energy, enthusiasm, innovation and dynamism of youth are assets that can be harnessed for Africa's development with appropriate policies that deal adequately with the issues facing them.

The potentially important role of youth in Africa's development cannot be overemphasized. Youth could be a source of labor inputs as well as human capital in production, which would improve total factor productivity in a region of the world where capital formation is limited. When employed, youth could be a reliable source of demand for the economy through their consumption activities. In addition, the youth of Africa could be critical for the development of a new class of entrepreneurs that African countries need to prosper. Furthermore, Africa has an opportunity to harness a "demographic dividend": With the projection that most countries in Africa will have more working-age adults per child in 2030 than in 2006, there will be a large workforce supporting fewer children and the elderly. This trend would result in a lower dependency burden, freeing up resources for development; see, for example, Ashford (2007).

There are several reasons why youth could become an integral part of Africa's economic growth and development. First, they tend to be more educated than their older cohorts. Therefore, they can better absorb new technologies and ideas and adapt them to the African environment. Second, they tend to take more risks than their older counterparts. Finally, they are more likely to challenge certain norms and sociopolitical processes that may be hindering economic development. The challenge to African policymakers is how to harness young people's desire for change that has the potential to translate into positive outcomes.

The consequences of not fully developing and harnessing youth's potential could be dire, including significant economic losses, armed conflict, and political and social upheaval and instability—as demonstrated recently by the Arab Spring. Youth are more likely to become frustrated because of legitimate grievances, including a lack of employment opportunities, low educational attainment, little participation in decision-making and low social mobility. In this volatile context, greedy and opportunistic politicians could even exploit these grievances by involving these frustrated youth in violent overthrows of legitimate governments—creating massive instabilities that could limit the economic growth of Africa's countries (see Collier and Hoeffler 2004).

Despite the elevated awareness of the challenges confronting Africa's youth noted by previous studies, several African countries still do not seem to have

developed comprehensive and effective policies to deal with the issues facing this large and growing segment of the African population or to have in place a means to assess the progress made. The purpose of this study is to advance the discussion of the problems facing youth in Africa by assessing whether African countries' existing youth policies can meet the challenges and how these policies can be improved to foster the continent's equitable and efficient development.

The study finds that policies to address the challenges facing youth have not resulted in a great deal of success. We attribute the failures to a number of factors including the inadequacy of information about youth that is necessary in the design of policy, weak coordination amongst government agencies, donors, regional organizations, and the failure to design specific policies that are suited to deal with the problems of African youth.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the characteristics of African youth, including demographic and economic aspects, which provide insights into their challenges, although data are limited. Section 3 looks at policy actions that have been proposed or taken (by development agencies, partners and, in particular, individual African countries or countries as a group) to address the challenges of the youth, and whether they meet the challenges. Section 4 discusses how African youth can be harnessed to foster economic development. The study concludes in Section 5 with recommendations.

2. CHARACTERISTICS OF AFRICAN YOUTH

An effective assessment of the well-being of the youth living in African countries requires good information on their characteristics—including size, gender composition, economic situation, health and sociopolitical makeup. Here we discuss the limitations of the data on African youth, including their lack of availability and uniformity. The discussion that follows is based on the available data, with all their limitations, which make it difficult to fully understand the challenges facing African youth.


There is no universal definition of the youth population. “Youth” is traditionally defined as a period of transition from childhood to adulthood.¹ In the *African Youth Report 2009* (hereafter, the *AYR*) (UNECA 2009), “youth” are defined as people between 15 and 39 years of age.² However, several African countries define their youth population differently. For example, Ghana, Tanzania and South Africa define the youth population as those between 15 and 35 years of age; Nigeria and Swaziland define it as those between 12 and 30 years; and Botswana and Mauritius define it as those between 14 and 25 years. These varying definitions of the youth population make it difficult to effectively discuss issues affecting youth in Africa generally and to compare information across countries.

The age band used in the *AYR* is too wide because it is generally agreed that people in their 30s are adults, and hence not part of those youth who are in transition to adulthood. For statistical purposes, the United Nations (2011d) defines youth as those aged 15 to 24 years. Although arbitrary, this is the age group that has been recognized internationally as “youth.” Though generally acceptable and preferable, its implementation often poses problems because the data for different countries are not provided using this definition.

For example, population data are commonly presented in five-year age bands or presented for children (below 15 years) and for adults (15 years and above). Similarly, labor market data are typically presented for adults (16–64 years). This study adopts the United Nations’ definition of youth. However, given the discussion above, in some situations we depart from the 15–24 year bracket because of data availability. One of the challenges of developing policies for youth is finding the appropriate data on the youth population in Africa because such data are not routinely collected by government agencies. This study relies on limited data from several sources, including the United Nations, the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the United Nations Economic Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), as well as national sources whenever possible.

The available data suggest that the youth population is large and growing, but there are limited data on gender and rural/urban distribution. The youth population in Africa is relatively large and is growing very fast. As shown in Figure 1, youth constitute about 20 percent of Africa’s population. Thus, the absolute size of the continent’s youth population is slightly above 200 million (in 2011, Africa’s total population was estimated at about 1.05 billion). Although Asia has the largest youth population in the world because of its large total population, Africa is the region with the highest youth population relative to its entire population. Because Africa’s population is relatively young (about 42 percent of Africa’s population in 2010 was estimated to be below 15 years of age) and has a high fertility rate, the youth population in Africa is projected to grow very fast and is likely to remain high for a long period of time. As shown in Figure 1, Africa is the only global region where the proportion of the youth population increased between 1990 and 2010. This youth bulge has consequences for the development of Africa.

Figure 1. Youth Population in Africa and the Rest of the World



Source: *African Youth Report 2011 (UNECA 2011)*.

Although Africa’s youth population is relatively large, throughout the continent there are regional and country differences in the size of the youth populations and in the rates at which these populations are likely to grow. The youth bulge is larger in North Africa than in sub-Saharan Africa, but the growth of the youth population is likely to be higher in sub-Saharan Africa than in North Africa because of differences in the dynamics of the populations across regions and countries. Though the youth population is expected to reach a plateau in North Africa by 2030, in sub-Saharan Africa it is projected to grow in both absolute and relative terms until about 2050. There are differences in the rates of growth in the youth populations across countries as well. And though the relative sizes of the populations are expected to decrease in countries like Tunisia and Morocco by 2030, they are expected to continue to increase in countries like Kenya and Uganda.

There are limited data on gender composition of the youth in Africa. However, if one assumes that the

gender distribution of the youth population parallels that of the general population, then the youth population is composed of slightly more females than males. Similarly, there are limited data on the distribution of the youth population between rural and urban locations. However, given the geographical distribution of the general population in Africa, a larger share of the continent’s youth population resides in rural areas as opposed to urban areas and is more likely to be engaged in agricultural activities than in the modern economic sector. In general, urban youth have better opportunities for education than their rural counterparts.

Youth, especially in North Africa and especially males, have high educational attainment. Table 1 presents the educational attainment of the total population and the total youth and female youth populations in Africa using data from Barro and Lee (2010) showing primary school completion rates, secondary school completion rates, tertiary school completion rates, and other measures of the population’s educational

attainment. The data indicate that, on average, in Africa youth have higher educational attainment rates than the continent's population as a whole. For example, the average years of educational attainment in the population of Africa is 2.40, whereas it is 3.69 years for youth—53 percent higher.³ Similarly, youth have more education than the average person at every level of education, whether primary, secondary or tertiary. In addition, Gyimah-Brempong and Ondiege (2011) and the World Bank (2000) have shown that tertiary education enrollment in African countries has more than doubled in the last decade.

Like other characteristics of youth in Africa, there are regional differences in their educational attainment. Youth in North Africa tend to be more educated than those in sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, though there is a large gender gap in education in sub-Saharan Africa, the gender gap is almost nonexistent in North Africa, especially in countries like Tunisia and Morocco. Although educational attainment by African youth has increased significantly in the last decade, the relevance of the curricula and the quality of education, in most cases, are not good (see Gyimah-Brempong and

Ondiege 2011). These challenges have implications for young people's employment prospects and their potential contribution to African development.

Youth unemployment rates are relatively high, with significant regional differences and potential adverse consequences, such as poverty, disease and migration. The contribution of the relatively large youth population to Africa's development depends on the quality of human capital they possess and crucially on whether they are gainfully employed as employees or have opportunities to establish their own businesses. Theoretically, an increase in the youth population will depress the real wage in an economy by increasing the labor supply, which in turn will increase employment, all things being equal. This, of course, may depend on the degree to which youth labor is complementary to, or substitutable for, existing (adult) labor or capital. Therefore, it is not clear whether an increased youth labor supply may lead to increases in aggregate employment and output, all things being equal. Because the contribution of youth to economic growth in Africa depends on whether or not they are employed, here we briefly discuss youth employment in Africa.

Table 1. Educational Attainment in Africa, 2010: Total Population, Total Youth and Female Youth

Level of Education	Total Population	Youth (Total)	Youth (Female)
Primary school completion (%)	9.33	14.76	14.80
Secondary school completion (%)	3.99	6.19	6.49
Tertiary education completion (%)	0.72	0.64	1.45
Years of educational attainment: Total	2.40	3.69	3.52
Years of educational attainment: Primary	1.80	2.70	3.01
Years of educational attainment: Secondary	0.60	0.93	1.21
Years of educational attainment: Tertiary	0.04	0.05	0.05

Source: Barro and Lee (2010).

Labor market data in Africa are infamously unreliable because most countries do not collect such data on a consistent basis. Even when these data are collected, they are available for only the formal sector. Given the large size of informal sector activities, a focus on the formal sector is likely to result in seriously understating the true employment rate. Therefore, the labor market data on youth employment should be viewed with caution.

Although youth constitute about 37 percent of Africa's labor force, they account for about 60 percent of total unemployment in Africa. The labor force participation rate among youth is higher in sub-Saharan Africa than in North Africa. Little empirical work has been done on the causal linkages between youth unemployment rates and labor force participation rates in Africa. However, a simple correlation analysis suggests a strong negative relationship between the two in Africa. As shown in Table 2, despite the higher educational attainment of youth relative to the population as a whole, the youth unemployment rate in Africa tends to be higher than for the population as a whole compared with the rest of the world.

Table 2 shows the youth unemployment rates in all of Africa, selected regions of Africa and the world. The data show that youth unemployment rates in Africa average more than 10 percent and are expected to remain above 10 percent up to 2015. African youth unemployment rates are high compared with the world as

a whole. For example, in 2011 the 12.5 percent youth unemployment rate in Africa was about four times the rate in Southeast Asia. The high youth unemployment rates in Africa are not limited to those with less education. For example, in Tunisia, which has one of the highest-quality tertiary education systems in Africa, only about 30 percent of students graduating from university are able to find a job in the first year after graduation. Similarly, in Ghana and Nigeria a large proportion of university graduates can find jobs only in the informal sector in urban areas.

Although the data given in Table 2 suggest that the average unemployment rate among African youth is not different from the average unemployment rate in the world, this information should be interpreted with caution. As indicated, the unemployment rates reported reflect more of what is happening in the formal sector labor market, not necessarily what is happening in the informal sector. The African data may also not reflect the large number of underemployed and disguised unemployed workers found in the informal sectors in African countries. For example, the ILO estimates that, in 2007, 65, 39 and 35 percent of youth were underemployed in Mauritania, Mozambique and Cameroon, respectively. Given the large informal sector in African economies, the reported youth unemployment rates may be seriously underestimated and not comparable to the rates in developed countries and in other areas of the developing world.

Table 2. Youth Unemployment Rates in Africa (%)

Year	World	Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa	North Africa
2007	11.6	13.5	11.5	23.8
2009	12.6	13.5	11.5	23.6
2010	12.7	13.3	11.4	23.1
2011	12.6	12.5	11.5	17.9
2015*	12.7	13.9	11.4	26.9

*Projected.
Source: ILO (2012b).

As with other data pertaining to youth in Africa, there are large regional differences in youth unemployment rates in Africa. The rate in North Africa tends to be twice as high as that in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition to regional differences in aggregate youth unemployment rates, there tend to be regional differences in the gender distribution of youth unemployment in Africa. In North Africa, rates are substantially higher for females than for males, even though labor force participation rates among females are much lower than those among males. For example, in 2010 the female youth unemployment rate in North Africa was 34.1 percent, whereas that of males was 23.8 percent, even though labor force participation rates were 19.5 percent and 47.2 percent for females and males, respectively. Conversely, there is less gender difference in youth unemployment and labor force participation rates in sub-Saharan Africa. Female and male youth unemployment rates were 13.2 percent and 11.8 percent, respectively, whereas labor force participation rates were 51.4 percent and 55.8 percent, respectively. The relatively low average youth unemployment rates in sub-Saharan Africa may reflect the fact that a large proportion of jobs in sub-Saharan African economies are in the informal sector. Indeed, in several countries—such as Mali, Burkina Faso and Uganda—more than 90 percent of youth are employed as unpaid family labor.

There are also large intraregional variations in youth unemployment rates in sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa. For example, the youth unemployment rate is below 5 percent in Malawi, above 20 percent in Ghana and Zimbabwe, above 30 percent in Botswana and Mauritius, and above even 60 percent in South Africa. In North Africa, youth unemployment rates in Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria are all above 30 percent.

What explains the high rates of youth unemployment rates in Africa? Several factors have been identified.

First, slow economic growth has not generated enough jobs. Although there has been an uptick in the average economic growth rate in Africa in the last decade, the growth rate has been generally low compared with the rest of the world. Second, Africa's economic growth has been powered by the exploitation of mineral resources, whose production tends to be capital intensive and thus creates few employment opportunities. The choice of capital-intensive production techniques is itself a function of factor market distortion policies—policies that tend to subsidize capital and overprice labor. Third, the high youth unemployment rate may also be due to skills mismatch—the educational system produces skills that are not demanded by employers. In a sense, the educational system is based on irrelevant curricula and inappropriate pedagogy (see Gyimah-Brempong and Ondiege 2011).

In addition to high unemployment rates, young people in Africa face longer spells of unemployment than adults, regardless of their level of education. In Tunisia and Egypt, about 25 percent of university graduates remain unemployed three years after graduation. High unemployment rates combined with long durations of unemployment imply that youth either lose the skills they acquired through education or lose their attachment to the labor market completely. The long-term consequences of high and persistent youth unemployment are a high incidence of poverty among youth and their inability to contribute to the development of Africa.

A further consequence of the massive and persistent youth unemployment rate is a high incidence of youth poverty in Africa. The United Nations (2011b) and World Bank (2009) estimated that in 2008 that more than 70 percent of the youth in Africa lived on less than \$2 a day, and 46 percent lived on less than \$1.25 a day. Again, there are country and regional variations in the incidence of poverty. In Burundi, Ethiopia, Nigeria

and Uganda, youth poverty exceeds 80 percent, whereas it is much lower in Ghana. The incidence of youth poverty is highest among females in rural areas. And when facing severe poverty, youth resort to survival mechanisms that could have several undesirable outcomes.

The high rates of unemployment and poverty among African youth have several negative consequences for the development of Africa. African countries are deprived of their human capital as youth migrate to the developed world or the oil-rich Arab Gulf states. International migration is generally selective—typically, the best and the brightest emigrate, depriving the African countries of those with the skills and energy needed to develop their economies. The ILO estimates that the median age of international migrants from Africa is slightly less than 29 years old.⁴

Under more pessimistic scenarios, the high incidence of youth unemployment and poverty in Africa poses serious problems for social stability and peace. Poor and unemployed youth are more likely to be the foot-soldiers in civil conflicts. The World Bank (2007c) and Human Rights Watch (2005) have estimated that more than 50 percent of the youth who joined rebel groups cited unemployment as the reason. A number of recent events bear testimony to how high rates of youth unemployment and poverty can generate social instability and conflict—including the Arab Spring; armed conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo; and the growing popularity of the terrorist group Boko Haram in Nigeria. High rates of

youth unemployment and poverty could also lead youth to resort to crime and violence, such as armed robbery, to “earn their living.”

High youth unemployment rates and poverty in Africa may also lead youth to adopt risky lifestyles that could worsen the prevalence of HIV/AIDS among them. The prevalence of HIV among African youth is above 5 percent, compared with the world average of less than 1 percent. Female youth are three times more at risk than their male counterparts (see UNAIDS 2011). This high HIV/AIDS prevalence among both male and female youth is partly due to ignorance about the disease but also due to using commercial sex to earn their living.

Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2007) have argued that Africa’s economic growth in the near term will be determined by growth in the working-age population and improvements in institutional quality. These factors are crucially influenced by the quantity and quality of the youth population. Youth policy, especially regarding investment in human capital and the employment of these human resources, is therefore very important for the future development of Africa. Similarly, the World Bank (2007) has argued that institutions, infrastructure, innovation and a good investment climate are the key pillars of Africa’s long term growth. Given the potential contribution of youth in all these areas, the quality and size of the youth population is again critical for Africa’s development. We discuss the challenges of developing effective youth policies in Africa in the next section.

3. POLICY ACTIONS PROPOSED FOR YOUTH IN AFRICA

Several studies and reports, predominantly by development agencies and their partners, have discussed the challenges facing youth in Africa, and what policies could be adopted (see Table 3 for three prominent frameworks—World Program for Action for Youth, the African Youth Charter and the *AYR*—on developing youth policies in Africa). The objectives of these reports are to contribute to developing an agenda for youth development—which embodies broader economic, social and political goals consistent with the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by analyzing the major problems facing youth and providing recommendations for African countries. Several priority areas are identified, particularly education and employment, health (particularly HIV/AIDS), and political participation, as well as gender issues. Specific policy recommendations are provided in one of the reports—the *AYR*, from the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). Although the reports recognize the need for African countries to take further steps to develop and implement their national plans and to fully assess their progress, no study has been done to evaluate these aspects of youth policies.

The *AYR* indicated that African governments have responded to the challenges of youth, but the challenges facing youth in Africa still persists. There is a need to foster youth involvement in the process of policy formulation and to consider youth issues within a general framework that incorporates regional and global responses. A World Bank (2008) report, aimed at providing information to policymakers, who have been hindered by the paucity of information on what policy options are available and what has worked or not worked in different situations, provided stylized facts on the youth and labor markets in Africa as well as past policies and actions. It argued for an integrated, multi-

sector approach that looks directly at the labor market, for policies that indirectly affect employment, and for close monitoring of governments’ actions.

Several African countries have made progress in developing youth policies, as embodied in the African Youth Charter, a regional framework for youth development, as well as in other reports—including the *AYR* (UNECA 2009) and the United Nations’ 1995 World Programme of Action for Youth to the Year 2000 and Beyond (WPAY). But overall, the progress seems to have been slow, and the available policies or actions do not adequately meet the challenges.⁵

Motivation for developing youth policies in Africa has been influenced by a large number of reports by various bodies—including regional member states, international organizations and development partners. At the regional level, a big influence seems to have been the *AYR*, a relatively recent and comprehensive report on African youth. Partly due to data constraints, the report provides an in-depth and up-to-date analysis of only some of the key issues that arguably disproportionately affect youth—namely, education and employment, health and HIV/AIDS, and youth participation in political and decision-making processes. These priority areas are broadly consistent with the objectives of several initiatives and forums on youth development; see Table 1 for the priority areas identified by selected youth policy frameworks. The *AYR* recommends a coordinated approach by all stakeholders, including the U.N. system, development partners, African Union (AU), governments and youth.

In recognition of the necessity to deal with the problems and challenges facing youth in Africa, the AU member states declared 2008 as the “Year of African Youth.” They also sought to develop policies in a coordinated manner to deal with issues affecting youth. In

Table 3. Selected Frameworks for Developing Youth Policies in Africa

Year: Report (Author)	1995: World Programme of Action for Youth to the Year 2000 and Beyond (United Nations 2010)	2006: African Youth Charter (African Union Heads of State and Government)	2009: African Youth Report— Expanding opportunities for and with Young People in Africa (UNECA)
Objective	Not available	Encourages various stakeholders, including youth, to take action to promote youth development as well as broader economic and social development (consistent with the MDGs)	Contributes to the youth development agenda by undertaking analysis of the major problems and providing recommendations to enable African Member States to tackle them
Coverage	Not available	Regional (Africa): Individual countries will be responsible for their programs	Regional (Africa): Individual countries will be responsible for developing their programs
Priority areas	10 priority areas: education, employment, hunger, poverty, health, environment, drug abuse, juvenile delinquency, leisure-time activities, and girls and young women's participation 5 emerging issues: globalization, information and communications technologies, HIV and AIDS, youth and armed conflict, and intergenerational relations	Not available	Education and employment, health, and political participation
Recommended actions	Not available	Not available	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Education and Employment: Access to post-primary education, particularly for girls; curricula development; economic growth; active labor market policies, e.g., internship/training, entrepreneurship; other national policies affecting youth, e.g., poverty; data collection and research ○ Health: Health services and holistic strategies; education; data collection and more research ○ Political participation: Create opportunities for youth participation in political debate through youth quotas in parliament, on village councils; increase knowledge of national policies through participation and training; proactive youth organizations
Comments	Not available	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Adopted in 2006 at the Fifth African Development Forum on "Youth and Leadership in the Twenty-First Century," organized by UNECA, AU, other U.N. agencies, AfDB, and International Organization of the Francophone ○ 13 countries have ratified the charter based on the Consensus Statement, and 32 have ratified (as of April 2102) ○ Further steps include development and implementation of national plans 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Inaugural report (with attention to the needs of girls' education) ○ States have responded to the challenges, but need to fully understand their progress and consider these issues within the overall framework of regional and global responses to youth issues ○ Effective policies require youth involvement in all issues

addition, some countries—including Algeria, Ghana, Kenya and South Africa—have used the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) as another vehicle to address youth unemployment. The 2001 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)—a program of the AU adopted in Lusaka, Zambia, on July 11, 2001—included the goals of achieving the MDGs that explicitly and implicitly concern youth.⁶ Through the initiatives of NEPAD, African youth leaders have established ongoing networks to coordinate their efforts to advance the goals of the MDGs and those of other their development partners.

Internationally, there have been several youth development initiatives. U.N. member states that are parties to the MDGs, including African countries, resolved to “develop and implement strategies that give young people everywhere a real chance to find decent and productive work.” The report of the WPAY identified 10 priority areas, and the U.N. General Assembly agreed on five emerging issues.⁷ Also, in 2006, the meeting of the U.N. Office of the Special Advisor on Africa on youth in post-conflict countries focused on the social and economic integration of youth through job opportunities and the reintegration of ex-combatants into civil society.⁸ The World Bank’s *World Development Report 2007* focused on youth issues. And almost all the recent Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), a program initiated by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in 1999 to encourage African countries to develop integrated poverty reduction strategies, have focused on youth employment. Finally, several U.N. resolutions concern youth employment.⁹

Proposed Youth Policies Advocate an Interrelated Approach to Economic, Health, Political and Social Issues

As mentioned above and shown in Table 1, the frameworks for youth policies identify about a dozen priority

areas. These areas can be grouped broadly into an integrated framework that embodies the economic, health, political and social issues affecting African youth. We next discuss the priority areas that national youth policies should address to promote youth development.

Economic Issues

The economic issues concern how to deal with the immense youth unemployment problem using an integrated approach, including the promotion of economic growth, improving access to high-quality education and implementing various labor market policies. A critical implication of youth employment policies is that jobs would be available for those with the right education, skills and training. Thus, national policies should foster increased and sustained economic growth to boost the demand for labor and employment, especially for youth. As is well known, the strong correlation between economic growth and employment implies that promoting economic growth helps to increase employment. For instance, in South Africa it is estimated that the employment elasticity of economic growth was 0.7 between 2004 and 2008, meaning that a 1 percent increase in the growth of the gross domestic product was associated with a 0.7 percent increase in employment, all things being equal (see South Africa 2011).¹⁰

Even when jobs are available, youth must have the requisite skills to take advantage of the opportunities. Policies should improve formal education and/or training to increase the supply of skilled youth who are ready for the job market. Several policy actions have been suggested in various reports that could improve the quality of youth labor. First, policies should seek to improve access to a high-quality formal education and increase graduation rates because deficiencies in the education system limit the ability of young workers to find decent jobs. For example, in South Africa,

engineering graduates were found to be unemployable in the automotive industry because of the low quality of their training (Gyimah-Brempong and Ondiege 2011). Second, policies should aim at increasing activities that would increase the supply of high-quality educational opportunities, including investments in infrastructure, textbooks, learning materials, curricula reforms and equipment, and well-trained and motivated teachers. Third, in order to minimize mismatches between skills and job requirements, formal education can be combined with work-based training in a concurrent or sequential manner.¹¹ Fourth, because most African governments face severe fiscal constraints and sustained job creation is arguably the domain of the private sector, public-private partnerships, especially in the area of curricula reform, would be helpful in increasing both the demand for and supply of employment opportunities for youth.

Furthermore, in order to reduce the mismatch between the supply of skills coming out of African educational institutions and the skills needed by employers, it may be necessary to overhaul the educational curricula as well as pedagogical methods. Whereas employers in Africa seek employees with problem-solving scientific skills, the educational systems in Africa turn out graduates mostly in the arts and social sciences. For example, only 24, 18 and 14 percent of tertiary students in South Africa, Botswana and Ethiopia, respectively, were enrolled in science, engineering and technology programs in 2009.¹² Even when African universities turn out science and engineering graduates, the pedagogy employed involves rote memorization. Employers are looking for graduates with problem-solving skills. Educational reforms to improve employment opportunities for youth will not only involve an emphasis on science, engineering and technology but also entail a change in the pedagogical approach to emphasize independent thinking, problem-solving skills and

experimentation. And they will require university-industry linkages to achieve these necessary reforms.

Active labor market programs (ALMPs) are an important component of attempts by several African governments to increase the availability of labor and employment opportunities. These policies are used to enhance employment opportunities for youth because they increase the chances that a young person with the right skills will find work by increasing the demand for his or her labor. ALMPs can take several forms. First, training programs can be used to enhance skills and raise human capital, thereby enhancing the productivity and employability of youth. These programs include assisting those who have not completed or have inadequate formal education to alleviate their conditions by providing vocational training and apprenticeships. An example is the Egypt-Germany Initiative, which operated from 1995 to 2002 as a dual education system.¹³ For these programs to be effective, coordination between the public and private sectors is necessary to improve the chances that workers will be gainfully employed after their training. Although the overall evidence suggests that the impact of skills training on employment may be inconclusive compared with other ALMPs (see, e.g., Kluve 2006), or even less effective, evidence from the World Bank (2007d) indicates that training may be effective in developing countries, especially for female and less-educated individuals.

Second, several policies could help create employment opportunities:

- *Direct public sector employment:* Public works programs have been used in several countries, even though the evidence suggests that they are not generally effective (Kimenyi 1995, Kluve 2006). They are usually used to help the unemployed gain experience or to help new graduates gain initial access to the labor market through

programs such as national youth service. By providing short-term employment at low wages, they are helpful to young people without skills.¹⁴ For example, Ghana has established the National Youth Employment Program to employ youth to engage in several civil activities.

- *Job search assistance:* Employment services can be used to reduce labor market frictions by assisting youth in their job searches and with job matching (Kimenyi 1995). These include helping youth with the preparation of résumés and for interviews, with counseling and mentoring, and with providing job market information. Currently, these services are dominated by the public sector, and they tend to target the disadvantaged, the long-term unemployed and discouraged workers.
- *Self-employment:* Given the lack of jobs for youth in the formal sector, self-employment could yield tremendous benefits, especially with the high levels of underemployment in the informal sector. This policy includes providing microcredit and start-up loans to young entrepreneurs. The World Bank (2007d) argues that entrepreneurial projects tend to have positive short-term effects on youth employment, even though high dropout rates and business failures are also rampant. For instance, Youth Business International (YBI), a global network of independent nonprofit initiatives based in the United Kingdom, helps young people start and grow their own businesses and thus create employment. YBI members assist underserved young entrepreneurs with a combination of training, access to capital and mentoring. They work in partnership with governments, businesses and multilateral and civil society organizations. In 2008, 90 young entrepreneurs were started in three accredited member countries (Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa) and in two pilot member countries (Ghana and Uganda).¹⁵ The College of Business at the University of Botswana is also in the process of establishing a chapter of YBI.
- *Wage or employment subsidies:* This policy could increase employment opportunities (through an

employer subsidy) or raise the worker's wage (through an employee subsidy).¹⁶ The World Bank (2007d) argues that "wage subsidies have been particularly successful in improving short-term employment outcomes in transition economies, while having mixed outcomes in industrialized economies, but has long-term dynamic effects through improving the permanent employability." South Africa has proposed implementing such a program in 2012 and is currently seeking comments on that policy. A related policy involves improving youths' employability by providing them with skills through general training or more specific vocational training—an example is Kenya's Jua Kali Voucher Programme started in 1997.

- *Ensuring competitive labor markets:* This policy entails the liberalization of factor markets, reducing subsidies on capital import, reducing labor market rigidities and ensuring that hiring and firing are performance based. These actions will help make the mix of inputs for production reflect their relative scarcity. With the relative abundance of labor in Africa, employers will have incentives to adopt labor-intensive production techniques instead of capital-intensive techniques. Combining these actions with paying the members of the labor force the value of their marginal product and giving them the ability to hire and fire unproductive workers could increase youth employment. These are part of structural adjustment reforms, but it appears that African countries have not fully implemented these factor market reforms.

Health Issues

Youth in Africa struggle with poor health conditions, including diseases (e.g., HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis), inadequate nutrition, disabilities, mental illness, unhealthy behavior, violence and substance abuse. Some of these health issues are major causes of mortality. These health problems are complicated by the lack of adequate understanding of their causes, and worsened by inequalities in age and gender.

Furthermore, as suggested by several bodies, an effective way to deal with health issues is to take a holistic approach that considers not only youths' physical and mental well-being but also their social, economic and cultural environment.

Several recommendations have been suggested for dealing with African youth health problems.¹⁷ Policies could seek to change young people's behavior as a way to deal with some health problems, especially HIV/AIDS, and substance abuse.¹⁸ Prevention is also recommended, including the so-called ABC ("Abstain, Be careful, use a Condom") campaign, which requires young people to be active participants in solving the problem. While recognizing that there are limited resources, it would still be worthwhile for governments to provide and improve health programs such as immunizations. Furthermore, it is necessary to increase youths' capacity to make informed decisions about their health through education and access to youth-friendly information and services. Youth education should include appropriate health and lifelong skills through the formal education curricula or after-school programs organized by nonprofit entities. Finally, the development of youth-friendly health services that emphasize coordination among the various ministries responsible for youth—including health- and education-related activities such as nutrition and physical activities/exercises—would be worthwhile.

One area that has received less attention is the vulnerability of African youth to environmental health concerns, which is about all the physical, chemical and biological factors external to a person and all related factors that affect the person's health (WHO 2008). Youths' vulnerability to environmental health comes from several sources, including unsafe drinking water and sanitation, air pollution (both indoor and outdoor), chemical pollution and electronic pollution. Although

these conditions affect the general population because youth tend to be more active and spend more time outdoors engaging in physical activities, they are more vulnerable to environmental health issues. Policies to improve youth health outcomes should include the provision of clean water and sanitation, as well as controlling water and air pollution. In particular, African governments should do a better job of abating pollution, such as that caused by lead from recycling batteries and water and air pollution from the disposal of electric and electronic waste as ordinary household waste. A rapidly increasing source of environment pollution in Africa is the improper disposal of electronic waste. Perhaps African governments may have to do a better job of policing the importing of electronic products at the end of their useful lives—a major source of electronic waste.

Political and Social Issues

In most African countries, the age hierarchy embodied in the culture has meant that there are limited opportunities for youth to express themselves and to meaningfully participate in national social and political discourse. A broad-based participation of the citizenry, including youth, would enhance good governance in addition to improving democracy. There is evidence that a lack of good governance is predictive of the poor economic performance of African countries. At the same time, the governance dimension of "voice and accountability," which is strongly related to political participation, tends to be high for well-performing economies (World Bank 2009). A study by Karikari and Gyimah-Brempong (2011) confirms previous studies that found that the quality of governance improves when countries get richer because these countries then have the resources to pursue good governance, even though they also find that governance has not enhanced economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa. This

trend suggests that strong economic growth is necessary to advance effective political participation by the citizenry, particularly youth.¹⁹

African governments are making efforts to provide for the full participation of youth in the political process through different channels of representation, including the creation of national youth councils, youth parliaments and regional youth advocacy groups. There are also consultations with young people on economic issues that have a disproportionate impact on them, such as unemployment and poverty, as well as on strategies (such as PRSPs and the APRM) for dealing with their problems. The AYR discusses the extent to which youth issues have been made an important part of countries' PRSPs. Participation by youth in the political process is important to addressing the high poverty rate that disproportionately affects them.

However, efforts to encourage effective political participation by youth have generally not been successful, partly because of a lack of meaningful access and integration of youth into the political apparatus of the state, along with youths' and the government's limited capacities, due to inadequate skills and resources. Four main solutions for effectively involving youth in the political process have been recommended.²⁰ First, youth can be provided with the opportunity to participate in politics at all levels, which could even include quotas, as well as encouraged to be politically involved. Second, youth can be provided with the information and training needed to understand key aspects of the government, including the budget process. Third, youth can be provided with the opportunity to witness and learn about the political process at the regional and local levels. This is important because some national policies are based on consensus developed at the regional and local levels, including youth policies. One way to increase involvement by youth would be

to provide relevant internships for them. And fourth, youth can be provided with enhanced social consciousness and political participation with the help of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which have generally been very active and seem to be successful. Collaboration between the government and the NGOs in this area could be beneficial.

African Countries are at Different Stages of Developing and Implementing Youth Policies

There is limited information on the development and implementation of youth policies in Africa. Nonetheless, here we seek to provide anecdotal evidence of efforts by certain countries to develop programs that advance their youth policies, which suggest that African countries are at different stages in this process. The selection of programs is based on several factors, including the availability of information about the program, the program's efforts to develop and implement youth policies, the uniqueness of the program in the African region, and the program's priority area(s).²¹

Ghana: A National Youth Policy Is Finally Launched

In 2009, three years after the African Youth Charter (AYC)—which urged member states to endorse and adopt the charter, and to develop and implement a national policy for youth—it was unclear whether Ghana had a national youth policy in place.²² This was apparent at the youth stakeholders' forum in 2009 organized by two NGOs—the Youth Bridge Foundation and the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development. Ghana officially launched its national youth policy on August 12, 2010, as part of the International Youth Day celebration, a day that the U.N. General Assembly endorsed upon the recommendation of its ministers responsible

for youth. The lack of a national concerted effort to develop a youth policy by Ghana is also reflective of the experiences of several other African countries. Although the key issues affecting youth have been universally identified, including linkages to overall youth welfare, not all countries have ratified the AYC.²³

As in many other African countries, given the large and growing proportion of unemployed youth in Ghana, the lack of attention to their development has long been a concern for all stakeholders. Youth in Ghana make up about a quarter of the population.²⁴ It has been estimated that of about 250,000 young people entering the labor market annually, only 2 percent (5,000) become employed, primarily in the formal sector. The rest are either openly unemployed or underemployed in the informal sector. Thus, the problem of youth unemployment is getting worse over time.

Ghana needs a national youth policy that generates benefits from promoting all the priority areas that affect youth and is consistent with the MDGs. Furthermore, a far-reaching policy will help allay the concerns of several stakeholders who believe that helping youth does not seem to be a top priority of the government. It is noteworthy that Ghana's 2012 budget statement has programs targeting youth. Under its social intervention program, the Ghana School Feeding Programme will be expanded to cover an additional 500,000 students from its current level of 1,040,000. Also, it is projected that the National Youth Employment Programme will recruit about 692,000 people under its 15 modules and projects, which is expected to create 500,000 new jobs during the next four years.²⁵

Ghana has in place various governmental programs (e.g., the National Youth Council, National Service Council and the National Youth Employment Programme) as well as well-organized NGOs (e.g.,

the Youth Bridge Foundation and the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development) that could be useful channels as Ghana seeks to develop and implement an effective national youth policy. However, it does not appear that Ghana has an integrated policy to deal with the problems affecting youth.

The Gambia: A Third National Youth Policy Is Launched for 2009-18

The Gambia has launched its Third National Youth Policy for 2009-18.²⁶ This policy immediately followed the Second National Youth Policy of 1999-2008, which was charged, among other things, to be an advocate for youth development and to create opportunities for youth. The new policy seeks to invest in youth as part of its aim to achieve sustainable economic development by addressing the critical issues they face. The overall objective is to get youth involved in all aspects of national development, and to empower them through their participation and mentoring. The policy seeks to provide a more serious outlook for the development of youth because the Second National Youth Policy of 1999-2008 is believed to have fallen far short of its "key goals of empowering young people to be able to harness their potential for self-fulfillment and responsible citizenship."

The Gambian Ministry of Youth and Sports has traditionally been in charge of youth affairs but in a secondary role to education. Over time, the ministry has been overhauled to deal with the youth population, which was growing very rapidly. The lack of strategic direction hampered the ability of the ministry to deal effectively with the challenges facing youth. In 1973, youth affairs came under the control of the Department of Youth and Sports within the Ministry of Education, Youth, Sports, and Culture. Later, in 2000, the National Youth Council was set up to coordinate youth activities as part of the

Department of Youth and Sports. A major objective of the Third National Youth Policy is to mainstream youth problems, taking into account regional and global developments. In particular, increasing youth employment through education and training, and investments in youth are critical parts of the policy.

Like those in many African countries, Gambian youth face several challenges, including limited opportunities for viable employment, education and training, access to good health care and social services as well as meaningful participation in policy discussions. Youth make up at least 47 percent of the population, with youth unemployment estimated at 22 percent. Furthermore, the majority of youth, who mostly reside in urban areas, are classified as poor, and unemployment among males is higher than females.²⁷ There is a high incidence of drug abuse and criminal activity among youth. Furthermore, it is believed that Gambian youth suffer from the “Babylon” syndrome—that is, the desire to migrate out of Gambia by any means necessary. The prevalence of HIV/AIDS is very high among the cohort of age 16 to 35 years, and the infection rate is higher compared with the older cohorts.

The population and housing census of 2003 indicated that the government has promoted initiatives to achieve universal access to basic education for all school-going ages. These initiatives have included the construction and maintenance of school facilities, the abolition of fees at the lower basic school level (grades 1-6), free education for girls and increased enrollment at the upper basic level (grades 7-9). The gross employment rate increased by 25 percent at the upper basic level and doubled at the secondary level. However, retention and the quality of education and training, and disparities between boys and girls, remain problematic. In addition, vocational or skill centers are not

evenly distributed across the country’s regions, and they are of low quality.

Kenya: Tackling Youth Development through an Agenda for Peace

Kenya attempted to develop a national youth policy when it adopted the National Youth Policy in 2002 “to promote youth participation in community and civic affairs and to ensure that programs are youth-centered and engages the youth.”²⁸ The policy emphasized employment creation, health, education and training, sports and recreation, environment, youth and the media, and youth participation and empowerment, among other objectives. Youth with disabilities, street youth, female youth, youth with HIV, out-of-school youth, and unemployed youth were particularly targeted for special attention. A National Youth Council was to be formed to oversee the implementation of the policy. Events of 2007 and a subsequent study (see below) suggest that this policy was either not implemented or not successful if it was implemented.

A study sponsored by the Nairobi Peace Initiative Africa (NPI-Africa, n.d.), with funding from UNESCO, was charged with providing an understanding of how the challenges facing Kenyan youth could become part of a broader agenda for promoting peace after the 2007 postelection violence. Although the study was based primarily on a very small sample of 180 youths, it provided some insights into the conditions of youth in Kenya and how they could be helped to become part of the process of achieving peace in the country. The study’s findings indicated that achieving political stability and peace in Kenya would mainly depend on addressing the challenges facing youth. The study implored several stakeholders (including the state, private entrepreneurs, civil society organizations, faith-

based organizations and donor agencies) to become active participants in the process.

About 75 percent of Kenya's population is below 30 years of age, which makes it a youthful country.²⁹ Like the youth in almost all African countries, the challenges facing youth in Kenya include unemployment, limited access to high-quality education (especially higher education), health care, training and recreation, and peer pressure.³⁰ Youth also feel marginalized and frustrated, conditions that have been exacerbated by the recent violence, and they are vulnerable to exploitation by political and ethnic leaders. Furthermore, the youth themselves were very much involved in the postelection violence, and many of them became victims of the conflict or internally displaced persons. The study suggested that Kenyan youth are aware of their predicament and regard unemployment to be their most important challenge, followed by poverty and harassment by the authorities, including the police. It is important to note that youth harassment has not conventionally been recognized as a youth challenge in many other countries in Africa.

The government of Kenya has made efforts to address the problems facing youth, but it is believed those efforts have been inadequate and ineffective. The Ministry of State and Youth Affairs was created in 2005, followed by the 2006 Kenya National Youth Policy and the Strategic Plan (2007-12). The NPI-Africa study finds that though the country's youth were aware of the existence of the Ministry for Youth Affairs, most of them believed the ministry had virtually no impact on their lives because it does not focus on their problems. In particular, it is the view of youth that the government's plans and policies could be helpful if they addressed the challenges facing youth on education and employment, involvement in decision-making and extending infrastructure countrywide to reach youth in all areas.

Regarding unemployment, the youth believed that the major causes include inadequate jobs, a lack of technical skills and experience, and job discrimination against them. Furthermore, it is the youths' opinion that in addition to the government, other stakeholders, particularly youth and their parents, can play crucial roles in addressing their challenges, especially in helping those who have a sense of hopelessness about their future and are likely to be attracted to criminal activity.³¹

The youth in the study confirmed what many observers believed—that they participated heavily in the 2007 postelection violence. Although the youth attribute the violence primarily to tribalism, other factors are related to the challenges facing them—flawed elections, land issues and poverty. A major conclusion of the study is that “to build everlasting peace in Kenya, it is critical to address the challenges faced by the Kenyan youth effectively.”

South Africa: Using Employment Subsidies to Enhance Youth Employment

According to the late president of the African National Congress, Oliver Tambo, “a nation that does not take care of its youth has no future, nor does it deserve one.”³² As a result of South Africa's unique history, youth policy has been an integral part of its policy of providing social justice and equitable development. Post-apartheid South Africa has adopted a series of youth policies, including the 2000 National Youth Policy (NYP), the National Youth Development Framework (NYDF) of 2002-07 and the NYP of 2009-14. In addition to these, the South African government passed the National Youth Commission (NYC) Act of 1996 and has established such a commission. The NYP 2009-14 focuses on four areas of intervention—education, health and well-being, economic participation and social cohesion. Youth groups targeted

for special attention include female youth, youth with disabilities, unemployed youth, out-of-school youth, rural youth and at-risk youth. The policy instrument provides specific interventions for each objective with measurable benchmarks. Implementation of the policy will involve the government, private sector and NGOs. NYP 2009-14 calls for the establishment of a youth unit/directorate in every government ministry or department. It also sets up a mechanism to conduct impact assessments of youth programs in South Africa. Given the high rate of youth unemployment in South Africa, the NYP heavily focuses on providing employment for the youth. Here we discuss some of the policies to increase employment for youth.

South Africa's New Growth Path calls for the state to "provide bold, imaginative and effective strategies to create millions of new jobs that South Africans need.... To this end, the outcomes-based approach that has been adopted by government identifies the need to develop a multi-pronged strategy to tackle youth unemployment."³³ South Africa has published a discussion paper for public comment on using employment subsidies as an important part of its youth policies. Although the employment subsidy program has been used in several countries worldwide for quite some time, it is new to Africa.³⁴ A key motivation of this program is the recognition that, whereas the supply of high-quality labor is a critical component of youth unemployment, stimulating the demand for labor is necessary to complement the need for a high-quality education and human capital investment, which generally takes more time and is often very costly. Furthermore, the program would increase the opportunity for the private sector to be involved in labor market policies that have generally concentrated on issues that are under the control of the public sector such as education and direct public employment.

According to the *Quarterly Labour Force Survey*, a publication of Statistics South Africa, in the third quarter of 2010, about 42 percent of South African youth under 30 years of age were unemployed, compared with 17 percent for adults over 30 years of age, implying a ratio of youth to adult unemployment of 2.5. The youth who are unemployed tend to be less skilled and inexperienced. Furthermore, almost 86 percent of youth do not have formal further or tertiary education, and 66 percent have never worked.

The employment subsidy program, which targets young individuals earning below the personal income tax threshold, was planned for implementation on April 1, 2012, through the Pay as You Earn system and will be operated by the South Africa Revenue Service. Individuals can use this program for a maximum period of two years at a maximum value of 12,000 South African rand (R) (approximately \$1,500), which is about 50 percent of the average income of the targeted cohort.³⁵ The program is expected to subsidize a net of 423,000 new jobs at a cost of R5 billion (approximately \$625 million) in tax expenditures during the three-year initial implementation period. There will be detailed quarterly monitoring and reporting during the implementation period to help evaluate the effectiveness of the program.

The targeted employment subsidy program is intended to boost the demand for the young and less skilled individuals who are between 18 and 29 years of age and have little work experience by, among other things, helping to reduce their training costs to employers. The subsidy would increase demand for labor because it decreases the gap between youth productivity and the real wage. Giving youth the opportunity to work would improve their long-term employability because work experience is generally found to be a key determinant of an individual's likelihood of finding a job and keep-

ing it. For instance, in South Africa the evidence shows that unemployed young people with experience are almost three times more likely to find a job than those without experience.³⁷

The proposal provides a balanced account by also discussing why the potential adverse effects of the subsidy would be minimized or less likely to materialize. It is argued that whereas the employment subsidy program could be costly in terms of increasing the deadweight loss (when a subsidy is paid to a currently employed young worker), the potential distortions from substitution effects (when a firm is incentivized to replace unsubsidized older workers with subsidized younger workers) are less likely in South Africa. Regarding the potential for firms to seek younger new hires compared with older ones, it is argued that such a substitution might not be as harmful because it would help to minimize the advantage that older workers have over the young regarding work experience. Furthermore, it is argued that “destructive churning,” whereby current subsidized workers are replaced by newly subsidized workers at the end of each subsidy period, is not likely for several reasons, including the fact that the two-year period gives ample time for the worker to develop the necessary job skills. Moreover, the stigma generally associated with the subsidy is expected to be minimal because the program would be available to young people based on age who meet the earnings threshold, unlike programs that target disadvantaged youth, as in the United States.

Finally, the program proposes a primer for evaluating the success and cost-effectiveness of the program using the measures provided in the World Bank’s 2007 Youth Employment Inventory, a global database on the effectiveness of the intervention and the quality of the intervention, based on a comparison of more than 300 youth employment programs in about 90 countries.

The South African subsidy program is an example of a well-planned youth policy effort targeting the unemployed who lack skills and work experience, albeit at substantial costs to the government.

Several Challenges Confront Those Developing African Youth Policies

Based on the framework(s) for developing youth policies in Africa and the efforts made by several countries in this regard, we have identified several challenges that could have an impact on the development and implementation of effective youth policies.

Assessments of the problems facing youth are complicated by data limitations. The availability of sufficient and reliable data is obviously pertinent to the formulation of effective youth policies. For instance, available data on measured unemployment rates do not take into account the large number of underemployed, especially in rural areas, and migration to urban areas. Also, the extent of unemployment due to skill mismatches is not well known. A mismatch could result from the “educated youth hypothesis,” whereby better-educated youth queue for limited lucrative public sector jobs (Leibbrandt and Mlatsheni 2004), along with a mismatch between acquired skills and vacancies (Boateng 2002, 2004). Another problem is that low labor force participation by women generally tends to bias the reported unemployment rates. Furthermore, knowledge of the causes or types of unemployment (e.g., frictional, structural/wait or cyclical) is important, especially for developing and implementing ALMPs.

Given the scarcity of funds for youth employment programs, the lack of conclusive results on which level of education yields the highest returns to education is a serious limitation. Although an efficient policy would imply allocating resources to educational levels where

the returns are highest, equity would imply targeting the most disadvantaged groups (rural areas, girls, indigenous communities; see World Bank 2005). Also, it is important to note that the targeting of policies to certain groups could be subject to influence by special interest groups, and that the problem of balancing the efficiency and equity of improving access to a high-quality education could be challenging.

Given the importance of having reliable and accurate data for policymaking and the current data limitations vis-à-vis youth, the steps taken by the AU to develop the African Youth Statistical Database are commendable.³⁸ This database is expected to include relevant indicators to measure progress on youth development and empowerment in Africa. The database will further be utilized as the main platform for gathering information from countries in an effort to also develop country profiles of AU member states on youth for comparability analysis.

The effectiveness of programs depends crucially on economic growth and the types of jobs that are created. The outcomes of ALMPs depend on the creation of enough “right” jobs for youth. In this regard, it is important to promote economic growth as well as balance several trade-offs, including job creation in the informal versus formal sectors, urban versus rural areas, and the quantity and quality of jobs (in terms of pay and work conditions). Improving the quality of jobs to meet the requirements of the so-called decency of work would imply improving access to insurance and social protection, developing health and safety standards, encouraging worker representation and freedom of association, and eliminating all forms of discrimination, exploitation and child labor (ILO 2002). These efforts may complicate the policy of creating more jobs for youth, given that the policies are likely to increase the cost of employment for employers.

On the issue of economic growth and job creation, the study by Leautier and Hanson (2012) is informative. They argued that the agricultural sector is suited for playing a crucial role in dealing with Africa’s unemployment problems. The size and rural character of the agricultural sector provides the opportunity for job creation and reduction in unemployment, growth of the agricultural sector. In addition, the sophistication and innovative potential of the agricultural sector, especially agricultural value chains, can attract educated youth.

The Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network (FANRPAN), at its 2011 Regional Food Security Policy Dialogue, focused on “advocating for the active engagement of the youth in the agriculture value chain.”³⁹ According to the head of FANRPAN, Lindiwe Majele Sibanda, youth have a role to play in dealing with the challenge of increasing agricultural productivity and promoting growth in rural areas. It is suggested that these challenges could be overcome through investment in social and economic infrastructure in rural areas, the creation of tailor-made opportunities and economic incentives for young people to engage in agriculture and the rural non-farm economy, and more training for young men and women to build skills in both agro-economy and business. Specifically, FANRPAN has launched the African Youth in Agriculture Policy initiative to engage youth in the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), which includes assisting youth to collect evidence and case studies and contribute to future policymaking.

There is a lack of comprehensive youth policies that are integrated with national development plans and broad macroeconomic policies. There is a general lack of adequate human and financial resources devoted to youth issues, which has resulted

in the so-called Cinderella ministries for youth—ministries that exist but have very little functionality. National youth policies tend to operate on separate tracks: formal education policies and youth policies (see Chingunta 2002). The formal education policy deals with the formal education system and the formal labor market, such as national youth service programs that provide work primarily in the formal sector. Conversely, the youth policy includes different youth initiatives such as training for informal sector jobs and make-work programs.

Perhaps governments should have a comprehensive youth policy on education, health, employment and the political and social engagement of youth in national affairs. For instance, youth in Africa are often not involved in national debates on issues, even on issues that affect them, directly or indirectly. African policies should engage youth in national policy deliberations. In this connection, the “International Institute for Environment and Development Project Young Citizens: Youth Participatory Governance in Africa” is an effort in the right direction.⁴⁰ Perhaps an effective way to harness the energy, passion and talents of youth for development in Africa is to “mainstream” youth policies. This means that government policies, expenditures, strategies and actions will be evaluated for their potential effects on youth. African governments have mainstreamed gender policies, and a similar approach would be appropriate for youth.

The costs of programs and funding sources are not fully known. All programs to develop young

people’s capabilities and opportunities require massive infusions of resources, especially financial and human. Generally, the full costs and the sources of funding of these programs are not completely known. For instance, improving access to education includes making education affordable, which may include abolishing tuition fees, making nontuition costs such as uniforms and meals affordable, and providing female role models (e.g., teachers and administrators) for girls in their educational process. Although these efforts can cost a lot of money, their ultimate costs, both direct and indirect, are typically unknown. Also, the funding for ALMPs, such as public works, is typically mismanaged or not well accounted for. Furthermore, as is typical of government programs, it may be difficult to terminate inefficient programs once started (e.g., Kenya’s 1997 Jua Kali Voucher Programme).

Governments lack the capacity to undertake comprehensive monitoring and evaluative processes. Although it is important to monitor and assess the effectiveness and efficiency of programs, especially the various ALMPs, African governments typically lack the capacity to monitor and evaluate the relevant processes. To date, no reliable assessment has been done for the few existing ALMPs. An effective youth policy should seek to mitigate risks by setting performance measures and benchmarks that can be monitored and reported on regularly—in this regard, the approaches provided in the World Bank’s 2007 Youth Employment Inventory could be useful.

4. POLICIES TO HARNESS YOUTHS' TALENTS TO FOSTER ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Unfortunately, youth policies in Africa have fallen short of the massive challenges facing youth. African youth have responded to these challenges with several coping mechanisms, including withdrawal from the labor market and political processes, emigration (within and outside Africa), and resorting to activities that challenge the existing orthodoxy either through political agitation or by joining rebel groups. Nonetheless, youth are a resource that needs to be developed and harnessed as part of African governments' comprehensive strategies to foster economic growth and development.

Youth unemployment is at the core of the economic challenges facing youth and is also related to health, and political and social isolation. Increasing youth employment would require an acceleration of economic growth, especially because the youth populations are large and growing in several African countries. At the same time, economic growth and development can be enhanced if youth development is an integral part of the development process.⁴¹ Moreover, there are serious economic, social and political costs of neglecting youths' predicament—including underutilized human and social capital, stunted economic growth and development and weakened national security. Therefore, there is a need to pay greater attention to the youth development dimension of economic growth, particularly by enhancing employment opportunities for youth and by enabling their greater participation in the growth process. To effectively address the challenges of youth would require assessing policies as well as the related institutions and strategies.

Given the diverse economic and political environments of African countries, no single approach would be

suitable to promote economic development generally and for youth in particular in all countries. It is therefore appropriate to discuss approaches that could harness the development of youth in most countries. Because an effective youth development strategy needs to be heavily intertwined with economic growth, this study focuses on strategies of youth development that are consistent with economic growth and development that are both pro-employment and pro-youth. Furthermore, there is a need to mainstream youth issues in government actions and policies. We use a framework that reflects these ideas—in particular, we exploit the key strategic challenges of economic growth and development in Africa, as identified by the World Bank (2006): improving the investment climate, expanding infrastructure, harnessing innovation and building institutional quality.

Youth Development: Improving the Investment Climate

A key challenge for youth is unemployment, which means that a solution to youth problems should include increased economic activity and youth employment. An important obstacle to economic growth in African countries is how to improve the investment climate, which involves reducing indirect costs to businesses. Although a high proportion of the costs to businesses include the costs of energy and transportation, there are also the costs of reducing and mitigating risks that are related to youth activity—including crime and political instability. The role of the investment climate in economic growth has received much attention since the World Bank's *Doing Business* annual reports began to be published in 2003.⁴² A key basis of *Doing Business* is that good, transparent and universal rules promote economic activity by avoiding burdensome regulations and promoting competition.

Clearly, crime and political instability adversely affect investments. The destabilizing effects of the violence and political instability in Kenya after the 2007 election are a testament to how crucial it is to maintain stability in the vulnerable economies of Africa. Also, during the 2012 presidential elections in Senegal, the members of a youth movement swore to render the country “ungovernable” if the incumbent president won. Their reasoning was that the incumbent president was violating the two-term limit he had signed into law in 2001.⁴³ Such turmoil would threaten the investment climate with adverse consequences for investment, trade and even aid. So efforts to reduce or redirect the energies of youth into productive activities would be useful. Furthermore, youth are a potential resource that firms could employ directly as inputs into their production process if they have the right education and training and as consumers if they are gainfully employed. More important, youth are more entrepreneurial than their elder cohorts. Improving the investment climate could unleash this entrepreneurial spirit for national development.

Youth Development: The Need to Expand Infrastructure

The huge infrastructure deficit in Africa is well known, even though its extent is not exactly clear. It is estimated that inadequate and expensive infrastructure is retarding growth by 2 percentage points each year. Also, there is the potential to recover an additional \$17 billion a year by improving the efficiency of the existing infrastructure with sensible policies, management and maintenance.⁴⁴ Many countries lack high-quality roads and a steady supply of electricity—conditions that, as indicated above, exacerbate a poor investment climate. It is believed that the infrastructure deficit is partly due to the shift of development emphasis in the 1990s by African governments and development

partners from infrastructure to social programs, and partly to the unreasonable expectation that the embryonic private sector would fill in the gap.⁴⁵ It has been estimated that sub-Saharan Africa needs massive financing of about \$18 billion in infrastructure projects to promote the economic growth necessary to reduce extreme poverty by 50 percent and another \$18 billion per year to achieve its MDGs.⁴⁶ There are obvious challenges in marshalling the needed resources for infrastructure investments. Such challenges include evaluating the suitability and viability of public vis-à-vis private sector financing.

One of the challenges for youth development is the persistent migration from rural to urban areas, which exacerbates the problems of the youth in urban areas because there are not enough jobs and social services to accommodate the massive inflow. To reduce young people’s attraction to urban areas for elusive jobs, the allocation of a sizable proportion of infrastructure development to rural areas would be beneficial for youth development. Of course, this infrastructure expansion should include the building of educational facilities to improve education and training, as well as the provision of health and social services. It is important to recognize that because infrastructure projects in rural areas may not be commercially viable initially because of a lack of sufficient market size, there may be resistance, especially by the private sector in a public–private partnership.

Apart from investing in infrastructure that is pro-youth, several strategies have been suggested to increase the productivity of new as well as existing infrastructure. These include making the development of infrastructure pro-job creating by adopting labor-intensive techniques (when viable), using youth to help collect the necessary information to inventory, manage (e.g., through revenue collection), and maintain the existing

infrastructure, as well as employ them in the construction of new infrastructure.⁴⁷ Also, youth can be trained to be the voice and locus of accountability for the integrity of infrastructure projects as a part of improving regulation.

Youth Development: Harnessing Innovation

Key factors for economic growth are investments that increase skill formation to exploit the world's burgeoning information and communication technology advancements. Obviously, there are second-mover advantages in technology from which African countries could benefit but that would require them to make the necessary investments in information technology. Arguably, investments in youth through education and training would enhance their productivity and improve their competitiveness in the labor market. Moreover, youth are more open to technological developments. Such an investment could promote jobs that are outsourced from developed countries, including telemarketing call-centers.

In recent decades, one of the remarkable features of globalization is the movement of people across national boundaries—international migration. This phenomenon has gathered momentum among African youth in the last two or three decades, with educated African youth seeking their fortunes in OECD countries or in the oil-rich Gulf region. The median age of migrants to OECD countries is about 27 years of age, slightly older than the youth population (however, most youth aspire to migrate for a better life). Indeed, the United Nations calculated that for most West African countries, the proportion of migrant stock under 20 years exceeded 40 percent.⁴⁸ An important characteristic of international migration is its selective nature. Because emigrants from African countries must compete for

jobs in their destination countries, mainly the skilled, adventurous or the most entrepreneurial are likely to emigrate internationally. For example, Clemens and Patterson (2007) calculated that about 50 percent or more of physicians trained in some African countries are working in OECD countries, while the health care systems in their home countries remain in shambles. This robs Africa of its most talented human capital, with serious consequences for development.

Innovation could help overcome the shortages of skilled and trained labor power in African countries because wages in the information and communication technologies are generally more competitive. African countries have struggled to deal with “brain drain”—that is, how to retain the few skilled professionals they produce. Conversely, policies can be put in place to attract skilled professionals living in the diaspora to return home to help train the youth. But this will require committed political will from governments. Africa could take advantage of international trade to create jobs for youth by exploiting its comparative advantage and the development of new technologies. For example, North Africa can produce and export solar energy to Europe.

Some studies have recommended promoting youth development through integrated rural and agricultural policies and investment. The idea is that policies and programs that promote the modernization of agriculture through innovation would help attract youth back to rural areas, which has a predominant share of the labor force in agriculture.⁴⁹ A large number of jobs can be created in the agricultural sector for youth from agricultural value chains.⁵⁰ Although farming may not be attractive to youth, especially educated youth, they could be employed in the storage, processing, packaging, transporting and marketing of agricultural products. Similarly, employment could be created for youth

in the production, storage, marketing and distribution of agricultural inputs, such as fertilizers and irrigation.

Youth Development: Building Institutional Quality

Building institutional capacity involves strengthening the competencies of individuals and organizations, making organizations more effective, and enforcing the rules of the game, which all help to improve the climate for businesses. The strategic actions to build institutional

capacity include “the exercise of voice as an agency of restraint,” including fighting corruption. Moreover, the active involvement of youth in improving governance would create social stability, thereby averting potential social and civil unrest, which has serious consequences not just for the economy but also youth. For example, the active role played by youth in the recent presidential elections in Senegal to safeguard the constitution suggests that youth participation in political discourse could be a positive development that bodes well for institution building in Africa.

5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Several theories, including demographic factors, have been proposed to explain the poor economic performance of African countries compared with other regions of the world.⁵¹ Africa is the youngest continent in the world, with about 70 percent of its population 30 years of age or younger. And with a large proportion of the population now below even 15 years, the youth population in Africa is expected to grow rapidly into the foreseeable future. Unfortunately, the plight of youth has been neglected far too long, but African governments still have the opportunity to utilize this resource or face the consequences of social unrest and stunted economic growth and development.

This study has investigated the role of youth policies in promoting economic prosperity in Africa, as governments seek to address the challenges facing youth, including a lack of access to a high-quality and relevant education, high rates and long durations of unemployment and underemployment, a high incidence of chronic poverty, political disengagement, and health and environmental risks. The study's salient findings and recommendations are as follows.

Improve the quality and scope of data of youth in Africa. One of the major problems for studying youth in Africa and crafting policies for them is the lack of data. As the adage goes, "You can't manage what you can't measure." It is recommended that policymakers gather and store high-quality data on youth in Africa (both in their cross-national and time-series dimensions) to guide research and policy on the youth. As part of this process, it would be useful to have a common definition for the youth cohort and also to include information on gender and rural/urban dimensions. In this regard, the steps taken by the AU to develop an African Youth Statistical Database are commendable.

Integrate youth and economic growth. Even with the limited data, there is enough evidence that youth suffer from high levels of unemployment, underemployment and chronic poverty. Although the lack of a high-quality and relevant education is part of the problem, these problems exist because there are no jobs for youth. Economic growth policies can alleviate these problems by having a pro-youth focus. As we have discussed, policies can integrate youth with the four pillars of economic prosperity—improving the investment climate, expanding infrastructure, harnessing innovation and building institutional quality.

Mainstream youth policies. Problems facing youth are multifaceted. This means that the effects of policies and actions for youth would be more effective if they were mainstreamed. Governments should continuously ask how policies and actions would have an impact on youth. This can be done in conjunction with gender issues, because these two groups have been neglected despite their potential to contribute to the prosperity of African countries.

Develop effective youth policies. Finally, it is important to have youth policies that seek to address the challenges facing youth as discussed in this study. Part of the process is to be able to assess the costs of youth programs and set performance measures with benchmarks that can be monitored and reported regularly. On this account, there should be a process whereby countries can learn from the best practices of other countries, as in Latin America and the Caribbean.

ENDNOTES

1. Different chronological ages are used to define this period of transition because of differences in cultures and purposes; i.e., several African countries define years of adulthood differently, and for different genders in some countries. Different countries have different minimum ages at which a person can independently enter into a marriage; some cultures (e.g., South Africa) even set different ages for boys and girls. Also, for the purposes of migration, most countries set a minimum age of 18 years for an individual to be regarded as an independent migrant. For these reasons, an age-based definition of the youth is arbitrary across African countries.
2. The African Youth Charter defines the youth as persons between the age of 15 and 34 years.
3. Years of schooling is not a good indicator of the human capital accumulated. A better measure for comparison purposes would be returns to education but such data are not readily available for most countries.
4. Migrants are likely to be among the highly skilled workers. It is estimated that more than 50 percent of all doctors trained in Ghana since the 1980s are practicing in OECD countries. It is not uncommon to see university graduates from Africa driving taxi cabs in the United States and the United Kingdom.
5. The African Charter was adopted at the Seventh Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union in Banjul, Gambia, in July 2006.
6. NEPAD is a radically new intervention, spearheaded by African leaders to pursue new priorities and approaches to the political and socioeconomic transformation of Africa. Its objective is to enhance Africa's growth, development and participation in the global economy. In February 2010, the 14th AU Assembly established the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NEPAD Agency) as a technical body of the AU to replace the NEPAD Secretariat. The NEPAD Agency is a key outcome of the integration of NEPAD into the AU.
7. See Table 3.
8. See United Nations (2006).
9. For a partial list, see UNECA (2009, 46).
10. We note, however, that in a recent study by Leautier and Hanson (2012) they found that high economic growth has had differential effects on job creation across countries in Africa.
11. See, for example, Chingunta (2002).
12. The data were calculated from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2009).
13. See Kanyenze, Mhone, and Sparreboom (2000).
14. Examples include a program in Senegal funded by the AfDB and the World Bank in 1989, and programs by Youth Business International (YBI 2008).
15. See YBI (2008).
16. For a detailed discussion of labor market policies used in both developed and developing countries, see Kimenyi (1995), Chapter 8, "Labor Market Policies."
17. See, for example, UNECA (2009).
18. The Advocates for Youth (a nonprofit organization and advocacy group based in Washington dedicated to sex education, the prevention of HIV and of sexually transmitted disease, teenage pregnancy prevention, youth access to condoms and contraception, equality for lesbians and gays, and youth participation) launched a three-year initiative in 2001 called the Youth Leadership in Fighting the Epidemic (YouthLife), which partnered with four youth-led NGOs in three countries severely affected by HIV/AIDS: the Youth Health Organization (YOHO) of Botswana, the Youth Action Rangers of Nigeria (YARN), and the Township AIDS Project (TAP) and the South African Centre for Organisational Development (SACORD) of South Africa.

- Their activities included skills-based training, advocacy program implementation, organizational development and youth participation in policymaking.
19. The potential links between education, income and democracy is what social scientists in the middle of the last century referred to as the “modernization hypothesis.” However, the empirical evidence on education and democracy is unclear.
 20. See, for example, UNECA (2009).
 21. Apart from the cases discussed for the three countries there is limited information on national youth policies of Botswana, adopted in August 1996; Guinea’s policies on youth, culture and sports, declared in April 1993; Malawi’s first youth policy in 1995; Namibia’s first youth policy in 1993; Nigeria’s first youth policy in 1983; and Sierra Leone’s national youth policy in 2003. See “African Youth Policy Update 1,” <http://blog.developmentpartnership.org/?p=4>.
 22. This section is based partly on <http://allafrica.com/stories/200907061784.html>.
 23. To our knowledge, 32 African countries have ratified the AYC, as of April 2012 (see Table 1).
 24. The proportion is based on a youth definition of 18 to 35 years.
 25. See Ghana (2011).
 26. This section is based partly on <http://thepoint.gmafrica/gambia/article/natioanl-youth-policy-2009-2018>.
 27. The youth is defined as those between 13 and 30 years of age, but those falling outside this range could be included in the policy’s programs and activities under special circumstances.
 28. The discussion here is based primarily on NPI-Africa (no date). For the quotation here, see Kenya Ministry of Home Affairs, Heritage, and Sports (2002).
 29. The Kenyan government defines youths as those between 15 and 30 years of age.
 30. See World Bank (2005); Kenya Ministry of State and Youth Affairs (2007).
 31. It has been reported that some parents stop supporting their children financially after they finish the form-four grade level, which is the last stage before entering university. Also, the youth are not granted access to assets, such as land, until they got married; see Mbatia (1987). The other stakeholders include faith-based organizations, community based organizations, NGOs, private sector firms, and banks and other financial institutions.
 32. The discussion here is based primarily on South Africa (2008, 2011).
 33. South Africa (2011, 5).
 34. E.g., Australia had the Special Youth Employment Training Program for 15 to 24 year olds from 1976 to 1985 (see Richardson 1998), and the United States had the “Targeted Jobs Tax Credit” program for disadvantaged youths from 1979 to 1994 (see Katz 1996).
 35. *Wall Street Journal*, February 27, 2012.
 36. South Africa (2011, 34, 36).
 37. See “Monitoring and Reporting on the Implementation of the AU Youth Decade Plan of Action 2009–2018: Peer Review and Stakeholders Technical Consultations on the Conceptual and Practical Framework of an African Youth Empowerment and Development Index,” November 17, 2011. http://africa-youth.org/sites/default/files/DB_Meeting.pdf.
 38. See <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/blogs/climate-conversations/enticing-africas-youth-to-agriculture/>.
 39. See “IIED, Program 64: Young Citizens: Youth Participatory Governance in Africa” (Institute for Development Studies 2011).
 40. The World Bank (2007b) suggests that demographic variables are consistently predictive of the observed difference between growth in the

- Sub-Saharan Africa region and other developing regions.
41. The reports rank countries on their overall “ease of doing business” and analyze reforms to business regulation by analyzing the extent to which countries are strengthening their business environment. The 2012 Doing Business report provides information on the time, steps and cost for a private business to get an electricity connection. For the 2012 report and earlier reports, see <http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2012>.
 43. *Wall Street Journal*, February 27, 2012.
 44. Africa’s infrastructure gap is estimated at more than \$90 billion annually, more than twice the current expenditures, based on the five main economic infrastructure sectors—information and communication technology, irrigation, power, transportation, and water and sanitation; see Briceño-Garmendia (2010).
 45. The 1995 Copenhagen Social Summit was part of the motivation for the shift.
 46. See Wormser (2004).
 47. The Chinese government has employed youth as part of its massive infrastructure project; see Banerjee, Duflo, and Quan (2012).
 48. See United Nations (2011a).
 49. See Leautier and Hanson (2012). See also Kararach, Hanson, and Leautier (2011); Proctor and Lucchesi (2012).
 50. The concept of value chain involves the full range of activities required to bring a product or service from conception, through the different phases of production (involving a combination of physical transformations and the input of various producer services), to delivery to the final consumer and final disposal after use; see Kaplinsky and Morris (2000).
 51. See World Bank (2007b).

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