

# Democracy and Futures

Eds.
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#### **Foreword**

This year the Parliament of Finland celebrated, in a great variety of ways, its 100-year history as an institution founded on equal and universal suffrage. The Committee for the Future decided that its own contribution to this celebration of democracy would be, in a spirit of futures work, to produce this book on the future of democracy.

It is, naturally, difficult or nearly impossible to predict what democracy will look like in several decades' time, but nonetheless collectively pondering what lies ahead is important also in politics. Because the Committee has felt from the beginning that a global examination is a valuable aspect of its work, we decided to ask international authors to contribute to this sounding of the future of democracy. Our most sincere thanks to all of the authors, and especially Professor Jim Dator and Dr. Mika Mannermaa for their expert guidance.

Thanks are due also to the members of the Steering Group, Representatives Kyösti Karjula, Päivi Räsänen, Esko-Juhani Tennilä, Anne Huotari and Jyrki Kasvi, whose advice and evaluations contributed to the work in many ways. A warm thanks to Doctors Paula Tiihonen and Osmo Kuusi and Researcher Ulrica Gabrielsson from the Secretariat.

The publication of the book is timely, coinciding with the nationally and internationally acclaimed Pori Jazz Festival 2006, where the Parliament's Grand Committee (or so-called EU Committee) and the Committee for the Future will be taking part with their own sessions and seminar, getting out to meet the people.

I hope this book will stimulate a lively discussion of the many futures of democracy.

Kalevi Olin

Chair of the Democracy Steering Group Deputy Chair of the Committee for the Future

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### Introduction

#### Mika Mannermaa

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In 2006 and 2007 the Parliament of Finland is celebrating its 100th anniversary under the theme "The right to vote – trust in law. One hundred years of Finnish democracy". In connection to this celebration the Committee for the Future of the Parliament started the project "Futures of democracy". As part of this project the Committee decided to produce an international collection of articles written by distinguished futures researchers. The authors were invited on the basis of their competence in the field of futures studies. The idea was to let professional futures-thinkers to approach the theme of democracy and futures from different cultural, scientific, technological, geographical and other perspectives. New ideas and personal well-argued views were especially welcomed. As it should be self-evident, the views expressed in the following articles are solely those of the authors and do not present in any way the positions of the Committee.

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The concept of *democracy* is a Latin translation of Aristotle's terms *demos* and *kraiten*. *Demos* means an area or humans as a group, and *kraiten* means administration or power. Patrick Love, for example, interprets the present concept of democracy as a product of the Age of Enlightenment. According to him, it is based on Immanuel Kant's concept of *autonomy*, the roots of which are in antique's Greece. Autonomy is a law (nomos) that someone orders herself for herself (Greek. *autos*='self'). Shortly, "governing humans, by humans, for humans". In the place of word *human* the word *people* is often used.

In the future *demos* will probably be something else than it used to be in the past or even what is at the present. Traditionally, *demos* has been connected primarily to *citizenship* or to the *nation* (eg. Finns), which by using autonomous power in a specific territory (Finland as a geographical territory), is practicing *democracy*. Although this idea will probably stay as prevailing for a long time, *demos* in the future will almost certainly be more multivaried than the existing understanding of it.

- 1. In the future, the autonomously acting group of people, *demos*, can be a small *tribe* of an information society, which consists of minorities only, contrary to the industrial society of majorities. The people in a tribe can be joined together by varied factors like profession, lifestyle, culture or hobby.
- 2. These tribes can be partly or entirely *virtual*, and they constitute a multiple systemic unity for example one person can belong to many tribes.
- 3. The tribes will probably require and cherish autonomy, for which new models to practise democracy will be developed: "the democracy of minorities".
- 4. On the other hand it is possible that in the long-range future *demos* can be a bigger group of people than previously; a genuine *European identity*, or even global identity can evolve and produce a new understanding of a *demos*. Furthermore, although the global perspective concerning the idea of *demos* may seem to be politically, culturally and in economic sense difficult to accept, even naïve in the light of the events in the beginning

- of the new Millennium, in the longer run it may become increasingly plausible, if not a necessity.
- 5. This development, too, produces its own *models of democracy*; eg. democratic *European community*, and democratic *global governance*. Global strategic questions the relationships of human systems to the environment, the playrules of global economic and other relations on the globe, etc. need democratic global governance, which in the year 2107 can be as natural as is the Finnish parliament at the moment. It is justifiable to hope that the development to this direction will take place much more rapidly. It would be alarming for the humankind and the globe, if we should have to wait for democratic global governance still more hundred years.
- 6. *Demos* as *small tribes* and as *big supranational communities* are not contradicting trends of the future, but they can co-exist simultaneously adding to each other. The trends of globalisation and localisation may produce the trend of *glocalisation*. As a result of these developments diversity and complexity of societal systems will grow.
- 7. Correspondingly, it is possible to estimate that *communities connected to one physical* place and representing traditional locality, and novel virtual tribes that are independent of place, can, in principle, live in harmony in the future. Novel models of power and governance will exist between and inside of them.
- 8. In the very long-range future it is possible that most human actions, measured by economic indicators, are virtual, and *almost all societal activities and decision-making go over to virtual space*. We will be witnessing more virtual decision-making and politics than traditional face-to-face meetings.
- 9. Although the number of countries applying democratic models of governance, and the number of humans living in those countries has grown up till the present, it would be naïve to think that in the future we will be witnessing some kind of deterministic triumph of democracy in the world. There are very powerful cultural and societal trends, which are pushing forward other models of governance than democracy.
- 10. Additionally, the models of democracy will face prominent challenges in the traditionally democratic western societies in the future. The main reason for that is the general societal development from industrial nation-states into global information societies. Technological, economic and societal phenomena are more complex than before, and changes are accelerating everywhere. One can even speak of a paradigm shift from the concept of democracy of the industrial age into the one of the information age.

From the point of a futures researcher, the prevailing models of democracy and political culture in the western countries possess many features, which are far from the primary starting-points of future-oriented thinking. The differences – even paradoxes – are described in following table:

Futures thinking	Prevailing (representative) democracy		
Long range; decades or more	Shor range; parliamentary cycle (frequently four years)		
Multisectoral systems thinking	Sectoral "not my job" -thinking		
New modes of thinking and organizing societal activities are born from the conditions of the information society and its followers	Modes of thinking and organizing societal activities (eg. political party structure) comes from the agrarian and industrial eras		
Complex societal reality; difficult to perceive the big picture	Simplifying issues; political temptation to sell easy solutions to the citizens		
Perseverance – "sometimes it is necessary to abstain now in order that the better fruits could come later"	Short-sightedness – "we want prizes and satisfactions now"		
Change – accelerating change, unpredictable surprises	Status quo, "stick to your position", predictable trends		
Visions; goals and value discussions producing them	Modern information society has blurred old ideologies, new ones are still unborn		
Proactivity – "we make the future"; futures analysis of the key factors in the operating environment and our own inspiring visions form a basis for our strategies to take over the future	Opportunism or passivity – "we drift into the future"; inspiring ideological visions of the future of our societies are lacking		

Without determined attempts to develop our ideas and models of democracy the situation is getting even more problematic in the future. For example dependencies between different parts of societies are strengthening all the time, and complexity of the societal systems is constantly growing. It is not enough that every ministry takes care of its own sector only, because events in one sector will have immediate impacts on many other parts of the society. Furthermore, the borders between different parts of the society are often indistinct and changing all the time. Societal, economic, technological and other systems will become evermore complex in the future, and there are less and less simple and easy "everything fixed up at once" solutions. Changes in our societies show no signs of stopping or even slowing down, rather the opposite. Holding on to

old models and status quo positions and privileges will be working worse and is irresponsible from the point of view of the whole society in the future.

Without futures-oriented discussion on values, goals and visions it is not possible to "take over" the future. At the moment we have too little such kind of goal-rational societal discourse eg. in Europe. Instead of discussing desirable visions of the future we produce a lot of instrumentally rational talk on means, like on competitiveness of the European Union. Real futures thinking, however, requires that in order to be able to effectively discuss means (competition) you need to clarify your goals.

One could state that the western democracies are suffering from a certain chronic short-sightedness. On the other hand one has to remember that it may be even more so in some other cultures.

This needs not to be the case in the future. We should obviously develop the ideas, models, technologies and practises of democracy in such a way that democratic decision-making would be more future-oriented and more capable to govern rapid change phenomena in societal reality in the future than it is nowadays.

In the articles of this book there are several attempts to promote democracy in different ways. What is common to all of them is that they are written not only by futures researchers but by people, who are true democrats. They seem to think that despite of all of its deficiencies and problems, democracy is by far the most desirable system of societal governance invented by human being so far. What is, however, needed is critical and open discussion on democracy and futures. In this discussion there should be no forbidden questions or other taboos.

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According to *Alexander Ageev* (Russia) unsatisfactory knowledge of historical trends predetermines confusion of politicians, experts and businessmen in the face of the future. Together with the seriousness of the challenges facing modern Russia and the entire world, all this results in high strategic vulnerability of major decisions being made nowadays in Russia and the world community. In his article Ageev describes the results of a multifactorial analysis, which he has made with his colleagues. It allowed them to find out rather distinct rhythms in occurrence, actualization and change of series of development strategic problems of Russia. They are expressed in dynamics of such major societal subsystems as economy, science and culture, positioning in the world, political systems, etc. Reconstruction of picture of the past through the prism of long-term fluctuations of the strategic problems that need solutions by means of the internal and foreign strategies, writes Ageev, provides us with the very important information about the system's capabilities, including opportunities to develop democracy. In turn, it also allows to make some assessments about the future scenarios for all components of the societal system.

When analysing mutual relations and interferences of strategic factors, their relevance and completeness, Ageev et al found nine most significant independent factors of dynamics of state development. They are government, territory, natural resources, population, economy, culture and religion, science and education, army (armed forces) and foreign policy (geopolitical environment). According to Ageev dynamic structure of all previous cycles of strategic evolution of Russia gives the opportunity to make general assumptions for the future. As a whole, we may expect that by years 2015-20 the internal life in Russia will stabilize, quite stable relations with neighbor countries will be formed, and Russia in 2020-2040 will pass through technological

revolution determined by changes in societal life requirements. The development of state and society will be more probably democratic, writes Ageev.

The title of Walter Truett Anderson's (USA) article is Global Citizenship and the New Cosmopolitans. According to Anderson, in the globalizing, hyper-connected postmodern world, the ancient concept of the global citizen – the cosmopolitan – is taking on new meaning and vitality. This trend has many dimensions: psychological, cultural, ethical, political and legal. The key psychological issue in relation to politics and governance is identity, and thinking on this subject is changing rapidly, challenging the modern era's equation of psychological health with stable identity and exploring the experience of people who learn to partake of many realities, play a variety of roles, change many times in the course of their lives. A new spirit is evident also in the intermingling of cultural forms, and in cosmopolitan writings which celebrate mixture, mélange, contamination instead of purity. The ethical discourse points out the racism and ethnocentrism which are inherent in so many traditional ethnic and national identities, and seeks to define an ethic of self-choice and self-definition. These transformations relate to "post-Westphalian" concepts of national sovereignty and separateness, and to an image of a global order which is neither state-centric nor world-centric, but multicentric. Anderson refers to Vaclav Havel as one of many scholars, activists and political leaders who are searching for a workable vision of a post-Westphalian world order: one explicitly *not* based on the assumption that the world is now, will be in the future, and should be, neatly divided up into a map of distinct nation-states, their boundaries as impermeable as their leaders choose them to be, their governments' sovereign authority within those boundaries undiluted by outside actors. The global system of human rights is seen as an emerging body of "cosmopolitan law" which makes global citizenship a reality, albeit a limited one.

In conclusion, Anderson speaks of a world of open systems. The near-term future is of tension between cosmopolitan urges toward multicultural democracy and tribalism in its various forms. The cosmopolitan thrust which is so evident in cultural intermingling suggests that the movement over time will be toward Havel's vision of nations as less "cultlike entities charged with emotion" – which Anderson takes to mean less driven by the passions of nationalism and the yearning for cultural homogeneity, and more likely to grant full rights of citizenship to diverse peoples.

Clem Bezold (USA) revisits anticipatory democracy in his article. The original use of the term was by Alvin Toffler, as his prescription for "future shock", in his book by that title in the early 1970s. Bezold himself edited a book called Anticipatory Democracy. People in the Politics of the Future already in 1970, which is a major catalogue of activities in the 1970s. In his article Bezold reflects on some of the key sections of that book and also revisits anticipatory democracy in light of a global scan of cyber democracy that he and his colleagues at the Institute for Alternative Futures conducted in 2000 and 2001, as well as current developments "transforming governments" at the state level in the U.S.

According to Bezold anticipatory democracy involves a wide range of developments in futures and foresight, as well as in participation in government, particularly participation by the public. The global scan of developments in "Cyber Democracy" identified some trends, that support similar to the conclusions in the 1970s, particularly how communications and internet enhancements to voting, other public participation, and to what government does. In his reviews dealing with the futures commissions at present, Bezold states that they form a core part of anticipatory democracy considered already in 1978. These reviews focus on activities in U.S. states and communities generally including futures commissions in state court systems.

Bezold concludes that anticipatory democracy is a collection of trends and is an aspiration in itself – genuine, enlightened participation with foresight. Its tools and applications grow and recede, in this case like a slowly rising tide. There are enormous challenges we face – from nature, our social and economic systems, and our fellow men. Our ability to anticipate specific events remains challenged, but our capacity to use futures tools to better understand the range of possibilities we face and to better choose and create the future we want are improving. The information and cyber revolutions will likewise enhance our learning and opportunities for participation even while threatening our privacy and security. Anticipatory democracy remains a needed advance for nations and for global governance, writes Bezold.

**Riccardo Cinquegrani** (Italy) analyses different aspects of the concept of democracy within the context of the European Union. His article deals with the need to face changes and to understand the level of complexities which are related to this process. Several questions are taken up: How many years will be required to understand and possibly to manage the connection between all the new and different social, economic and political positions inside the EU? Is it possible to consider the EU's "institutional architecture" as a model for new forms of governance? What are the concrete questions of democracy within Europe? What are the characteristics of the non-existent European people? What is the role of technology in this atypical form of democracy?

Referring to Amanda Sloat Cinquegrani states that many of the most important changes in modern society are currently taking place through mechanisms beyond the scope of parliamentary purview. One of the causes of this change is related to the "scientification of politics", particularly to the use of expertise. In the politics of knowledge and technology, scientific and technical experts advise policy-makers. However, experts do not speak with a single voice or authority. As a result, effective monitoring, deliberation and decision-making about many, if not most, policy areas today are far beyond the capacity of a typical parliament. "The sovereignty of experts complements as well as competes with parliamentary sovereignty". If the "use of experts" is possible and already needed and requested in technical, fiscal or environmental matters, why should it be different for decisions closely related to the future? According to Cinquegrani parliaments need to consider and prepare for future developments. Tools of pro-active analysis and deliberation would be useful, such as scenario analysis and impact assessment. Parliament could then assume the role of *Meta sovereign*, defining and enforcing general standards of governance.

Cinquegrani argues that we are witnessing "a change of paradigm": in modern democracy the focus is on values, rules, parliamentary representation and structured forms of power (political parties, trade unions, media), in *future* democracies the attention shifts to the available *resources*, the way in which they are mixed and their *alchemical effect*. Practical examples of the meaning of *resources for future democracies* are concepts such as research, social knowledge management, and participation. According to Cinquegrani our political structure is struggling against what is changing and we are losing the challenges of today, the current forms of western democracy do not preserve the needs of future generations and this implies that we are running away from the model of development we would like to follow. The use of futures studies methodologies and the ability to think, participate and act locally could represent a new approach towards a development of new forms of democracy.

*Jim Dator* (USA) states that the United States is not a democracy, has never been a democracy, was not created to be a democracy, and will not become a democracy without substantial changes in the structure of government and the understanding and will of the American people. On the one hand, says Dator, this is an utterly commonplace and banal statement. The fact that the US is not a democracy and that the founding fathers who wrote the US Constitution had no intention of establishing one has been well known and widely discussed for many years. This is

also a startling and liberating statement that should enable Americans and all others to strive towards creating a form of government that does not yet exist anywhere as fully as it can and should.

Dator gives the concept of democracy a very specific meaning: *Democracy is a form and process of governance that allows each person affected by the actions of an entity, a continuous and equal opportunity to influence actions of that entity*. Given this definition, Dator states that not only is the US government not "democratic" but neither is the government of any other country, though some countries tend towards it more than others – such as the governments of Scandinavia and Holland.

The implications of this idea of democracy, according to Dator, include extending the term democracy to more than just formal government. In order for a polity to be democratic, democracy must extend to all forms and processes that influence people, first and foremost, economic structures, most of which are profoundly authoritarian and undemocratic. Similarly – and perhaps actually more importantly – democracy should inform the decision-making processes of the family and of religious groups, both of which are also generally patriarchal and authoritarian.

Even though Dator don't expect America to become a democracy soon, he considers it possible in the longer run: "While conventional political science in the US utterly ignores issues of new governance invention, design, and experimentation, ordinary people in the US and everywhere else (by their participation on the internet, in electronic games, and in various face-to-face activities in their local communities and worldwide) are in fact learning how to create postmodern forms of governance that can be translated to the public sphere when the time is ripe. And, one day, the time will finally be ripe, first somewhere, and then everywhere. As the world becomes truly democratic, so will America."

In his conclusion Dator also presents his fascinating and thought-provoking idea of the rights of robots in future democracies. He notes that most people would consider it an absurd concern – just as most people used to consider it utterly ridiculous to contemplate giving political rights to poor people, or black people, or to women who, while pleasant creatures, were considered to be just too flighty to be trusted with the vote. But now, more and more machines are thinking for us all, while many of them are also learning to emote and empathize with us as well. So true democracy may emerge not when machines learn to do all the work for us, writes Dator, but when they also do all the essential thinking for us.

Jerome C. Glenn (USA) deals with some of the biggest global threats to the future of democracy, ie. organized crime, information warfare, environmental and economic migrations, and the SIMAD (single individual being massively destructive) phenomenon. He states that the annual income of organized crime has grown beyond that of all military budgets combined, giving it even the ability to buy and sell government decisions. Information warfare means manipulating information flows used by the opponent so that decisions are made in the interest of the attacker, without the opponent sensing the attack. The climate change being a big global threat in the future the environmental problems as a whole will become evermore severe issues, and eg. with water tables falling on all continents and 40% of humanity being dependent on water sheds controlled by two or more countries, conflicts and migrations seem inevitable. The prospects for the poorest one billion people may not improve fast enough to prevent the acceleration of their migrations to richer areas. The combined environmentally and economically induced migrations could overwhelm many governance systems. SIMAD means that with the continued miniaturization of everything from chemistry sets and pharmaceutical manufacturing to genetic and

nanotech engineering, it may be possible for an individual, acting alone, to make and deploy a weapon of mass destruction.

Glenn states that these global threats are not being addressed seriously enough today to ensure the future of democracy not to mention the potential synergies among these threats. Glenn concludes that "it is a gargantuan task to collect and organize the countermeasures to each of these threats, and conduct feasibility studies of their potential effectiveness, but the sooner it begins the better for democracy and the prospects for civilization."

In her article *Beyond dreaming of democracy*... *Fabienne Goux-Baudiment* (France) states that from the original Greek model democracy has grown up carried by a continuous enlargement of the demos and a fight for more justice and equality. The invention of the modern State, and of the Nation which supports it, has led to a new step in its evolution. Based, during the last two centuries, on the idea of the human progress and the fear of totalitarism, democracy occurs today as the indisputable best political regime. According to Goux-Baudiment there are challenges ahead, such as the nature of the next generations, the increasing demand for another world, the consequences of globalisation and the development of the noosphere, which are jeopardising democracy. We should be asking, whether we are sure that democracy is still the best model to face the XXI<sup>st</sup> century, writes Goux-Baudiment.

In her article Goux-Baudiment describes the development from Antiquity to the modern world, like development of the idea of progress, the situation, where we are at the moment, and dreams of the future, possible "beyond democrary". In concluding she says that two forces of change seem now to be facing themselves. First, the traditional world built on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries values: accumulation of wealth, wild consumption, lack of distance in relation with events, etc. Second, the next world: looking for meaning rather than wealth, sustainable consumption, global concern for human development, critical mind and world public opinion. This paradigm shift follows the model of adolescence: a teenager is torn apart by contradictory forces, one which push him to stay a child, protected and irresponsible, and the other one pulling him towards adulthood and all its consequences. Growing up, according to Goux-Baudiment, always produces violence, whatever encapsulated or wildly expressed; this violence can be seen today everywhere in the world, from a form of dull violence, ordinary, durable, that undermines the everyday life, to the incredible savagery of ethnic massacres... She stresses that we don't need just to look at it and long for maturity to come. We can act, too, as if we are responsible of our own future, by supporting, accompanying, educating this rebellious child on the way to a tame freedom, to a highest humanity, and perhaps a better way to rule it.

Linda Groff (USA) writes that her article is largely a think-piece on the current state of U.S. democracy, challenges to that democracy, decisions on key issues facing U.S. democracy, and various alternative futures for U.S. democracy. Democracy is according to Groff an imperfect type of political system, but it is (in various forms) perhaps the best type of political system that we humans have been able to devise so far. It can at times be chaotic, and take time for public policy decisions to be made, because elected representatives, national leaders in various sectors of society, public opinion, and different interest groups can all seek to play a role in decision-making. At various times, democracies (like any type of political system or like institutions in any area of life) can also face crises in their functioning – due to wars and external or internal threats or other issues which can challenge whether that political system will be able to live up to its own democratic principles in practice.

Groff argues that U.S. democracy is currently in such a crisis over the preservation of some of its own cherished democratic principles for a number of reasons. To understand this, first the found-

ing principles underlying U.S. democracy are explored in the article, then some of the reasons for the current crisis of U.S. democracy are examined, followed by looking at a list of key policy decisions on key issues currently facing U.S. democracy, whose outcomes will collectively determine the future direction of U.S. democracy. The article concludes with two alternative scenarios (worst case and best case) for the future of U.S. democracy, noting that the U.S. is an ongoing experiment in democracy and that the most probable future will probably be somewhere inbetween these two scenarios. Groff states that the world is a complex, ever changing, place. The evolution of U.S. democracy is also a complex, evolving experiment. The two topics are intertwined: both influence each other.

Referring to Winston Churchill's statement – "Americans can always be counted on to do the right thing... after they have exhausted all other possibilities" – Groff sets forth the hope that this time Churchill is right. Nonetheless, U.S. government policies have created many crises and consequences – domestically and internationally – which will have to be addressed, if this is to occur, writes Groff.

In his article *Bernd Hamm* (Germany) explores ways in which democracy must be reformed in order to meet the new requirements posed by globalization, which according to Hamm has not really been in favour of democracy as such but rather helped to undermine and leverage democratic procedures. Hamm argues that the main problem is not how to conceive a blueprint of a global democratically structured government, and define its tasks. The main problem is rather to find out how we could come from here to there. Hamm analyses who or what it is what blocks the road towards global democracy, and why. He also takes up some new developments, which possibly allow to open a new window of opportunity and emphasizes, how the European governments will have an especially important part to play there, together with civil society.

Hamm gives several criteria for the idea of democracy, such as everybody affected by a decision ought to have a chance to take part in it, the majority decides but also protects the legitimate rights and interests of minorities, tolerance and non-violence are fundamental principles of all social relations, government will be determined in general, free, equal and secret elections, and can be changed, and all citizens are free to convene and to organize without any control by government.

According Hamm democracy is not a static paradise, achieved once and for ever, but rather a never-ending social process. It needs permanent rethinking, commitment and active involvement from all citizens to safeguard its virtues.

Hamm stresses the active role of citizens in promoting democracy: "Against the stage set of the neoconservative great game, we the people usually feel helpless and victimized. However, there are chances for concrete action. They might be described within the three broad concepts of localization, self-organization, and saving natural resources. We need not continue to submit ourselves to the dictate of transnational corporations, their offerings and their temptations but should rather strengthen local and regional autonomy. The weakness of the nation-state might turn out to be the opportunity for civil society to self-organize and develop ideas, projects, infrastructures, and tools. In all these, we should not forget the global imperative of safeguarding the natural life support system. Of course, there are thousands of small scale projects all around our societies, productive, democratic and imaginative answers to the disastrous world situation. More and more people should be encouraged to join these forces and build a real market and cooperative economy from below in a democratic setting."

Sohail Inayatullah (Pakistan-USA-Australia) asks whether democracy is breaking down, being challenged fundamentally. Is this breakdown leading to its deepening, broadening and transformation? Inayatullah explores foundational challenges to democracy. First, to the challenge of security, four scenarios are developed: the global empire-state; global one person-one vote; global institutional democracy; and regional democracy. Second, the challenges to the local are developed – both to the local councilor in the West and the local mullah in Islamic regions. Third, the inner dimensions of democracy are explored as an attempt to answer the question: is it possible to have public democracy if the many selves that constitute us are controlled by an authoritarian ego? Fourth, the challenge to traditional forms of leadership and organization are explored, particularly the possibility of a facilitative leader guiding a learning and healing organization.

In his conclusions Inayatullah stresses that deeper democracy means challenging the insideoutside division of the nation-state vis-à-vis international relations and governance, and thereby
moving ideally to a world governance structure. It also means working with local representatives
to help them find a purpose in the newly emerging governance system and culture. Furthermore,
the futures of democracy relate to archetypal futures – whether eating up nature (continued
growth), living with nature (back to the past), collapsing or somehow transforming. Transformation appears as desirable to Inayatullah, to be the hoped for future, given the cascading of world
crisis – the planetary challenge. This transformation, however, is not just external but internal,
too. If we are to create deeper democratic futures, then we need to map our multiple selves, and
analyze how we project outwards as persons and as civilizations. Finally, Inayatullah writes that
to create different democratic futures, new types of leadership and organizations are required –
ones that are organic facilitative and that are learning and healing oriented.

Eleonora Masini (Italy) writes on women's contribution to the future of democracy. She recognizes that the right to vote is very important but it is not enough. Women's achievements in different areas, like economic, political and academic fields in some of the not so well-known countries, is discussed. Masini emphasizes the notion that women in general are social actors and not only victims and as such are building alternative societies and ways to democracy. This should be recognized and supported also by the women who have already gained success. The point that women have some specific capacities to live in a changing society and to develop change is made and supported by examples stemming from empirical research in different parts of the world. Masini gives examples of women's movements around the world. The concluding point of Masini is that women are able to have visions, as their way of thinking and acting is geared to the future. Women's role in the future of democracy is to be found not only in women who have reached success in various areas, which shows women's great capabilities, but also in small enterprises, solidarity or social groups, which should be seen as "weak signals" with a strong potential for social change. However, for signals to become visible, women have to become visible first to themselves as well as to others involved in similar activities.

We can say that women have and need to keep their capacities to build alternative societies, based, as they often are, on democratic behaviour in different contexts. These are, according to Masini, the indications for women to contribute to the future of democracy in their countries as well as at the world level.

**Peter Mettler** (Germany) emphasizes that envisioning the future of democracy is difficult because both citizens and societies are changing extremely rapidly already today, and they will change even more rapidly in the future. Mettler starts by noting that his view may be Western, and from that viewpoint he lists world problems as he sees them at the moment: Poverty and underdevelopment co-exist with excessive and even rapidly growing wealth and lavishness, profits of so far unknown dimensions, blind market fetishism (economic neo-liberalism), criminality in general and economic criminality in particular, decay of virtues, ecological catastrophes and climate changes, terrorism, crypto-religiosity, aimlessness as well as missionlessness of the western wealth-society, etc.

Mettler discusses the concept of democracy stating that democracy as an idea historically came into being as an anti-idea: against clergy, feudalism, military and party regimes or against totalitarian ideologies. According to him the historical as well as the present nation state is "abstract" in the sense that the average citizen can't grasp most of its logic, e.g. in economic or financial matters, in science and technology or in foreign affairs. Today's democracy, potential future versions or forms of today's democracy as well as future new variations face the many challenges mentioned, above all those of the globalised economy as well as those of the globalization of almost all other spheres of life. – Democracy was regarded as the very best form of politics and yet and at the same time, it was and is heavily loaded with severe deficits. That's why democracy is more uncertain than ever or why future structures will most likely be completely different. Or even: the chances for survival of today's versions of democracy are decreasing since the basic facts, on which they once were built, do not exist any more, writes Mettler.

He discusses the possibilities of global democracy and presents one model based on developing the structures of the UN. In his postscript Mettler cites Jeremy Rifkin's analysis of the EU as a much more promising model for solving (world) problems, which starts from the fact that the EU stands for peaceful conflict-regulation, that she tries harder than most others to reduce environmental damages and that general human well-being is ranking higher within her realm than the profit of the few.

*Takuya Murata* (Japan) writes on the future of democracy in India and China, which are the major developing powers at the moment. According to Murata through their soft power India and China may provide inspiration and images of the future for the developing world. They also have compatibility, due to shared problems with other developing countries. Murata explores the possibilities and distinguishing features for each country: India as a diverse, post-colonial representative government, and China as a leading candidate to step into a new political future beyond representative government. Murata discusses the meaning of the use of electronic voting machines in India. In order to reduce the huge operating cost, in 2004, India conducted the world's first national electronic vote, using 1,075,000 EVMs, each of which can record up to 3,840 votes. The experiment was a success. India is also developing the idea of e-courts.

According to Murata India and China are most likely to inspire government in the developing world because their design innovations are solutions to problems shared in the developing, post-colonial world of emerging democracies. India seems to most likely continue with its model of liberal, representative democracy. Trends point towards innovation in areas of governance related to diverse and large societies with innumerable ethnic, racial, religious, and language identities. On the other hand, Murata believes that China has the possibility of leapfrogging into a new political future due to combination of popular will towards participation and the lack of a liberal, representative government.

Whither democracy? asks *Ruben Nelson* (Canada) in his article. According to him democracy is doing well from many perspectives. When an increasing number of countries elect their governments by universal suffrage and so many pundits exude confidence, what could possibly go wrong? This question is explored in the article especially from the perspective of the following basic rule: "Context is King – the historical conditions set the rules."

Section I of the article asks, "Will democracies as we now know them be able to adapt to the fundamental changes which the 21<sup>st</sup> Century will bring?" Nelson's "reluctant conclusion", as he puts it, is that they will not. In section II Nelson, however, offers the hope that a fresh understanding of democracy as a developmental human project can create a new path forward.

Relative to our stage of development as human beings and whole cultures, the evidence is growing that the 21<sup>st</sup> Century will be more demanding of us than any in history. Nelson notes that while it is not widely understood, we are already 200 years into the work of transforming and moving beyond Industrial consciousness and culture. A new sensibility can be seen in dozens of places, including the philosophy of science, post-Newtonian science, modern liberation struggles, hermeneutics, humanistic psychology, literary criticism and intimate human relations. Tens of millions of people are according to Nelson already struggling out of their inherited world-views and committing themselves to the journey of living as co-creators of their own bodies, lives, families, communities and cultures.

Nelson suggests that in order to sustain hope, the *Creating Tomorrow Foundation Challenge* must be embraced – by 2020 at least one country – eg. Canada or Finland – must openly, knowingly and responsibly have committed to the journey of becoming more deeply democratic; and this commitment will be seen as a major dimension of being the pathfinder of the future.

In their article *Erzsébet Nováky* and *István Kappéter* (Hungary) describe the societal history of Central-Eastern European countries and the birth and development of futures studies in those countries. According to Kappéter-Nováki in the 20<sup>th</sup> century the key-problem of the democratic development was the equal participation of women and men. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century the main tasks of democracy are the increase of collaborated participation of laymen as well as specialists and balanced handling of aggression. The Eastern-Central European, especially the Hungarian experience shows that in countries where during national socialist and communist dictatorships the majority lost civil moral, the opportunity to reorganize parliamentarian democracy is not enough. New methods are needed to rebuild democracy.

In their conclusions Kappéter-Nováki point out that after 1990 "we live in democracies, but most of us are disappointed." The destroyed civic moral inhibits the beneficial usage of parliamentarian democracy. Due to participativity, on the other hand, the future shaping became more democratic and more useful forecasts can be made.

In the course of finding new ways, write Kappéter-Nováki, the experience of futurists and psychiatrists can be utilized. Futurists can help to increase the future orientation of laymen and can ensure the prevalence of democratic principles by developing and using participatory methods in the outlining and creating future alternatives. By applying methods elaborated by psychiatrists in caring for "difficult persons" futurists can contribute to the human and effective handling of aggression present in our society.

In their article *Yongseok Seo* and *Youngsook Park Harmsen* (Korea) take up the notion of "Asian Values Democracy", which has been paid much attention to by numerous intellectuals as a contesting image of futures as well as an alternative to Western liberal democracy. According to Seo - Park Harmsen the Asian values democracy debates, however, heavily rely on the theory of cultural autonomy. As a result, it exposes its limit to illustrate contemporary Asian political systems and their futures. On the theoretical level, the premise of Seo - Park Harmsen is that culture is not a static substance; rather it is always subject to change through cultural exchanges and especially by technological developments. On the case level, they explore how the new development of technologies and their diffusion affect values change, particularly, the democratic values of the younger generation in Korea. Based upon the analysis of Korean age-cohorts with their new social and political experiments, Seo - Park Harmsen envision four alternative futures of Korean democracy: Representative Democracy, Disciplined Democracy, Return of the Autocracy and Recreational Democracy.

The age-cohort analysis in Korea revealed that the younger cohorts differ greatly from the older cohorts in terms of beliefs, values and norms. Korean cohorts from the younger spectrum lean toward political progressiveness and cultural liberalism, while the older cohorts are more politically conservative. Now cherishing individual freedom and diversity are becoming important values for young Korean people. The Korean youth question the core Asian values of conformity, authority, stability, solidarity and are easily suspicious of collectivism.

Seo - Park Harmsen also found that technological development plays a crucial role in these value changes. In particular, the emerging Generation C in Korea is highly likely to bring about a quite different landscape in Korea's future. Generation C is more accustomed to images and sounds than texts, and began to communicate with each other by using all five senses. It is uncertain what kind of impact they will bring on the future of political systems and democracy, but it is certain that the world will be very different from today when they enter into politics in the next two or three decades. Seo - Park Harmsen write that Korea is now transforming from the information society to the Dream Society, and they ask whether the Korean experience can become a future model of Asian democracy.

In her article *Paula Tiihonen* (Finland) uses the metaphor of democracy being like institutional gardening, in which one hundred years is a short time. She makes a remark that there are countless theoretical definitions of democracy and just as many practical applications, because people's participation in collective decision making can be implemented on so many levels and in so many functions. It can be practised in the family, in people's small immediate community, in local government, regional administration, the state, on a broad regional level and even in international organisations. Tiihonen presents thirteen theses on the futures of democracy, among them the following: *Democracy demands time and care, The ability to read and write is a precondition for democracy, Democracy does not work in artificial states, Democracy must be globalised and globalisation democratised, Whole continents can reject democracy on the national or global level, Income differences gnaw at democracy from within and The question of destiny for European democracy begins with the demographic structure and concerns sharing.* 

When writing about globalization and democracy Tiihonen states that although the world can be governed without democracy, a good economy and good governance presuppose responsible and accountable institutions. That, in turn, demands democratic control. In the final analysis, what is involved is trust between the rulers and the ruled. There are three possible actors in global democracy: states, which represent their enfranchised citizens, political entities which have themselves organised their own activities and are part of a worldwide civil society and the people, i.e.

the assumed world citizens. According to Tiihonen politics made an irreversible transition from an era of national politics to a post-national stage in the late 1990s. Opening up the borders of national markets and creating global markets presuppose a globalisation of politics. What is essential is to build a set of global ethics, in which people are conscious of belonging to a common humankind, in which they share a common destiny. In a hierarchical and unequal world, responsibility resides especially with those who lead the biggest and richest states and companies or with those who have the best knowledge-based opportunities to lead. However, that is not enough. Global ethics applies also to ordinary people in rich countries.

Tiihonen states that a major challenge facing the future of European democracy is intertwined with its demographic development and how its economic prosperity develops relative to the regions surrounding Europe. The scenario for the development of Europe's demographic structure is clear. If the present demographic forecasts prove accurate and the European Union does not open its borders to migration, Europe will lose its power of renewal. The problem of a downward spiralling in standards of living can be solved in three ways: 1) by increasing the birth rate and restoring natural reproduction to its former level, 2) by opening borders to immigrants or 3) by doing both.

In concluding, Tiihonen writes that what is ultimately involved in democracy is people's opportunity to influence their own lives. They must be able not only to influence the formation of their own country's government, but also to participate directly in some of the regional and global processes that affect their lives. All of this presupposes, in addition to the basic institutions of democracy, also personal autonomy.

# The Past, Current and Future Strategic Challenges and Democracy in Russia

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#### **Abstrac**

Unsatisfactory knowledge of historical trends predetermines confusion of politicians, experts and businessmen in the face of the future. Together with the seriousness of the challenges facing modern Russia and the entire world, all this results in high strategic vulnerability of major decisions being made nowadays in Russia and the world community.

The multifactorial analysis made by us allowed to find out rather distinct rhythms in occurrence, actualization and change of series of development strategic problems of Russia. They are expressed in dynamics of such major society subsystems as its economy, science and culture, positioning in the world, political systems, etc. Reconstruction of picture of the past through the prism of long-term fluctuations of the strategic problems that need solution by means of the internal and foreign strategies, provides us with the very important information about the system's capabilities, including opportunities to develop democracy. In turn, it also allows to make some assessments about the future scenarios for all components of the social system.

#### 1. Ecclesiast's Argument

Unsatisfactory knowledge of historical trends predetermines confusion or conceit of politicians, experts and businessmen in the face of the future. Together with the seriousness of the challenges facing modern Russia and the entire world, all this results in high strategic vulnerability of major decisions being made nowadays in Russia and the world community. The explanations of many failures or fluctuations in development of democratic institutes by means of known arguments such as bad historical heritage, lack of political will or propensity to autoritarism, other barriers turned out to be unconvincing. In all these cases deeper reasons took place. Interpretation of these reasons, factors, interrelations led step by step to well-known Ecclesiast's experience — «everything in its own time».

The theories of "life cycle", the different long waves are well-known, but in our case it was a question of something more complex than a cycle of major industrial systems or Kondratieff's conjuncture cycles. This "something" is unobviously connected with influence of forces regarding to which the players visible to us and their coalitions look like fragile constructions of Florida State or resorts of Thailand during a typhoon. Whirlwinds of an epoch, a kind of Hollywood "the day after tomorrow", "fatal minutes" operate more powerfully than conjuncture cycles.

The logic of the scenarios analysis of the future for a whole century forward with its inevitable selection by different bases should make us sooner or later to address to the past, proceeding from necessity to reveal the key parameters of «dependence on the way chosen in the past». Further, it is difficult to stop: first, going back for decades, then for centuries, to reach after all sources of the Russian civilization at least in I century A.D. The result of such observation appeared rather intrigu-

ing: during the centuries-old Russian history amazing repeatability of strategic challenges that faced the country and its ruling elites as well the institute of democracy was found out. The knowledge of this repeatability, that is rhythmics of occurrence, aggravation and attenuation of the set of strategic problems of the country is regarded crucial for comprehension of the applied questions concerning its technological basis, life style, social control etc.

Russian state and society during all its history finds out cyclic fluctuations of its integral power (see figure 1).

From beginning of I century A.D. Russia in its specific historical shapes has gone through almost five large extra long strategic cycles, each 400 years. All such periods include 5 long-term cycles with 80 years lengths. The country has been developing through ups and downs. It's necessary to stress, that in reality the historical dynamics has the very complicated structure and evolution of different components is not synchronized. The country periodically pays the bills of the generations of ruling elites, which fail to manage country effectively, in trend – to nurture the institute of self-organization in society. Periodically the elites become proud by greatness and neglected laborious work on diligent adjustment of the system purposes in conformity with its opportunities and allowing serious deviation from the natural course of events.

### 2. Strategic matrix of Russian history

Gerodot mentioned that tribes in the territory of modern Russia have the life style specified to them by the nature of the country. Today we can treat "nature conditions" with today's is natural-scientific completeness, not being limited with just concepts of landscape and climate. The major break in this respect was made by D.I. Mendeleev, A.L. Chizhevsky, N.D. Kondratyev, V.I. Vernadsky, I. Prigozhin, L.N. Gumilev, etc. In all versions of historical events not only the subjective moments appear, but also the circumstances having fundamental influence traced on significant time periods. First of all, they include territory, climate, population, energy consumption, positioning in the world. Many theories take into account (in the explicit or concealed form) only some of the specified factors.

The systemic approach to the history requires to harmonize historical time, space and the strategies of the basic agents in a single whole. Such combination is necessary to be structured not only by events, but also in system of space-temporal coordinates which may also be described in the language of matrix variables.

The matrix must contain both rather steady and more dynamical variables. It is also important that not only changes of quantitative characteristics of the matrix, but also qualitative leaps in its development take place with the certain periodicity. Definition of the most important variables forming the matrix basis has considerable value. In other terminology it is the question of archetypes of historical behavior. An archetype is a structural principle of the collective unconscious, a priori, before-experienced form of behavior. It represents deep characteristics of social matter and is expressed in behavior of people, their thinking, decisions, attitude to reality, etc.

The next logical step in our reasoning is directed to the strategic matrix (matrix of strategic factors). As strategy is tendency to transform a system in qualitatively new condition according to opportunities or purposes of its subjects, primary value for it is received by variables of the second-order infinitesimal that provide conditions of this transition.

In case of successful transition to a new condition of a social and natural system (that is, a successfully realized strategy) we deal with harmonization or expansion of the system, and in case of failure – with chaosization, simplification, falling into archaics and barbarization. Despite the fluctuations in the strength – weakness of self-organizing institutes there is evident correlation between stage of 80-year cycle and trends to democracy.

Cyclicity of occurrence of certain variables allows to consider history as a series of accomplished steady states in which only separate quantitative variables and qualitative characteristics eventually change. Thus, their such particularly physical characteristic as life cycle length is kept.

If to define this value, it would not be difficult to calculate range of changes, of that historical sluggishness, at which the course of events, obeying «Ecclesiast's imperative», simply "squeezes out" us towards quite a certain future. Having estimated force of such "squeezing", it is possible to understand its direction and to move not forcedly any more, but purposefully, influencing this "squeezing out" force.

Social choice of the system evolution vector is the key problem of strategic management as well as democracy. At the level of practical policy the choice is shown either in revolutionary events, or in some reforms of the previous government mode or in effective external influence on internal policy.

The choice of the direction frequently takes place as guessing of the orientation of evolutionary processes, and only later as an attempt of their reasoning and selection. The problem is that in what degree the realized direction choice will correspond to internal tendencies of the system, what efforts will be required for its passing to the target direction and the target condition and whether the rates and rhythm of the environment will coincide with those of the given system. The history knows a number of attempts to direct violently the evolution of society contrary to natural laws, but any deviation from them was punished by cataclysms expressed differently.

Certainly, the success of the strategy depends not only on validity of strategic decisions, but also on managing, intuition, harmony of motivations of process participants and number of other circumstances. Therefore, studying of particular strategy histories is doubtlessly interesting. In fact, the source of strategic routes of countries and nations can be both discoveries that took place or expected, and motives of struggle for power, religious impulses and requirements, changes of technologies, demand or production opportunities, pressure of competitors, natural accidents. Equally, such sources can be Utopias, illusions, fancies, greed, petty tyranny and voluntarism of leaders. In the latter case deviation from natural society evolution corridor, unreasoned waste of resources take place that can lead to ruining of systems themselves.

For more vivid representation of strategies character realized during centuries, we generated the multifactorial model (enniagram) of the most important objects of strategic decisions. From multitude of the circumstances influencing dynamics of historical process, nine the most important have been chosen. As a matter of fact, there is nothing new in such a set, all historians mention these factors anyhow.

We performed the careful analysis of mutual relations and interferences of all mentioned factors, their relevance and completeness. As a result of such research nine most significant factors of dynamics of state development, they are government, territory, natural resources, population, economy, culture and religion, science and education, army (armed forces), foreign policy (geopolitical environment) are chosen as independent ones (see fig. 2).

The Past, Current and Future Strategic Challenges and Democracy in Russia

Figure 1. Change of integral factor of power of the Russian State




Figure 2. Strategic matrix of historical trends

Revelation of specific values of these factors for the period of Russian history was made on the basis of expert evaluation with method of progressive approximation.

In the enniagram, representing graphic expression of potential and kinetic social energy factors providing development potential and realization are distinguished. Respectively, the first group include territory, natural resources, population, culture and religion; the second group consists of economy, science and education, army and foreign policy. Government, covering scales for analysis the democracy development, is considered as a factor synthesizing all these elements.

Increase or decrease of matrix profile amount is a sigh of orientation of combined vector of evolution either to creation or to destruction of the system. For instance, it is obvious looking at initial and final volume of full matrix of the Russian empire for the period of years 1837-1917 (fig. 3) and the first part of the matrix of the Soviet Union for the period of years 1945-1973 (fig. 4).




Figure 3. Strategic matrix of the Russian empire (1837–1917)




Figure 4. Strategic matrix of the Soviet Union for the period from the end of World War II to "stagnation period" 4-V (1945-1973)

#### 3. Expectations for the current cycle up to 2080

Having finished a full 80-years cycle from 1917 to 1998, Russia nowadays got into a definitely new, though not finally determined state. Its main dynamic feature is coexistence of several destinations of possible evolution, one of which is sure become dominant in several years. These destinations differ by their driving social forces, ways of interconnection with the environment, potential, consequences of development. On the surface of events, it is plurality of destinations, though, in the framework of changes range fixed in its major properties, it appears as active searching of «national idea», hesitation of political preferences, competitive struggle of different sectors and ways of economy, regional differences, languor of foreign policy having no strong framework of distinctly interpreted « vitally important interests», etc.

All the above-listed is the key feature of the all initial phases of long cycles. The time limitation of this phase, some kind of «roaming» in the multitude of evolution models was same typical for the past.

Proceeding from the total length of social and economic cycle of the country development calculated by us (about 80 years) and referring of the beginning of its modern kind to year 1998, we may expect the maximum of development of its social activity approximately in years 2020–2040, and the relaxation phase of this wave of transformation in years 2060–2070. Besides, it is this cycle of the current extra long 400-years wave scaled social, technological, scientific and cultural changes. The historic analogue of the coming rise of social energy is, for instance, period of crisis of Ryurikovichs dynasty and establishment of new dynasty of Romanovs, stabilization of government, strengthening of religious aspect and quite harmonic development of Russia in years 1620–1640.

As a whole, we may expect that by years 2015-20 the internal life in Russia will stabilize, quite stable relations with neighbor countries will be formed. At that, the country will still be weak and its status will vary between «regional» and «great state», according to the typology accepted by us.

In particular, evaluating the prospects of changing of administrative function for the period to year 2080 we proceed from that for Russia, according to the current state, the function of management covering democratic self-organation is positioned at the level of a regional power and, besides, the balance of state power factors is far from ideal.

However, it is significant that for relatively short period the «government» function performed considerable rise, because in 1991-1998 its values were within the range of 1-2. On the surface that time was considered as so called «transition to market economy», but in the essence evolution of democracy turned to be very controversial. Acctually the beginning of 90-s of the previous century was characterized by almost full loss of state organization in Russia. As to the level of democracy situation in the postsoviet countries it was ruther anarhy than democracy. Only after 2000 year the population started to evaluate politics as growing democratic trends facing corruption as the key barrier.

In these conditions, rise of function of government up to level 4 was the reflection of stabilization of the government in Russia (in other words, gaining of more stability according to the scale accepted by us) at keeping quite a high degree of dependence on foreign influence.

Proceeding from that, for consideration of the further strategic choice of Russia within the limits up to year 2080 on the basis of the broad expert involvment the scenarios of transformation of the "government" factor till 2080 presented on figure 5 were modeled.

The realistic sight at possible dynamics of development of government function proves that change of political administration mode is unlikely both in 2010 and especially by 2010.

As a whole, formation of five variants of incompatible hypotheses of realization of government function allowed to formulate a complete group of possible events, which probability of occurrence is estimated by experts of «Strategic matrix» club of Institute of economic strategies.

The results on the basis of processing of experts' opinions testify that up to 2020 the most probable outcome will be retention of the existing system of prevailing influence of one political force.




Figure 5. Scenarios of development administration vs self-organization up to year 2080

At the same time, the most social expectation of Russian population are connected, first of all, with the third variant - reintegration of the post-soviet area. The probability of realization of the fourth and fifth variants (slipping down to chaos or authoritarianism) for all the prediction period was determined as extremely low. The more expected trend is associated with converting one-party dominance into the effective democracy in 20-s years the current century.

By year 2030 under the «optimistic scenario» by academician A. G. Aganbegyan the GDP value of Russia will reach 4.5–5 trillion USD in current prices, that will make half of current value of GDP of the USA. By economic potential, GDP value, volume of industrial production, key assets and investments Russia will rise from the 10<sup>th</sup> to 4-5<sup>th</sup> place and outgo Brasilia, Italy, France, Great Britain, Germany and, probably, India, letting only the USA, China and Japan ahead. The

structure of economy will change fundamentally, that will obtain post-industrial features. Russia will be able to become one of the world leaders in no less than 8 of 50 macrotechnologies. Service sector will make 75–80% of all GDP, the most effective of them will be educational services (not less than 10% of GDP), scientific (5%), and also in the area of health protection (15%). Conclusions of academician A. G. Aganbegyan also coincide with «optimistic scenario» by academician L. I. Abalkin, opinion of academician N. P. Fedorenko, that «Russia will be able to return to the maximum level it had in XX century before years 2025–2030». This conclusion is also proved by results of forecast of energetic trends of development of Russia made by academicians N. P. Laverov and A. Y. Kontorovich.

### 4. Freedom of choice and Immunity of civilization

Any modeling of social dynamic does not exclude the freedom of social and personal choice. The fundamental liberalization may provoke the rise of social irresponsibility. It is, in essence, social and spiritual AIDS of our civilization. There is a need for improving the moral basement of society to get the most positive course of evolution.

Development of civilization is nothing but realization of the confidence capital. The difference of civilization from barbarism is in development of confidence as bases of relations in a society, realizations of rights and personal freedoms, solidarity round common values and ideals. The confidence is an immunity of civilization, basis of personal and social responsibility. We are responsible for confidence given to us by parents and children, friends, colleagues, partners, heroes of the past and ideals of the future. We either justify this confidence, or not. Modern civilizations potential of confidence has historically developed on the basis of cult of faith, represented in world religious system of values being the source of confidence energy for social, business, political, scientific and educational fulfillments. Realizing this confidence independently of accurate historical interpretation of the forms of cult of faith in socialization systems, people were developing their civilizations. This idea has found various theoretical justifications in Plato, Hegel, Kant, Weber, Toynbee, Jung, etc.

The virus of social irresponsibility has many modifications, but its genetic formula is "egoistical success at any means", without call of duty, responsibility, and public solidarity. If actually all world religions are reduced to the formula "the God is love" and if it is the source of all variety of displays of the social responsibility, than "at any means" is a formula of supreme, egoism, absolutization of individual state is built, absolute disparage both the superior religious verities, and laws of social life.

The principle "success at any price" has struck the vital structures of modern societies in business and policy. Previous objectives have become targets. And in fact still Hamlet has noticed – «O, 'tis most sweet When in one line two crafts directly meet.»

There are times when the victory, one for all, is necessary and when "we'll pay the price". There are situations of compelled and necessary defense and then "everything is permissible in the war, and I can permit myself" (Maria Stuart). But there are "mean" times, times of irresponsibility and lawlessness, times of dishonest games.

This is not the issue, that life is similar to game. But the issue is that games without the rules are focused on dramatic outcome for the rival, start to determine the atmosphere of whole our life, plunging it in chronic uncertainty chaotic state, prethunderstorm context, total force major.

The very services of leaders of business and policy are not only decisions and actions for the sake of efficiency, but also actions having ethical sense, that are justice, honesty, reasonable sufficiency, charity. Any vertical of responsible authority and business is constructed on verticals of tall orders, senses, and values. Without them the authority and business degenerate in manipulation for the sake of tactical and narrow group interests.

The problem is not only in increase of quantity and scale of natural and man-caused threats and not only in level our elites comprehends the challenges facing to the country and the world as a whole, that is far from necessary, if saying nothing about abilities and will to action. The problem is that sawing the cracked branch, on which the society somehow keeps, became extremely profitable business of the few against the background of carelessness, indifference, ignorance or depression of the majority. "Even a flood, but after us", "who is not in time, that is late", "let the loser to cry" such formulas are many-sided, but their essence id the same, that is success at any means.

Immunity of any society to social illnesses is defined by the degree of social and moral responsibility of its citizens, their confidence to each other and to the state, cleanliness and honesty of game. Nonresistance to principle "success at any price" dramatizes crisis, leading to hardly remediable degeneration of civilization: based on belief and responsibility to the one based on unbelief and irresponsibility, dot and mass terror of the few against all. Carriers of the virus "success at any price" are met today everywhere. Traces of this epidemic are easy for seeing not only in terrorists, but also in respectable leaders of business. Russia and the world are full of such examples. Enron and MMM, Arthur Andersen and the Russian government in the August 1998, that declared the default, MacDonnell Douglas with MD-11 and nuclear tests. Machiavellian type of businessman, represented by D. Trump, I. Boesky or J.R. Ewing on TV, the attempts of executives to maximize their profits at owner's expense was criticized by many publications of Harvard Business Review, as an example.

Glaring example of undermining the confidence of Russian and world society to Russian authorities and to business is Russia. Fears of investors are determined by absence of confidence to Russian players, confidence in stability of rules, security from tricky improvisations. Still N. Gogol has drawn personage who thought, "To live with subtlety, art to deceive all and not to be done by himself is the real task and the purpose". But this problem is not only Russian. Deficiency of responsibility is global epidemic of social and spiritual AIDS promising a lot of damages to democracy.

Indifference to methods of success achievement leads to lawlessness, down to "anything goes". Activity of these virus carriers has led to a present lack of credibility and responsibility.

# 5. Socially responsible democratic systems or formal prove of ancient commandments

The huge responsibility of today's leaders in politics, society or business must be focused on non-distribution of pathogenic viruses.

The success of any cooperation on the basis of paideia is defined by ability of all its participants target the efforts to achievement of the common task. It is not success at any means, not the celebration of egoism, but harmony, talented combination of plusses and minuses of all players,

voluntary consideration of preferences and interests of other participants, coordinated following of all common strategies bring to victory in result. For understanding of this truth the Nobel Prize on economy has been recently awarded. The winner is John Nash, who has made invention comparable to the contribution of Newton, Copernicus, and Einstein in natural sciences.

John Nash has denied Adam Smith's classical postulate that "an invisible hand" of the market, inducing individuals to pursue the egoistical purposes, increases well-being of all society. Discrepancies of this thesis with reality found the theoretical sanction or in more and more abstract schedules coming off from the life and basing on set of conditional assumptions (about perfection of the market, rationality of behavior, etc.), or in eclecticism of practicalness. For 250 years after Adam Smith the set of "spillovers" in managing has been revealed, diverse concepts of the social blessings have been developed, more extensive motivations of economic behavior, comprehended transformations of "invisible hand" in "seen and invisible fist". But the main thing is that the world has not once become the witness of how in enmity and the thirst of business success based on primate of egoistical aspirations, destinies of people, organizations and peoples were crashed, resources were exhausted, the ecology degraded, social systems perished. Happened in 90th years everywhere in the world liberalism splash in such, narrow egoistic understanding has completely distinctly been replaced by other designs and motivations of the social responsibility going back to "social - market economy".

The essence of John Nash opening consists in the proof by formal and mathematical methods of extremely simple and very ancient moral installation applied to daily practice of business and social life. It is necessary, that each individual, each player aspired to achievement of purposes, but in view of interaction with other players and requirements of wellbeing of the total system. Authority of the Nobel committee newly confirmed the base requirement to the rules of command game. Only correcting the behavior in view of interests of other players it is possible to achieve optimum distribution of prize among all parties, and not only inside a team, but also among contenders. Competitiveness, thus, can quite effectively mean partnership.

We find the description of consequences of this rule of rules infringement in the Old Testament, in the history with construction of the Babel tower. The plan to construct city and a tower up to heavens in it belonged to Hamites, one of Noah's sons, whose ark has rescued the mankind from destruction. However this plan was aimed at becoming famous and, what is especially important is at leaving from testate by Noah submission to Sim and Japheth descendants, brothers of Ham. The result of not charitable undertaking is well-known, the builders started speaking in different languages, stopped understanding each other, have thrown construction and have gone in the different parts of the world. People have gradually forgotten the primary relationship. Command game has failed, as observers would say at present.

"Any empire, divided in itself, will become empty; and any city or the house, shared in itself, will not stand" (*the Gospel from Matthew*).

Each system has own level of social responsibility that is the same, the level of solitariness. It is the attitude of all advantages and good proceeding from business structure, to all harm and evil proceeding from it during its life cycle. Systems at which this level is lower than one unit will be necessary regarded unbeneficial, irresponsible.

Socially responsible systems are characterized by focus on customer, have high level of dependence and durance, simple and not expensive, produce minimal damage to the nature, protected from damaging use, increase the faith, neutralize the energy of evil.

#### **Conclusion**

Dynamic structure of all previous cycles of strategic evolution of Russia gives the opportunity to make general assumptions for the future. First of all, Russia in 2020–2040 will pass through technological revolution determined by changes in social life requirements. The development of state and society will be more probably democratic.

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# Global Citizenship and the New Cosmopolitans

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#### **Abstract**

In the globalizing, hyper-connected postmodern world, the ancient concept of the global citizen—the cosmopolitan—is taking on new meaning and vitality. This trend has many dimensions: psychological, cultural, ethical, political and legal.

The key psychological issue in relation to politics and governance is identity, and thinking on this subject is changing rapidly, challenging the modern era's equation of psychological health with stable identity and exploring the experience of people who learn to partake of many realities, play a variety of roles, change many times in the course of their lives. A new spirit is evident also in the intermingling of cultural forms, and in cosmopolitan writings which celebrate mixture, mélange, contamination instead of purity. The ethical discourse points out the racism and ethnocentrism which are inherent in so many traditional ethnic and national identities, and seeks to define an ethic of self-choice and self-definition. These transformations relate to "post-Westphalian" concepts of national sovereignty and separateness, and to an image of a global order which is neither state-centric nor world-centric, but multicentric. The global system of human rights guarantees is seen as an emerging body of "cosmopolitan law" which makes global citizenship a reality, albeit a limited one.

In closing, the paper examines the concept of "an age of open systems," and a near-term future of tension between cosmopolitan urges toward multicultural democracy and tribalism in its various forms.

#### **Introduction: Cosmopolitanism through the Centuries**

As the world becomes more interconnected electronically – and the phrase "death of distance" becomes more and more realistic – it seems hardly surprising that the ancient concept of global citizenship is undergoing a revival. We have, as one sign of its vitality, what seems to be a small literary movement of books and articles organized around the theme of "cosmopolitanism" – books such as Jason Hill's *Becoming a Cosmopolitan*, various writings by Kwame Anthony Appiah on what he calls "the new cosmopolitanism," Martha Nussbaum's much-cited essay "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," and the anthology *Cosmopolitics* edited by Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins.

Something old, something new: the core idea comes down to us from ancient Greece, specifically from the philosopher Diogenes, best known for the legend of his wandering about with a lamp in search of an honest man. Diogenes was a cynic, but not in the contemporary meaning of the word; in its original meaning, being a cynic meant choosing to live as simply as a dog (cynus), owning nothing. According to the story Diogenes was asked where he came from and replied that he was a cosmopolitan, a citizen of the world, as much at home in one place or another.

Later cosmopolitanism became the key concept of Stoicism, a philosophical and ethnical system identified at first with the Greek philosopher Zeno, and later with the Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius. This was heavily based on a concept of rationalism as a universal quality, uniting humanity; Zeno wrote: "The unreflective person thinks of himself as an independent unit in this world, complete in himself. His own private good is the criterion for every choice he has to make. But true wisdom begins when the individual reckons himself a fragment, a part of a perfect whole, the universe. He is under obligation to make the reason at the heart of things his own standard of behavior."

Cosmopolitan ideas and ideals have been expressed in many ways. In the 18<sup>th</sup> century, they were beginning to appear in a truly global framework, and identified with democracy. In 1789 the revolutionary French National Assembly issued the stirring Declaration of the Rights of Man proclaiming universal entitlement to "liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression." A few years later, Immanuel Kant's essay "Perpetual Peace" articulated a vision that "individuals and states, co-existing in an external relationship of mutual influences, may be regarded as citizens of a universal state of mankind." Scholars frequently note that the essay was written just after the treaty of Basel between the European monarchies and republican France, and suggests that Kant was tending toward a vision of France as the model for future cosmopolitan democracies.<sup>1</sup>

The cosmopolitan philosophy that emerged in the age of city-states, matured in the era of Greek and Roman empire, and underwent another transition in the age of nation-states, is metamorphosing again in the age of globalization. The context changes, but always the urge is toward a wider, even boundless, sense of community; in its more recent forms, cosmopolitanism expresses a more complex sense of human identity and selfhood which admits of the possibility – and the desirability, both for psychological health and social progress – of multicultural personalities and distributed allegiances.

A concept whose foundation is the transcendence of boundaries calls out for an interdisciplinary approach, and so I plan to look at it from several different perspectives, beginning with the psychological.

#### The making of the cosmopolitan mind

The key psychological issue in relation to politics and government is identity. The act of defining oneself is central to the development of the individual, and also to the development of societies: We mark the course of human history by transitions in selfhood, such as the one that took place in Europe in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, when the people of France, in the course of a violent upheaval, went from defining themselves as subjects of the king to citizens of *la Patrie*. We note the prevalence of "identity politics" in contemporary societies, where ideology takes a back seat to identity-based movements defined by race, gender, or sexual orientation. And we deal recurrently with the ugliest forms of identity politics: racism, genocide, "ethnic cleansing," the bitter feuds of Sunnis and Shias.

In the West, psychology has tended to focus on the importance of identity to mental health, seeing it as an essential need of the individual to become an integrated and bounded self. In this respect, Erik Erikson's work was particularly influential in forming the model for thinking about how a person ideally grows, gets through his or her "identity crises," avoids the perils of "identity diffusion," and becomes a stable adult with an assured sense of inner continuity and social

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Cheah 1998, 24

sameness that bridges what he was as a child and what he is about to become, and will reconcile his conception of himself and his community's recognition of him. Psychology is, after all, an agent of the social order, and the civilizing agenda of societies has always been to develop responsible human beings who could bring their wildly divergent urges and voices and energies under control and take up their roles in the community's economic and social and political life. Stable societies need stable people.

But toward the closing decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century – in a world marked by increasing human mobility and an increasingly rich and accessible media environment – new and radically different concepts of selfhood were articulated by "postmodern" psychologists who contrast the conditions of contemporary life to that of people who lived in societies that were much more culturally homogeneous. Most of us now, say the postmodern psychologists, live in a virtually endless contact with otherness. In traveling – or simply by opening our eyes and ears to the communications media – we are bombarded daily by different values, different beliefs, different realities.

Kenneth Gergen invented the term "multiphrenia" to describe this "populating of the self, the acquisition of multiple and disparate potentials for being," that is the lot of people who live in our time. Multiphrenia is the consciousness of all of us who are, as he puts it, "saturated" with messages that flow into our minds from the daily experiences of a mobile, multicultural, mediarich civilization, and whose sense of personal identity may well be as transient as the image in a kaleidoscope: "Emerging technologies saturate us with the voices of humankind – both harmonious and alien. As we absorb their varied rhymes and reasons, they become part of us and we of them. Social saturation furnishes us with a multiplicity of incoherent and unrelated languages of the self. For everything that we 'know to be true' about ourselves, other voices within respond with doubt and even derision. This fragmentation of self-conceptions corresponds to a multiplicity of incoherent and disconnected relationships. These relationships pull us in myriad directions, inviting us to play such a variety of roles that the very concept of an 'authentic self' with knowable characteristics recedes from view."

So in the postmodern world as Gergen describes it, you just don't get to be a single and consistent somebody, because you don't have a social environment in which all your interactions and relationships, all the voices that you hear and the images reflected back to you by others, unanimously support a consistent view of who and what you are.

Another perspective on this issue comes from the work of Robert Jay Lifton, whose thinking is closely akin to Gergen's but who approaches the subject from a slightly different direction and with a slightly different emphasis. Lifton reported some years ago that he had, in his psychiatric work, identified a new type of person he called "the protean self." The protean person is unafraid to change, goes willingly through many metamorphoses in the course of a life. These may be stressful to the person who is going through them and bewildering to others, but they are not simply signs of pathology or weakness. Furthermore, says Lifton, this pattern extends to all areas of the person's experience. It may include changing political opinions and sexual behavior, changing ideas and ways of expressing them, changing ways of organizing one's life.

Lifton's first contribution to the literature of psychology – and his first exploration of the protean self, although not yet under that label – had come much earlier. That was his groundbreaking study of brainwashing as it was practiced on political prisoners during the time of the Cultural Revolution in China. One of the most common arguments against postmodern psychology is the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Gergen 1990, 228

charge that it only describes the problems of postmodern intellectuals and others like them in the contemporary Western world and has little or nothing to say about humanity in general. But what Lifton documented was a profound *changeability* in human consciousness -- something universal, to be found in all people: When people are manipulated with sufficient skill and ruthlessness, they can literally "change their minds" not only about what's true – what is right and wrong politically – but about who they are. This was exploited by the brainwashers – as it had been by various inquisitors and propagandists before them – but it was not invented by them. It was inherent in the nature of human consciousness. It was also, I suspect, what most human cultural institutions – rom the rituals of traditional societies to the ideologies of the modern world – had been designed to keep under control so that people stayed on track, secure in their identities and their beliefs.

When I first encountered Lifton's ideas about the protean self – in a work published in 1970 – I got the impression that he was talking mainly about conversions over time. But, in a more comprehensive work on the subject published in the 90s, he said that, although the protean person might indeed change sequentially – trading in one personal style, personality, role or belief system for another – proteanism could also be simultaneous, "in the multiplicity of varied, even antithetical images and ideas held at any one time by the self, each of which it may be more or less ready to act upon..."

## Cultures of sameness and difference

I have a phonograph record I bought in San Francisco in the late 1960s, which serves as my personal reminder of when I began to notice another kind of cultural mixing. It's called "A New Sound from the Japanese Bach Scene," and it is a collection of Bach pieces played on koto, shakuhachi, guitar, bass, and drums. I bought it simply because I had heard it and found it a beautiful piece of music, but it set me to thinking about what was happening in the music world. I should have noticed already, of course, because the popular music of the time was rife with cosmopolitan innovations such as George Harrison playing the sitar in "Norwegian Wood."

The truth that had escaped me for a while – and is easy for everyone to escape simply because it is so overwhelmingly present – is that people keep combining elements of different cultures, in a never-ending variety of ways. This is a somewhat different aspect of the postmodern condition – not simply the exposure to different cultures that is available to anyone who travels or lives in a multicultural society, but the constant blending of all cultures to the point where *their* identities begin to blur. Thus Jan Nederveen Pieterse asks in his study of cultural globalization: "How do we come to terms with phenomena such as Thai boxing by Moroccan girls in Amsterdam, Asian rap in London, Irish bagels, Chinese tacos, and Mardi Gras Indians in the United States?<sup>5</sup> Actually, one no longer really has much of an option to do anything but come to terms with it. It is everywhere, and – this is really the main point to grasp and savor – it is, for the people who practice it, in no way extraordinary. They are merely living in their time, and in their place – which happens to be the whole world, from which they can freely draw symbols and practices of all kinds.

<sup>3</sup> Lifton 1963

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Lifton 1993, 8

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Nederveen Pieterse 2004, 69

In a couple of sentences that could serve as the manifesto for this kind of intermingling of things that were once separate, Salman Rushdie has said that his novel *Satanic Verses* "celebrates hybridity, impurity, intermingling, the transformation that comes of new and unexpected combinations of human beings, cultures, ideas, politics, movies, songs. It rejoices in mongrelisation and fears the absolutism of the Pure. Mélange, hotch-potch, a bit of this and a bit of that is how newness enters the world." And the fact that Rushdie's book led to a fatwa calling for his death serves to remind us that not all people find this refreshing.

"Hybridity" has been the term most frequently used by sociologists to describe cultural intermingling. But of course a "hybrid," in its original biological meaning, is a plant or animal created from crossing two different species or varieties. Today's cultural hybrids are created from so many different ancestries that in many cases we cannot even identify all of them, and may not recognize the product as a mixture at all.

This is now happening on a global scale, and some observers regard it – usually with distaste and a certain nostalgia for the imagined good old days when all cultures were distinct – as a process of worldwide homogenization that will lead inevitably to a gray sameness, everything the same everywhere. Still others, like Rushdie, celebrate it, see in it not a poverty of variety but a great heterogeneity, offering a richness of diversity and choice that no civilization in the past could offer. Economist Tyler Cowen doesn't think those two points of view are mutually exclusive. He writes:

The observed increases in homogeneity and heterogeneity are two sides of the same coin, rather than opposing processes. Trade, even when it supports choice and diverse achievement, homogenizes culture in the following sense: it gives individuals, regardless of their country, a similarly rich set of consumption opportunities. It makes countries or societies "commonly diverse," as opposed to making them different from each other.

I would qualify this a bit – Hong Kong's diversity is different from Amsterdam's – but I think he is essentially correct: cultural globalization is happening, and it is an enormously rich and complex process that I believe is tending toward making cosmopolitanism the norm. I'll come back to this, after we consider the new cosmopolitanism as a philosophical movement and consider how developments in the realm of politics and governance reflect – and in some ways resist – the cosmopolitan trend in culture.

## The cosmopolitan as existential hero

Multiphrenia and proteanism are diagnoses of a psychological condition, which may or may not be pathological: some of the individuals Gergen and Lifton describe are perfectly happy, even thriving. But the failure to find a single identity may be extremely stressful to some, and multiphrenia can be problematic in another way, in those cases where one person is having a fine time with it but others – usually family members – strongly disapprove. With the appearance of the new cosmopolitan movement, multiphrenia ceases to be a diagnosis of a psychological condition – a more or less successful adaptation -- and becomes an existential choice, a deeply principled determination to make one's own selfhood. Some of the most articulate leaders of the new cosmopolitan movement are philosophers such as Jason Hill (Jamaica-born, of African descent) who

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Rushdie 1991, 394

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Cowen 2002, 129

came to America, found not just racism but a stagnant set of racial and ethnic niches, each with its own morality – the niche of the black-is-beautiful rebel, the niche of the middle-class assimilator -- and decided to create his own. In articulating his principles he invokes a set of epistemological and ethical propositions:

- "Self is an ethnic or racial construct, based on the assumption that racial and ethnic concepts of the self are stable, objective and closed."
- "The self is always either potentially or actually in a process of becoming and thus open to revision and reconfiguration."
- "Morality sometimes demands that we give up old selves and commit ourselves to the goal of fashioning new moral identities. This is often accomplished by inviting the other in, letting go of the seriousness of one's identity..."
- "If one can come to see that ethnic and racial identities are bequeathed and hence unchosen and that these identities have morally questionable features built into them (racism, ethnocentrism, and national chauvinism); if one can accept the fluidity of the self and its capacity for self-reinterpretation, then one recognizes self-ownership as a viable option."

For those who find the word "cosmopolitan" a bit too evocative of jet-setting café society, the preferred alternative is "the *new* cosmopolitanism." This is the term used by another of the movement's spokespersons, Kwame Anthony Appiah, a Princeton philosophy professor – born in Africa of a Ghanaian father and a British mother – who wrote a recent book on the subject. It's about moving beyond both of the ways of defining oneself – tribalism and nationalism – that have warred for the hearts and minds of Africans, and also moving beyond the nervous cultural protectionism advocated by well-meaning Western activists who believe it is their duty to keep "indigenous" societies free of contamination from the modern world. He writes: "I've seen visitors from England and the United States wince at what they regard as the intrusion of modernity on timeless, traditional rituals – more evidence, they think, of a pressure in the modern world toward uniformity. They react like the assistant on the film set who's supposed to check that the extras in a sword-and-sandal movie aren't wearing wristwatches."

Appiah likes the word "contamination" with its in-your-face challenge to all ideals of purity, and admires Salman Rushdie for making cosmopolitanism a literary movement as well as a political one.

Cosmopolitanism itself is (in Rushdie's term) a bit of newness entering the world. The newness is not so much the intermingling of ethnicities and cultures -- although that is now happening at a greater rate than at any time in the past and on a global scale -- but the idea that is a healthy growth process rather than a deviation from normality. This kind of thinking has its critics, of course: Racial purists don't like it, for obvious reasons. Neither do cultural preservationists who are trying to keep local and indigenous cultures from being swamped by globalization. Neither do old-school communitarians who see it as rampant individualism.

## Post-Westphalian governance

It is hardly surprising that, in a world becoming so heavily populated with multiphrenic and cosmopolitan people, its once-separate (or at least relatively separate) cultures intermingling, there would be hopeful thoughts of moving toward governmental systems less rooted in national identity as a primary reality. In the last year of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Czech president Vaclav Havel

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Hill 2000, 1–2

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Appiah January 1, 2006, 30

gave a speech to the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, expressing a remarkable vision of such a future – especially remarkable for being proposed by an incumbent president of a sovereign state. He said:

In the next century I believe that most states will begin to change from cultlike entities charged with emotion into far simpler and more civilized entities, into less powerful and more rational administrative units that will represent only one of the many complex and many-leveled ways in which our planetary society is organized.

With this transformation, the idea of noninterference – the notion that it is none of our business what happens in another country and whether human rights are violated in that country – should also vanish down the trapdoor of history.<sup>10</sup>

In offering that vision of the future, Havel placed himself in the ranks of the many scholars, activists and political leaders who are searching for a workable vision of a post-Westphalian world order: one explicitly *not* based on the assumption that the world is now, will be in the future, and should be, neatly divided up into a map of distinct nation-states, their boundaries as impermeable as their leaders choose them to be, their governments' sovereign authority within those boundaries undiluted by outside actors. Less explicitly, these visions often appear to be searching for an alternative that is not simply a centralized "global government" with all national sovereignty nullified or diluted beyond recognition. They seem to be recognizing that we are already far into another kind of world order, and need to clarify the situation and constructively advance the post-Westphalian trend.

Earlier in the decade of Havel's speech, I participated with several colleagues in a series of meetings on the general theme of "global governance," in which one of the major goals was to examine and define alternative possibilities of future world order. This exercise was part analytical, part normative: Analytically, we identified three different visions of global governance that are currently held by different groups of contemporary players and observers:

- The "realist" view, exemplified by diplomats such as Henry Kissinger and to some extent formalized by neoconservative theorists and journalists, which sees the sovereign nation-states, motivated primarily by national interest, as the true and final players in global politics and governance, with international institutions such as the United Nations playing relatively minor roles and useful mainly to the degree to which they can be mobilized in the service of national foreign policy.
- The "global government" view, which favors the creation of a democratic central government of the world, federal in structure, with a constitution and some form of the elements of present national governments legislature, courts, etc. Such a government might be created by an expansion of the scope and powers of the United Nations the option preferred by the World Federalist Society, the main advocate of global government or it might be legislated into being (by a process never made entirely clear) as has been advocated by some other groups.
- A third view which, at the beginning we defined simply as "the global something else," but which is arguably the system we have, and are going to have for some time to come. This is an apples-and-oranges kind of world order, the product of many hands. It contains

<sup>10</sup> Havel 1999, 4

many organizations and many kinds of organizations overlapping and interpenetrating: nation-states, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, corporations, networks, the media, etc.

These three alternatives might be summarized as state-centric, world-centric, and multicentric. Normatively, we gravitated toward the third alternative, agreeing that we found it not only the most accurate description of how things stand and the most likely scenario of what lies ahead (we used the term "foreseeable future," even while doubting deeply that there is such a thing), and discussed possible terms that would describe it and make it more accessible to the nonspecialist. This produced an entertaining list of possible titles for the third alternative: James Rosenau called it "polyarchy." Harlan Cleveland called it a nobody-in-general-charge system. Mary Catherine Bateson called it an ambiguous world order. I liked her offering – was especially intrigued by her idea that ambiguity is a more female concept, that men are more inclined to fret if all boundaries are not clearly drawn and all lines of authority precisely established.

My own candidate was "ecology of governance," tending toward an image of a world order somewhat like an ecosystem – diverse, complex, interactive, not directed from a single center, ever-changing. Global citizenship in such a world is not a thing to be legislated into being, but rather evolved into being through the actions and interactions of many people and groups.

# The global citizen's bill of rights

Yet, although the concept of global citizenship is not formally created by international law, it is in fact being institutionalized in many ways in the legal structures of the emerging polyarchic, nobody-in charge, ambiguous world order, the global ecology of governance. The conceptual core of this development is human rights.

The trend toward a post-Westphalian system of human rights has been especially pronounced since the end of World War II. One early sign of the kind of global order that was to emerge was the Genocide Convention of 1948 which specifically outlawed "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group." In that same year the UN General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which affirmed the entitlement of all people to security of person, freedom from slavery, freedom from arbitrary arrest, freedom of association and religion, and the right to marry and own property.

These were important symbolic steps in what was to be a long march – one that is still underway – toward what might be called a bill of rights for all people. It took almost twenty years before the first two treaties – one on Civil and Political Rights, another on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – were negotiated, another ten until the minimum number of states had ratified them, and more years after that before the signatory nations began to enforce them.

In succeeding years more human rights treaties have been negotiated and ratified, nongovernmental organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have taken on global roles

David Held and his collaborators on the book *Global Transformations* describe this as a trend "from international to cosmopolitan law" – surely one of the most significant evolutions of law that has ever taken place – and define it thusly:

Cosmopolitan law here refers to those elements of law – albeit created by states – which create powers and constraints, and rights and duties, which transcend the claims of nation-states and which have far-reaching national consequences. Elements of such law define and seek to protect basic humanitarian values which can come into conflict, and sometimes contradiction, with national laws. These values set down basic standards or boundaries which no political agent, whether a representative of a government or state, should, in principle, be able to cross. <sup>11</sup>

These developments create a real but limited global citizenship: It is real in the sense that we actually do belong to a global civilization, a global polis; it marks an ongoing evolution toward an idea of the person, not the citizen, as the bearer of rights. It is limited in that people do not become citizens of a global superstate with the right to participate in its governance as they may in a democratic nation, and it is limited in the opposite sense that neither do they not realize the anarchic dream of citizenship in no state at all.

We are still a long way from a truly post-national global order. The traveler may enjoy the protection of an extensive array of human rights guarantees that have been ratified by virtually all countries, but enforcement of them remains erratic from country to country. And even in the nations where human rights agreements are observed and enforced, there is a third sense in which global citizenship is limited: non-citizens of a nation do not enjoy the same rights as citizens in regard to participation in the country's government. In some countries guest workers have rights of "denizenship" that allow them to be employed in the public service, even vote in local elections; but the rights of democratic citizenship – the key rights to vote and hold national office – are still restricted to citizens.

In this respect, the global world order may seem to some to be, as one study put it, "a fractured world." We have our global identification which allows us to develop all manner of transnational and post-national identities and commitments, we have the freedom of a wide range of "multiple belongings" within our countries through our participation in diverse cultures and associations — a rich spectrum of ways to define ourselves and our citizenships — yet *national* citizenship remains black-and-white, with a few shades of gray.

The shades of gray are the cases of large numbers of people who are consigned to second-class citizenship, or no citizenship at all. Two well-known examples are the Turkish *Gastarbeiters* (and their descendants) in Germany, and the Arabs in Israel – two advanced liberal democracies, with populations of cosmopolitan people who enjoy both their national citizenships and many international identifications. Until recently, Turkish immigrants and their native-born offspring were not allowed to acquire German citizenship; now they can, thanks to a law passed by the Red-Green coalition, but the situation remains explosive and precarious. The rise of militant Islam since 2001 has made many Germans increasingly reluctant to accept those of Turkish descent as "real" Germans. Turks attempting to nationalize must now agree that they will renounce their Turkish citizenship, and not re-apply for it. Thousands who did attempt to do so when it was still legal were "de-naturalized," i.e., deprived of their German citizenship. In Israel, the

<sup>11</sup> Held et al 1999, 70

<sup>12</sup> Oger 2003

"problem group" are the Arabs, descendants of families that have lived for centuries in areas that are now part of Israel, and who have full citizenship; they can vote, they have their own political parties and their own members of the Knesset. And they pay taxes. But there are restrictions on their right to pass their citizenship on to their children, on their ability to buy or own land. No Arab party has ever been included in the formation of a government. This is made particularly glaring in view of the fact that foreign-born Jews are full citizens participating actively in politics and governance. Moldovan-born Avgidor Liebermann, leader of the Israel Beitenu party, has held ministerial posts in two governments; he has also advocated the "transfer" (meaning deportation) of Arab-Israelis.

## Conclusions: Toward a world of open systems

In the 1990s – the timing is important here, for reasons I will discuss below – the French scholar-diplomat Jean-Marie Guéhenno wrote a book (titled *The End of the Nation-State* in its American edition) which declared: "We are entering the age of open systems, whether at the level of states or enterprises, and the criteria of success are diametrically different from those of the institutional age and its closed systems. The value of an organization is no longer measured by the equilibrium that it attempts to establish between its different parts, or by the clarity of its frontiers, but in the number of openings, of points of articulation that it can organize with everything external to it."<sup>13</sup>

Guéhenno was essentially correct in recognizing that globalization involves an ongoing reorganization of all systems. He may have been a bit overly optimistic about the *degree* to which all systems were becoming more open, but he wrote during the decade between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the fall of the Global Trade Centers in New York when a great opening-up did appear to be underway. In the wake of 911 we saw for a short time a severe slowdown of international travel, and for a longer time a range of restrictions and (especially in the United States) increasing attempts to protect national security that made it appear we were turning back toward a new age of closed systems.

I don't think so: of course there are and will continue to be many forces pushing against international openness – not only the fear of terrorist attack, but also resurgences of nationalism and fundamentalism, economic protectionism, localism, cultural isolationism. Global climate change, which now bids to be the major concern of the century, dwarfing all others, may well have its divisive effects but it is also clearly a global concern, everybody's business, driving us toward new efforts at international cooperation.

The cosmopolitan thrust which is so evident in cultural intermingling suggests that the movement over time will be toward Havel's vision of nations as less "cultlike entities charged with emotion" – which I take to mean less driven by the passions of nationalism and the yearning for cultural homogeneity, and more likely to grant full rights of citizenship to diverse peoples. But it seems clear that what the near-term future holds is an ongoing tension between cosmopolitanism – which in political terms means multicultural democracy – and tribalism in its various forms.

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<sup>13</sup> Guéhenno 1995, 49

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# **Anticipatory Democracy Revisited**

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## Introduction

This paper "revisits" anticipatory democracy. The original use of the term was by Alvin Toffler, as his prescription for "future shock", in his book by that title in the early 1970s. Toffler asked me to edit a volume of cases in the mid 1970's, published as the book, Anticipatory Democracy: People in the Politics of the Future. I'll reflect on some of the key sections of that book of 30 years ago. In this paper I'll also "revisit" anticipatory democracy in light of a global scan of cyber democracy that I and my colleagues at the Institute for Alternative Futures conducted in 2000 and 2001, as well as current developments "transforming governments" at the state level in the U.S. Finally, I'll give my sense of options in 2006.

This paper is being prepared for the Finnish Parliament's celebration, in 2006, of the 100 year anniversary of being the first nation to give women the right to vote.

This is only a partial review. Anticipatory democracy involves a wide range of developments in futures and foresight, as well as in participation in government, particularly participation by the public. The book, Anticipatory Democracy: People in the Politics of the Future, is a major catalogue of activities in the 1970s. The global scan of developments in "Cyber Democracy", more than 20 years later identify some trends, that support our conclusions in the 1970s, particularly how communications and internet enhancements to voting, other public participation, and to what government does. The third section provides reviews from 2006 of futures commissions, a core part of anticipatory democracy that we considered in 1978. These reviews focus on activities in U.S. states and communities generally including futures commissions in state court systems. These reviews were part of an exploration of "transformational initiatives" for state government in the US. Finally I will provide conclusions about directions for anticipatory democracy.

# Anticipatory democracy - 1970's

In the 1970's, in the course of working with Alvin Toffler in encouraging foresight and greater public participation, Toffler asked me to edit a book that reviewed the various experiments in looking ahead and involving the public. The result was *Anticipatory Democracy: People in the Politics of the Future.* <sup>1</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Clement Bezold, ed., Anticipatory Democracy: People in the Politics of the Future, (New York: Random House, 1970)

Anticipatory Democracy had been Toffler's prescription at the end of his best seller, Future Shock. In the Introduction to Anticipatory Democracy, Toffler wrote that:

"The simplest definition of anticipatory democracy (or A/D) is that it is a process for combining citizen participation with future consciousness."

Toffler argued that representative government was the key political technology of the industrial era and that new forms must be invented in the face of the crushing decisional overload, or political future shock, that we faced.<sup>2</sup>

The book reviewed cases and arguments covering a wide set of areas for developments that marry greater future consciousness and greater participation.

I'll focus on a few of these, both because of the subsequent roles of their authors, and because of their significance for this revisiting of anticipatory democracy.

# An Overview of Anticipatory Democracy Experiments

David Baker reviewed 15 of the leading experiments at the local, state and national level in the US in the 1960s and 1970s. These had multiple motivations. Some were explicitly focused on developing goals, some on growth or environmental issues, some on more general explorations of the future. Baker's review lead him to provide several key insights about their design: obtain adequate funding (\$100,000USD per year in the mid 1970s – or about \$360,000USD in 2005 dollars); face political realities; decide on the major research/goals topics early; build ties with the bureaucracy; design and implement a process that involves policy makers from the start; and present findings early and throughout the life of the process.<sup>3</sup>

There were specific case studies, a few of which retain transcendent significance. One is Newt Gingrich's article on Jimmy Carter's Goals for Georgia Program. Carter had been elected Governor of Georgia in 1970 and had created a public goals program. Gingrich was a professor of history and colleague of Toffler. Carter went on to be elected US President in 1976. Gingrich was elected to the US Congress in 1978 and went on to rebuild the Republican Party in the House of Representatives, becoming the Speaker of the House in 1995 – the first in 40 years. Both Carter and Gingrich were significant for foresight - more below.

In setting up Goals for Georgia, Carter had argued that in a democracy, no government can be stronger, or wiser, or more just than its people. Gingrich, in his review of the Goals for Georgia program, made several observations:

- One of the primary benefits of Goals for Georgia was the opportunity for community leaders to learn from each other
- It set the stage for the state government reorganization effort, by making bureaucrats and citizens more aware of current problems

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Ibid, Introduction by Alvin Toffler, pp. xii and xvii

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> David Baker, "State, Regional, and Local Experiments in Anticipatory Democracy: An Overview", in Bezold, op. cit., p. 30–33

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Newt Gingrich, "The Goals for Georgia Program" in Bezold op. cit p. 38

- Goals for Georgia did not explore a range of alternatives, nor did it have systematic public involvement, beyond the leaders, in building commitments as bases for future programs
- Georgia's personality, scandal, and trivia focused news reporting that make anticipatory
  programs difficult. "To be effective, anticipatory democracy must rely on thematic dialogues over time in order to enable the individual citizen to understand the problems, and
  respond by helping to develop serious alternatives." This is made more difficult by Georgia's traditionalistic political culture and by the need for sustained support by the governor to make such an effort permanent.
- The low level of citizen activism (in Georgia) is likely to make any Goals program dependent on the life of the incumbent administration. And without a network of supporters within government, goals programs would not be sustained.

This last point is important for anticipatory democracy – namely these future focused programs need popular support and the support of top leadership. When the top leader leaves, his or her successor can and often does ignore the effort. Alternatives for Washington showed that deep, significant involvement of the public (both active citizens and the general public) can create a base of support that transcends specific administrations.

In the 1960's and 1970's programs were held focusing on the year 2000. Hawaii 2000, is an example, which included leadership from the Governor and the Editor of the Honolulu's major newspaper, and University of Hawaii political scientist Glenn Paige. This had a major impact at the time and in setting up the state's plan. Unlike Alternatives for Washington, there was not as much friction in changing administrations. Yet Hawaii 2000 shows that the shelf life of a futures program is not likely to extend for multiple decades. In 2005 the state has begun a renewed effort Hawaii 2050, focusing on sustainability.<sup>5</sup>

## Goals for Dallas

Many American cities have used goals programs to focus their community. Goals for Dallas was a prime example. Robert Bradley's review summarized it as:

- An effective leadership device, broadly framed in the range of goals it pursued.
- It catalogued aspirations and dreams of many within the Dallas community.
- It gave the city tools for anticipation and a structure that increases the leadership's sensitivity.
- But it was imperfect in that participation was focused primarily on the well off sectors of the community, and it failed to consider a range of futures and goals directly related to the lowest economic sectors of the city.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Robert Bradley, "Goals for Dallas", in Bezold, Anticipatory Democracy, p. 87.

# **Alternatives for Washington**

Alternatives for Washington remains one of the finest anticipatory democracy programs in the US. Governor Dan Evans initiated the program in 1974 stating that:

"Our future need be imposed neither by the personal interests of an elite nor the impersonal force of history. It can be determined by all of the people of the state if they are willing to...devote the effort to the task... I believe the citizens of this state can, in an orderly and rational manner, determine their future and assure such as privilege will also be available to generations yet to come."

Alternatives for Washington proved to be a unique combination of leadership, novel involvement processes, media involvement, and advanced facilitation. John Osman of the Brookings Institution was the lead facilitator. Governor Evans was the originator and leader of the process. Over 60,000 people in the state took part in the focus groups, surveys, or local meetings. The print and broadcast media in the state cooperated in distributing educational material and surveys. The public generated 11 alternative futures. Citizens voted on their preferences. This led to a set of policy preferences. The Governor then asked the public to take up the more difficult question of budget priorities. Tens of thousands of citizens gave their preferences for budget priorities.

The article in Anticipatory Democracy does not fully cover the second round of the program that took place in 1977. I was a visiting scholar at Brookings during the time Alternatives for Washington was going on. John Osman once commented that Governor Evans complained that the project had led to a different type of citizen activism. Typically most issue groups focused on their own issues, after their experience with Alternatives for Washington, groups were taking positions across the policy and budget spectrum. One criticism of AFW was the lack of engagement of state legislators in the process – leading to a lack of responsiveness to the Governor's proposal of AFW based goals after the first round of the process. This was made more difficult when the next Governor, Dixie Lee Ray, essentially told her administration to ignore AFW.

Yet the AFW remains one of the most significant programs in terms of impact because of the depth of its involvement in the state, the range of alternatives it considered, and the focus on both policy and budget priorities. Five years after AFW ended the National Conference of State Legislatures asked me to put on a panel on goals and futures programs. I recruited a state legislator from Washington State. She went to the state budget office and asked for a tally of how many of the AFW recommendations had been put in place five years after the program ended. It was about 80%, in spite of the lack of active engagement of the legislature at the time and in the face of hostility from the next Governor. There had been enough increase in citizen and issue group understanding to get the proposals passed.

The significance of AFW was brought home to me when, in 2000 and 2001, we did the Cyber Democracy Global Scan summarized below.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Governor Dan Evans quoted in "Alternatives for Washington", by Robert L. Stilger, in Bezold, op. cit., p. 88

# **Legislative Foresight**

A core part of representative democracies are legislatures. The most consistent participation citizens have available to them is electing their representatives. Legislatures then develop policies reflective of constituents' interests – at least theoretically. Anticipatory democracy includes not only the public goals and futures programs but greater "foresight" in legislatures as well. As described in the Anticipatory Democracy, there were significant discussions of foresight in the US Congress in the 1970s. I defined foresight at the time as "the systematic looking ahead". The key functions of foresight in Congress included:

- 1. to improve early warning of issues, problems and opportunities that might become the subject of legislation;
- 2. to develop a greater awareness of the future in drafting and preparing legislation, including the preparation of forecasts of the primary or intended as well as the secondary or side impacts of legislation. These are known as impact forecasts;
- 3. to encourage the conscious coordination of policies across committees by identifying the cross impacts of legislation and setting priorities through the budget process and other mechanisms for establishing coordinated national policy;
- 4. to support oversight activities of Congress and committees. 10

There were also important commissions focused on the operation of Congress, both for the House and the Senate. Each included recommendations encouraging foresight. In 1974 The House Select Committee on Committees recommended that each standing committee... shall on a continuing basis undertake futures research and forecasting on matters within the jurisdiction of that committee. The House the Senate for There had been a series of activities working to promote foresight in Congress in the 1970s and early 1980s. These included the introduction of a bill by then Congressmen Al Gore and Newt Gingrich in 1983 to provide for the continuous assessment of critical trends and alternative futures.

Congress had established the Office of Technology Assessment to provide some of this analysis on major current or emerging technologies.

In Congress, legislative foresight and interest in futures generally was aided by a major day-long seminar in 1975 on "Outsmarting Crisis: Futures Thinking in Congress", developed by the Committee for Anticipatory Democracy (particularly by Alvin Toffler and I) at the request of Sen. John Culver, Rep. Charlie Rose, and former representative John Heinz. This in turn led to the formation of the Congressional Clearinghouse on the Future<sup>12</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Clement Bezold and William Renfro, "Citizens and Legislative Foresight", Anticipatory Democracy, p. 116

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Clement Bezold, Strategic Policy Assessment and Congressional Reform: The Future in Committee, Ph.D. Dissertation (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1976)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Bezold, Anticipatory Democracy., p. 124

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Ironically that provision remains in the House Rules: see Charles W. Johnson 2000, How Our Laws are Made: Section VIII. http://thomas.loc.gov/home/holam.txt

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Congressman Charlie Rose, "Building a Futures Network in Congress", in Bezold op. cit., pp. 105-113

# Foresight in Congress circa 2006

Viewed from the distance of 3 decades, unfortunately foresight in Congress has declined. Part of this is the impact of increased partisan hostility. In the House of Representatives in particular hostility between the Republicans and Democrats has grown over the last 20 years. Greater foresight requires being able to deal with and explore the uncertainty of multiple alternative futures. A culture that does not respect fellow legislators is also not likely to tolerate uncertainty in statements about the future, or will see disagreements over interpretation of the future in a consistently partisan manner.

The Republican takeover of Congress brought with it the demise of Congress' OTA – Office of Technology Assessment, and the increase in partisanship and hostility, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), an arm of Congress has added foresight to its conscious focus. David Walker, the Comptroller General of GAO, who has made it clear that GAO's job is to support oversight, insight and foresight in the federal government. As part of its foresight work GAO provides a foresight report on major challenges of early 21st Century.

# Other Developments in Foresight

Beyond Congress, other parts of government continue to use futures approaches to enhance fore-sight. At the state level in the U.S., the Council of State Governments provides trend reports to the states. Likewise the National Center for State Courts as well as individual states provide trend reports (see the discussion below). In 2006, IAF and the Foresight and Governance Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars will restart the foresight database focused on the US now on WWICS website. 17

Beyond the US there is more consistent and visible foresight work going on in Europe, particularly the UK, and in various parts of Asia. The EU is supporting a European Foresight Monitoring Network. 18

## Cyber Democracy

In 2001 IAF's for-profit subsidiary, Alternative Futures Associates responded to a request from Vivendi Universal Prospective, the futures think tank at the time, of the communications and entertainment company, then headed by Jean Marie Messier. They had requested six major futures reports on related topics. Ester Dyson did a report on the global digital divide. AFA's full

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> David Walker, "Doing What's Right", http://www.gao.gov/cghome/uvaspeech.pdf, accessed April 10, 2006

<sup>14 21</sup>st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal Government <a href="http://www.gao.gov/21stcentury.html">http://www.gao.gov/21stcentury.html</a>
15 one for groundle Council of State Council and State Council and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> see for example, Council of State Government, Trends in America: Charting the Course Ahead, June 2005, <a href="http://www.csg.org/nr/csg/images/TrendsInAmericaFinal.pdf">http://www.csg.org/nr/csg/images/TrendsInAmericaFinal.pdf</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> National Center for State Courts, Future Trends in State Courts, 2005, http://www.ncsconline.org/D\_KIS/Trends/index.html

<sup>17</sup> http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=topics.home&topic\_id=1414

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> European Foresight Monitoring Network, <a href="http://www.efmn.info/">http://www.efmn.info/</a>

report was presented and is available for review from the website.<sup>19</sup> These developments are significant for their impact on Anticipatory Democracy.

Cyber Democracy involves the use of information and communications technologies to support governance. Cyber Democracy is a collection of new processes and old habits, of aspirations and fears, of specific detailed improvements in government services and enhancements in human evolution, of tremendous promise and terrible risk. Cyber Democracy focuses on the information and communication mediated aspects of democracy. In terms of Anticipatory Democracy, these advances can allow new or enhanced forms of consciousness, learning and participation. In democracies, we, as voters, get back what we invest in the process. Yet most democracies do little to train us on how to be citizens, particularly on how to develop shared aspirations and visions that could steer our polity or help us anticipate events. Cyber developments – through the internet and increasing artificial intelligence can also allow more rapid and pervasive manipulation and invasions of privacy.

The results of our global survey led us to two conclusions on the status of Cyber Democracy:

*Initial experiments*: Around the globe, but particularly in the most "connected" regions of the world, there are truly significant experiments in government administration. The experiments involve voting, political participation, providing the infrastructure for participation, and developing new forms of agenda setting. This report reviews leading examples of these critical developments.

*Emergent possibilities*: Current experiments only hint at the potential. There is a promising opportunity to invent and put in place new approaches that enhance the key values of democracy, particularly: freedom, equality, stability, majority rule with protection of minority viewpoints, participation, shared vision, and anticipation. In addition, the interactive nature of technology could enhance collective intelligence for shaping policy and implementing change.

Cyber Democracy includes at least five activities:

- **Cyber Administration** Or E-government. The use of the Internet and other information and communications technology (ICT) to enhance government services. The Internet is helping to expedite a wide range of such services.
- Cyber Voting Internet voting for candidates as well as for policies via initiatives and referenda.
- **Cyber Participation** ICT-enhanced citizen interaction and input on policy issues or policy development apart from voting. This would include petitioning legislatures, electronic town meetings<sup>20</sup>, enhanced polling and internet mediated policy dialogues.
- **Cyber Infrastructure** In addition to connectivity, more specific cyber tools used to enhance participation, deliberation, and community building. These tools in-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Cyber Democracy 2001: A Global Scan For Vivendi Universal Prospective by Alternative Futures Associates available at http://www.altfutures.com/docs/Cyber%20Democracy%202001%20-%20A%20Global%20Scan.pdf
<sup>20</sup> see the latest summary from America Speaks:

http://www.americaspeaks.org/resources/library/as/about/as program report 0406.pdf

clude groupware and online community development tools, games and simulations, as well as polling and surveys.

• **Cyber Agenda-Setting** – The use of the Internet and other ICTs to enhance or redirect the political or policy agenda by established groups such as political parties and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and through emergent phenomena, particularly "swarm activism."

The Promise of Cyber Democracy. More than half the US population and three-quarters of European citizens surveyed believe information technology will spark a renewal of democracy and civil society.

The Dark Side of Cyber Democracy. With the enhanced connectivity made possible by ICTs, come potential privacy violations by "big brother" governments, corporations, or terrorists; employment discrimination; loss of civic rituals and community; isolation into one's own political community.

# **Anticipatory Democracy in the Context of Government Transformation**

Another source of input on this tour of Anticipatory Democracy Revisited are the inputs to a project on the future of state government in the US: The Council of State Governments (CSG) States Transformation Initiatives: 2006-2010. In the U.S., CSG is a representative of all three branches (executive, legislative, and judiciary) at the state level. The Project is seeking to identify and promote the most important changes in government. CSG developed a list of models, approaches and best practices that its Transformational Project should consider – the list is below:

## Models/Approaches

- Redesigning Government of Tomorrow Anticipatory democracy/Futures commissions
- Budgeting for Outcome Price of Government
- Legislating for Results Performance measurement
- Managing for Results Qualify management
- Long-Range Forecasts Legislative agenda
- Performance Budgeting Vision/foresight-oriented
- Governing by Network Public-private partnerships
- Charter Agencies Reorganization, flexibility/efficiency
- Reexamining Leadership Driving government performance

While each of these has aspects that are relevant to this article on Anticipatory Democracy Revisited, the ones that are most relevant are the ones that deal with Redesigning Government of Tomorrow, Long-range forecasts – Legislative Agenda and the Performance Budgeting – Vision/foresight-oriented.

In assessing the first topic, I developed an overview of futures programs, based on my observations for the 1970s on. The discussion in the first section of this paper above, from the book *Anticipatory Democracy*, provides my base for observing three decades of developments in this

area. For the CSG Project, the National Center for State Courts reviewed the history of futures commissions and related efforts in state courts. Since the 1990s over 30 state court systems in the US, have had some type of futures effort. Most of those states used the assistance or training material on scenarios and visioning developed by a team that I led from the Hawaii Research Center for Future Studies, the National Center for State Courts and the Institute for Alternative Futures. Below I summarize key lessons from futures commissions for local communities and state governments in the U.S., the National Center for State Courts summarizes the lessons form the judicial futures efforts.

# **Anticipatory Democracy/Futures Commissions**

A summary of a model/approach for the Council on State Governments' session on 21<sup>st</sup> Century Transformational Initiatives (STI) effort March 4, 2006 By Clem Bezold, Institute for Alternative Futures

Futures commissions, and related efforts to look ahead, typically consider alternatives, develop shared visions, set goals, and set priorities. They can take many forms and can be statewide, focused on one branch, e.g. the judiciary (36 states have had these since the 1990s), or focused on the future of a specific topic.

They typically analyze current trends, develop forecasts and alternative scenarios. Many will develop a shared vision from which to generate audacious goals and strategies. Some link these to budget choices.

These efforts can be critical in giving government greater foresight, more conscious direction setting, and greater capacity to create positive change. They can also be less than effective and at times wasted endeavors.

They are most successful when they have strong leadership support (e.g. governor, chief justice), involve other key stakeholders, including the legislature and media, have public learning and public involvement components. The most active and those with the highest long term impact have included these factors. They also considered alternative choices in relation to goals and visions, and involved the public in choices or priorities related to the budget across multiple policy areas.

Different personality types, leadership styles, and personality preferences (e.g. MBTI types) affect how well leaders, stakeholders, and the public can support and take part in these efforts.

Like many government reform efforts, evaluation is seldom designed in from the beginning, and most futures commissions have not been systematically or comparatively evaluated for their long term impacts.

There are many emerging internet/web based tools for enhancing futures commissions and public participation generally.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Bezold, Clement, Wendy L. Schultz, Beatrice P. Monahan et al. Reinventing courts for the 21st century: designing a vision process: a guidebook to visioning and futures thinking within the court system (Williamsburg: NCSC, 1993)."http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/ctadmin&CISOPTR=15

Futures commissions can stimulate imagination and creativity in considering options; track emerging trends and relate these trends to current policies; develop alternative scenarios; inform and involve the public and key stakeholders; and allow the public to link policy options and trends to priority setting for state policies and the budget.

These typically are one-shot activities. And their greatest weakness is their demise or lack of attention when a new governor or leader brings in a new administration.

There are efforts, such as in Kentucky, to make a foresight function more permanent, but in this case Kentucky is ahead of the rest of the country. And many of the functions mentioned above could be built into decision-making more consistently.

Bottom line: Futures commissions (using various names) can be important tools for Transforming Government. They require a significant commitment of resources for staff or consultants, participant travel, communicating with key stakeholders and the public, as well as attention and support from their sponsor, e.g. the governor and relevant leaders.

## **Judicial Futures Commissions**

Summary of Model/Approach by National Center for State Courts for the March 4, 2006 Council of State Governments' session on 21st Century Transformational Ini-

Historically, state court systems have been reactive bodies. As the court administration discipline matured, state court judicial leaders recognized the need for courts to be more forward-thinking, to proactively address systemic problems, and to better position the courts to respond to change. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, judicial leaders for the state courts undertook an initiative to develop forward-looking visions and strategic plans.

The National Center for State Courts (NCSC) received a grant from the State Justice Institute (SJI) for a multi-faceted project. The grant supported the work of several state court futures commissions, national conferences [e.g., The Futures and the Courts Conference (May 1990)], development of a guide to strategic planning, development of a curriculum to assist courts in developing their capacities for conducting futures analysis and strategic planning, and a template for conducting environmental scans at the national level so as to support local, state, and national futures activities.<sup>22</sup>

While state court leaders had flexibility to design their individual state futures/strategic planning effort to meet the individual needs and structure of the organization of their state courts, the basic phases of the approach were as follows.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> NCSC continues to conduct annual environmental scans at the national level and publishes an annual trends document. The most recent edition, *Future Trends in State Courts 2005*, was published in November 2005. A copy of the publication is on the NCSC web site at <a href="www.ncsconline.org">www.ncsconline.org</a>. Questions can also be directed to NCSC's Knowledge and Information Services at (800) 616-6164

- Mission A mission statement was adopted as the overarching reference for all
  activities for the state court system and identified the formal and informal mandates with which the state court system was charged.
- **Vision** An inspirational shared vision was established to encourage creativity and facilitate implementation of the strategic plan.
- Futures Thinking The central element of futures/strategic planning was to
  extrapolate and express possible outcomes/futures based upon observed patterns of change over time. Futures analysis within state court systems served to
  identify the types of demands that courts face and to assess to potential and
  likely implications of those demands.
- Strategy Formation A broad and creative range of options were considered
  to devise strategies that are supportable, implementable, and effective. Political
  considerations were also acknowledged and addressed as part of the planning
  process.
- **Implementation Planning** Planning was required to ensure realization of strategies. Action steps for implementing the strategies and the resources needed to support the strategies were defined.
- Managing Change Leadership was critical to maintain the momentum of the
  initiative, secure the needed resources to support the strategies, obtain buy-in
  from both internal and external stakeholders, and to take corrective actions as
  needed based on implementation experiences.
- State Court Futures Reports Reports were issued documenting the recommendations coming out the futures/strategic planning effort. These reports are available through the NCSC's web site at <a href="http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/StateLinks/CtFutuStateLinks.htm">http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/StateLinks/CtFutuStateLinks.htm</a>
  The NCSC also issued a guide to strategic planning based on the experience of the Judicial Futures Commissions. This publication can be found at <a href="http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/KIS\_CtFutuCharting\_a\_Course.pd">http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/KIS\_CtFutuCharting\_a\_Course.pd</a> f.

The analysis of the futures reports identified recurring themes among the recommendations.

- Improving access to justice through multicultural improvements and user friendly forms and instructions for pro se litigants;
- Creating new and rehabilitative methods for solving problems and resolving disputes;
- Improving judicial performance through evaluations, education, and increased compensation incentives;
- Improving public trust and confidence in the legal system through increased knowledge and education;
- Modernization and integration of technology throughout the state courts;
- Structural consolidation of state court systems; and
- Improving family interventions in the juvenile and domestic relations courts.

While it is unclear how many futures commissions currently exist, initiatives to implement the recommendations referenced above are on-going across the country.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Charting a Course to Strategic Thought and Action, by Kenneth G. Pankey, Jr. and Anne E. Skove with Jennifer R. Sheldon (2002)

# Integral Futures: Values, Societal Evolution and Democracy

Anticipatory democracy is an aspiration supported by a set of trends in future tools, in societies and in government processes. Futures tools are broadening to include our deeper understanding and our values. Causal Layered Analysis, led by Sohail Inayatullah<sup>24</sup>, and Integral Futures both provide richer tools. Likewise at the Institute for Alternative Futures we have been evolving "aspirational futures" approaches that help communities ensure that they are creating the future they really want.

An important and evolving concept for considering where and how anticipatory democracy might steer societies is integral futures or integral philosophy, with its related approach to spiral dynamics. Ken Wilber is most associated with Integral Philosophy<sup>25</sup> and Don Beck and Clare Graves with Spiral Dynamics. The basic argument is that societies mature and evolve, as individual humans do. There are a several levels of development. Ken Wilber notes that in the first tier there are 6 levels, "each of which believes that its value system is the only true, correct, or deeply worthwhile value system in existence. Those first-tier waves are, very briefly: beige: instinctual; purple: magical-animistic, tribal; red: egocentric, power, feudalistic; blue: mythic-membership, conformist, fundamentalist, ethnocentric, traditional; orange: excellence, achievement, progress, modern; green: postmodern, multicultural, sensitive, pluralistic... Those first-tier waves of development are followed by what Clare Graves called "the momentous leap of meaning" to second tier, which has, as of today, two major levels or waves of awareness: yellow: systemic, flexible, flowing; turquoise: cosmic unity, integrative, nested hierarchies of interrelationships, one-in-many holism"<sup>26</sup> Laws for most societies are written at the highest average expectable level of development in their governance system.

This awareness of levels of development among within and across societies has been used in anticipatory democracy like programs in South Africa and other settings to increase the consciousness of participants and to develop strategies that more effectively accomplish shared goals.

Anticipatory democracy is a collection of tools and practices that bring more effective steering by the public. This integral viewpoint, using spiral dynamics points out that many individuals live within levels or memes that do not value those at other levels. Becoming conscious of these levels will be important for enhancing effective democracy.

## **Vision and Directions in Anticipatory Democracy**

My view of the evolution of anticipatory democracy, and the advances and setbacks it has faced over 3 decades, reinforces the importance of developing shared vision. The more effectively efforts have developed shared vision, particularly across diverse communities, the more successful these efforts have been. Given the diversity of individuals – and the differing levels from which

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Sohail Inayatullah, editor, The Causal Layered Analysis (CLA) Reader: Theory and Case Studies of an Integrative and Transformative Methodology; Tapei, Tamkang University Press, December 2004. Available from February 9, 2005

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Ken Wilber, A Theory of Everything: An Integral Vision for Business, Politics, Science and Spirituality, Boston, Shambala, 2000.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> from Ken Wilber On line

 $<sup>\</sup>label{lem:http://72.14.203.104/search?q=cache:pdptn4qZKZYJ:wilber.shambhala.com/html/misc/iraq.cfm+integral+politics+9/26+Policy+ken+wilber&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=1$ 

they view their society, the task of developing shared vision is more challenging. Individuals at different levels may not accept, appreciate or recognize the legitimacy of those at different levels.

Yet it remains essential for to develop shared vision and to relate these to goals, priorities and tradeoffs. Alternatives for Washington did this in the 1970s and it had a transcendent impact on state policies. Goal setting in the context of values and vision are essential; as will be mechanisms for the public to provide input on budget priorities and tradeoffs. Budgeting for outcomes and other advances on the list above from the Council of State Governments project are providing better tools for doing this as well as experience that can move across jurisdictions.

Are there signs that evolution at the level of values and vision may be taking place that could give hope to a fulsome future for democracy. Yes. Society does "change its mind". Societies changed their minds about slavery and women's rights. The book in which this article sits celebrates the fact that Finland gave women the right to vote in 2006. This is one important step in equality for women. Currently there is a parallel trend toward equity and fairness at its early stages. As with slavery and women's rights, statements of principles and vision statements precede change. In the area of "fairness" or "equity", health is increasingly a place to observe this evolution. The World Health Organization's, "health for all" vision, adopted by all nations of the world in the mid 1990s, includes the values of equity, solidarity, sustainability, ethics, gender and human rights is an example.<sup>27</sup> The US in complying with that vision set up our Healthy People 2010 Objectives for the nation with 2 overarching goals for this decade. The first overarching goal is longer years of healthy life; the second is "the elimination of health disparities". And the US scientific body on health care, the Institute of Medicine, has developed a major report on quality - Crossing the Quality Chasm. Its six aims for health care include equity - that health care is equitable – the system should seek to close racial and ethnic gaps in health status. <sup>28</sup> The WHO Health For All vision, the Healthy People 2010 Goals, and the IOM report, are not significant for the outcomes they have generated thus far. They represent the early stages of society "changing its mind". Just as there were major commitments to abolish slavery or give women rights that represented steps toward those ends. Anticipatory democracy will ultimately include the ability for societies (local, national, and global) to weigh and express their values and what they want for the world to be. While a slow process, this will, I believe, ultimately lead to a world with greater equity.

## Conclusion

Anticipatory democracy is a collection of trends and is an aspiration in itself – genuine, enlight-ened participation with foresight. Its tools and applications grow and recede, in this case like a slowly rising tide. There are enormous challenges we face – from nature, our social and economic systems, and our fellow men. Our ability to anticipate specific events remains challenged, but our capacity to use futures tools to better understand the range of possibilities we face and to better choose and create the future we want are improving. The information and cyber revolutions will likewise enhance our learning and opportunities for participation even while threatening our privacy and security. Anticipatory democracy remains a needed advance for nations and for global governance.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Health 21: The Health for All Policy Framework of the European Region of WHO: <a href="http://www.who.dk/document/health21/wa540ga199heeng.pdf">http://www.who.dk/document/health21/wa540ga199heeng.pdf</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> see Donald Berwick, A User's Manual For The IOM's 'Quality Chasm' Report, HEALTH AFFAIRS ~ Volume 21, Number 3, pp. 80–90; http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/21/3/80.pdf

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# Linking People to pixels, next steps in EU democracy and power Present challenges, limits and perspectives of an atypical form of governance

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#### **Abstract**

This paper analyses different aspects of the concept of democracy within the context of the European Union. It is focused on the need to face changes and to understand the level of complexities which are related to this process; some questions arise from these considerations: how many years will be required to understand and possibly to manage the connection between all the new and different social, economic and political positions inside the EU? Is it possible to consider the EU's "institutional architecture" as a model for new forms of governance? What are the concrete questions of democracy within Europe? What are the characteristics of the non-existent European people? What is the role of technology in this atypical form of democracy?

In order to give possible answers to these questions the paper will briefly analyse three concrete aspects of "EU citizenship", which are related to health policy, ethnic minorities and migration. The challenge will be the identification of a model able to transform problems into potential opportunities using a futures approach, the conclusion will be that part of today's challenges are directly connected to the need for new future forms of Governance.

## Introduction: our common past, one possible idea of democracy in Europe

In 1948 George Orwell wrote, "the face of the Big Brother faded away again and instead the three slogans of the Party stood out in bold capitals: WAR IS PEACE, FREEDOM IS SLAV-ERY IGNORANCE IS STRENGTH. But the face of the Big Brother seemed to persist on the screen, as though the impact that it had made on everyone's eyeballs was too vivid to wear off immediately". It sounds like an ironic coincidence, but in 1984 the Italian philosopher Norberto Bobbio wrote an important book<sup>2</sup> which generated an intense debate at the European level; the title of this book is "The future of democracy" and one of the theses discussed in the work was the possibility of fostering forms of direct democracy using personal computers (note that the existence of the Internet was not, at that time, known worldwide).

The sense of this short introduction is that, starting from the Second World War, it is possible to identify in Europe a sort of feeling (or even a faith) focused on the relationship between democracy and technological development. Moreover, the concept of faith implies hope, improvement and trust; all of them, of course, projected into the future. Put briefly, the idea of democracy in Europe is understood as something in perpetual change, the principles are clear and accepted, the forms are subject to different possible evolutions.

<sup>1</sup> Orwell 1989

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Bobbio 1984

# Some aspects of the sources and characteristics of democracy within the EU context

Participation and debates are the food of democracy, the creation of forms of *consensus* on specific themes is one of the needs to satisfy. As citizens we experienced this challenge some years ago when there was a deep debate on the future of Europe. "Enlargement is both an historical opportunity and an obligation for the European Union", said Romano Prodi, former President of the EU Commission. The Institutional website of the EU Commission offered the chance to take part in a virtual debate and the result of this form of interaction among citizens became part of a "White Paper on Democracy" published in 2004.

This example gives us the chance to maintain that in the relationship between democracy and technology, the first is the objective, the other is a means. The mix of the "sources" of democracy, their alchemy or their failure depends on their combination in the future; this implies that a multidisciplinary and rigorous approach, studying the changes and the trajectories of our needs and expectations could be seen as one of the most relevant sources for democracy in the EU.

The European Union is a unique example of the concrete realization of "visions" and ideas of the future using the concept of democracy as an objective and several different sources as means. Of course, it is not a perfect model. If we start to analyse the "galaxy" of general direction/executive, offices, commissions, units and so on called the European Union we identify a political compromise able to produce about 20 versions of a single document (the so-called official languages). Moreover, even if the European Union increasingly "speaks with one voice" in international negotiations and agreements related, for example, to environmental risks such as climate change, it is not possible to argue the same in relation to Enlargement, or even in relation to the Schengen Agreement or the "Euro" (considering, for example, the British decision, referred to as "opting out"). Another factor of complexity is related to the differences between "substantial" and "formal" enlargement: Article 49 of the European treaty foresees the unanimity of consensus in order to permit a Democratic country to enter in the European Union. Once again, democracy and future.

## Living the democracy today: practical example (and problems) of being EU citizens

At this stage it seems possible to argue that the various forms of European Democracy will have to face different problems with different levels of complexity. One thing could be considered as a starting point: in Europe (East and West) the time of excessive hope and fears is over. Today, one of the problems is "how to establish and maintain conditions for sustainable development of European societies in economic, political, cultural and environmental terms"<sup>4</sup>.

All these aspects are part of the concept of "democracy", understood as a way of living and acting and not as a theory or something which does not have points of contact with citizens' daily lives. In order to analyse "practical applications" of the value of democracy, this paper will develop a brief overview of three concrete situations, which are related to health policy, ethnic minorities and migration. This, (hopefully), will give the reader a sort of complex impression: the "new citizenship", (that is the expression of rights and duties which refers to all Europeans), seems to be something which is under construction and we have to work to prepare ourselves for

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Prodi 2001

<sup>4</sup> Genov 2004

possible futures alternatives. The exercise of "Linking people to pixels" becomes an expression of the supreme value of our social pact and it crosses the borderlines of the relationship between technology and *demos* (the people).

The first consideration comes from the need to face a terrible disease named AIDS. Western Europe has one of the lowest prevalence rates of HIV globally, and has not been affected by the epidemic to the same extent as other regions such as South East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. In eastern Europe, however, the prevalence of HIV during the last decade has gone from being one of the lowest in the world to spreading alarmingly rapidly, with the highest rate of new infections in the world. It is important to highlight that there is currently no harmonisation with respect to Aids policy in the European Union. All of the EU countries have different legal approaches and policies regarding HIV/AIDS. There is a clash of interests with respect to individual, institutional and social aspects. For example, some legislators in some countries feel that the rights of the patient are more important than others, while others feel public health is more important. "This leads to different policies regarding aspects such as mandatory versus voluntary testing. Because of these differences in point of view, no common policy has been formed. Many suggest that it is important to implement a uniform political strategy towards the issue, because many believe that totally uniform legislation will not be possible"<sup>5</sup>. In this context, the lack of harmonisation becomes an indicator of the absence of fundamental rights closely connected to the concept of citizenship, which is one of the more important exemplifications of the presence of a system of rights, duties and forms of justice in an institutional environment.

A second example comes from the "ethnic minority issue". A century ago, about half of the area under consideration was identified with one ethnic minority or another; sixty years ago the proportion was still about one-quarter. Today, although quantitative approximations are extremely problematic, it might be estimated that no more than one tenth of the population in east-central Europe belongs to an ethnic minority. Nevertheless, the problems associated with minorities have not declined proportionately. Unlike immediately neighbouring regions, such as Moldova, minority problems here have not exploded into armed conflict and they are not likely to do so. However, they continue to weigh considerably on the internal evolution of the area and on its future relations with the EU.

The exclusivist conception of the state, with its consequences for the minority issue, is a common feature of all the "new EU countries", regardless of the very significant distinction in the weight and situation of minorities among them. Four countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary) have minority populations not exceeding 10 % of the total population. With the exception of the Roma, these minorities are not salient. In four other countries, Slovakia and Lithuania (already EU members), Bulgaria and Romania (their access is in the negotiation phase), minorities comprise up to 25 % of the population. Here, certain minority groups constitute compact and distinct societies and they are an important factor in national policies. Finally, in two countries (Latvia and Estonia) minorities, in fact, a single Russian speaking or Slavic minority, exceeds 30 % of the population<sup>6</sup>. Once again, what will the solutions of the "spectrum" of problems related to this issue be? What kind of EU citizenship is foreseeable for these people? Is it possible to foster a political solution at Union level, by-passing to a certain extent, the role of nations? Is it possible to imagine for the future two levels of democracy in Europe, a sort of common basis for all members which covers "macro rights" and a set of specific solutions adopted according to national legislation? The so-called two (or even more) speed Europe seems not to be applicable to this issue.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> European Parliament, STOA 2001

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Liebich 1998

The two aspects analysed give us the opportunity to focus attention on the need to better understand the link between democracy and citizenship. The European Union laboratory seems to indicate that there is "another actor on the stage" and this is the need to understand and design new forms of governance, possibly future oriented.

Another example which supports this thesis comes from the "migration issue". Fifty years after mass migration began in most European countries, the process of integration has entered a new phase. Since the end of the 1970s in the north of Europe and of the 1980s in the south, it has been obvious that all the major European countries have become countries of immigration and must build policies to promote the integration of their immigrants. After a decade of debate and study we know a little more about the slow progress towards the social integration of different immigrant groups. However, as soon as we began to analyse the changes that had occurred in the socio-demography and economic position of immigrants, a new issue emerged on the social and political agenda: the 'management of diversity'. The rise of a 'second generation' (i.e. the offspring of immigrants) in the former countries of immigration has produced a new context that needs to be analysed. To improve our understanding of integration in the long run, the social sciences, demography in particular, should promote observation and analyses of the socioeconomic positions and trajectories of this second generation. What kind of integration are the second generations experiencing compared with their parents and with the natives of the countries where they live? Are they reproducing the positions, practices and trajectories of their parents or are they converging with 'native nationals' of the same age groups according to the theory of integration?

These three examples (health policy related to aids, ethnic minorities and migration) give us the idea of a structured relationship which links complexity and political choices. The various decision-making processes (at national or EU level) have to face problems which already require particular skills and "levels of knowledge" merely to be simply understood; the question is: how it is possible for our Parliaments to solve all these typologies of situations properly?

# EU democracy of tomorrow: risks and opportunities of sharing power with national parliaments and experts

"Historically, parliament has been a symbol and agent of *Demos*, the basis for legitimising political authority and legislation, and accountable to "the people" for laws and regulation. However, many of the most important changes in modern society are currently taking place through mechanisms beyond the scope of parliamentary purview".

One of the causes of this change is related to the "scientification of politics", particularly the use of expertise. In the politics of knowledge and technology, scientific and technical experts advise policy-makers. However, experts do not speak with a single voice or authority. As a result, effective monitoring, deliberation and decision-making about many, if not most, policy areas today are far beyond the capacity of a typical parliament. "The sovereignty of experts complements as well as competes with parliamentary sovereignty".

If the "use of experts" is possible and already needed and requested in technical, fiscal or environmental matters, why should it be different for decisions closely related to the future? Parlia-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Sloat 2000

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Ihidem

ments need to consider and prepare for future developments. Tools of pro-active analysis and deliberation would be useful, such as scenario analysis and impact assessment. Parliament could then assume the role of *Meta sovereign*, defining and enforcing general standards of governance. Democracy is changing, parliaments also need to define explicitly in new legislation or a new constitution the role, duties, responsibilities, and accountability of *expertise and scientists* in democratic policies. An appropriate and modern constitution would then refer not only to parliament, formal government and citizens, but also to organisations, agents of civil society and experts in governance processes, defining their roles, rights and obligations.

# Next steps: from governance to renewed forms of democracy?

The above-mentioned high level of complexities, together with the need to identify some alternatives to a political choice, lead us to two different levels of consideration: in modern democracies, especially in an innovative and supra-national one such as the EU, from one side it is necessary to find a sort of "mediator" of complexity and, from the other side, actual forms of governance require new methods and models of action.

If we assume that participation, knowledge, public debate, the correct use of mass media, the circulation of information and (why not?) also the study of the future (understood as the rigorous analysis of possible developments of present challenges) are all sources for democracy, then this mix of elements will contribute to the development of a valuable definition of several possible alternatives related to the solution of concrete political, economic or social problems (for example in terms of migration policy). In between these alternatives there will probably be a "suggested action" which could be followed in the process of taking the decision. It has to be underlined that this process operates in "democratic conditions" that is, that we are not referring to an oligarchy or to an insufficient governmental capacity on the part of decision makers. On the contrary, this path could only be developed in efficient and mature democracies or international Institutions such as the European Union.




Fig. 1. Basic elements and their sequence in a simple process of governance in EU context

After having taken the decision, there will be a monitoring phase conducted by several actors from their own perspectives: decision makers, public opinion and groups of experts. In any case, the decision will produce political results that will be evaluated once again by all the actors involved in the process. After this the actors will arrive at a redefinition of the problem, probably a sort of simplification of it, in our case comprehension of the necessity "to split" the original problem named simply, "democracy in the European Union" into several aspects. The scheme suggests identifying single causes and effects, keeping our attention on the necessary holistic approach which is needed to solve problems of such complexity.

Of course, the process is not perfect and could be starkly influenced by exogenous factors which are able to influence and halt it in any phase of its development: for example, the presence of another actor, a pressure group, which is politically stronger than a group of experts in a certain field, could express opposition to the suggested action, refusing legitimisation of such an intervention. Another obstacle could originate from the consequences that the decision to be taken could have on political parties preparing their strategy in order to win impending elections. If the suggested action could cause the loss of votes, it is difficult to argue that the decision makers will adopt it! Finally, during the evaluation phase opposition in public opinion could arise which, even if based on emotional rather than scientific grounds, has to be taken into consideration just because, once again, we are referring to democratic States.

# The bridge between the present and future of democracy in EU: Lisbon, research policy and the subsidiarity principle

The EU laboratory has developed strategies related to the future of Europe. "Scientific research, technological development and innovation are at the heart of the knowledge-based economy, a key factor in growth, the competitiveness of companies and employment. For this reason, the Commission has made strengthening European research a major objective in its Communication on the future financial framework of the Union, proposing to increase the European Union's research budget: taking all activities together, the budget should be doubled" 10.

In the Lisbon strategy, research becomes a means to sustain social policy; this system of rights, duties, public intervention, equity and re-allocation of financial instruments seems to be a clear indicator of the level of democracy of a certain institution. Another means in this process of redesigning democracy in Europe is the so-called socio-economic partnership (mostly at a local level) and citizen participation. It is not an attempt to rebuild the ancient Greek forms of democracy, and this paper does not theoretically refer to a sort of "retrotopia" (that is a utopia which looks to the past while it is dreaming about the future). The most relevant aspect is that, in Europe, a continent is trying to move beyond different types of economies and several decades of cold war without the authority and the forms of power typical of a national state but using a new institutional architecture. In this process, it is extremely important to "take part", to share visions and values and to bring forms of support to the collectivity.

A key question for policymakers at the national, regional and local level is how to provide the right conditions to generate the growth of more knowledge-intensive forms of activity and development within the context of dynamic innovation systems or learning regions. Regional fore-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> European Commission, COM (2004) 101, 10.2.2004

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> European Commission, COM 353, 16.06.2004

sight exercises may provide a useful instrument in helping them chart their economic strategies. "A critical issue rests with the impact of path dependency in local and regional economies. The concepts of path dependency and lock-in imply that the technological trajectories of specific regions and localities are historically determined by the research and innovation capabilities developed by individuals and organizations over time. The nature of key institutional elements may affect both the innovative capacity of regional economies and their potential to serve as nodes for cluster development. Similarly, the ability, or inability, of the local or regional economy to develop the underlying conditions of trust and social capital that contribute to the presence of a learning economy may create a condition of lock-in to a specific innovation trajectory." <sup>11</sup>.

Moreover, most science and technology applications affect social, organisational and institutional dimensions. The uncertainty associated with the impact of technology policies calls for a greater involvement of stakeholders and users in decision-making, for example through participatory mechanisms, public-private partnerships and far greater transparency in decision-making.

"As a result, the focus on public-private partnerships is being strengthened, but also the coordination between national and regional policies in a form of "multi- level governance", in which regions are assuming an increasing role. Indeed, one important trend in recent years has been that of moving towards decentralisation and regionalisation of policy making, i.e. the transfer of substantial powers to regional and local authorities, which are viewed as more capable of acting in the best interests of their respective areas.

This trend relates to the concept of *subsidiarity*, whereby decisions should be taken by those public authorities that are as close to the citizen as possible <sup>12</sup>.

## Conclusion: from bottom up to a polycentric concept of democracy

In such a framework, it is possible to argue that we are witnessing "a change of paradigm": in modern democracy the focus is on values, rules, parliamentary representation and structured forms of power (political parties, trade unions, media), in *future* democracies the attention shifts to the available *resources*, the way in which they are mixed and their *alchemical effect*. Practical examples of the meaning of *resources for future democracies* are concepts such as research, social knowledge management, and participation.

Parliamentary democracies are basically founded on the coherent interaction of four "elements": people, elections, parliament, government. The paradigms of next generational forms of democracy are participation, best resources allocation, future thinking, establishing a system which evaluates alternatives. The substance of the new paradigm of European democracy lies in this apparent paradox: a Union (not a Federation or a Confederation) of 25 states identifies in decentralization, in multi-level governance and in subsidiarity the core and the aim of its way of understanding democracy. It seems that sharing, or even losing power in some aspects, produces better forms of government. The innovation in the link between people, power and democracy is not based on technology but on political philosophy.

In this context the roles of all actors involved in the decision-making process changes, the Parliaments become the place in which citizens are represented, different interests are mediated but

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Gertler & Wolfe 2002

<sup>12</sup> Uyarra & Haarich 2002

also the "framework" in which a considerable and (perhaps) hidden form of power, *Knowledge Power*, is exercised.

To "Democratise scientific knowledge" is another necessity which comes from institutions and public opinion; knowledge could be a source for a renewal of democracy, it should not be considered as an obstacle. The diffusion of future studies exercises is closely connected with a situation of uncertainty. Theoretical, methodological and conceptual innovation often derive from crises which become opportunities. The 21<sup>st</sup> century will be characterised by technological efficiency and social turbulence; these aspects (in other dramatic dimensions), were particularly present during the Nazi period. The western democratic system seems to be searching for sustainable models of economic growth, social cohesion, inter-cultural dialogue. In other words, this is what we call 'development' and in a global society it is necessary to start with what is considered to be immediately possible, that is the local dimension or, put in an informal way, "participation"

To summarise, our political structure is struggling against what is changing and we are losing the challenges of today, the current forms of western democracy do not preserve the needs of future generations and this implies that we are running away from the model of development we would like to follow. The use of futures studies methodologies and the ability to think, participate and act locally could represent a new approach towards a development of new forms of democracy.

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# Will America ever become a democracy?

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#### **Abstract**

The US Constitution did not create a democracy. Numerous constitutional structures prevent democracy, and most Americans are content with that. No other nation is democratic, though some tend towards democracy. Democracy is technically possible at a global level if and when people and artilects desire it.

## The US is not a democracy

The United States is not a democracy, has never been a democracy, was not created to be a democracy, and will not become a democracy without substantial changes in the structure of government and the understanding and will of the American people. Until it is fully understood and recognized that America cannot possibly be a model for democracy anywhere since it is not democratic itself, neither America nor the rest of the world will be able to move towards the kind of peaceful self-governance that democratic theory and practice promises.

On the one hand, this is an utterly commonplace and banal statement. The fact that the US is not a democracy and that the founding fathers who wrote the US Constitution had no intention of establishing one has been well known and widely discussed for many years.<sup>1</sup>

On the other hand, this is a startling and liberating statement that should enable Americans and all others to strive towards creating a form of government that does not yet exist anywhere as fully as it can and should. Some governments now, such as those of the Scandinavian countries, most clearly including Finland, and Holland, tend towards democracy while most others do not.

## The NonDemocratic American Constitution.

In the space available for this essay, it is not possible fully to demonstrate that the struggle to create the US government following its separation from England, between 1776 and 1789, was a conflict between people desiring to create as nearly democratic a government as was possible for the former colonies, given their historical isolation, geographic separation, and the ideologies and especially technologies available to them at the time, on the one hand, and those who wanted to create a stable government that would keep power firmly in the hands of a minority of white male property owners, on the other. But that was the struggle of the time, and those in favor of a restricted-franchise republic were successful in crafting a Constitution and a debate that then entirely defeated those who wanted a moderate democracy for the new nation. While there have

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<sup>1</sup> Ketcham, Beard, Parenti, Dahl

been a few amendments to the original constitution that have extended the vote to people who originally were not allowed to vote or run for office (former slaves first and women later), there has not been any amendment adopted that has moved US national governance towards a democracy. There have been some such movements in some of the states and municipalities, and that is noteworthy, but the structure and process of national governance in the US remains firmly non-democratic.

# **Dangerous Presidentialism**

And dangerously so: Professor Fred Riggs has shown that the Presidentialist system of US governance, which has been adopted in many newly-independent parts of the world (in South and Central America, Africa, and some parts of Asia during the decolonization period following the Second World War and more recently following the collapse of the Soviet Empire in the 1990s) without exception led to military dictatorship in the former and is steadily tending towards military dictatorship in the latter.<sup>2</sup>

Whenever one has a choice between a presidentialist and a parliamentary government, choose parliamentary – though surely we can do better than that now given current and emerging communication technologies and theories and practices of self-governance.

# **Single-member districts**

Moreover, the Constitutionally mandated single-member district system of the US government (both in elections for the President and Vice President and House of Representatives, and in effect also for the Senate) forces the US to have a two-party system, making the emergence of a multiparty system impossible in the US. As a consequence, even "representation" in the US national government is always of the most aggregate and remote kind, while the resulting "representatives", with very few (and mainly gerrymandered) exceptions, are wealthy white men who can garner the money necessary to buy the votes required for election, and thus are truly representative of only a tiny sliver of American citizens.<sup>3</sup>

## **Judicial** governance

In addition, the US Supreme Court, an entirely unelected group of people chosen in part because they tend to be out of touch with and unrepresentative of current sentiments, has gained over time (and extra-constitutionally) the ability to interpret the meaning of the words of the US Constitution, and to declare acts by other branches of government and individual citizens at all levels "unconstitutional" when it so wishes<sup>4</sup>.

I could go on and on pointing out the fundamentally undemocratic structure of US national government, and thus the absurdity, if not the hypocrisy, of any American--such as myself--who pretends to be interested in "exporting" or "nurturing" democracy elsewhere in the world without first achieving it in the US itself.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Riggs

<sup>3</sup> Ami

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Schubert, Dator 2001

## No democratic will

But in addition to anti-democratic structural impediments built into the US Constitution, it is also the case that most Americans do not want a democratic government. Most of them are quite willing either to pay no attention to and not to participate in formal politics at all, or they are quite happy to engage in the ritual of voting (which is essentially unrelated to any policy-making), and in no other form of political participation.

John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse did some excellent empirical work for their book titled *Stealth democracy: Americans' beliefs about how government should work.* The authors state their conclusions very clearly in the introduction:

The last thing people want is to be more involved in political decision making: They do not want to make political decisions themselves; they do not want to provide much input to those who are assigned to make these decisions; and they would rather not know all the details of the decision-making process. Most people have strong feelings on few if any of the issues the government needs to address and would much prefer to spend their time in nonpolitical pursuits. Rather than wanting a more active, participatory democracy, a remarkable number of people want what we call stealth democracy....

Participation in politics is low not because of the difficulty of registration requirements or the dearth of places for citizens to discuss politics, not because of the sometimes unseemly nature of debate in Congress or displeasure with a particular public policy. Participation in politics is low because people do not like politics even in the best of circumstances; in other words, they simply do not like the process of openly arriving at a decision in the face of diverse opinions<sup>5</sup>.

The rest of their book documents these conclusions.

There is of course a minority of citizens who are intensely interested in influencing public policy making. Some of them are rich or well-connected enough to be able to be influential while the rest engage in frustrated discussions, emotional oratorical outbursts, and occasional demonstrations in the streets.

# What is "democracy"?

So far, I have not explained what I mean by "democracy". It is indeed the case that there are many different, often contradictory, meanings of the term. Almost every government on Earth (and especially during the Communist era) labels its government "democratic." The word can almost be said to just mean "good", "a government I like", or "what most rulers like to call their government".

I mean something very specific: Democracy is a form and process of governance that allows each person affected by the actions of an entity, a continuous and equal opportunity to influence actions of that entity.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 1–3

Given this definition, it should thus be clear why I say that not only is the US government not "democratic" but neither is the government of any other country, though some countries tend towards it more than others – such as the governments of Scandinavia and Holland.

# The implications of "democracy"

It should also be clear that I extend the term democracy to more than just formal government. In order for a polity to be democratic, I believe democracy must extend to all forms and processes that influence people, first and foremost, economic structures, most of which are profoundly authoritarian and undemocratic. The historical failure of all communist and socialist states so far to achieve workplace democracy should not be allowed to prevent us from trying to achieve it if we feel it is worthwhile, as I do.

Similarly – and perhaps actually more importantly – democracy should inform the decision-making processes of the family and of religious groups, both of which are also generally patriarchal and authoritarian. I know I have probably lost my audience with that assertion – if I even had it so far – but it is not possible to have effective formal democratic government unless we have routinely informal democratic governance as well, I believe.

It also clearly follows that the bounds and pretensions of the current nation-state system are too narrow to encompass my definition of democracy. Many years ago, a colleague, Yasumasa Kuroda, and myself wrote and presented to the Japanese Diet a proposal that representatives of all people outside of Japan who are significantly impacted by Japanese economic and political activities should have a place in the Diet and be able to vote on measures impacting them<sup>6</sup>.

I believe that notion now needs to be expanded globally on the basis of my definition of democracy, along with the emergence of a global definition of "citizenship" or whatever that concept morphs into.

## Do people want democracy?

Let me revisit my comments about citizen interest and participation in governance. The quotation I gave from Hibbing and Theiss-Morse might lead one to conclude that Americans, at least, are not interested in self-governance and are quite willing to leave it up to others to govern for them. But that is not entirely the case. In the same section of their book that I quoted above, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse also wrote: "People want to be able to make democracy visible and accountable on those rare occasions when they are motivated to be involved. They want to know that the opportunity will be there for them even though they probably have no current intention of getting involved in government or even of paying attention to it".

That I think is the key. Even citizens who say they have no interest in self-governance *do* want to have an opportunity to participate effectively in it whenever they later decide they want to participate. But this they cannot do. And since they know (or soon discover) that they cannot participate effectively when they want to, they become even more apathetic or cynical about politics.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Kuroda and Dator

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2

But they are not apathetic about all forms of participation. Although Robert Putnam documented the decline of certain kinds of civic participation in the US<sup>8</sup>, there is also ample evidence that almost all Americans, and all other humans, are involved in some kind of activity outside their home, even if it is increasingly online or virtual. The situation is this: 1) people participate in things they care about; 2) when their participation or nonparticipation matters to them; and 3) when they are enabled to participate easily and effectively. And that is the point. Currently, in the US and generally elsewhere, governance structure are designed to prevent, or to make extremely difficult, participation in policy making (and policy implementation, which is often completely overlooked) in any effective way. If structures existed that made political participation easy, fun, and effective (and nonparticipation costly), more citizens would participate in formal government just as they participate in religious, sports or other activities that they are interested in<sup>9</sup>.

# Why people work

One of the biggest obstacles to citizen active participation in politics is the fact they have to work. It has always been a big mystery to me why participation in the workforce is considered to be mandatory (or at least laudatory) while participation in governance is considered to be voluntary and difficult. Since human mental as well as manual labor is really not necessary for the creation, distribution, repair or recycling of most goods and services now available in so-called "advanced countries" (people are made to work mainly to prevent them from having the time and energy to participate in governance, and as a way of giving them access to the credit – or debt – that enables them to acquire goods and services produced without their significant labor), why not invent and design systems that free people from meaningless "labor" and that enable them once again to become actively-participating democratic citizens in the old Athenian mode? I am certain that is possible if people were to decide it was desirable.

#### A hybrid model of democracy

Nonetheless it is certainly the case that very few people want to participate in every decision in the world that needs to be made. They are quite happy to leave most of the decisions up to others of their choosing. Here is where Jiri Räsänen's brilliant "Aanivalta" project of the late 1980s still rings true to me. Among other things, "Aanivalta" proposed a system that allows citizens to participate directly in any public policy making they wish, and to choose (on a daily basis, if necessary) a representative to act on the many issues they prefer not to become directly concerned about.

# Direct democracy is possible now.

It fortunately is not necessary for me to demonstrate that global, as well as local, direct electronic democracy is possible now, and certainly in the future, if we wish to have it. Extensive experiments have been conducted all over the world showing that it is possible. It is also possible to design systems that prevent the "abuses" of direct democracy that so many people raise in objection, such as instant emotional responses that result in "wrong" decisions; the fact that informa-

<sup>8</sup> Putnam

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Dator, 1983

tion and discussion is needed before any person can or should participate; that designing and making transparent software used for public decision-making must itself be available for public scrutiny; and many, many more. I heartily recommend anyone interested in the possibility of direct electronic democracy to read Ted Becker and Christa Daryl Slaton's *The future of telede-mocracy*, and participate in the discussions on the TAN+N website <a href="https://fp.auburn.edu/tann/">https://fp.auburn.edu/tann/</a><sup>10</sup>.

# Conclusion: So, when will America become a democracy?

No time soon. There is scant evidence that many people in the US are concerned about achieving democracy. Indeed, much evidence is to the contrary, so frightened have Americans become of their own shadow: "The land of the free and the home of the brave" indeed! "Give me liberty or give me death!" Quite to the contrary, never before have people given up their vaunted freedoms as quickly and willingly as most Americans did after the events of September 11, 2001. It will be very difficult to recover or advance beyond those lost freedoms again, should Americans ever become brave enough to want to do so.

But not impossible. While conventional political science in the US utterly ignores issues of new governance invention, design, and experimentation, ordinary people in the US and everywhere else (by their participation on the internet, in electronic games, and in various face-to-face activities in their local communities and worldwide) are in fact learning how to create postmodern forms of governance that can be translated to the public sphere when the time is ripe.

And, one day, the time will finally be ripe, first somewhere, and then everywhere. As the world becomes truly democratic, so will America.

#### But what about the robots?

It would be uncharacteristic of me to conclude without commenting on the rights of robots and artilects in future democracies. I have a long history of being concerned about this matter<sup>11</sup>, and I am gratified that every day more and more people are turning their attention to the issue<sup>12</sup>. Of course most people consider it an absurd concern – just as most people used to consider it utterly ridiculous to contemplate giving political rights to poor people, or black people, or-most ridiculous of all – to women who, while pleasant creatures, were considered to be just too flighty to be trusted with the vote. All great political theorists once agreed that weighty reason is clearly man's work while women specialize in the unimportant emotional things of life.

But now, more and more machines are thinking for us all<sup>13</sup>, while many of them are also learning to emote and empathize with us as well<sup>14</sup>. So true democracy may emerge not when machines learn to do all the work for us (as male slaves, all women, and most children did for the few male citizens during Athenian democracy), but when they also do all the essential thinking for us. This could result in a much more exciting version of "hybrid democracy" that includes not only what Ian Pearson calls *homo ludditus* (old unaugmented humanity)<sup>15</sup> and its elected representatives in

<sup>10</sup> Becker and Slaton

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Dator 1989, 1990, 2004, McNally and Inayatullah

<sup>12</sup> Goonatilake, Gray, Hughes, Kurzweil 2005, Sudia

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Brooks, Kurzweil 1999, Moravec, Perkowitz

<sup>14</sup> Breazeal

<sup>15</sup> Pearson

the *Aanivalta* mode, but also *homo ludditus* and its various intelligent agents as well as transhumans, posthumans, cyborgs, clones, chimeras, and a wide variety of artilects and forms of intelligent artificial life, along with Martians, Venusians, Europans and the like (when speciation begins again on human, artilectual, and posthuman settlements on the planets, moons and platforms in the solar system and beyond 16) – including any ETs who feel they have the right to participate in matters affecting them.

The more I contemplate such futures of diversity and intelligence, the brighter seems the futures of democracy, and not only "in America."

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# Some Future Threats to Democracy<sup>1</sup>

#### Jerome C. Glenn

#### **Abstract**

The annual income of organized crime has grown beyond that of all military budgets combined, giving it the ability to buy and sell government decisions. Information warfare is the manipulation of information flows used by the opponent so that decisions are made in the interest of the attacker, without the opponent sensing the attack. This can be done by a variety of actors making it difficult to know whom to trust about what. With water tables falling on all continents and 40 % of humanity dependent on water sheds controlled by two or more countries, conflicts and migrations seem inevitable. The prospects for the poorest one billion people may not improve fast enough to prevent the acceleration of their migrations to richer areas. The combined environmentally and economically induced migrations could overwhelm many governance systems. With the continued miniaturization of everything from chemistry sets and pharmaceutical manufacturing to genetic and nanotech engineering, it may be possible for an individual, acting alone, to make and deploy a weapon of mass destruction. Not only is this a threat to democracies itself, but methods of prevention could greatly reduced the freedoms associated with democracy. Although this paper explores these threats and suggests some potential strategies to counter them.

#### Introduction

Democracy is a mental attitude and a habit of behaviour as well as a pattern for responsible governance that protects group and individual rights and assures opportunity for meaningful participation in the political process. Since democracies tend not to fight each other, and since humanitarian crises are far more likely to occur within authoritarian regimes, the trend toward democracy should lead to a more peaceful future. That is, if some various new threats can be managed as discussed in this chapter.

To continue the evolution of democracy, countries need policies to foster an independent civil society, long-term economic stability (reasonable credit access, stable currencies and exchange systems, security of assets, property ownership), a strong judicial system, tolerance of political opposition, and pro-democratic actors. However, dramatic changes like multiparty elections, a free press, written constitutions, legal reforms, and an independent judiciary do not automatically create a culture of democracy with citizen participation.

It is quite a challenge for new democracies to address previous abuses of power in order to earn citizen loyalty and promote justice, without letting the pursuit of that justice increase social discord and slow the process of reconciliation and democratic transition. That is a current concern. Future concerns with seeds in the present must also mobilize the attention of guardians of democracy.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Much of this paper is drawn from research in the 2005 State of the Future with permission from the authors. Glenn, Jerome C., Gordon, Theodore J., 2005 State of the Future. American Council for the United Nations University. The Millennium Project. Washington, D.C.

These include countering organized crime, including the ability to tamper with elections, information warfare, including the ability to manipulation information necessary to make informed choices, environmental-economic migrations, including potentials for breakdowns in governance systems unable to cope with millions of refugees and displaced persons, and massively destructively powers in the hands of individuals, including well educated but psychotic who could make and deliver their own bioweapons.

## **Organized Crime**

The total of all the military budgets in the world is close to  $\in$  1 trillion. The total of all the organized crime proceeds around the world is estimated to be more than  $\in$  2 trillion.<sup>2</sup> What kind of future will organized crime buy?

As some crimes are reduced by improved policing, it is reasonable to assume that organized crime (OC) – like any business – will seek new ventures. Those new ventures could include the buying and selling of government decisions. Organized crime has already grown to the point where senior government officials of some countries have said that OC is increasingly interfering with the ability of their governments to act.

Nation-states can be understood as a series of decision points that are vulnerable to the vast amounts of money available to organized crime (OC). OC's power in one country can be leveraged to increase power in others. The World Bank estimates that about  $\in$  1 trillion is paid in bribes each year; it is not clear how much of that is paid by OC.

OC has not surfaced on the world agenda the way property, water, and sustainable development have. The vast amount of money amassed by OC allows its participants to buy the knowledge and technology to create new forms of crime to generate even more profits. Daily international transfers of up to € 1-2 trillion via computer communications make tempting targets.

Imagine a computer virus that attacks Excel spreadsheets of election files that were imbedded in a hard drive of election equipment that compares the results of the candidate in column A with the candidate in column B. If A is greater than B, the file is left unaffected and is transmitted with the others filed for final tally – assuming that candidate A is the OC's choice. If A is less than B, then the virus would calculate the difference as a ratio necessary to change the totals so that A has the higher number. The virus would then recalculate all the cells in the spreadsheet of every polling entry so that the results would be evenly proportional – making everything look normal. Polling areas where A is less popular would still have few votes, but not quite so many fewer. Whatever can be understood can eventually be digitalized. OC could hire top computer security experts through respectable systems companies. It is normal for such experts to be asked to beat system in order to improve the security software, but unwittingly they could be breaching security on behalf of OC. What ever can be digitalized can be manipulated. Election security could become an intellectual arms race.

Some Latin American and Central Asian countries exemplify how OC, terrorism, and governmental corruption can work together. The Prosecutor General of Russia has stated that 500 large enterprises are controlled by organized crime.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Estimates of the annual income of organized crime are educated guesses. The IMF and World Bank have estimated money laundering to be 2%-5% of the global economy or between US\$0.8 - 2 trillion. Although this is not precisely related to organized crime, it is a good starting point Millennium Project staff estimates of income from diamonds and other bartered goods yield a total in excess of € 2 trillion.

Some see organized crime as a "cost of business," and hence, do not counter it. This attitude creates an environment conducive to continued growth of organized crime. Some argue that organized crime may be a natural part of economic liberalization, as it was in the United States in the late 1800s and early 1900s. This argument for inaction ignores that the scale of crime was much smaller then and the means of international growth and power are quite different now – there were no jet planes, Internet, or weapons of mass destruction, and countries were not being taken over. The Chicago Mafia did not have twice the budget of the U.S. Pentagon. The size and technological sophistication of organized crime today makes its power relative to government much different from earlier times. If we wait for it to mature into legal enterprises, OC might well take enough time for it to grow beyond our ability to stop it. Democracy should not take that risk.

The millions of AIDS orphans may have little choice but to turn to crime to survive. This creates a vast pool of competition that in turn could produce a more aggressive future "criminal talent pool" from which transnational organized crime could draw.

It is reasonable to assume that on average democratic government organizations move more slowly than criminal systems. OC is able to respond to changing conditions and have financial resources that do not require citizen support to mobilize. Hence, it is reasonable to assume organized crime will grow in a business-as-unusual scenario.

Organized crime should be treated as a national security threat on a par with a strong military threat.

# **Counter OC Suggestions**

OECD's Financial Action Task Force has made 40 recommendations to counter money laundering. The United Nations has the Office on Drugs and Crime's Global Program against Money Laundering. There is also the International Narcotics Control Board, the International Group for Anti-Corruption Coordination, and the International Criminal Court. Since OC continues to grow, then it is reasonable to assume that there is no international effort on the scale needed to turn the situation around.

Serious change will require a global movement led by activist organizations such as Transparency International (which so far focuses on corruption but not organized crime) and backed by reformist politicians, professional organizations, and unions to develop a global consensus for action against organized crime. Coalitions based on national politics cannot address global organized crime. Going after one crime category as a time fails to recognize the system of OC. A global response is necessary. We have to learn how transnational organized crime networks can be stopped from becoming more powerful and sophisticated global enterprises, before democracy turns into a show manipulated by OC.

Information technology could certainly be used to identify sources and target money-laundering locations, create an international agreement to upgrade the recording system for all financial transactions, share information on financial transactions, and coordinate prosecution strategies through an intergovernmental body. Such a body might be initiated through a special meeting of the IMF. To make this work, all banks would have to cooperate or be frozen out of the international system. Instant access would have to be available on every financial transaction requested by the international body. Countries would have to give up some sovereignty, as the international

body would set the location for prosecution. The international body would authorize the freezing of criminal assets prior to arrest and the transfer of assets after conviction.

The UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (the Palermo Treaty) came into force in September 2003. It calls for a variety of modes for international cooperation to help fight organized crime. Possibly an additional protocol could be established to create an intergovernmental body to complement the Global Program against Money Laundering, with responsibility for identifying money-laundering locations and setting information traps, identifying top criminals by the amount of money laundered, preparing legal cases, identifying suspect's assets that can be frozen and the readiness of relevant institutions to freeze them, identifying where the criminal is currently located and assessing local authorities' ability to make an arrest, identifying the best country in which to prosecute the particular case, and determining the readiness of local courts to move immediately. When everything is ready, this new intergovernmental body would execute all the orders at the same time to apprehend the criminal, freeze the assets and access, and open the court case. Granted the lawyers for the OC leader would argue that the case cannot begin for a variety of reasons, but it the meantime, the leader is in jail and the international body can begin to develop the next arrest. This should be one leader person at time, working down the list from the most money laundered to the least.

Now, how to provide oversight for such a global organization? Government funding would only be used to initiate this mechanism. If governments had to contribute each year, then they too could be targets for further corruption. Instead the subsequent funding could come from frozen assets of convicted criminals. Some of this could also be used to offset the expenses of cooperating police and military systems. Hence, it would be a self-financing system based on its success, rather than being dependent on government generosity.

#### **Information Warfare**

Most people in the world may be connected to the Internet within 15 years, making cyberspace an unprecedented medium for civilization. This new distribution of the means of production in the knowledge economy is cutting through old hierarchical controls in politics, economics, and finance. It is becoming a self organizing mechanism that could lead to dramatic increases in humanity's ability to invent its future and its control.

The Internet is increasing the opportunity for citizen feedback on public issues through e-government and other electronic means. As a result, governments are expected to become more accountable, transparent, and responsive to their citizens. Yet increasing sophistication and interaction among information technology, marketing, competitive intelligence, organized crime, and the potentials of information warfare raise the potential for the manipulation of information. Freedom of choice — inherent to democracy — implies judgment based on reliable information. Since a knowledgeable and informed public holds a democracy together, disinformation or information warfare can weaken democracies.

As the integration of cell phones, video, and the Internet grows, prices will fall, accelerating globalization and allowing swarms of people to quickly form and disband, coordinate actions, and share information ranging from stock market tips to bold new contagious ideas (*meme epidemics*). This could be both a force for improving freedom and democratic principles of transparency, feedback, and accountability. But it also presents a more powerful was to manipulate large numbers of people though electronic and photonic means. Digitalized pictures are easily manipulated. Time sequence of events can be altered, giving false impressions.

Reliability of information is destroyed in information warfare (IW). There has always been propaganda and deception in wars, but as a tactic not as the central objective. Information warfare can result in changing a leader's mind so that an invading land army is not necessary. The channels of information deemed reliable by a decision maker can be manipulated to change the opponent's decision, in such a way that the decision maker thinks he/she has made the right decision, but instead decided what the opponent wants. Blowing up communications systems is not information warfare; it is industrial age warfare. Advance marketing techniques may have elements of information warfare too, since they seek to know the decision making of individuals and groups and how to influence it.

The development of methods to counter information manipulation will be important for continued democratization in the future. The prevention of IW should be a priority for democratic governments.

## **Environmental Migrations**

The UN Millennium Ecosystem Assessment found that 60 % of our life-support systems are gone or in danger of collapse. Severe damage to environmental life-support systems has led to major migrations in the past. Today, water tables are falling on every continent, agricultural land is becoming brackish, groundwater aquifers are being polluted, and urbanization is increasing water demands faster than many systems can supply. Without water, people have to migrate. When people migrate into populated areas, conflicts can occur that threaten orderly democratic procedures. 1.1 billion people do not have access to safe drinking water. UN agencies estimated that, without major changes, by 2050 more than 2 billion people will be in water-scarce areas.

Since agriculture makes up 70 % of all human usage of fresh water, future urban-rural tension could contribute to migration. 40 % of humanity lives on international watersheds, which can lead to conflicts. During certain parts of the year, the major rivers like the Yellow River in China, the Nile in Africa and the Colorado in North America dry up before they reach the ocean.

Since another 2.6 billion people are expected by 2050, it is difficult to see who how mass migration due to environmental factors will be avoided. Humanity may have consumed more natural resources since World War II than in all of history prior to that time. The synergy between economic growth and technological innovation has been the most significant engine of change for the last 200 years, but unless we improve our economic, environmental, and social behavior, the next 200 years could be difficult.

The public has to be engaged through massive educational efforts via television, music, games, movies, and contests that stress the quality of human beings in harmony with nature along with what individuals and groups can do to change consumer behavior, initiate environmental tax reforms, and move from a fossil fuel economy toward a knowledge-consciousness economy. We should bring scientists and engineers from around the world together with new leadership from UN Global Compact corporations to stimulate investments into more-sustainable solutions; establish an environmental crimes international intelligence and police unit; bring environmental security to the UN Security Council; create definitions and measurements for commonly applied tax incentives and labels for more environmentally friendly products; abolish environmentally inefficient subsidies; include environmental costs in the pricing of natural resources and products; invest in socially responsible businesses; spread the environmental standards ISO 14000 and 14001; create an international public/private funding mechanism for high-impact technolo-

gies such as carbon sequestration or space solar power and for acquiring the rights to innovate "green" technologies; declare key habitats off-limits for human development; consider the establishment of a World Environment Organization with powers like the WTO; encourage synergy between environmental movements and human rights groups to make clean air, water, and land a human right; and demonstrate how to change complacency and consumption while increasing efficiency and improving living standards.

Otherwise, environmental migrations of people from damaged areas to more environmentally stable areas seem inevitable. Such migrations and new concentrations of different kinds of people are likely to lead to a variety of conflicts and calls for less democratic means to keep order.

# **Economic Migrations**

Explosive economic growth over the previous decades has led to dramatic increases in life expectancy, literacy, and access to safe drinking water and sanitation and to decreases in infant mortality for the vast majority of the world. Yet without the creation and implementation of a strategic plan for a global partnership between rich and poor that uses the strength of free markets with rules based on global ethics, disparities could grow and trigger increased migration of the poor to rich areas, resulting in a range of complex conflicts and humanitarian disasters.

Although the interdependence of economic growth and technological innovation have made it possible for 3–4 billion people to have relatively good health and living conditions today, unless our financial, economic, environmental, and social behaviors are improved along with our industrial technologies, the long-term future could be more difficult.

The ratio of the income of people in the top 5 % to the bottom 5 % has grown from 6 to 1 in 1980 to over 200 to 1 now. This is not sustainable. Such high ratios of the rich to the poor have been an indicator of political instability. Hence, it is not unreasonable to expect far more economic migration in the future than in the past, which can threaten democratic procedures as hostility toward migrants might escalate.

The high technology and low wages of China and India will result in their becoming giants of world trade, which should force other parts of the developing world to rethink their trade-led economic growth strategies. But the developing world does not appear to be rethinking this approach. It is paying the high costs of inputs (ports, foreign experts, urban infrastructure, etc.) and may not get the returns they expect. Some believe that China alone could produce 25 % of all manufacturing in the world by 2025.

World population grew by 4 billion since 1950 and may grow another 2.6 billion by 2050 before it begins to fall. According to the UN's lower forecast (which previously have generally proved to be more accurate), world population could fall to 5.5 billion by 2100 — an astonishing 1 billion fewer people than are alive today. This assumes that there will be no major life extension breakthroughs by then. In any case, civilization will have to adapt to a world in which older people form the majority. Economic activities for the elderly as well as non-conventional trade should be a priority to keep democracies healthy.

#### **SIMAD**

Security risks are shifting from nation-states to terrorist networks, organized crime, and individual maniacs. Imagine the continued synergy among, and miniaturization of, everything from chemistry sets and pharmaceutical manufacturing to genetic and nanotech engineering. Eventually an individual, acting alone, will be able to create and deploy a weapon of mass destruction. Ignoring this possibility could become the greatest folly of humanity. If weapons of mass destruction will become available to single individuals over the next generation or so, then the welfare of anyone should be the concern of everyone. Such platitudes are not new, but the consequences of their failure will be quite different in the future, when a single individual can be massively destructive. To prevent individuals from growing up to be massively destructive, we should begin to explore how to connect the systems of education, mental health, and security in a democratic and effective way. However, can this be done while preserving democracy?

It is easy to imagine the evolution of state control as people begin to understand the concept of a single individual being massively destructive (SIMAD). Already the United States has begun actions under the "Patriot Act" that many see as eroding the American democracy due to its wide-reaching response to terrorist groups. How far could that trend go when driven by the fear than anyone one day might manipulate some biological materials and create the biological doomsday weapon?

Even today there are still 27,000 nuclear weapons in the world, and their disarmament has to be perfectly controlled so that deranged self-appointed "cleansers" of the world cannot get access to these materials – is that likely? There are many research projects in biology, physics, chemistry, nanotechnology and other areas of science and engineering that that could lead to other potential weapons for SIMAD. How then can we prevent the dangerous use of science and technology without stepping on free inquiry and human rights? The fear of SIMAD could lead to new kinds of global controls that would authorize intervention in lines of scientific inquiry and engineering projects. Banning research that could lead to SIMAD technologies would drive it underground and into the arms of organized crime and terrorist groups. Democracies will have to create usage control policies instead, as the IAEA has done for nuclear energy.

Could research identify the social, cultural, philosophical, neurological, ethnopharmaceutical, and religious factors that increase and decrease the likelihood of someone becoming a SIMAD? If so, then might future leaders advocate that the threat is so great it is morally justifiable to create and connect advanced systems of education, public health, and security to detect incipient SIMADs and alter their development?

After all, they might argue, a great deal is being learned about how the brain develops and works. This knowledge should be integrated into monitoring systems to protect the future of civilization. Some might ask how to "infect" enough of humanity with memes (influential contagious ideas) for tolerance to stamp out stupidity, or harmful public actions. Could ignorance and intolerance that might lead to a SIMAD be treated like a disease?

Universal lie detection software could be integrated into all transaction systems. Insights in cognitive science about fear and intolerance might one day be integrated into some computer-assisted instruction and public mental health systems. Although this would disturb many people, the prevention of individual acts of mass destruction might justify the integration of education,

mental health, and security systems, and create its own momentum that also strangles democracy.

Three categories to explore potential approaches to counter SIMAD are: technical monitoring and intervention; human infiltration and informant protocols; and integration of educational, mental health, and security monitoring – all of which could grow beyond their original mandates into a mega system clearly threatening the future of democracy.

#### Conclusion

The potential growth of organized crime, methods to tamper with election results, development of information warfare, conditions for environmental-economic migrations, and the trends that could lead to massively destructively powers in the hands of individuals are not being addressed seriously enough today to ensure the future of democracy. It is daunting to consider potential synergies among these threats, not explored in this paper.

It is a gargantuan task to collect and organize the countermeasures to each of these threats, and conduct feasibility studies of their potential effectiveness, but the sooner it begins the better for democracy and the prospects for civilization.

# Beyond dreaming of democracy How do we face the reality of democracy?

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#### Abstract:

Democracy has become a word so magic than we do not often think of its contents and even less of its future. Exploring the structural lines of evolution of this node of futures, according to Futures Studies methodologies, helps to better understand what democracy is about and what are the drivers influencing its future.

From the original Greek model, democracy has grown up carried by a continuous enlargement of the demos and a fight for more justice and equality. The invention of the modern State, and of the Nation which supports it, has led to a new step in its evolution. Based, during the last two centuries, on the idea of the human progress and the fear of totalitarianism, democracy occurs today as the indisputable best political regime.

Yet challenges ahead, such as the nature of the next generations, the increasing demand for another world, the consequences of a globalisation which is far from being achieved and the development of the noosphere, are jeopardising democracy. But are we sure that democracy is still the best model with which to face the 21<sup>st</sup> century? If we decide so without studying the question in-depth, we mortgage our future. To leave it open, it is time to invent alternatives.

#### PART I: From a dream of equity to a world-wide model

We have a saying in France that when a word is heard everywhere, it means that what it represents has already disappeared. We have never heard the word "democracy" as much as during the last decade. Does this mean that the concept behind the word is disappearing?

The daily work of a futurist is to identify structural problems with long-term effects in order to help the decision-maker to take the best possible decision for shaping the probable future. Pondering the future of democracy calls for such futures-oriented work today. In the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, what is democracy? What does it mean really, beyond the word itself and the perhaps obsolete way we have to consider it? What are the possible consequences for the future of what we describe with this word?

# From Antiquity to the modern world

Let's go back to the far past to remember the original meaning of democracy. The word itself has been derived from *demokratia*, formed from *demos* (people) and *kratos* (rule). Thus it refers to a form of government in which the people rules.

#### The Athenian model

The oldest records that have survived for us to study describe the city-state of Athens as the first government based on democracy. This great historic innovation was supported by four pillars: political equality (*isonomia*) among the "people" (an ambiguous word), liberty, respect for the law, and justice.

However this model was remote enough from what we now consider a democracy, especially from two points of view that still have a major importance nowadays. The first angle is the definition of *demos*. Demos was a protean word with multiple meanings, inter alia "the people in his unit" (or to be more precise, the body of the citizens) and the "small people" (lower classes). Theoretical debates in Antiquity played many times on this fundamental ambiguity. In fact, the Athenian democracy was organised around citizens, but it excluded women, as well as slaves and foreigners, that is to say citizens were no more than 10% of the Attic population. Even later (509 BC), when the Roman Republic was founded, the sovereign capacity was allotted to the People (i.e. the patricians), and women as well as plebeians were still excluded.

The second angle of the Antiquity model revolves around *kratein*, meaning "to rule". If today we understand "rule by the people" as usually "rule by elected/nominated representatives of the people", this was not the case in the beginning. The Athenian democracy was a direct or participatory democracy. This means that the citizens were members of the Parliament (*Ecclesia*) which held the main part of the capacities, made all the decisions and named the magistrates, who were in charge of executive functions and rendered accounts to the Parliament. Although only a quarter of the citizens were in practice involved in the political life of the City, each one was likely to be chosen by lot to sit on a court or to become magistrate. Consequently, one can speak indeed about a direct democracy insofar as everyone, at least once in his life, was to form part of the system and could therefore not claim to be unaware of how it functioned.

Whatever way one considers the Athenian democracy, as good like THUCYDIDES or evil like PLATO or ARISTOTLE, the role of force, which represented first the shaping and then the operation of this system during two centuries, must be recognised. But it must also be recognised that modern nation-states have little in common with Athenian democracy, unless they change to the size of the Greek city-states.

From this quick glance, we can easily observe that this conception of democracy has indeed much evolved in the course of millennia.

# An ongoing progress towards a better model

Three main aspects of this evolution are significant enough to have banned forever the possibility to implement once again a new Athenian democracy.

The first change is the widening of the concept of people. For centuries there has been a protracted struggle to obtain political rights. And evolution toward the inclusion of each human being within the concept of *demos* is still ongoing...

The second change is the creation of the modern State. In Athens, society and state were merged in a "political society". The Athenian city-state and the Republican Rome both had elements of a high popular participation in governmental affairs and little, if any, centralised bureaucratic con-

trol. When the idea of democracy re-emerged in the European political thought, at the end of the sixteenth century, MACHIAVELLI had already created a decisive watershed in modern political thought: he separated political power from theology, he laicised it. Consequently, the construction of the modern State — as support of the power exerted by the Prince — became possible and would be developed, précised and enriched by the major political thinkers<sup>1</sup>.

The cross-fertilisation between the widening of the *demos* and the construction of the *kratein* produced in the nineteenth century the third change: the idea of nation. This concept takes the place of "people", the former *demos*. As a sovereign abstract entity, the nation can express itself only through representatives. Thus the nation becomes the basis of a new concept: the nation-state, the most complex form of human organisation yet attained. In less than one century, this institution has become the dominant form of nationhood today, mainly due to the increasingly penetration of the State into the daily life of its citizens and the growing sophistication of its organisation of internal resources.

It does not mean that the nation-state concept has resolved the main difficulty of democracy that political theorists<sup>2</sup> have pointed to. On the one hand, the State must have a monopoly of coercive power in order to provide a secure basis to the citizens and their activities; on the other, this regulatory and coercive capability could deprive citizens of political and social freedoms. Since the sixteenth century, political thought has been focused on this fragility and the search for the best system of government to compensate for it (sovereignty of the people, separation of powers, constitution, balance between might and right, power and law, duties and rights, authority and liberty). In the early nineteenth century, liberal democrats provided the key institutional innovation to try to overcome this problem: representative democracy. Thus citizens can choose, authorise and control political decisions, according to a "social contract" where the delegation is entire. To complete this model, equality between citizens had to be recognised and universal suffrage achieved. Slowly, this model became the norm, during the twentieth century, in most of the Western countries and beyond.

## An overwhelming flow

Considering that the great majority of political thinkers from Ancient Greece to the present day have been highly critical of the theory and the practice of democracy, how are we to understand the current uniform commitment to democracy and the lack of imagination about another form of government, more adapted to the current world?

Two main reasons appeared, embedded in the history of the nineteenth century, and then developed during the twentieth.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Jean BODIN, *Six livres de la République* [Six Books of the Republic], 1576; Thomas HOBBES, *Leviathan*, 1651; Charles de MONTESQUIEU *De l'esprit des lois* [The spirit of the laws], 1748; Alexis de TOCQUEVILLE, *De la démocratie en Amérique* [Democracy in America], 1835

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> see Thomas HOBBES on this subject

## An idea of the human progress

The first reason is that the notion of democracy is intimately tied to that of human progress.

In the nineteenth century, with the spread of the inspiring French Revolution ideals (1789), inherited from the Age of Enlightenment and under the influence of a mythified<sup>3</sup> vision of Antiquity, the four pillars of democracy (freedom, equality, supremacy of the law and justice) became the structuring forces of the political progress.

Meanwhile, some structuring forces emerged as well to forge the social progress. The Bourgeoisie was one of them. Heiress of 1789, carrying the general interests of society, what is indeed the middle class? "It is the people having reached comfort, with education, with safety. And these conditions of ease and wellbeing, without which freedom is a meaningless word and a cruel derision, here are what the people aspires to in turn, and what under no circumstances would it obtain, without the assistance of the middle class, assistance which the middle class cannot refuse without opening of the abysses where civilisation itself is lost and absorbed."

With such a political role to play, the nineteenth century middle class, much like the Greek demos and the Roman *Populus*, is a new elite, strengthened by the development of education and capitalism. During the second half of the nineteenth century, some political thinkers suddenly realised that this middle class would be more a 'glass ceiling' than a social lift for the lower classes, especially the proletarians whose conditions of life were worsening. MARX, ENGELS, and later the Marxist tradition more broadly, envisaged then the replacement of the liberal democracy now associated with the capitalist economy, by the complete democratisation of society and state that could be embodied in a pyramid structure of direct democracy. Such a democratisation means necessarily that human as well as political emancipation can only be attained by the suppression of the State. However the various experiences of socialist democracies until the end of the twentieth century have resulted in not the extinction of the State but, on the contrary, its strengthening to the point of totalitarianism. The current liberal democracy itself, so-called "soft tyranny", has hardly resisted this temptation.

So, whatever promoted by the Left (social democracy) or the Right (liberal democracy), democracy has become the best model of reference at the end of the nineteenth century. In both conceptions of the antagonist parties, democracy must lead to the emancipation of the human being, through education and citizenship (civic responsibility), and to the universally recognised equality of all in terms of justice and freedom. If the Athenian model is definitely over, the four pillars that have supported its development are still —and more than ever—the basis of the most desirable vision of the future of (Western) humanity.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> a vision transforming the reality in myth, obscuring the negative aspects and idealising the positive ones

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Prosper ENFANTIN, *Le Crédit*, 1848 (quoted by Michèle RIOT-SARCEY, "Comment relire le XIX° siècle ?", in *Revue d'Histoire du XIX*° siècle, 2005-31)

#### The fear of totalitarianism

The second reason for such a wide development of democracy in the world is the fear of totalitarianism. The unfolding of the twentieth century confirmed the evidence: in the democratic regime, the main problem is the power of the State, even as legitimate representative of the Nation.

With nine million dead, and the huge change in the nature of war that the First World War introduced, some scepticism began to appear then about the democratic system. Left and Right parties strengthened their position between the two Wars: social tensions occurred everywhere in Europe, amplified by the economic crisis of 1929. However the march towards a better democracy still went on: more and more social rights were given to the people. For some, the development of the Soviet Union was also a promise of hope.

Then, as we know well from history, whereas MUSSOLINI comes to power through a coup d'état, HITLER gains it though regular elections, in a very democratic way. After the Second World War, all of a sudden, totalitarianism is discovered in the fascist regimes of the Right as well as in the communist regimes of the Left. The rough number of deaths imputed to these regimes (in Asian as well as Western countries) is almost fifty million. Hiroshima and Nagasaki are forever scars in the collective mind of the Western civilisation.

From now on, democracy is besmirched by suspicion. In the best case, liberal democracy has failed to protect society against arbitrary power; in the worst case, there is something rotten in modern society itself, either because of the industrial model of mass consumption according to ARENDT or because of the very nature of human beings; and democracy can't change it, liberal or not.

In conclusion, this brief twentieth century — begun in Europe in 1914 and finishing in 1989 — brought a twofold disenchantment: the State, even bounded by representative democracy, is not the ideal mechanism for democracy it was supposed to be; and people themselves, even after three millennia of civilisation, are not as civilised as the Enlightenment asserted. Thus humanism has probably been the great loser of the post-war era. With it, the idea of the future as a place of progress to be striven towards, has mostly disappeared. This huge shift has led to the preeminence of 'short-termism', the search for immediate reward, hedonism, and a kind of laziness or lack of thought in sowing the seeds for the future...

In the beginning of the twenty-first century, two strong trends are manifesting themselves: the empowerment of individuals and the weakening of the nation-state as the best representative of a democratic regime. As a way perhaps to escape the State-octopus and the old institutions that are linked to, individuals have built new clans, bringing them together whatever the geographic scale (from the smallest area to the world diasporas) and giving them more power (through NGOs) and the feeling of more freedom.

Will democracy survive this new deal?

# Part II: Dreams beyond democracy?

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 led to more than a new geopolitical order — the end of the 40-years-old opposition between East and West and the Yalta partition of the world. It opened the door to a soft revolution centred no longer on economic and technological progress as in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but on human development. This does not mean only poverty, health, education... as included in the UN human development indicator, but also the philosophical question of what is humanity. The current fight between Darwinists and Creationists, the quick and broad spreading of the notion of sustainable development are both ways to deepen or answer fundamental questions: who are we and where are we going? Extinction of humanity is no longer an unthinkable topic; so as the idea of a new physical evolution of the human being toward a mix of humanity and machine or towards an "improved man" thanks to genetic modification. From pacemakers to bionic prosthesis and exoskeletons tomorrow, interfaces between man and machine are increasing: will we stay then, in our mind, the same human beings than our ancestors were?

In this context, and considering the past, two questions arise: Where are we heading with democracy in this new world? Is democracy still the best model to rule the next generation of human beings?

## Human development: alien complexity ahead

Alienity is not so distant from us: there is no need to think about extraterrestrial beings or our post-human descendants in a far future. The first aliens we meet are much more likely to be our own children. From all over the world we hear the acknowledgement that the new generations are very different from the previous ones. Maybe every generation says that about its own children. But this time the phenomenon appears significant because the same characteristics are mentioned in America and Europe as well as in Africa and China. How will they cope with democracy?

# The Alien generation

1960 was a pivotal date. Generation born after that date —the 'X generation'— has much fewer points in common with the previous generation than any generation before (at least in the twentieth century). In the Western world, they are influenced by several factors that have shaped them in this different way.

In most of the Western countries (and in some Asian ones), they are free from any war influence: they have not lived one, nor were influenced by parents having participated in one. This is a major rupture if we consider the history of Europe, for example. Hence the loss of some social solidarity and of the sense of survival. Hence also some uncontrolled expression of violence, because they have no idea of what real violence is and how quickly mechanisms of war can trigger and lock themselves into action.

Comprehensively richer than their parents, having access to a larger daily comfort provided by technologies (e.g. white and brown goods), they are highly hedonist. For most of them, work is no longer a way of personal achievement but only a mean to earn their living and keep their good

standard of life. They look for immediate rewards and are little inclined to long-term investment. Implicitly shaped by the '1968 revolution', freedom is their main if not unique flag. They tend to reject family authority as well as any hierarchical authority (school, police, state). Highly individualistic, they have all the rights and very few duties towards the community. When they look for spirituality, Buddhism strongly attracts them.

The following generation, called the "Me/We generation", born in the 80s, is proceeding along the same path, although slightly different. Besides having the same characteristics as their elders, they are interpersonal individualists: their excess of individualism is counterbalanced by their need to belong to a group. Having grown up with a cellular phone in the hand, they are flexible, quickly changing their mind in order to adapt themselves to seize new opportunities: they are afraid of being stuck without any alternatives. Their optimism regarding their own future is rooted in their certainty that they are capable of achieving what they strive for. Still more hedonists, they are large consumers. Very aware that the world is changing, they do not believe in the traditional institutions nor in the "adults' world"; in fact, adults are no longer a model for them as those have failed to prevent economic crisis, to preserve family (most of them come from reformed families) and to protect the environment. Cyberspace is their new planet of games: there they play collective online video games and engage in role playing in their relationship with others through chatting. As adults, they will probably have in common the sense of family, a still closer relationship between parents and children with a decreasing demand about the school results of their children (at the opposite of the X generation), as well as a better concern about health quality. Demographic transition, especially in some European countries, could slow down with the "Me/We generation", if specific policies to help early childhood (nurseries) are implemented.

This new generation offers no 'white' or 'black' characteristics, but paradoxical behaviours, feelings and components, as if always playing a different role. This is what makes it so difficult to forecast its future. Yet this is obvious they will have to face critical problems during the next twenty years, most of them due to an excessive individualism: violence, drugs consumption, denial of justice, corruption, environmental degradation, and so on. How will democratic systems cope with this situation? Through the easiest solution: increasing the coercion of the State over individuals? Or through the most difficult: reforming/revolutionising, at least, the educational system?

The old traditional system of social classes is not dead, it is just hidden. Within this new generation, a new elite is ready to take risks, such as going to live abroad, building thus a cosmopolitan society at the world level; ready to fight to defend their ideas and change the world. At the opposite, another minority expresses a desperate need for a hierarchical system of their own, within which they could find and assume a position, being recognised by their peers. They enrol in parallel armies (Far Right), Mafia-like organisations, or urban clan tribes. The large majority of the others, more or less educated, just refuses to look for a job beyond a distance of twenty-five kilometres from home or the family area<sup>5</sup>, living in a welfare state or an 'insurancial' society that has transformed them into continuously assisted people, and they don't care about anything else than their limited surroundings and immediate satisfaction.

If we remember that Athenian democracy required a general commitment to the principle of civic virtue — dedication to the city-state and subordination of private life to public affairs and common good — then the world to come seems more distant than ever from this model. Indi-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> French national statistics: this can be different in other countries

vidualism has gained such a high rank among the common values that back-pedalling appears impossible, even if the counterpart seems to be more social tensions and more freedom limitation by the State whose laws are yet less respected. The current world reveals itself as very unsatisfying for most of humanity. More and more people are now looking for "another world".

## **Looking for other worlds**

Utopia often emerges in periods of transition and reform: "When everything is locked by systems that have failed but that can't be defeated... utopia is our resource. It can be a way out but it is also the weapon of critic."6

As the current evolution of the world appears to many people to be no longer sustainable or desirable, reflections spring up about the possibility of another world that would bring humanity more happiness. Soft visions try to spread themselves through global think tank networks, peace movements, pragmatic networks for collaborative work, green organisations, 'anti-globalisation' demonstrations such the World Social Forum, etc. Old resorts also come back, often under the appearance of extremism, e.g. religious fanaticism, far right or far left ideologies; they look like a final spurt of effort to exist again.

Obviously, the advent of the new century is arousing the hope that something could change, that the future could be brighter if only we want it. Yet, alternatives are not so clear: until now they mostly look like description of utopias. It is interesting to note that none of these future visions, except perhaps these coming from extremist powers, has ever called democracy into question. Is it because we are unable to think about a third way that would be neither democracy nor tyranny? Or because democracy is so suitable to hedonism and short-termism that it has become a taboo to question it<sup>8</sup>? Is there a way to think "out of the box", beyond all that has already been thought, said and written since the beginning of history?

The futurist's methodological optimism requires a positive answer. There is always a way out. Positive aspects are often hidden by the negative: technologies of information and communication bring new possibilities to manipulate perceptions and minds as well as new means to develop a broader and stronger socialisation; the search for egoistic pleasures mixes with the worrying for a better world; democracy finds its limits in individualistic auto-determination but has given us the means to shape our future, with cleverness, energy and willingness, if that is what we want to do.

There is only one certainty ahead: the coming century will be very different from the last ones. Not worse OR better but worse AND better. Definitely more complex and so less predictable. Definitely alien. That is where we are heading, with more or less democracy. But will democracy still be the best model then?

Next challenge ahead: inventing a new, better adapted model to rule the world

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Paul RICOEUR, L'Idéologie et l'Utopie [Ideology and Utopia], Paris : Le Seuil, 2005

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> see <a href="http://www.anotherworldispossible.org/">http://www.worldchanging.com/</a>, <a href="http://www.pekea-fr.org/">http://www.pekea-fr.org/</a>, http://www.commondreams.org/views02/0201-01.htm, http://www.licc.org.uk/culture/another-world-is-possible

Democracy is the best possible regime in a civilisation built on the development of the people as individuals protected by a State under the rule of law and a hierarchical pressure. Is there no other possible alternative than obeying under force or law? Our attachment to the concept of democracy can lead to two different issues: either a strong enough tenacity to continue on its path until we finally reach it, as an almost perfect model; or such a blindness that we would be unable to get out of what has perhaps become a dead end and to imagine new ways of governing ourselves.

# Farming globalisation

Beyond concepts and practices, democracy is a word just bounded by our limited capability to think the future. We are human beings, the only species on Earth that is able to think, explore and shape the future: in some way, this is our unique feature. So we should not be afraid to think beyond this word to shape a new vision for our future, to define a new challenge to free individuals from political parties or approaches that lock them in an obsolete pattern of opposition, conflicts, and sometimes quasi war.

When imagining some of the most probable futures, we can see how globalisation will affect democracy.

The nation-state is indeed challenged by globalisation and the related interdependence. With, on the one hand, expanding diasporas and, on the other, an increasing number of foreign populations inside the country, the notions of nation and state are less clear. Between devolution to local authorities and a less explicit, but equally restrictive devolution to regional (e.g. European Commission) and global (WTO, UNO) authorities, nation-states have entered a slow but real process of weakening. They are probably no longer the most efficient place to govern in an increasingly complex and interconnected world.

The European expressed need for new transnational collaborative institutions with greater transparency and democracy, more empowerment of the European citizen and greater accountability, is only one of the signals pointing toward the way to new forms of government at the regional and global level. To support this future authority, a new kind of nation must be thought about in order to meet the citizens' need to be an active and responsive part not only of their own communities but also of the regions in which they live, and of the planet itself where global phenomena are concerned. Already the formation of a world public opinion is a contribution to this process, as well as the progressive disappearance of territorial borders, the G8 sketch of a world government and the diffusion of "governance" below, above and alongside the nation-state.

In reaction to this far too fast globalisation, one can observe a growing need for bearings. A return to the Middle Ages, when political power and theocracy were intricately tied, can not be excluded... Democracy is still one of the best defences against such a threat.

# Mastering the noosphere

Fifty years ago, Pierre TEILHARD DE CHARDIN explained how the noosphere could lead towards the emergence of a global consciousness emerging from the interactions of human minds. The Internet has made this convergence possible today, and some 'world public opinion' could one day express it. Hence the urgent need to provide individuals with the means to master the noosphere, that is to acquire within it the freedom they have in the biosphere.

Basically, the noosphere is about globalisation and information. Information, from raw data to highly complex knowledge, is submitted to positive as well as negative processes: some can free people; others can send them to prison unjustly. Manipulation is its plague. To protect people from all these dangers, including these concerning democracy, there is only one solution, universal, global: education.

Education alone — not only knowing how to read, write and count, use a computer and have at least one foreign language, but also as a capability to forge one's opinion — can build the critical and compassionate mind needed to free individuals from the intellectual chains of the soft tyranny (political correctness, mass media). As the Renaissance was rooted both in the invention of printing and the spread of academe, a new Enlightenment can spring from the invention of the Internet and the spreading of a new, future-oriented education.

Such an education would be focused on three basic fields. The first would be that of mastering information by developing a critical mind, checking information sources, detecting manipulation and providing a better knowledge about the stakes of the mass media's functioning and lobbying. The second field would be futures studies/foresight in order to better grasp current evolutions, understand the macro-historical components of human development and be able to chose and shape one's future. The third field would encompass 'moral' and civic education, through a mix of political science, sociology and comparative history of religions and ideas and through 'civic practice' as a volunteer in a registered NGO. Thus individualism could be bound by experience of solidarity, soft tyranny by information and short-termism by futures-oriented aspirations. Such "beyond-democracy"- and "beyond-civil society"-oriented education could teach not only what liberty is but how to practice it, in order to become efficient citizens, informed consumer and positive humanists.

#### Conclusion

The Greek democracy, as some sort of direct and elitist approach to power, was the best regime to face the constraints of the far past. The modern democracy, built up on a representative and somehow less elitist approach, intermediated by the state and civil society, was probably the best regime for the situation in the nineteenth century. However, already during the twentieth century, it has demonstrated some limits such as its inability to prevent totalitarianism and its own soft tyranny. Analysing the 90s has revealed the depth of the change underlying this current time of transition. In Tiananmen Square and along the Berlin Wall, individuals have succeeded in recreating hope, some new enchantment, the idea that the world could change in a positive way. Undoubtedly, collective manifestations of these individuals — most of them genuinely free from influence of the old parties or ideologies — are seeds for a new kind of actor: world public opinion. Its forming proves that individualism — considered as the current source of all our evils — can be counterbalanced by a sense of solidarity and a new sort of intercourse. It also expresses something about the desire for "another world".

Two forces of change seem now to be facing each other: the traditional world built on nineteenth and twentieth centuries values: accumulation of wealth, wild consumption, experimenting with anarchical freedom, lack of distance in relation with events and herd submission to the mass media's distorted voice; and the next world, slowly emerging from the limbo: looking for meaning rather than wealth, sustainable consumption, global concern for human development (mainly peace, welfare and education), a critical mind and world public opinion. This paradigm shift follows the model of adolescence: teenagers are torn apart by contradictory forces, one which pushes them to stay a child, protected and irresponsible, and the other one pulling them towards adulthood and all its consequences. This stage of growing up always produces violence, whatever encapsulated or wildly expressed; this violence can be seen today everywhere in the world, from a form of dull violence, ordinary, durable, that undermines the everyday life, to the incredible savagery of ethnic massacres...

It is probably the price to pay to grow up, to become a more mature humankind. We can just look at it and long for maturity to come. Or we can act, as if we are responsible of our own future, by supporting, accompanying, educating this rebellious child on the way to a tame freedom, to a highest humanity, and perhaps a better way to rule it.

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# Current crises challenging U.S. democracy and alternative future scenarios

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"Americans can always be counted on to do the right thing...
after they have exhausted all other possibilities."

— Winston Churchill

#### **Abstract**

This article is largely a think-piece on the current state of U.S. democracy, challenges to that democracy, decisions on key issues facing U.S. democracy, and various alternative futures for U.S. democracy (based on those policy decisions).

Democracy is an imperfect type of political system, but it is (in various forms) perhaps the best type of political system that we humans have been able to devise so far. It can at times be chaotic, and take time for public policy decisions to be made, because elected representatives, national leaders in various sectors of society, public opinion, and different interest groups can all seek to play a role in decision-making. At various times, democracies (like any type of political system or like institutions in any area of life) can also face crises in their functioning — due to wars and external or internal threats or other issues which can challenge whether that political system will be able to live up to its own democratic principles in practice.

This article argues that U.S. democracy is currently in such a crisis over the preservation of some of its own cherished democratic principles for a number of reasons. First, the founding principles underlying U.S. democracy are explored, then some of the reasons for the current crisis of U.S. democracy are examined, followed by looking at a list of key policy decisions on key issues currently facing U.S. democracy, whose outcomes will collectively determine the future direction of U.S. democracy. This article concludes with two alternative scenarios (worst case and best case) for the future of U.S. democracy, noting that the U.S. is an ongoing experiment in democracy and that the most probable future will probably be somewhere inbetween these two scenarios.

# Part I: Principles Underlying the Foundation of U.S. Democracy

While the U.S. is called a democracy, it is really a democratic republic, meaning a representative form of government, as opposed to a direct democracy.

The U.S. form of government was founded by fairly enlightened people, based on some of the following principles:

- A government of laws, based on a written Constitution.
- A government "by, for, and of the people." Regular elections would ensure that government representatives were elected by the people and accountable to the people once elected. If not, they could be voted out of office in the next election.
- A federal form of government, in which certain limited powers were legally given to different branches of the Federal Government, reserving all remaining powers to the states.
- A belief that "power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely" (to cite a later phrase from Lord Acton, a British historian, in the 1800s), and thus there must be builtin, legal mechanisms, in a written Constitution, that would protect people's rights and also create a system of checks and balances within the Federal Government, that would allow any abuses of power by one branch of government to be checked and challenged legally by one of the other two branches of government.

Unlike European Parliamentary systems of government, the U.S. also has elections both for its elected representatives in two houses of Congress – the House of Representatives (where the population size of different states determines the number of representatives it has) and the U.S. Senate (where each state has two representatives), as well as for the President of the U.S., who heads a separate Executive branch of the government. (In Parliamentary systems, in contrast, the elected representatives and the parties they represent must form a majority coalition, which then selects a Prime Minister to run the government, but that Prime Minister is not directly elected by the people, as the President is in the U.S.)

Two very interesting influences on the founding of U.S. democracy included: (1) the influence of the Iroquois Confederacy (a confederacy of five, then six Native American tribes whose confederacy form of government influenced the founding of the U.S. Federal form of government); and (2) the influence of Freemasonry, with a significant number of the "founding fathers" of the U.S. democracy being Masons or Freemasons, whose exposure to esoteric spiritual principles also influenced the founding of the U.S. This influence can be seen in the symbols on the U.S. dollar bill, including a pyramid with an unfinished top, indicating that the U.S. experiment in democracy is unfinished and ongoing; and the important words, "E Pluribus Unum" ("Out of Many One"), indicating that behind diversity is Oneness – politically, as well as spiritually. The U.S. has always been a nation of immigrants, made up of the disaffected peoples of the world who were seeking a better chance in life, who then came to the U.S. with all their diversity and became "Americans." (While people used to call the U.S. the "melting pot," the preferred analogy today is the "salad bowl," based on both unity and diversity.)

While the above two influences on the founding of the U.S. democratic form of government were positive, a few blights also existed, including the treatment of Native Americans (who were here originally and with whom the U.S. government made and then broke many treaties), African Americans (who were brought here from Africa against their will and sold into slavery, only later becoming full citizens), and women (who were not given the vote until the 20th century). Nonetheless, the U.S. likes to see its democracy as a model for the world. Unfortunately, the attempt to create a democracy via military force in Iraq, without first getting an international consensus through the United Nations for such action, and without stabilizing the country militarily first, and the challenges to certain principles of U.S. democracy domestically – since 9/11 and the Iraq War began – have put serious strains on the current functioning of U.S. democracy and on the standing of the U.S. internationally, which this article will cover.

#### Part II: Current Issues Challenging the Foundations of U.S. Democracy

Whenever a war situation occurs, it is natural for people to come together behind a perceived threat to the country. The highjacking of planes by terrorists trained by Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda on 9/11/2001, that hit both the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. (two symbols, respectively, of U.S. economic and military power) led after that to U.S. government policies, under the Bush-Cheney Administration, to invade first Afghanistan, and then Iraq. Afghanistan was charged with allowing Bin Laden to reside there and train terrorists, who then attacked the U.S. on 9/11. Iraq under Saddam Hussein was charged with seeking to develop "weapons of mass destruction" or "WMD" (a new term coined to include any of the following: chemical weapons, biological weapons, or nuclear weapons), and with cooperating with Bin Laden and other terrorists who attacked the U.S. on 9/11. These were the two primary reasons cited by the Bush-Cheney Administration for going to war with Iraq in March 2003, not long after going to war with Afghanistan in October 2001. The problem is that neither of these reasons turned out to be valid in reality: weapons of mass destruction were not found, after extensive searches, in Iraq; and Saddam Hussein, a secular ruler, was not tied to Al Qaeda and Bin Laden, a radical Islamist, who was behind the 9/11 attacks.

Going to war is a serious business, and many people are very uncomfortable with, and concerned about, whether intelligence was manipulated to justify a "war of choice" with Iraq that was promoted as a "preemptive war" to protect an immediate threat from Saddam Hussein. When weapons of mass destruction were not found in Iraq, and Saddam was finally admitted to not be linked to Al Qaeda – the two original reasons cited for going to war – the Bush Administration then changed its rationale for war to the need to establish a democratic form of government there, while justifying cutbacks in democracy at home as necessary to counter the terrorist threat. These cutbacks can be seen in the Patriot Act and in the discovery of warrantless wiretapping of American citizens by the N.S.A. (National Security Agency). Some people are also very critical of the rush to attack Iraq before Afghanistan was stabilized and before Bin Laden was caught, thereby diverting the legitimate war on terrorism (and those behind 9/11) to a war on Saddam Hussein, who was not behind 9/11.

For Iraqi citizens, who still live with violence and death and an insurgency movement every day, one can question whether creating a "democracy" has really improved the quality of their every-day lives. The myth that holding elections would create a democracy by itself has also been brought into question. Without stabilizing a country militarily and economically, reconstructing the country, and establishing a civil society, democracy becomes difficult to establish. The issue is not whether democracy is a good thing — it is, but about *how* one goes about trying to establish it

It has also become clear, after the fact, that the Bush-Cheney Administration had on its agenda, from day one of the first George W. Bush Administration, an intention to go to war with Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein from power. (Suskind, *The Price of Power*) When 9/11 happened, the perfect excuse was presented to the Bush Administration for linking Saddam Hussein to Al Qaeda, and for claiming Saddam Hussein was seeking to develop WMD, which posed a direct threat to U.S. national security. The Administration is now charged by critics with "cherry-picking" data from the intelligence community that supported their claims and ignoring evidence (including from the intelligence community itself) that might have questioned the Administration's reasons for going to war with Iraq. Nonetheless, the Administration has tried to blame the intelligence community, especially the CIA, for poor intelligence, and has justified setting up alternative intelligence agencies, largely staffed by Neo-Cons (Neo-Conservatives) and housed within the Department of Defense, which relied heavily for intelligence on people like Ahmad Chalabi, whose agenda was to claim that Saddam Hussein was developing WMD as a justification to get the U.S. to invade Iraq and overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime, which the Neo-Cons also had on their agenda.

It can also be argued that the U.S. decision to invade Iraq, and eliminate Saddam Hussein from power, was a direct outgrowth of the "Bush Doctrine." This Doctrine was formulated by Neo-Conservatives, who began articulating a policy in the early 1990s, first under Paul Wolfowitz, and then elaborated by the Project for a New American Century, and then by President Bush in 2002, that basically stated that now that the Cold War with the former Soviet Union was over, the U.S., as the only remaining superpower in the world, should use its power to maintain continued world dominance, and not let any other country or region come to power that would challenge this U.S. dominance. This policy later came to be called the "Bush Doctrine," under George W. Bush's Presidency. It also justified unilateral actions (without an international consensus first being developed through the United Nations Security Council), and even "preemptive wars," if necessary, in support of U.S. interests abroad. This led to George Bush later going to the U.N. and basically saying: "you can support the U.S. war effort with Iraq, but whether you do or not, we will go." This was a classic example of the "Bush Doctrine" in practice. In the view of many critics of this policy, this action was also a direct affront to international law. Even U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell (one of the few real moderates in the first Bush Administration), was finally pressured to go before the U.N. and cite claims (later proved false, which he has now acknowledged as one of the great blights on his career as a public servant) concerning Saddam Hussein's current efforts to develop WMD.

No one, by the way, is lauding Saddam Hussein in any way. He was a tyrant who killed his own people. The U.S. CIA supported Saddam Hussein in the past, however, when he opposed Iran. The CIA now has a term, "blow-back," to describe policies it has conducted, supposedly in support of U.S. interests abroad, which then come back to haunt the country. Saddam Hussein is one of those policies. Osama Bin Laden is another. When the Soviets went into Afghanistan, the CIA supported so-called "freedom fighters" – later called Islamist extremists and terrorists – to go into Afghanistan and attack Soviet troops during the Cold War days. One of the "freedom fighters" the U.S. supported was Osama Bin Laden. The Soviet losses in Afghanistan finally led them to withdraw their troops. After that, the U.S. also withdrew its support to the "freedom fighters"

there, and in the first Gulf War (under George Bush's father, George H. W. Bush, as President), the U.S. also stationed troops in Saudi Arabia. Both policies angered Bin Laden and led to his training of troops to attack the U.S., including on 9/11.

There are a huge number of other issues on which polarization has occurred – both internationally, concerning U.S. foreign policy, but also domestically, concerning U.S. policies of both commission, as well as omission, at home. The Bush Administration came to power claiming that it would be a uniter at home, and that it was not interested in "regime change" abroad. After 9/11 and the Afghanistan and especially Iraq Wars, the opposite ended up happening. Some of those other U.S. policies that have divided the country and the world are noted below.

# Part III: Decisions on Key Policy Issues, Which Will Collectively Determine the Future Direction of U.S. Democracy

Following is an abbreviated list of a number of additional policy issues still facing the United States. (Contact this writer for a more extensive list.) Decisions on these issues will individually and collectively lead the country either towards living more in tune with the democratic principles on which the country was founded, or away from such principles.

## Several Iraq War issues include:

- Whether the Iraq War continues unabated for years to come, and with it the increasing human casualties of U.S. and allied troops, as well as of Iraqi citizens, or not. (As of June 2006, 2,470 U.S. troops have died and over 30,000 Iraqis are dead, with many more casualties on all sides.) Many people already compare Iraq to Vietnam, and wonder how the U.S. can withdraw its troops. President Bush has altered from claiming a quick victory at the beginning of the war, to frequently saying the U.S. would withdraw its troops once the Iraqi troops could take over, to more recently saying that a future U.S. President would have to decide when U.S. troops would be withdrawn. Also whether other allied countries will continue to keep their troops in Iraq, whether Americans will continue to support the war effort, and whether Iraqis will finally just want all foreign troops out of their country, or not.
- Whether U.S. government treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay (the U.N. has asked
  the U.S. to close this base) and in Iraq (including Abu Ghraib prison), and policy of taking exception to the Geneva Conventions on the treatment of prisoners, will come back to
  haunt U.S. soldiers held as prisoners abroad, or lead to changes in U.S. policy, or not.
  Now also questions of U.S. troops killing Iraqi civilians at Haditha a war crime.
- Whether the costs of the Iraq war (9 billion dollars/month, and 250 billion dollars by the
  end of 2006), and ongoing hurricane relief efforts, cause increasing Federal government
  deficits, taking money away from other areas, and passing huge debts on to future generations, or not. Government deficits also force the government to borrow money, pushing up interest rates, which along with rising gas prices tend to slow economic growth.
- Whether the Bush Doctrine (see Part II) remains the basis of U.S. foreign policy, or the U.S. instead rejoins the international community and works with other nations (including through the U.N.) to collectively solve many pressing global issues, or not; and whether

the U.S. is thus able to mend its relationships with much of the rest of the world or not, which the unilateral invasion of Iraq greatly fractured.

• Whether the upcoming trial of L. "Scooter" Libby, former top aide to Vice President Dick Cheney, leads to a conviction, or not, on charges that he lied to Grand Jury investigators about Administration efforts to publicly discredit Ambassador Joseph Wilson, who publicly questioned the reasons cited by the Bush Administration for going to war with Iraq. Wilson wrote that he found no evidence that Saddam Hussein was trying to purchase yellow-cake uranium from Niger to make nuclear weapons. Eight days later, Wilson's wife, Valerie Plame, was outed as a CIA agent, which is illegal. Special Counsel Patrick Fitzgerald, who heads this investigation, could still also indict other top Bush Administration officials, including Karl Rove, who has been President Bush's chief domestic political strategist for years.

Increasing rich-poor gaps, and economic and political corruption issues, include:

- Whether the increasing gap between rich and poor is finally addressed, or not (see books by Phillips, and Moyers), If not, it puts continued and increasing pressure on the middle class (the cornerstone of a democracy). The information revolution began this movement towards a "two-tiered society" of technological and professional haves and have nots. Bush Administration policy of continued tax cuts, which especially benefit the rich, furthers this gap, as does the outsourcing of jobs by U.S. corporations favoring cheaper labor abroad (part of the "flattening" of the world that Tom Friedman discussed in his book, *The World Is Flat*). This is also the first time in U.S. history that the U.S. government has reduced taxes in a time of war, greatly increasing the Federal Government deficit, instead of using taxes to pay for the war effort.
- Whether the culture of economic and political corruption continues in both the private and public sectors, or not. In the private sector, the Enron scandal stands out, with its top executives now found guilty at their trial. In the public sector, illegal abuses of power by lobbyists and elected officials stand out. One example is Tom DeLay, former Republican Majority Whip in the U.S. House of Representatives, who was called "the hammer" and was forced to resign his leadership position, later deciding not to run for office again after being indicted and awaiting trial for illegally channeling funds to Texas Republicans. Another example is Jack Abramoff, superlobbyist accused and now convicted of illegally buying off different elected representatives, including aides to Tom DeLay.

Issues related to the influence of right-wing Republicans on Bush policy include:

• Whether Karl Rove's Republican strategy of dominating all branches of the Federal government, including Congress and the Presidency, continues to be based on appealing to right-wing, religious groups on social issues – like abortion and gay marriage, or not; and whether the founding principle of U.S. democracy, that there should be a separation of church and state, as a way to ensure that people can follow their own spiritual-religious interests unimpeded by government policies or a state-dominated religion, is able to survive under these circumstances, or not. (See books by Moyers and Phillips on the dangers of creating a theocratic government.)

Several important political and upcoming election issues include:

- Whether policies of the Bush Administration and the Republican majority controlling both houses of the U.S. Congress become more open and transparent or remain shrouded too often in secrecy, making public accountability (as on energy policy) more difficult.
- Whether the Democratic Party and the media are able to regain their voices, or not. They were both largely silent earlier in questioning the reasons cited for going to war with Iraq, largely out of fear of being called "unpatriotic" after 9/11.
- Whether the U.S. public is able to regain confidence in the policies of its elected representatives, or not. As of May 2006, President Bush had about a 35% popularity rating, while Vice President Cheney's popularity was down to about 18%. Ratings of elected representatives in Congress are not much better.
- Whether the November 2006 Congressional elections lead to the Democrats taking back control of the House of Representatives, and possibly the Senate, or not, which will determine whether the system of checks and balances, enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, as a means of checking abuses of power by any branch of the Federal Government, will be able to function again, or not.
- Whether the November 2008 Presidential and Congressional elections lead to a greater political dialogue by both Democrats and Republicans on the issues of real concern to voters, or not, and if not, whether a third political party emerges that is willing to address those issues as has happened in U.S. history previously when both dominant political parties fail to address key issues. Talk has already begun about a possible third "purple" political party that can bridge red/hinterland/conservative and blue/coastal/liberal perspectives, instead of polarizing the country. Also whether real dialogue on issues can replace character assassination in politics, or not.

Technology issues effecting the future of U.S. democracy include:

- Whether new electronic voting machines by the Debolt Co. (which contributes to Republicans) and now a Venezuelan Co. are tested for adequate safeguards making reprogramming of election results impossible, or not, and whether a backup paper trail exists, so if election results are challenged in some district, they can be properly investigated, or not. Serious questions remain about the Florida 2000 and Ohio 2004 election results, which decided the Presidential election in George W. Bush's favor in both cases. (Kennedy, 2006)
- Whether the discovery of secret Administration warrantless wiretapping of U.S. citizens
  (supposedly involved in conversations with potential terrorist suspects abroad) by the
  N.S.A. (National Security Agency), which created a public outcry, is brought under more
  Congressional and FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) Court oversight as required by law, or not, instead of being done secretly by the President and the N.S.A.,
  threatening citizens' privacy under the Constitution.

Whether "internet neutrality" is preserved, or not, or whether special interests are allowed
to control internet content, and thus whether the continuing expansion of the internet also
leads to increased public access to more alternative views on different policy issues than
the mainstream media often covers, or not.

#### Energy and global warming issues include:

- Whether the Administration really begins to deal more seriously with developing alternative sources of energy beyond just nonrenewable fossil fuels, including oil (one unspoken reason for going into Iraq) and a return to greater reliance on coal and nuclear fission (also based on nonrenewable uranium or plutonium fuels), or not, and whether serious research is resumed on developing renewable energy sources that could make the U.S.(and world) less dependent on Middle East oil, or not.
- Whether the growing evidence for global climate change and global warming which 99% of scientists confirm will lead to the U.S. government finally addressing this issue (after it failed to sign the Kyoto Treaty, and promised alternative policies, which are still not forthcoming), or not. The longer the U.S. and the world wait to address such issues, the harder it will be to turn such negative effects around. (Gore, An Inconvenient Truth)

Each of the above policy decisions on key issues facing the country are phrased as either/or decisions. Actually, there can be a spectrum of possible responses – from more to less – on each of the above issues. The more each of the above issues are dealt with, the more the prospects are for a return to policies based on more democratic principles – both at home and abroad, in U.S. domestic and foreign policy, while the less each of these issues are addressed, the more the future of democracy in the U.S. remains endangered and in a basically unhealthy state.

It is important to remember that each citizen in a democracy has choices — to become informed on the issues or not, and to demand that their public officials remain accountable to the public or not, and if not, that the scoundrels are voted out of office at the next election, unless really serious abuses of power have occurred, and then either Congressional censure or ultimately impeachment remain options. The future still holds out all of these possibilities.

## Part IV: Alternative Scenarios for the Future of U.S. Democracy and the World

The above sections outline the huge range of issues on which the future of U.S. democracy rests. It is one thing to have a written Constitution, which is supposed to outline what is legally possible or not under U.S. law, and to have a theoretical system of "checks and balances" on which abuses of power, by any branch of government, can be checked and countered and addressed, by other branches of government, as well as having mandated periodic elections, when new people (and political parties) can be elected to public office, and people who have abused the public trust can be thrown out of office. These are all fine in principle, but if they are not carried out in practice, democracy dies and just words remain that people give lip service to. In a "living democracy," those democratic principles must be repeatedly tested and adapted to changing times and to new challenges and crises that will periodically test the very foundations of that democracy.

This article has argued that the U.S. is again going through such a time. At least two alternative future scenarios – and a hugh range of inbetween scenarios – exist for the future of U.S. democracy. Short versions of both a worst case and best case scenario for U.S. democracy follow, but the most probable case scenario is somewhere inbetween. We are after all imperfect beings living in a very imperfect world, where ideals are not totally adhered to, but one counts on those ideals still helping people to correct abuses of power and to set the U.S. democracy back on a better course that is more in keeping with its own democratic Constitutional principles and history.

The U.S. is really an experiment in democracy. That democracy is always challenged and tested in a time of war. When the country learns that it has even gone to war under false pretenses, that democracy is even tested more profoundly. The outcome of all these challenges awaits us. In the meantime, here are two worst and best case scenarios for the future of U.S. democracy, with the more probable outcome being somewhere inbetween.

#### **Worst Case Scenario:**

The war with Iraq continues unabated. U.S. troops are not withdrawn, the insurgency continues even increases. The fragile Iraqi government even breaks down and the country descends into civil war between Shiites (the majority in the country, who at best will support a somewhat theocratic-inspired form of semi-democratic government emerging), Kurds (a minority in the North that would really like to join other Kurds in Turkey and Iran and form an independent state, challenging the territorial integrity of various countries, including the U.S. ally Turkey, in the Middle East), and Sunnis (a minority that ran Iraq under Saddam Hussein's regime and that is largely backing the insurgency movement against the continued presence of U.S. and foreign troops in Iraq). The U.S. is damned if we withdraw (and leave chaos and civil war in Iraq, which the U.S. invasion of Iraq helped created) and damned if we stay (which continues to fuel the insurgency movement in Iraq). Iraqi reconstruction efforts continue to be undermined, and the Iraqi people live in ongoing terror and uncertainty. Casualties on all sides continue to mount, and the U.S. deficit continues to soar, taking funds away from all other federal government programs whether social security, health care, education, the environment – including global warming, or other social programs. The American people are fed up and eventually – in 2006 and/or 2008 – elect different people and parties to lead the country. The U.S. finally withdraws some troops, but remains an ongoing presence in Iraq for years to come. In the meantime, instability in the Middle East remains, which U.S. policies have helped exacerbate. If insurgents or terrorists get nuclear weapons, and are willing to use them, like suicide bombers have used their own bodies, the world remains in an exceedingly dangerous place. The continued reliance of the West, as well as the global community (including China and India) on Middle East oil, increases tensions and conflicts in the world, as well as challenges U.S. power and dominance – the opposite effect of the reasons originally given for the Bush Doctrine in the first place. The old Cold War days – when state actors were at least easier to identify and locate than non-state terrorist actors and insurgents – seem simple by comparison.

#### **Best Case Scenario:**

The abuses of power – by public and private interest groups – that have existed under the Bush Administration are investigated and brought to trial. The politics of fear – that dominated much of the first Bush Administration after 9/11 – is replaced by a healthy skepticism and demand for more transparency and accountability in government – whether from the Executive or Legislative branches of government. The media and Democratic Party cease being intimidated and a real discussion of issues and alternative policies ensues. The U.S. gives up the Bush Doctrine as a basis for U.S. foreign policy and rejoins the international community, deciding to use its power to work through the United Nations and other international institutions to develop a global consensus to solve the many issues facing the world, including poverty, trade, environmental protection and global warming, as well as terrorism. The enormous polarization of the world, as well as of the U.S. public at home, is reduced, as people realize we must make this world work together. Instead of entering the 21st century as a world totally divided, a sense of global community and real interdependence begins to emerge, that also honors the diversity of the world's peoples and the different contributions that different cultures and peoples can make to humanity as a whole today. The Middle East also begins to transition to real democratic governments, where young people see a future for themselves, and terrorism loses its hold on their consciousness. The world also moves towards the development of renewable energy resources, tapped with much more sophisticated technologies – not just a return to coal and nuclear fission as temporary alternatives to oil - so that conflicts over resources are abated, and global warming - a threat that could become even much more serious than terrorism – is finally addressed, including by the U.S. government. As part of this, democracy evolves as the increasing choice of people globally, because it really does allow public participation and holds leaders accountable. A more accountable, globally-interdependent world really begins to emerge, people gain confidence in their futures, governments are able to cut back on military expenditures and wars, and funds are increasingly made available for people's health and education and environmental protection globally. A global healing is finally able to occur.

#### **Conclusion**

The world is a complex, ever changing, place. The evolution of U.S. democracy is also a complex, evolving experiment. The two topics are intertwined: both influence each other. Let us hope that the quotation from Winston Churchill, cited at the beginning of this article, turns out to be true, i.e., that after many mistakes, Americans will finally do the right thing and live up to their democratic roots. Nonetheless, U.S. government policies have created many crises and consequences — domestically and internationally — which will have to be addressed, if this is to occur.

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# **Democracy in the Light of Globalization**

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#### **Abstract**

This article explores ways in which democracy must be reformed in order to meet the new requirements posed by globalization. I will argue that the main problem is not how to conceive a blueprint of a global democratically structured government, and define its tasks. The main problem is rather to find out how we could come from here to there. To come closer to an answer, the chapter analyses who or what it is what blocks the road towards global democracy, and why. In concluding, it shall mention some new developments which possibly allow to open a new window of opportunity. European governments will have an especially important part to play here, together with civil society.

## 1. What is democracy?

Democracy can be defined as a certain way to organize collectively binding decisions. Most national constitutions include the relevant criteria:

- Everybody affected by a decision ought to have a chance to take part in it.
- The *raison d'être* of the nation state is to safeguard respect and enforce the fundamental rights and freedoms laid down in the constitution.
- The majority decides but also protects the legitimate rights and interests of minorities.
- Everybody's freedom has its limits in the freedoms of all others.
- Tolerance and non-violence are fundamental principles of all social relations.
- Government will be determined in general, free, equal and secret elections, and can be changed.
- Political parties serve to organize, articulate and represent the interests of different social groups.
- The media provide, in an objective and uncensored way, the information necessary to arrive at rational decisions.
- Everybody has free access to information and is free to express his or her views and opinions.
- The legislative and the judiciary supervise government; government is accountable to them; therefore, both must be independent of the executive.
- All citizens are free to convene and to organize without any control by government.
- Government is called upon to care for social justice and to protect the weak of the greed of the strong.

Thus, democracy is a shorthand for a bundle of rules which have evolved in a long civilizational process since Habeas Corpus (1679) and the Bill of Rights (1689) were wrested from the rulers. People have fought for them against the feudal and aristocratic powerful. They overcame charismatic and traditional rule and submitted might to law. The General Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 was adopted at a time when the most powerful signatories were still colonial powers. Still, they stated explicitly that these rights should be granted to all human beings irrespective of "race, colour, gender, language, religion, political conviction, national or social descent, property or other circumstances". Together with the Gandhian principle of nonviolence, human rights constitute the most fundamental achievement of the  $20^{th}$  century.

The equality in value expressed in Art. 2 of the General Declaration of 1948 is the very essence of this civilizational achievement. We are humans only insofar as we respect our fellow humans like ourselves especially if they are weaker in some sense, handicapped, women, poor, children, immigrant, illiterate, criminal, defeated. They all should not be of minor right. We could suppress, torture, kill them and have often done so in the course of history, but today almost nobody in the civilized world seriously disputes that this violates human rights. That we all are of equal right and deserve equal respect is the very essence of civilization. This emphasis seems especially important in times when ideologues of some sort tirelessly insist on the allegedly genetic minting of qualitative differences between humans in terms of intelligence, talents, or force. Never again should we forget that this sort of vulgar darwinistic misinterpretation had been used in the past to pave the way into the gas chambers. If the Nazi experience has any lasting sense then this: We might not be directly responsible for the crimes committed in our parent's generation – but we are responsible to guarantee that such might never and nowhere happen again. Equal respect for all human beings is the basic prerequisite.

It follows from this that the exploitation of humans by humans – the use of someone's freedom to the detriment of others – violates fundamental human rights, especially where others are denied the satisfaction of their basic needs. However, this happens daily on large scale when, e.g., people are being pushed into unemployment and poverty. The little amount of public outcry this arouses indicates the degree to which we have got used to common wrongfulness. Yet, we would have hundreds of good reasons for protest: polluted soil and water, genetically manipulated or poisoned food, acid rain and smog, exposure to radiation, the dramatic polarization of rich versus poor, injustice, corruption, nepotism and white-collar crime, racism, extremism and violence and, of course, war – to mention only a few. The state must define and enforce regulations in order to tame rabid capitalism and warmongering, and to prevent exploitation.

Democracy is an ideal, a utopia. We all know that our institutions are not perfect, affected by incompetence, abuse, dishonesty, corruption and fraud. We have built in mechanisms of control and sanction to limit such deficiencies. They don't work perfectly and in some situations they are overrun by plutocracy<sup>1</sup>. Some institutions are less democratic than others (prisons, hospitals, the military, public administration, private enterprise, many families), and in some of them we have injected democratic elements to limit despotism (works councils in many companies, school councils, parents' councils, students' parliaments, self-governing organs in social security etc.).

However, there are also some far-reaching misunderstandings. Democracy is not a static paradise, achieved once and for ever, but rather a never-ending social process. It needs permanent rethinking, commitment and active involvement from all citizens to safeguard its virtues. Second, democracy is not, as some seem to pretend, identical, in fact not even logically tied to, capi-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article13135.htm

talism. The contradiction is obvious in corporate capitalism: Democracy is based on the premise of equality while capitalism is based on the idea of inequality where some individuals are entitled to appropriate the surplus value worked out by others, i.e. on exploitation. Hence, they make use of their own freedom to restrict the freedom of others and subjugate them under their rule. We in the capitalist world pretend to be the most enthusiastic defenders of human rights, and even more, that (corporate) capitalism and democracy should be seen as two inseparable sides of one coin. A concomitant of Cold War propaganda, this misinterpretation must not persist. That it does may be seen as an indicator that propaganda has not stopped<sup>2</sup>. The logical trick tying the two together lies in the concept of private property. It abstracts from the wide variety of meanings which private property can assume<sup>3</sup>, from one's everydays' belongings (which is, of course, part of individual autonomy and thus tied to democracy) to the private property of means of production, or capital (which is usually appropriated from others and therefore even contradicts democracy), which constitutes the difference between the two major social classes and the antagonism between them<sup>4</sup>. This remains empirically correct even one hundred and thirty years after Karl Marx published Das Kapital. Equating democracy and capitalism is ideological, it serves the class interest of one social class, the capitalist, over the other. Therefore, capitalism needs politically defined rules to protect society from its potentially damaging character. The way democratic societies organize their economic system is not determined by natural law nor by economic science but rather an outcome of political debate and decision. Thus, we have seen in Europe all sorts of mixture between democracy on the one hand and a broad scale of state to market regulated economies on the other. There is no empirical evidence on which model would benefit society more. Finally, we should be aware of the fact that most violations of basic human rights and democratic principles happen indirectly, and sometimes are difficult to trace back to their origin. This is certainly the case in the International Monetary Fund's structural adjustment policy<sup>5</sup>, and to a lesser degree in the European Union's acquis communautaire imposed on accession countries.

The late 1960s witnessed the climax of the welfare state in many countries, supported by a mostly liberal public, critical social scientists, and an impatient youth. The emergence of the economic crisis in 1974 (misinterpreted by some as only the first oil prize shock<sup>6</sup>) was the lever used by right-wing politicians, capitalist oligarchs and ideologues to kick off the neoconservative offensive<sup>7</sup>, with huge sums of money invested to buy bestsellers and TV shows, intellectuals and journalists, university institutes and think tanks<sup>8</sup>. They all sang the song of economic crisis resulting from state regulation, of a winner-gets-all and shareholder value logic. This was the beginning of large scale corporate crime and corruption, especially in the U.S., but quickly spreading to other countries as well<sup>9</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Goodman 2004

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See, e.g., the lucid analysis in Marcuse 1998

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> While mainstream sociological theory informs us that the cleavage between two antagonistic social classes may have been historically correct but is no longer valid to describe todays' inequality patterns, I do insist that neoconservatives have continuously worked toward a new class struggle from above and brought back social class in a Marxian sense. This is, however, not the place to elaborate on the argument

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Chossudovsky 2001

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> A very different perspective is taken by, among others, Engdahl 2004

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Hamm 2005

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Nace 2005

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Nace 2005 op. cit.

# 2. What is New in Globalization?

The social model for which the concept of democracy has been worked out is the nation state. Democratic rights have been wrested from aristocratic rulers who had created the nation state as a unitary legal entity. Even if it had relations with other nation states ever since its emergence, we observe a qualitative change in this network of international relations, termed *globalization*. *International relations* denotes a more or less systematic and persistent pattern of exchange (of people, goods, services, capital, information etc.) among a certain number of independent and relatively autonomous nation states. In the course of history, the pattern has changed and has become more dense. *Globalization* means that the pattern of exchange dominates the independence and autonomy of the nation-states, and the gradual involvement of all nation-states. What we observe is the formation of a global society. The driving force behind this process is the globalizing economy, especially its financial sector, with deep consequences in the ecological, political, social and cultural spheres<sup>10</sup>.

With respect to the political sphere which is of primary interest here, the mesh of institutions and regimes has become so dense and decisive that it widely determines the political action of all national governments. Besides and beyond that there was and there remains the network of political relations in bilateral, multilateral and supranational agreements and conventions in their own regional or sectoral relevance. It is important here, however, to emphasize the *national* basis of political actors, as governments continue to depend on their national electorate or clientel which significantly impact on their chances for manoeuvre, together with the influence exerted by national non-governmental organizations. Their perception of global problems and their behaviour on the international scene is, however, largely shaped by an executive attitude, with little insinuation from democratic mechanism and control. In a double-bind situation, they will tend to limit the insight and influence of national democratic routines while on the other hand justifying their behaviour by unavoidable global necessities. A typical diplomatic outcome of this situation is the package solution negotiated on the global level (like, e.g., in the WTO) where national parliaments have only a yes or no vote but no voice in the details if they don't want the entire package to fail. The European Constitution is only the last important example of this kind. Not very surprising, national parliaments were ready to ratify the treaty but national referenda in France and in the Netherlands (after which those planned in other member states were cancelled) rejected the bill.

The United Nations have been shaped, from their very onset, by the interests, problem perceptions and power constellations of the Anti-Hitler Coalition and the beginning confrontation between East and West. This explains the nature of the UN Security Council. It also explains the character of the Bretton Woods institutions<sup>11</sup> which resided under the roof of the UN but did not accept accountability to, nor instructions from the General Assembly, nor did they obey to the one nation-one vote-rule. In UN history, three structural fractures can be made out:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Hamm 2002. Certainly, other factors like, e.g., science and technology, etc. also play an important part in this process; the basic driving force, the *énergie motrice*, seems to lie in financial flows. We should not forget elements of globalization overarching the sectoral spheres like, e.g., the Bilderberg group (since 1954), or the Trilateral Commission (1973), and others. They all tend to surpass democratic control and they all explicitly exclude developing countries. It has been observed that, e.g., the Bilderbergers have come to meet only days before the G 8 summits – *honi soit qui mal y pense* 

<sup>11</sup> The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank Group, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

First, the end of decolonization in the 1960s added some one hundred new formally independent member states (the "Group of 77", the developing countries) to the world body, thus changing majority positions in the General Assembly to the disadvantage of the western capitalist countries. Their most important forum became UNCTAD<sup>12</sup>, their greatest success was the adoption of the New World Economic Order in 1974, coinciding with the beginning economic crisis and a still-born baby from the beginning. The West in fact disapproved the integrated commodity agreement and the code of conduct for transnational corporations and rendered UNCTAD almost insignificant. To the fore came GATT (transformed with the conclusion of the Uruguay round, in 1995, into the World Trade Organization).

1975 saw the beginning of the World Economic Summits of the most important (Western) industrial nations, resulting in the G 7 and, later with the partial inclusion of Russia, the G 8. The importance of this step has often been underestimated. It was the beginning of systematic obstruction of the UN by the United States government, at least tacitly supported by its Western allies<sup>13</sup>. The U.S. government refused to pay its full constitutional dues and reduced its payments to the minimum necessary not to loose its right to vote. It used its veto in the Security Council again and again in order to protect her own egoistic interests, and her closest ally, Israel, from critical resolutions of the General Assembly 14. It pulled out of the International Labour Organization (1975) and later of UNESCO (1984) in an attempt to bring the UN under tighter control<sup>15</sup>. The U.S. refused to sign a great number of international agreements, mostly on disarmament and weapons control<sup>16</sup>, and boycotted international negotiations (as in the entire post-Rio process, or the International Court of Criminal Justice<sup>17</sup>) and, with impunity, violated a great number of international conventions. When they did not succeed, the U.S. resorted to build up a new global power center, the G 7, outside of any democratic control. Not only does the G 7 govern the UN Security Council (if Russia can be pulled into the boat, and a Chinese veto avoided); it also controls the IMF and the World Bank by a majority of votes. It exerts overwhelming power over the WTO; and last but not least it has a military arm, NATO (especially after the new mandate was adopted of defending common interests instead of common territory).

The third structural fracture followed the collapse of the socialist regimes. Not only did the number of UN member states increase again. The first Iraq war of 1990/91 immediately signalled the U.S. governments' will to act unilaterally (the 28 country-coalition and the majority for Security Council resolutions have been bought together). The nomination of a declared UN adversary as

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Beheading the UN: How did this institution, with its historic mandate to end all wars and promote peace and development around the world, come to such a sorry pass? http://207.44.245.159/article7032.htm

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> 30 Years Of U.S. UN Vetoes: How the U.S. has Voted/Vetoed

http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article2000.htm; see also List Of U.S. Vetoes of UN Resolutions Critical of Israel: (1972-2004), http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/UN/usvetoes.html; a list of UN Resolutions against "Israel" 1955-1992, http://www.middleeastnews.com/unresolutionslist.html

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> this was especially obvious in the case of UNESCO where the U.S. government put forward a proposal to introduce a 85 p.c. qualified majority as in the IMF which would have resulted in a factual U.S. veto right

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> U.S. finds strange bedfellows in UN vote on torture, Christian Science Monitor, April 19, 2002; UN Veto Reveals Bush Administration's Contempt for Human Rights, <a href="http://www.commondreams.org/views01/0404-03.htm">http://www.commondreams.org/views01/0404-03.htm</a>; 179 countries vote against the Cuban blockade: For the 13th consecutive time, the UN General Assembly has passed a resolution calling for an end to the U.S. blockade of Cuba. The voting on the resolution was 179 countries in favor and four against (The United States, Israel, the Marshall Islands and Palau),

http://www.granma.cu/ingles/2004/octubre/juev28/44votacion.html; Bush refuses to support UN over anti-torture pact, Cuba. http://snipurl.com/fw9w

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>Bush Faces Major Test at UN on Exemption from War Crimes Court, <a href="http://www.oneworld.net/article/view/88577/1/">http://www.oneworld.net/article/view/88577/1/</a>; U.S. Attempts to Exempt Troops from ICC, <a href="http://www.wagingpeace.org/menu/resources/sunflower/2004/06">http://www.wagingpeace.org/menu/resources/sunflower/2004/06</a> sunflower.htm#9b

Permanent Representative of the U.S. to the UN in 2005 indicates the persisting intention to fully dismantle the world organization.

It is important here to mention how the new wave of globalization has changed the role of the nation state from the mid 1970s on. Democratic procedures and control have remained fragmented on the national level while more and more decisions are being hammered out, if not formally made, on the global scale. In the course of this process, the IMF and the WTO have emerged as the primary instruments of U.S. world policy to enforce the neo-conservative agenda (i.e. the interests of American big business and financial circles)<sup>18</sup>.

The lifting of customs and trade barriers in GATT and WTO, accompanied by the almost total liberalization of international capital, helped big transnational corporations to dwarf many national governments. TNCs have no national roots, they shift their locations and subsidiaries at will to profit from favourable taxes, low environmental and safety standards, inexistent trade unions and wage disputes, and externalize costs at great measure. National governments, unwilling or unable to exert control, see themselves at service to the TNCs<sup>19</sup>. At the same time, corporate decisions and strategies are increasingly decided by institutional investors, banks, investment funds, pension funds. Shareholders rescue their money to tax oases which until now have profited from the tacit support of national governments, and thus avoid to accept their share in redistribution, infrastructure maintenance, and social justice. In fact, governments have not only not prevented such safe capital harbours, but created them in favour of the rich.

This is the one side of globalization. But there is a second side of the coin:

It begins with the World Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, June 1992 (UNCED). It had gathered around the concept of Sustainable Development and is based on two pillars: the United Nations on the one hand, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and social movements on the other. The UN played an important part in defining global problems and the necessary actions to solve them in the entire series of world conferences of the 1990s: environment and development 1992, human rights 1993, population 1994, social development 1995, women 1995, shelter and urban development 1996, the social role of science 1998. Each of these events concluded with a declaration of principles and an action plan<sup>20</sup>. Altogether they read like an inventory of rational and human world consciousness, signed by the majority of national governments even if not followed-up by according action. It is correct to see the UN as the solicitor of a better world. Existing evaluation, however, forces to conclude that national governments while signing those documents are far from committing themselves to their implementation, first of all many OECD members.

At these world conferences, NGOs made their appearance on the global level. While not really new in the UN system, UNCED was the first time for them to organize a counter summit and establish themselves as a global actor. Since then, they made increasingly spectacular events not only at UN conferences, but even more so at the summits of the IMF/World Bank, the WTO, or the G 7. Their highlight was, in 1998, the publication of secret documents on the planned Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) which were worked out in the WTO, but then shifted to the OECD in order to exclude developing countries from the negotiations, and would have be-

<sup>18</sup> Krüger 2005

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Pigs at the trough: Dems Charge GOP Has Corrupted Congress: "Lobbyists are now writing the bills passed by Congress," she contended. "They have infiltrated every aspect of our government. Their money and donations shape the opinions of corrupt lawmakers in a way that public opinion no longer does." <a href="http://tinyurl.com/9w3y6">http://tinyurl.com/9w3y6</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> All official documents can easily be found on the websites of the respective secretariates

headed nation states in favour of TNCs but vanished, like Dracula, when it came to public light<sup>21</sup>. INGOs have played an increasingly important role in assisting developing countries in such negotiations. It might not be exaggerated to assume that they were instrumental to help the Third World resist the impositions of the rich countries and develop an own strategy to block the actual WTO Doha round. Moreover, at the national level they reminded national governments of what they had themselves committed to with their signatures under world conference documents, and insisted that they keep up to their promises (like, e.g., the multiplicity of Local Agenda 21 movements). Important as this is, it still has little to do with democracy as NGOs have no legitimate public mandate. But civil society is moving. The World Social Fora, beginning in Porto Alegre, Brazil, have dissipated on continental, national, and regional scales. Their movement, with Le Monde Diplomatique as their most important megaphone and Attac as one of their most important confluants to the broad stream, is mostly based on Western, or Western educated, middle class intellectuals.

# 3. Global Democracy?

From both its sides, globalization has not really been in favour of democracy but rather helped to undermine and leverage democratic procedures. It has, however, strengthened the important insight into the descending capacity of nation states to cope with current problems in a democratic way.

If nation states transfer regulatory competence to higher levels of government (like, e.g., the European Union), then democratic institutions and procedures have to be invented and implemented to make sure that, on this new level, not the egoistic will of the few might succeed over the common good of the many. In fact, it does not seem too difficult to figure out what a possible majority of the global population would demand of a world government: peace, disarmament and security, the safeguard of the natural life support system, the enforcement of human rights for all human beings, some control over international capital movements, transparence, information and participation in those decisions which affect their lives or, in one word, democracy.

How could we imagine a democratic world government? Many people on earth would possibly support a model which accepts the United Nations as its nucleus. A new (directly elected) World Parliament (construed, e.g., according to propositions made by Georges Monbiot, with one directly elected deputy to represent ten million people<sup>22</sup>) could become the first chamber, the present General Assembly the second chamber of a global legislative. Whether or not a third chamber ( a House of Counsellors according to proposals made by the World Constitution and Parliament Association<sup>23</sup>) would be advisable might be left to a decision by the World Parliament. The international courts would constitute the judiciary. The executive could be formed out of the present secretariat, possibly assisted by some revised version of the ECOSOC (the Economic and Social Council), with an administrative basis built from the existing special organizations as departments: UNESCO would become the department of culture, education, and science; UNEP the department of the environment and of commodities; WTO, possibly joined by UNCTAD, the new department of economics; ILO a new department of work and social security; FAO a new department of food and agriculture; WHO an department of public health; and UNDP a department of development. Keynes propositions for a International Clearing Union could be used to design a new department of finance, as the IMF and the World Bank will turn out to be not re-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> While official MAI negotiations have been discontinued, the issue is of course still on the table under other titles

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> World Constitution and Parliament Association, <a href="http://www.worldparliamentgov.net">http://www.worldparliamentgov.net</a>

formable; and a new department of disarmament and conflict resolution might replace today's Security Council which, again, should not survive in its present logic<sup>24</sup>.

On the one hand, such a proposition would allow to make use of the high expertise acquired in the existing institutions. Moreover, it could rely on the long experience of multiculturally staffed organizations, with their unavoidable problems and frictions. All these institutions would be subjected to international law, and to the decisions of the World Parliament. Legally binding decisions could pass the World Parliament with a qualified majority of 85 per cent (as, e.g., in today's IMF), there would be no blocking minority. A way would have to be found to enforce decisions world-wide, even against the resistance of individual nation states. The world government should be, legitimated by a vote of the world parliament, in a position to impose, e.g., disarmament on nuclear powers. Beyond doubt, it must therefore be gradually conceded the monopoly of physical violence. The world government should be located in one of the poorest nations, Bangladesh, or Sudan, for reasons of regional economic impact. It could be financed, besides contributions of member states, by some sort of Tobin tax levelled on capital movements, thus at the same time slowing down international financial speculation.

The tasks of the world government could be defined according to the principle of subsidiarity enshrined, e.g., in European constitutional law. Only in case the world parliament defines a problem as globally relevant while unsolvable on the national and regional scales, it would come under custody of the world government. Most probably, peace and disarmament, environmental protection and the regulation of global financial streams and transnational corporations, would figure among its first tasks.

# 4. Why does global democracy fail?

Why then, one will ask, is the solution so far away if the problems are so pressing and so many constructive proposals are on the table? Why is the debate being stuck in so many minor technical details of little importance relative to the general goal? The answer demands looking back some decades just before the end of WWII:

As a matter of fact, the Bretton Woods negotiations had been held between only two governments, British and American. The head of the British delegation, John Maynard Keynes, had worked out a widely applauded proposal in favour of a globally just order. However, he failed. The American delegate, Harold Dexter White, succeeded in pushing through a new global currency system based on the U.S. dollar as the world reserve currency, based on the promise of being unlimitly covered by gold<sup>25</sup>. Thus, the task of levelling out the balance of payments would one-sidedly rest on the shoulders of other countries while permitting the U.S. a relatively free monetary policy, the export of its own inflation, and the purchase of foreign products at the price of printing costs of the U.S. dollar<sup>26</sup>.

When, on 15 august 1971, the U.S. government cancelled the exchangeability of the U.S. dollar against gold, and after the U.S. found herself increasingly in a minority position in the UN General Assembly after the end of decolonization, it began the systematic dismantling of the UN.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> There have been dozens of such proposals; my purpose here is not to synthesize them but simply to illustrate that rational solutions to the problem of a world government are easily imaginable. Needless to say, it would be a long way to go in a process of gradual reform

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> for a short history of the Bretton Woods institutions, see Monbiot 2003 op. cit.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Frank 2004

The nomination of John Bolton as U.S. permanent representative to the UN marked the temporary end of this process. Merely three weeks in office, Bolton submitted to the UN 750 proposals for reform (including the dismissal of the Commission on Human Rights, the end of all disarmament negotiations, the end of development aid, the end to all post-Rio negotiations, etc.), including in case of non-compliance the risk of loss of all U.S. payments to the organization<sup>27</sup>.

The major instruments of U.S. power after 1945 were the dollar and the Pentagon<sup>28</sup>, especially if we include covert actions<sup>29</sup> and, after the Mexican debts crisis, the IMF's *structural adjustment policy*. The *Washington Consensus* on which this policy was based was never formally consented, and certainly not by indebted countries, but worked out by a small group of people in the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the IMF, and tacitly supported by the other major IMF member states<sup>30</sup>. Recently we learned by the Confessions of an Economic Hit Man<sup>31</sup> how intelligence was used to drive developing countries into the debt trap and gain control over their economic policy and development.

The G 8 became strained to the extreme by the Bush2 administrations' uncompromising unilateralism. It was not before the second Iraq war that G 8 members refused their consent in the Security Council, and most members of the *coalition of the willing* supported the U.S. government against the clear will of their populations. However, on February 5, 2003, the date of Colin Powell's infamous presentation in the SC (the event he later called the darkest spot on his biography; remember that the "compelling evidence" he presented was copied from a decade old student's article without even correcting for typos<sup>32</sup>), the war had already been under way as we could learn from the Downing Street Memorandum<sup>33</sup>. The bombings which in fact never really stopped after 1991 had been intensified to war level already in december 2002<sup>34</sup>. Even in march 2003 when the war had been going on for three months, Bush told the TV audience there were no plans for war and he was doing everything to prevent war.

In its domestic policy, no administration has gone as far as Bush 2 in polarizing rich and poor, and in using the *war on terror* after 9/11 as a pretext to restrict basic human and democratic rights and to control and supervise the American people. The failure of democratic control mechanisms has often been deplored<sup>35</sup>. Many journalists observed a new fascism emerging: U.S. governments' detention centers were called American Gulag<sup>36</sup>, and the neoconservative power elite compared with the Nazis<sup>37</sup>. The liberal, educated, critical opposition does exist but appears as highly fragmented and unable, or prevented, to join forces.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> http://news.independent.co.uk/world/americas/article308269.ece; Bolton threatens U.S. funding for U.N., <a href="http://tinyurl.com/7rvxs; Sidney Blumenthal">http://tinyurl.com/7rvxs; Sidney Blumenthal</a>: The enemy within: How an Americanist devoted to destroying international alliances became the U.S. envoy to the UN <a href="http://207.44.245.159/article8230.htm">http://207.44.245.159/article8230.htm</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Frank 2004, op. cit.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Blum 2000

<sup>30</sup> Hamm 2005

<sup>31</sup> Perkins 2004

<sup>32</sup> Dossier 2003

<sup>33</sup> The Times, May 1, 2005

<sup>34</sup> Pilger 2005

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> See, e.g., the very enlightening analysis in Robert Kuttner 2004; also Charles Sullivan, http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article13135.htm

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> http://www.sundaytelegraph.news.com.au/story/0,9353,19202485-28779,00.html

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> A full-time minimum-wage worker earns \$10,500 a year, too little to afford an average single bedroom apartment, while "last year the CEO of Wal-Mart earned \$3,500 an hour. The CEO of Halliburton earned about \$8,300 an hour. And the CEO of ExxonMobil earned about \$13,700 an hour", The Nation, 04/18/2006; "In the 435-member House of Representatives, 123 elected officials earned at least one million dollars last year, according to recently released financial records made public each year. Next door in the ornate Senate, whose blue-blooded pedigree includes a

Now, a new step in the great game is being made: The UN is being left out, only very few of the old allies are around, notably Israel who takes part in the warmongering against Iran. Again, the only evidence available for Iran's alleged strive for nuclear weapons is dubious intelligence, after the U.S. has blocked all possible compromise offered. India will receive great amounts of weaponry in compensation for its vote against Iran in the IAEO. The establishment of a number of permanent military bases in Central Asia (and of the biggest embassy in Bagdad, at cost of 450 Mio U.S.\$) leave little doubt of U.S. governments' intentions.

The truly strange point, a paradoxon indeed, is the following: In case the U.S. would really be striving at world dominance<sup>39</sup>, it would be much easier, very much cheaper and extremely more credible to others if the government would reform American society into a really just and democratic role model, and accept its position as *primus inter pares*, with a clearly defined democratic program, in the world community, throughout the UN family and beyond. The U.S. could indeed be the credible spearhead of democratic reform if it would stop to apply double standards and if it would follow its own propagated criteria of social justice and the rule of law domestically and internationally. Peoples around the world would love the U.S. model and urge their own governments to follow it. That this is not the case cannot be attributed to a lack of intellectual capacity. Just opposite: The present power elite and its belligerent attitude give clear proof of an intention to service its corporate clientele of oil and arms industries without any serious regard to the future of its own society, nor of the world community<sup>40</sup>.

All this is not really new<sup>41</sup> but carried to the extreme by the present U.S. administration. It certainly is not new to European governments. Their argument that only close alliance with the U.S. would allow to have some influence on its course is simply, and empirically evident, naive. Their vasall loyalty makes them accomplices and they should not be surprised if others perceive them as such. It is high time to thouroughly think over and revise European positions. The UN Security Council, IMF and World Bank, the WTO and the IAEO would be the places to send new signals.

Kennedy and a Rockefeller, one in three people are millionaires. By comparison, less than one per cent of Americans make seven-figure incomes", Jean Luis Santini, *Agence France Press*, 07/01/2004; "President Bush has quietly claimed the authority to disobey more than 750 laws enacted since he took office, asserting that he has the power to set aside any statute passed by Congress when it conflicts with his interpretation of the Constitution", http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/04/30/america/web.0430bush.php; "The number of Americans subject to eavesdropping by the NSA could be in the millions if the full range of secret NSA programs is used", 01/10/2006 ABC News Internet Ventures; Domestic Spying Program Is Sign the U.S. is Decaying Into a Police State, *Democracy Now*, 01/03/2005; Why The Patrriot Act, Redux: Fascism Is The Here And Now, http://thepoliticaljunkies.net/Archived/Year%202005/Dec/Wk3-5/Jonas.htm; A Gestapo Administration,

http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article11435.htm

<sup>38</sup> Phoenix 2005

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Project for an New American Century (2000): Rebuilding America's Defenses, <a href="http://newamericancentury.org">http://newamericancentury.org</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Ibid.; some see many members of Congress facing criminal charges,

 $<sup>\</sup>underline{\underline{http://www.leadingthecharge.com/stories/news-00188510.html}$ 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Brzezinski 1997

### 5. What could be done?

Basically, there are three new elements which, seen in their combination and mutual enforcement, might open a window of opportunity: (1) The scepticism growing all around the world against U.S. unilateralism and power claim, as against the neoconservative mantra; (2) the dawning economic and social crisis in the U.S. itself; (3) the new self-consciousness of the developing countries in the international financial and economic institutions.

For the growing scepticism and even hatred, they are almost self-understanding in the Arab world after the general demonizing of Islam in the U.S. and in the West. A better indicator would be Latin America, the decade long backyard of the U.S. and privileged victim of structural adjustment dictates. Brazil and Argentina, Venezuela and Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Chili have voted leftist and installed U.S. critical governments – too many already to solve the problem, as in 1973, by murdering one of their leaders. In Asia, the Shanghai Cooperation Group was demanding information as to when the U.S. thought to close their military bases. Skepticism is growing among the Balkan countries, and certainly in Georgia and the Ukraine where U.S. sponsored, financed and organized "democratic" revolutions where supposed to bring U.S. friendly governments and market fundamentalists into power while the majority of the populations suffer more than ever before. In the UK Tony Blairs' position is more than shaky. A number of countries have announced they will shift their currency reserves from dollars to euros, and some oil exporting countries have signalled they might sell oil no longer in dollars but against the European currency (or, Russia, in Roubles).

Within the U.S., while the Christian Right seems to stand firmly, socio-economic polarization cannot be overseen. Fourty million people below poverty line, the highest proportion of any country of the young male population in jail or under judicial supervision, the spy, corruption, and lobby affairs, the assault on human rights and fundamental freedoms under Patriot Acts 1 und 2, public demands for impeachment – they all combine to create a adversial atmosphere which could lead to sudden changes, especially if the consequences of the double deficit and the further decline of the dollar will make themselves felt. Never before has an administration succeeded in splitting society into two opposing camps.

WTO's Doha round, declared to be a development round, has turned out to be a full scale flop after the Hongkong ministerial meeting last December. The new element here is that developing countries begin building coalitions and blocking decisions, and in turn demand that Western countries cease paying subventions to their farmers and lift trade barriers for processed products prior to further negotiations. Some have already declared the WTO dead. It is certainly no longer possible to use it exclusively to safeguard the rich countries' supply with cheap raw materials. Imagine what would happen if the developing countries jointly decide to no longer service their external debts! They are just beginning to understand their real power.

If we understand all these as elements forming a bigger mosaic, then the cards might fall in place. Europeans must understand the signs, and act accordingly. The next elections – in the Netherlands, in France, in the UK - will demonstrate that people are more mature than their governments.

On the one hand, action is required from European governments. In meetings like the recent EU-Mercosur summit in Vienna, but even more important in organizations like the Security Council, IMF/World Bank and WTO, they should be more emphatic and signal greater understanding for the developing countries' positions and necessities. They should give up double standards (as in the debate on Irans' nuclear research) and lower unjust barriers against Third World imports. They should actively and convincingly demonstrate that they do not share the egomaniac positions of the present U.S. government. Instead, they should honestly assist in developing new models for a democratic and just world order. Thus, the "European Dream" might have a realistic chance to materialize.

Against the stage set of the neoconservative great game, we the people usually feel helpless and victimized. However, there are chances for concrete action. They might be described within the three broad concepts of localization, self-organization, and saving natural resources. We need not continue to submit ourselves to the dictate of transnational corporations, their offerings and their temptations but should rather strengthen local and regional autonomy. The weakness of the nation-state might turn out to be the opportunity for civil society to self-organize and develop ideas, projects, infrastructures, and tools. In all these, we should not forget the global imperative of safeguarding the natural life support system. Of course, there are thousands of small scale projects all around our societies, productive, democratic and imaginative answers to the disastrous world situation. More and more people should be encouraged to join these forces and build a real market and cooperative economy from below in a democratic setting.

We all must definitely resist the neoconservative agenda which aims at devastating the inner coherence and solidarity of society in the egomaniac and unscrupulous interest of the few, and support all those who do. European enlightenment, and the painful defeat of the bloody 20<sup>th</sup> century must guide our ways. As a matter of fact, the Scandinavian societies contributed a lot to sign this path.

We are at the crossroads. There are good reasons not to give up hope in a more democratic world, even if powerful signs look adverse. In fact, we have no choice: We must begin paving the way towards global democracy – because the alternative might be war. World War.

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# **Alternative Futures of a Challenged Democracy**

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## **Abstract:**

Is democracy breaking down, fundamentally being challenged? Is this breakdown leading to its deepening, broadening and transformation? The foundational challenges to democracy will be explored in this article. First, to the challenge of security, four scenarios are developed: the global empire-state; global one person-one vote; global institutional democracy; and regional democracy. Second, the challenges to the local are developed – both to the local councillor in the West and the local mullah in Islamic regions. Third, the inner dimensions of democracy are explored as an attempt to answer the question: is it possible to have public democracy if the many selves that constitute us are controlled by an authoritarian ego? Fourth, the challenge to traditional forms of leadership and organization are explored, particularly the possibility of a facilitative leader guiding a learning and healing organization.

#### **Self-definition**

Democracy is no longer a stable concept. Even the mythology around its invention is contested. Is democracy Greek in its origins or as the historian Sarkar argues, invented by the Licivvi dynasy from Bengal<sup>1</sup>. Even the Greek historical heritage is challenged with Martin Bernal arguing in *Black Athena* that the Greek heritage in fact has African roots<sup>2</sup>.

The instability of democracy and its futures means that we cannot forecast its future with precision. However, we can use the instabilities, the points where it is being contested, to develop its alternative futures.

This article will be explore the futures of democracy focusing on how it is breaking down, and potentially transforming.

Democracy is central to how the West defines itself, and more and more, how all countries, and indeed, humans, define themselves. It is the one category that no one is willing to let go of.

During the 2003 Abu Ghraib prison scandal in Iraq, what feared Secretary of State Donald Rumsfield was that democracy – the Enlightenment aspirations of the USA as the land of the good, the rational and the fair – may be challenged. Thus, it was crucial that the USA be seen as fair and democratic – certainly not as evil, as foundational racist or Orientalist. Thus, the problem of torture was constructed as an issue of managerialism. "A few bad apples," was the conclusion of the Administration, meaning the deep myth of the West as provider of the good, true

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> For more on this claim, see Inayatullah (2002b), <u>www.prout.org</u>, Sarkar (1988) and Inayatullah (1999)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> For more on this, accessed 12 April 2006 <a href="http://www.talkradionews.com/blogs/uncommonsense/2005/11/few-bad-apples.html">http://www.talkradionews.com/blogs/uncommonsense/2005/11/few-bad-apples.html</a>

and beautiful was safe<sup>3</sup>. The problems were caused by private contractors incorrectly training security personnel and by the lack of procedural discipline as evidenced by the pervasiveness of digital cameras.

Democracy had to be above the fray.

However, the presence of digital cameras and what they signify cannot be taken lightly as they hyperdrive democracy into a new context: the global digital economy.

Digital cameras and the uploading of pictures in public spaces such as the web not only create new possibilities for transparency, they also create peer-to-peer governance possibilities. For example, Youtube.com and asiangroove.com are among many peer-to-peer websites where one can share private videos in global community spaces, develop one's directing abilities and create new communities of meaning. These are part of a new virtual democratic space where citizens learn tools, develop their capacity (video, audio, muckraking, spreading alternative news) and at heart challenge the vertical dimensions of democracy.

It is this vertical dimension that those critical of Abu Ghraib were quick to emphasize. Democracy was never for all - slaves, women in Greek history were not party to formal politics - and indeed this distinction can be seen as foundational to the construction of the other. Democracy within the national polis but terror (for those) outside. Thus, Abu Ghraib is a symptom of the vertical nature of democracy – those outside are mistreated, seen as less, even subhuman, while those inside have the power to power.

But from the broader American perspective, it is not Empire against the third world – democracies tend not to attack other democracies - but the lack openness societies in the Third that is the root problem. The way to make the world safe is to turn every nation into a democracy<sup>4</sup>. The subtext is that of parent helping children grow up, but when the child becomes teenager with weapons, then security becomes paramount.

This becomes the next challenge to democracy. The notion of security and nation.

In a recent essay, Philip Bobbit<sup>5</sup> claimed that just as the 20th century began with World War I the shooting of Prince Ferdinand in Sarajevo, the 21st century has begun with the cruel events of September 11<sup>6</sup>.

While there have many recent challenges to the nation state – the evolution of human rights, environmental problems that can only be solved through global agencies and action, to mention a few – it is the rise of the virtual nation that represents perhaps the biggest challenge. Al-Qaeda is the best example threatening the world economy and specifically certain Western and Islamic nations. Microsoft, and other multinationals, too function as virtual nations, moving the icon of passport to the meme of the password. While one exists on the edges of globalization, the spaces in between, the other changes the entire game. Indeed, it is noteworthy that President of China,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> For more on this, accessed 12 April 2006 http://www.talkradionews.com/blogs/uncommonsense/2005/11/few-badapples.html

Mansfield and Snyder (2005)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Bobbitt (2002)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Certainly 1990 makes more sense – the fall of communism and the rise of the Digital era.

Hu Jintao visited Bill Gates first on his April 2006 trip to the USA. Reported Reuters, "China president at Gates house, not White House."<sup>7</sup>

Bobbit's solution – here focusing not on big capital but on unknown terror - is the development of a stronger state, within the bounds of today's nation-states. Only strong states can challenge virtual outlaws such as Al-Qaeda. And for those on the Left, only strong states can ensure that there is economic equity as large corporations distort local economies – the strong state remains the best answer to inequitable globalization.

But does Bobbit's solution go far enough? Are stronger states the answer to the new challenge? While certainly this is one future – nation-states becoming far more security conscious, using surveillance technologies to watch citizens, preemptive military and legal strikes on communities and individuals contemplating terrorist activities – another future points to not a return to democracy within the nation-state but to an evolutionary jump to global democracy. The models for this future vary but they are similar in the nation-state becomes far less important (in defining the policy agenda, in regulating the economy and society).

# Models and scenarios of the futures of democracy

1. A **global empire-state**, like we have never seen before. This is not just cultural imperialism but military, political and economic domination. Power would be usurped in the name of democracy. However, at this stage, this grand future is unlikely. States are unwilling to give up so much power – cultures are varied, and while the USA harbors ambitions of expansion, having indirect control of world institutions is far more to the liking of the USA. This is not because of the exorbitant costs in managing an empire, but also because a root American myth is that "we are good people" not empire builders.

Moreover, managing global democracy is deeply problematic. Which nations should be allowed to vote, for example? In Arnold Toynbee's macrohistory, he considers world states as examples of failure. They emerge when creative minorities are unable to meet civilizational challenges – in this case the challenge of Al-Qaeda. However, this is only the visible challenge. The deeper challenge is that of (1) systems of representation which no longer match the realities of a global planet and (2) worldviews that are exclusive (God has chosen us, we have the right to expand), obedient to tribal narratives. A global empire state only represses and suppresses these concerns. Worldviews and ways of knowing of others are pushed back, delegitimized. If you will, one god wins over other gods, instead of a conversation of gods, or systems that allow a sharing of power, or alternative methods of distribution. Along with the American variety, as possible is the Islamic variety, the Caliphate, as imagined by Bin Laden and others. This would entail a wise council of muslim elders; patriarchy; strict moral rules for all – a general focus on the virtuous life. The American variety would be robust financially with God as the underlying story but not practice. The Islamic variety would be strict morally with the main challenge financially viability and cultural innovation.

How would democracy be maintained in this empire? Some alternatives are possible here. First, a two party system but with close agreement among the two parties ie with security the over-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> http://news.com.com/China+president+at+Gates+house,+not+White+House/2100-1001\_3-6061616.html, accessed 11 May 2006

whelming issue, dissent would be limited. Second would be a one or two party system but with surveillance technology – the 1984 future. Third would be a selection-election system, wherein, as often in Singapore, elite put up certain candidates, and then citizens elect. The procedures and processes of who is selected is not open to question.

2. As radical is **one-person** – **one vote**. Instead of bracketing democracy within the nation-state, democracy explodes globally with each human<sup>8</sup> allowed to vote. The nation-state becomes an administrative unit, not a political or unit of allegiance. This future is troublesome to many. Those with larger populations – India and China – are likely to have more elected representatives to a world body. And demographic trends do not see OECD nations winning this struggle, indeed, argue some statisticians, population growth will overwhelmingly favor developing nations<sup>9</sup> – with the Caucasian population of the world moving downward to less than 10 % by 2150. <sup>10</sup> Indeed, ninety-eight % of everyone who will be born in the foreseeable future will not be Caucasian but Asian and African. <sup>11</sup>

#### Population (in billions)




Figure 1 (http://www.prb.org/Content/NavigationMenu/PRB/Educators/Human\_Population/Population\_Growth/Population\_Growth.htm)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The issue of political rights for non-humans is crucial but not directly dealt with in this paper – Should trees have standing and will robots have legal rights are long term emerging issues which too will change the nature of "Greek" democracy.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> India in particular will have the demographic bonus, enough young people to provide labour but not too many old people where the social security bill is overwhelming. This is known as the population dividend. http://www.flonnet.com/fl2301/stories/20060127004010500.htm

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> <a href="http://www.lifeissues.org/international/v9n5.html">http://www.lifeissues.org/international/v9n5.html</a>. United Nations figure – in the medium project scenario have Africa at 2.8 billion, Asia at 5.1 billion, Latin America at 916 million, North America at 414 million and Europe at 590 million. World population would be around 11 billion. 90-95% would be "non-white" in these figures. However, this is crucial, population trends are not destiny, the UN offers a range of projections and scenarios, and categories of "white", "nonwhite" are socially constructed. <a href="http://iggi.unesco.or.kr/web/iggi\_docs/05/952655858.pdf">http://iggi.unesco.or.kr/web/iggi\_docs/05/952655858.pdf</a>. Also see:

 $<sup>\</sup>underline{http://www.prb.org/Content/NavigationMenu/PRB/Educators/Human\_Population\_Growth/Population\_Growth/Population\_Growth.htm}$ 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Sally Neal, Social Trends: Implications and Opportunities. Queensland Government, Department of Primary Industries. <a href="https://www.dpi.qld.gov.au/business/Welcome.html">www.dpi.qld.gov.au/business/Welcome.html</a>

When we look at youth bulges, they are in areas where there are already considerable historical fault lines – groups demanding recognition and rights. Certainly, giving global voting power to young, angry, unemployed Arab men and women may be a desirable future to enhance the possibility of global security. While this may lead to the Hamas scenario –where the "wrong" group wins power – the problem of governance and administration is likely to soften any extreme group – that is, eventually less bombs and more memos.




Figure 2 (www.cia.gov/cia/ reports/globaltrends2015/)

A one-person, one vote approach could create the possibility of the emergence of a new system. However, the weight of tribal politics qua the nation-state would resist this democratic future. Still, reducing the power of the nation-state, opening up democracy, creating a world democratic one person, one vote system is certainly one possibility.

The context of this future of democracy is globalization<sup>12</sup>. In this case meaning: (1) far more global travel for the elite, middle class and even for the poor; (2) hybrid persons, marriages and cultures; (3) acceptance of scientific arguments that there is no biological basis for race (and thus often for the nation-state); (4) peer-to-peer revolutions (in gaming for the dot.com generation, for example), and evolutionary pushes toward one system. Essentially this is the cultural globaliza-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> For more on this, see: <a href="http://www.eolss.net/E1-24-toc.aspx">http://www.eolss.net/E1-24-toc.aspx</a>, Inavatullah (2002a), also in *EOLSS Papers*, World Summit on Sustainable Development, 2002

tion process; meaning, the world is coming closer, with the boundaries of nation-state softening. What are needed are effective institutions to lubricate the new future.

- 3. Taking this last dimension seriously leads to the alternative future of **institutionalized democracy**. In this case, a world governance system would have a house of nations; a house of large organizations (corporations, institutions, professional associations); a house of social movements and religions; and a house of individuals. The houses would be interlocking, ensuring that no one system dominates, as with the current checks and balances in the American system of governance. This approach, suggested by Johan Galtung<sup>13</sup>, would be an intermediate step to that of full one-person, one-vote and the current system of voting within the nation-state<sup>14</sup>. The goal in this future would be to ensure multiple dimensions of representation so as to avoid a world state, and instead move toward more flexible global governance. While one may or may not like this particular model (citizen juries, a court of future generations, a reformed United Nations, are other approaches)—the goal would be to enhance global governance
- 4. **Regional democracy**. Mid way in these scenarios is that of regional democracy. While we can imagine someone from Europe playing a role in EU elections, it would appear strange for that person to be able to vote in East Asia. Through a regional approach (North America; South America; Europe; South Asia; East Asia; England, Australia, New Zealand; Pacific Islands, for example), some type of global democracy could emerge. The leading defining image for this future is the European Union. Indeed, even Asian Ministers have called for an Asian Currency<sup>15</sup> this would have been simply impossible, no, unthinkable a decade ago. Cultural distinction may remain (though blur over time) but administrative democracy would emerge.

Where would the resistance be to changes in the current model of democracy (as defined as democracy within nations, but no clear rules outside except the nation, except through the UN system)? Resistance to the current system would come from those who directly benefit from the nation-state capitalist system but as well as by those who would be afraid of the risk of a new system. Even if one could argue that globalization has unleashed the genie of systems cultural change and there is no going back to the nation-state system, ensuring that one's own cultural proclivities continue would be paramount. In Australia, this is the fear of "yellow peril" or asian invasion. Anglo values held dear can not be challenged. The response to the possibility of globalized democracy would not be experimentation but walled futures. Thus Fortress Europe, Fortress Australia, Fortress America are likely scenarios. As with all fortresses efforts to jump over the walls would continue (from refugees, from anti-systemic groups, from al-Qaeda inc, and from multinational corporations). For those in poorer nations, local leaders again would not be excited about a prospect of losing power to larger systems and institutions, especially as their funding and legitimacy comes from patronage to local clans and villages.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Galtung (1994), also see Barnaby (1988) (see in particular future governance, 239)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Almost complete voting in some countries (for adults but not for children); one party states, where voting is allowed but choice is limited; and in some barely any voting at all.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asian\_Currency\_Unit">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asian\_Currency\_Unit</a>. The Asian Development Bank is spearheading discussions on this.

#### **Local futures**

The local here becomes the key. For example, the local shire or city councilor in Australia, and for that matter, many OECD nations, face similar governance issues. The councilor is in search for a new identity. Their traditional power broking role made sense in an 18<sup>th</sup> century technological environment. James Dator<sup>16</sup> has argued this case that advances in technology make today's horse and buggy structured democracy ridiculous. With rapid communication (e-swarming, sms protests, for example) and globalization - for example, local shires in Australia travel regularly to China to position themselves for future energy, administrative contracts<sup>17</sup> – the local councilor suddenly is at a disadvantage if he can only speak the local language and only understand local culture. Multiple languages and an understanding of multiple cultures is central to a future sustainable role. However, they are often elected on the immediate, the local, on problem solving. It is not just technological revolutions (the net, the mobile phone, and even the cassette recorder and fax<sup>18</sup>) and globalization that challenge the local councilor but attempts by local shires to manage their futures. This is a two part process. The first stage has been community consultation. This has been done to ensure that there is buy-in to development projects, that citizens are engaged, that deeper democracy results. The second is futures visioning. This is about mapping the past, analyzing the present, developing scenarios around the city's futures, and articulating a preferred future<sup>19</sup>. This process empowers citizens and the professional bureaucracy. Councilors lose their privileged position in this world. Taking away local boundaries is likely to increase their tenuous claim to power and authority. In this sense, the local council is similar to the local mullah as their future options are being curtailed.

What are their ("mullahs") choices?

First, it is to join community consultation and citizen visioning, to become a guardian of the future and help citizens create desired futures – to help new forms of democracy emerge.

The second is to avoid this process and focus on very local concerns – neighborhood conflicts (though neighborhood mediation challenges this as well) and local zoning issues.

The third is to lament for the good old days and create a politics of the past resisting new technologies (e-governance), globalization (via localization, most often via a politics of culture, who got "here" first) and social innovation (attempts to create different futures and deep democracy). However, with even more advanced AI systems coming on-line and an increased search for niche futures in a globalized worlds, it is likely their hold on the politics of the future will be tenuous at best.

As mentioned earlier, city councilors of the OECD nations are the mullahs of the Islamic world are the party technocrats of the former Communist world – it is this fear of the loss of place that leads the Mullah to create a politics of rightist Islam. He can see that no future exists for him, thus a call for imagined past glory. A politics of interpretation and ambiguity again take power away from him, and thus a call to the past. Finally, with the interpretive dimension of the Quran easier for the less educated to access via AI systems (classifying in terms of what one must fol-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> http://www.futures.hawaii.edu/ for articles by James Dator on this and many other topics.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> For example, Sundstrom (2006), front page

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Both of which played an important role in Iranian revolution of the early 1980s.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> See the wonderful work of Steven Ames, <a href="http://www.asu.edu/caed/proceedings97/ames.html">http://www.asu.edu/caed/proceedings97/ames.html</a>

low, what is a mere opinion, what is contested, who contests, ie a full information interpretive system), their role will certainly diminish even further.

They – the "mullahs" – have choices as well.

First is to help create a new civilization, the evolutionary jump forward where there is far more inclusion, planetary problems are dealt with, the long term future is included in today's decisions - that is a handmaiden to the future. However, this requires a softening, ie birthing is the metaphor – a feminine approach to politics. It requires working with other muslim groups to mediate problems, to search for solutions that include other groups, to find transcend solutions<sup>20</sup> to deep conflicts.

A second solution is to radicalize, to hold power by demonizing the other – calling other muslim groups less muslim (as in the shia versus sunni versus ahmedi)<sup>21</sup> and calling other religious groups idol worshippers (as in "Hindus"<sup>22</sup>, Buddhists) and infidels (Jews and Christians).

A third is to hold power by again focusing on very local issues, avoiding the grander narratives, using economic and social patronage to ensure that children from the local village gain literacy, for example.

Ibn Khaldun, the 14th century philosopher, wrote that to retain power, asabiya, or the sinews that bind, unity is required. The cheapest unity is gained through the creation of enemies, real or imagined. The deepest unity is what the planet calls on us today for - a unity that deals with our very real strategic problems. On the grand challenges facing us – water, energy, climate, safety, dignity, to mention a few.

Currently, both in the OECD and in Islamic nations it is those who focus on the non-negotiable past that hold sway, on the cheap unity. It is the Fortress that is the image of the future. Other imaginations of governance do not figure in. This is largely as moderates are silenced<sup>23</sup>. This is also because the Right not only challenges the present but offers an easily understood image of the future. As well, by repeating the mantras of territory and security, the memes of tribalism remain current. Breaking these memes<sup>24</sup> will not be easy.

And yet when we ask what future we wish for, another politics emerges. In one workshop in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, when 150 Muslim leaders were asked their preferred futures, they responded in ways that would make a western Green happy. Gender partnership, economic alternatives to capitalism, self-reliant electronically linked communities, ecological sustainability and a global governance system were their key issues<sup>25</sup>. Thus part of the solution is by framing politics as less of who was here first (the politics of the past) to where do we want to be (the politics of

www.transcend.org for a methods on how to do this.
 For ways out of these conflicts, see the work of Sardar, Inayatullah and Boxwell (2003)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Hindu is, of course, a muslim concept. There is no Hinduism per se, but a variety of spiritual and religious traditions in India – the tantric and vedic being the two main traditions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> With violence, generally.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> http://www.scholars.nus.edu.sg/cpace/infotech/cook/memedef.html. See Dawkins (1989). The Oxford English Dictionary defines meme as: An element of a culture that may be considered to be passed on by non-genetic means, esp. imitation". Also, see Blackmore (1998)

Inayatullah (1996), Coverpage. This was many years ago - 1996 - and it is not clear how respondents would answer today. However, the key point is – asking questions about the future yields different results than about the past.

the futures) and then negotiating conflicts between futures through alternative futures and conflict resolution methods, finding optimal solutions, not merely compromise<sup>26</sup>.

# Mythic context

The broader contest for this are world futures themselves.

In the Western mythos, two archetypes are central to understanding the future.

One is the land of Cockagne: fruit and leisure for all. It is a pastoral vision, pre-modern, listening and sharing are central – humans live with nature. This is expressed currently in the Return to the past scenario when the world was simpler, less overwhelming. Wise leaders made decisions for all. One was consulted but elders decide. Communication and relationship solve problems.

The other is the Land of Arcadia, more complex, living off nature, ever improving, continuous growth. Progress and technology are central. These two images wrestle with each other. The leader is who can achieve solutions, meet basic needs, and meet changing desires. Democracy fits well into this mythology, as different individuals are needed as desires and needs change.

Overtime, this myth has become modernity, or realism, indeed, it is the non-myth, the truth before our eyes, the reality by which all other histories and futures are judged. It is real power – economic and political - that defines the present and future.

And strangely, it is in the language of realism that the utopian seeds of global government are forming. To stop the outlaws (Al-Qaeda et al, the hyper movement of capital, global climate problems), extra territoriality is required. To deal with the real problems, more than a list of policies is needed. Other worldviews must be engaged with.

But there are two other myths as central as Cockagne and Arcadia.

The third myth is that of the apocalypse, the end of the world. Humankind has sinned, fallen away from the true path, and must now suffer. Recent comments on New Orleans and Hurricane Katrina by Christian extremists in the USA illustrate this<sup>27</sup>. Again, democracy is a luxury in this future – it is not so much the wise leader or technocratic leadership that is required but the strong leader.

Finally, there is the myth of transformation in each culture – where something new emerges. Spearheading this possibility are the technological changes (genetic, digital, nano, to begin with)<sup>28</sup> and the cultural-spiritual changes (the mind-body and brain health revolution, the cultural creatives as argued by Ray and Anderson)<sup>29</sup>. A governance framework for this future has yet to be worked out – will it governance run by AI systems guided by wise elders, or full on line, real time, global democracy – endless e-swarming. A planet in constant dialogue? And will the tech-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> www.transcend.org explores the transcend method wherein out of the box win-win solutions are developed, not compromises or the victory of one over the other.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Dawson (2005)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> See the work of Ray Kurzweil: <u>www.kurzweilai.net</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> www.culturalcreatives.org. This group is focused on spiritual change, environmentalism, future generations thinking, global governance, and gender partnership.

nological and spiritual meet to create the imagination of Gaia Tech<sup>30</sup> or will they bifurcate creating two very different trajectories.

However, if we are to move toward a more transformed future, we cannot do so without enhancing inner democracy as well as the nature of contemporary leaders and the organizations they stand with.

# **Inner democracy**

As we hint above with the notion of archetypes, democracy should be seen not only as an external process and structure but an inner process as well.

That is, merely seeing the futures of democracy as an external construct avoids the notion how we organize our mind, our inner spaces. Do we have a voting process that gives voice to our multiple selves (as developed by Hal and Sidra Stone<sup>31</sup>) or do we have an authoritarian ego, where alternative voices are not listened to, not included? How do we deal with those aspects of ourselves that do not vote (our inner "children", or those outside our internal "nation-state") – do we negotiate? Do we follow community consultation processes in our mind? Do we have a one party system? Is there a system of checks and balances when we make important decisions?

More often then not, as we are not aware of our multiple selves, we project them outwards, as the Stone's in their letter to Bush suggest<sup>32</sup>:

> Our deepest concern however is not the Saddam Hussein that lives in the world. It is the Saddam Hussein that lives in the hidden recesses of your own heart, of our own heart, in everyone's heart. If we don't ultimately recognize that this kind of energy lives in each of us, we keep projecting it on the outer Husseins and this makes it impossible to deal with the darkness in the world in any way other than war.

There are number of crucial points here. First, there may be a correlation between external and inner democracy. Can one be a democrat outside but run one's self/selves as a totalitarian system? The hypothesis would be that this would fail, that selves disenfranchised from participation would find pathological ways to strike back (serious illness, anxiety or panic attacks, or depression). Indeed, one cause of the dramatic rise of depression<sup>33</sup> may partly be because there is a lack of inner democracy in the self – selves are not in dialogue and communication with each other.

A related hypothesis is that if we wish to create a more democratic globe, we must begin with ourselves. This is more than a call to be a better person, to be fairer, but to create a map of our own inner selves, asking how are decisions made<sup>34</sup>. There are likely times when a quick decision is needed (do we return to our instinctual self, which perhaps is not democratic), and there are times when deep sensitivity to the external environment is needed (and thus the desperately

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Linking robots and their futures with angels and their healing presence.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> See for the full letter by Hal and Sidra Stone to George Bush, see <a href="http://www.ratical.org/co-">http://www.ratical.org/co-</a> globalize/lookwithin.html. Accessed 12 April 2006.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> see the forecasts by the WHO. <a href="http://www.who.int/topics/global\_burden\_of\_disease/en/">http://www.who.int/topics/global\_burden\_of\_disease/en/</a>. Also see: http://www.scielosp.org/scielo.php?script=sci\_arttext&pid=\$0042-96862005000100018&lng=e&nrm=iso&tlng=e. World Health Organisation (2003). The global burden of disease. WHO, 2004. World Health Organization. Mental Health, http://www.who.int/mental\_health/management/depression/definition/en/. Accessed 10/08/04

needed perceptions of our multiple selves – our child self, aspects of the brain related to foresight, our self as other, disowned selves).

Taking this a step further, Hal and Sidra Stone argue that personality problems emerge when we disown various selves. This would imply that we have a democratic self that listens the various viewpoints of our selves (the child, the hero, the father, the lover, the mother, the nun) and we have authoritarian selves that assert that we should behave in certain ways. If we disown any particular self, we become impoverished, that is, even the authoritarian self may have some use — in facing difficult times, in knowing when to act. The deeper problem emerges when, the subpersonalities, do not cooperate, or are even at war with each other — the worse case scenario. This can lead to collapse of the system, a breakdown.

One conclusion would be that those calling for more democracy in the world may be projecting outwards, having not owned democracy in their country or democracy within themselves.

Critical International relations theory via the work of RBJ Walker challenges the notion of democracy within and anarchy outside, ie why is it that we accept democracy only within the nation-state? The Stone's approach applied to politics goes a step further and asks why is it that we have democracy in the external world and often authoritarian selves in our inner world? If we wish to create alternative models of governance including new futures for democracy we as well need to articulate new futures for our inner life —map and transform the politics of our selves.

# Leadership and organizations

This essay has explored scenarios of the futures of democracy, focused on impediments of the global reform at the local level, linked scenarios with deep archetypes, particularly from the Western experience, and hypothesized that as important as democracy in the outside world is democracy in the inner world. I now take a mid-range approach and focus on the organization. Just as important as global reform, local reform, and inner reform is organizational reform. Merely changing those dimensions is oblivious to the reality that humans work in organizations and use organizations as vehicles to express their futures.




Figure 3

As with the argument of outside/inside; global/local and external/internal, can a non-democratic organization create a democratic future? In hundreds of workshops on scenarios and visioning, two variables continue to emerge when discussing the futures of organization<sup>35</sup>. The first variable is the nature of leadership. Will leadership continue to be command and control (authoritarian – you will be democratic!), focused on compliance and rules, and generally steeped in the discourse of patriarchy (security and sovereignty) or will leadership be organic, transformational, softer, more feminine, if you will, community consultation, listening to others?

The second critical variable, uncertainty, is the nature of the organization. There appear to be two extremes. The first is the classical industrial organization. In this, standardization is crucial – one works a certain hours a day, days a week, weeks a year, years in a lifetime. There is a clear chain of command. Rules must be followed. The organization is successful because it responds in the same way to outside and inside stimulus, meaning it is predictable. Certainly this may make sense in a stable world, where gender, technology, external climate, and notions of governance are shared. However, what happens in a disturbed world of rampant future-shock where gender, culture and time and continuously contested.

The other extreme is the learning and healing organization. In this type of organization, democracy is taken seriously, not just in terms of voting, but in terms of the broader and deeper ways I have situated it. There are two parts to this. First it is a learning organization, learning from its members, from the outside world. If 9–5 time is challenged, if the industrial paradigm is no longer appropriate, it adapts. If the local paradigm is no longer appropriate, it seeks to move outwards, becoming global. Returning to Toynbee's macrohistory, the leadership responds to organizational challenges in creative ways. The second part of this is the healing organization – this is more concerned with the emotional-metaphorical dimension to work. Learning privileges the intellect and strategy while healing the heart and body. In this dimension, passive aggression, apathy, resignation are all named and transformed. Issues with colleagues, with the leadership, with the larger purpose of the organization are not seen as external issues but as pivotal. As well, the inner dimension of the organization is explored- not just its strategic focus but its inner focus. What is its story? Its defining metaphor? If democracy, then are all included?

Putting these two variables together, four futures for leadership and the organization emerge.

The left-upper quadrant [1] is essentially the traditional organization – strong male leadership with an industrial structure. Certainly this model historically helped create democratic institutions but can it do so in the future? With revolutions in technology (peer to peer), globalization, science and technology (genomics, nano and brain-mind) revolutions and changing cohorts (baby boomers defining organizations), is this model sustainable? Perhaps not in Western countries, however, East Asian nations appear to be at ease with this. The Confucian overlay (strong vertical relations, respect of authority) allows traditional modes of leadership – the wise male leader – to flourish. Singapore is a case in point. There is democracy of sorts but certainly not deep democracy (multiparty system, dissent in the media). However, Singapore is not at the Leftupper quadrant but at the right-top [2]. This is because they have understood the emergent global-digital-cultural challenge. To prosper in a global knowledge economy, what is required is creativity, the difference that makes the difference. Copying the US does not lead to the required rewards. While liberal political scientists assume that as wealth increases, the federalist American system will dominate, this is far from clear. Their can and most likely will be different sorts of modern governance systems. At the inner level, the assumption in Singapore is that "Father knows best" and given that these are turbulent and disturbed times (i.e. where there is little con-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> For more on this, see Inayatullah (2005)

sensus, where collectivities are far from agreement), having stable and wise government, even if not ideally democratic, may be the best choice. Singapore is willing to innovate. To do so it has begun to institutionalize creative thinking (not yet critical literacies though). However, it hopes to march into the future with a different drum beat<sup>36</sup>.

The left bottom corner [3] is the current tension. Leaders, especially the cultural creatives, desire to enhance the capacity of organization. They want to empower individuals. However, even as they attempt to facilitate a new future, the structures of industrial society remain – time, space, labour – are standardized, making flexibility and creativity near impossible. Thus the tension and the apathy for creating more democratic futures (inner, outer, deeper and broader). The structure does not permit – the system is rigid, even as leaders envision a different future. If an employee becomes inspired, their capacity enhanced and paradigm changed, they experience anxiety. They are changed but the system is not, nor is the system financially and emotionally supportive. The reality of the present is past based while the employee is caught in-between changing images of the future. Either they successful change the organization or the leave it, or they take a third approach – passive resistance, passive aggression and the full range of emotional sabotage.

Those inspired by a new future hope to create the right bottom quadrant [4] – the fourth alternative – a new leadership with a new type of organization. The leaders facilitate a learning and healing organization, and they lead organically by example. Is this possible?

The hypothesis is that if we wish for more democratic futures then we need to change the top-down model of leadership and the industrial model of organizing. This does not mean they must disappear, rather following the Stones notion of integrated selves, they need to be owned, and used when appropriate – when there are repetitious tasks, when there is consensus on direction, structure, process, content, for example. As well, in times of urgent crisis, then the hero archetype is far more important then community consultation and visioning. However, after the crisis, deep democracy is one again needed. The transition from the leadership required during urgency to the leadership required in normal times is the great challenge. The hero tends to become the tyrant, having stayed on too long. He does not have the capacity to choose which self is most appropriate, as for example, the elitist Asian leader who stays in power long after the crisis, or his term, has ended.

#### Conclusion

It is often said that the crisis of democracy must be solved by more democracy. The argument I have made in this article is that yes this is the case, but it is more than that. Deeper democracy first means challenging the inside-outside division of the nation-state vis-à-vis international relations and governance, and thereby moving ideally to a world governance structure (and far less ideally to the empire model). Second, it means working with local representatives (councilors and mullahs, who have the most to lose) to help them find a purpose in the newly emerging governance system and culture. Third, the futures of democracy relate to archetypal futures – whether eating up nature (Continued growth), living with nature (Back to the past), collapsing or somehow transforming. Transformation appears to be the hoped for future, certainly in this analysis, given the cascading of world crisis – the planetary challenge. This transformation, however, is not just external but internal, the multiple selves that we are. If we are to create

 <sup>36</sup> While Singapore would certainly be male in this regard – you will innovate, one can imagine a global nanny state
 – Singapore plus Scandinavia plus surveillance technology – the state "benevolently" taking care of all.

deeper democratic futures, then we need to map our multiple selves, own or disowned selves, and analyze how we project outwards (as persons and as civilizations). Finally, to create different democratic futures, new types of leadership and organizations are required – ones that are organic facilitative and that are learning and healing oriented. These are not just goals for a deeper democracy but as with self-reliance- the path and the goal must be one.

Given the overwhelming change required of us, perhaps we should remain committed to the current system. Why travel outside and within?

But what will our legacy to the future be if we do not change? Perhaps we should ask future generations to choose which history they wish.

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# Women's Contribution to the Future of Democracy

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#### **Abstract**

The starting point of the article is on the basis of the two opening sentences of the 100 Anniversary of Finnish Democracy: the right to vote and the trust in law. A brief indication of women's achievement of the voting right in different countries is followed by the recognition that the right to vote is very important but it is not enough. Women's achievement in different areas, economic, political and academic in some of the not so well known countries, is briefly described. At the same time the notion that women in general, are social actors and not only victims and as such are building alternative societies and ways to democracy, should be recognized and supported also by the women who have already gained success. The point that women have some specific capacities to live in a changing society and to develop change is made and supported by examples stemming from empirical research in different parts of the world. The concluding point is that women are able to have visions as their way of thinking and acting is geared to the future. Hence we can say that women have and need to keep their capacities to build alternative societies, based, as they often are, on democratic behaviour in different contexts. These are, in the opinion of the writer of this paper, the indications for women to contribute to the future of democracy in their countries as well as at the world level.

#### Introduction

The hundred anniversary of Finland's democracy offers a great opportunity to review the present and future prospects of other countries, reflecting on their past to see what indicators it can give us of change or resistance to change today with special reference to democracy.

I will be talking about various countries and, sometimes, my own country Italy, whose long struggle for democracy began in the 19th century thanks to statesmen such as Giuseppe Mazzini and freedom fighters such as Giuseppe Garibaldi, to name just two, among the many not so well known outside of Italy. It should also be remembered that philosophers like Plato and Aristotle traced out the main principles of democracy which have influenced the thinking of many people throughout the centuries, and of which the American and French revolutions may be considered examples with great historical effects.

Of specific interest for the 100th anniversary of Finnish democracy are the two opening sentences: the right to vote and trust in law. The right to vote is one of the basic concepts of democracy, equality and freedom, something now taken for granted by almost all citizens worldwide. However, Italian women only gained the vote in 1946 after the Second World War and have this year been celebrating its 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary. Many have forgotten what a long, hard struggle it was! Women gained the right to vote in New Zealand in 1883, although they did not get all the democratic rights, as they were not allowed to become candidates, the right to vote was gained in Australia between 1894 and 1906 (South Australia coming first), in Finland in 1906, in Norway

in 1910, in Denmark and Iceland in 1915, in the UK in 1918, in the US in 1920 and France in 1945, to cite just a few.

The second principle is the trust in law, fundamental for living in a society for every citizen everywhere. In UNESCO's Courier issue of November 1992 on "The Challenge of Democracy", Alain Touraine wrote: "A society can only be democratic if it recognizes both its unity and its internal conflicts. Hence the crucial importance, in a democratic society, of the law and the idea of justice, defined as the greatest possible degree of compatibility between the interests involved".

Given these two principles and bearing in mind that women have achieved the right to vote, what can we say about their role in the future of democracy?

## 1. Women as actors of change

Women are mostly considered victims in almost every society, this is still a terrible challenge that has to be continuously faced in all parts of the world. In this particular context, I stress, that they are also increasingly becoming actors in society and have, moreover, specific capacities to be such.

Women are often the silent builders of alternative societies. Alternatives usually emerge from those outside the present social structures (well proven by historical analysis), which means that women are still not properly recognized as crucial to social structures and still not seen as social actors. They have, of course, the formal possibility of voting. This is very important and justly considered one of the pillars of democracy, as well as one of the themes indicated for the 100th anniversary of democracy in Finland. It is also possible for women in almost all countries to achieve high positions in economic, political or scientific spheres. I will first mention two who have reached the highest levels in politics: the president of Finland and the president of Chile, these are great recent achievements, and in both cases, with incredible democratic consensus at the same time keeping their specific qualities as women.

It is a fact that women in various important areas of political and economic life are becoming more present. They are becoming top managers of important enterprises and are at the same time involved in political life. I shall mention a few, from Europe and the Mediterranean area which are not generally well known, and are, at the same time, indicators of rapid change in specific countries. I shall mention Marta Turk, who is National President of ASE (Slovenian Association of Women Entrepreneurs) as well as being charged by the Slovenian government to adapt local enterprises to European rules and being responsible for an editorial enterprise. Leyla Khaiat, President of the Association of Entrepreneurs of Tunisia and member of the Tunisian Parliament as well as head of a large enterprise (PLASTISS). Another woman in this area I wish to mention is Ludmilla Chubatouk, President of the Association of Russian women Entrepreneurs and head of a building enterprise.

As to the political area it is interesting to see how in the last years women are more present in Europe, at different levels, local and regional, in Italy, France and Spain and not only in the Northern countries where this has been true for many decades. This change is becoming evident also at the national level where Spain is a very good example as 8 women are in government, 47,1 % and, with the recent government 6 women are present in Italy. This indicates an impor-

tant trend for the future regarding the presence of women in political decision-making in Europe. However differences between countries are also evident.

A very interesting change indicating a trend is that of women in politics in Africa. In a tormented country, internal and external for different reasons, as Liberia, a woman president was elected in November 2005, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. Liberia, is in recent years, a country of constant conflict and with a terribly destructed territory including the capital Monrovia. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was elected with a 60% of votes. Her task will be undoubtedly very difficult. Rwanda is also a very interesting indicator for the future. The percentage of women in Parliament is 50%. This of course is also due to the consequences of the terrible 1994 genocide when many men were killed, at the same time it is the highest percentage of women in Parliament in the world. In the same country the closest advisor to the president, Kagame, is a woman who has the strong intention of bringing more women into political life. At the same time, women in Rwanda are completely aware of their need for political education as it is shown in recent researches. These are strong indicators of change that come from countries that are not the western more powerful ones where women in politics have been present in the last decades or more.

My view of the importance of women in politics is that they should bring, as they are doing in many countries, their specific capacities of building relations and solidarities even between different people, as well as being more flexible in facing changes which are the specificity of our time and will be more so in the future. In my view women are more able to face rapid change as they have had to adapt to it as can be seen through history in different socio-cultural contexts. Women hence have to bring and will do so, their specific capacities to politics as it is shown by the already mentioned presidents of Finland, Chile and Rwanda. Women are indeed also present in science since the time of Madam Curie and just as an example there is, in my country, my friend the Nobel prize winner for neuroscience, Rita Levi Montalcini.

Many other extraordinary women have made a significant contribution to society. But despite this, the majority of women are not recognised for their social contribution.

In this article I intend to highlight women's potential as actors in society whether they reach high responsibilities or operate in smaller environments, stressing the fact that their unrecognised capacities are specifically adapted to a changing, as well as a complex, society, that they are capable of offering an everyday contribution to the building of democracy. In the next paragraph I will describe women's capacities in real life as I saw and analysed them in empirical work in many parts of the world in which I have been involved for many years.

The capacities I will briefly describe are in many cases still untapped and, strangely enough, unrecognized, even in highly industrialized or in information and communication societies (I think this is now changing in the latter, although unfortunately I do not have any findings to confirm it).

Women in power should keep these capacities, which I have previously indicated. I shall describe them as being at the individual and social levels and are documented by empirical work, which I shall later describe in more detail.

#### On the individual level:

Women are capable of doing different things at the same time, a skill that is particularly important in a rapidly changing and therefore demanding society. It stems from their acute awareness of their physical, social and cultural environment and is very important in a fluid

and complex society. Just think of how women manage to combine part-time, informal jobs or home based work with running the family and the household on everyday issues. In some societies this aspect is changing but in many other parts of the world it is still deeply rooted, as empirical research shows.

- Women tend to favour human aspects rather than the strictly economic ones. When they have a choice and are not completely co-opted by an economically- oriented society or situation, women will often prefer to look after their sick child or parent than earn money. This attitude will be very relevant in a society that will have a growing need for carers not sufficiently covered by the public sphere.
- Women tend to prefer horizontal relationships and mostly attribute little importance to hierarchies. This is essential in a society where team work and horizontal relations are becoming more important than vertical structures. It is interesting to see how women managers differ in the way they organize their enterprises and their management relationships, and this also seems to be true for some women politicians.
- Women's sense of time is based more on biological and natural rhythms than clock-regulated activities. This is important in a society with rapidly changing processes in which time frames are constantly being altered.

### Capacities of women on the social level:

- Women tend to understand those who have different cultures, education and religion, mainly on the basis of everyday life needs. Many are the examples in Europe: migrant women in Europe, such as Turks in Germany or Ethiopians in Italy, find they can communicate with women of the receiving country on issues such as food, children's schooling or health, whereas for men it is almost impossible to create a relationship based on historical and religious matters.
- Women, and this is probably their most important capacity, tend to create solidarities to cope
  with crucial needs without waiting for approval or external support. This capacity is particularly valuable, and often only visible, in situations of conflict and war, extreme poverty or
  environmental disasters. And I shall give some examples of this capacity later in this article.
- Women have the capacity to look ahead in the long term, at least as long as a child's life span if not more, a capacity which is in danger of disappearing in the more rich countries in the present world and will prove to be needed more and more in the future. For example, a study on women employed in tea plantations in the Reef Valley in Kenya found that they were doing this demanding work to give their children a better life than their own.

In conclusion, there are certain capacities that seem to be more specific to women, or possibly they have better preserved them. Although such capacities are often ignored, they may well play an important role in introducing new perspectives for a society on constant flux. At the same time, it is important to stress that these women are often not visible in society as actual actors of change and builders of social alternatives, nor it is recognised that they are capable of tackling issues that to many people seem impossible. They do what is needed in silence and often in isolation. Such women in my view are as important as women visible in power roles.

What such women need is visibility, first of all for themselves, and they need also to be aware that there are other women doing similar things in other parts of the world. This was the aim of the WIN (Women's International Network) Emergency and Solidarity project and which I coordinated for ten years with the help of women around the world and the support of UNESCO and the European Commission.

The silent activities of women worldwide, though fragmented, have in themselves the potential to stimulate change and, more important, can sow seeds of strong democratic behaviour geared to the common good and, in different ways, support women in political or economic roles. Both groups should become more aware than they are of each other.

As Vandana Shiva, an Indian physicist, but even more important, someone who has called attention to the role of women in development worldwide, says: "destruction is violent and visible; balance and harmony are not seen but experimented". This apparently simple phrase is, in a nutshell, what women in many countries still represent. Women are often seeking justice in a conflict-ridden society. Recalling Alain Turaine, the core of his thinking on democracy is that women are helping their societies to live with their conflicts. Balance and harmony are achieved not by one act of heroism but by gradually building the future day by day in the awareness of those who are doing it in different ways.

#### 2. Women and their vision of the future

The other point I want to make in this article on the topic of the 100th anniversary of democracy in Finland is women's capacity to be future-oriented. Once more, Vandana Shiva speaks of women in relation to nature, since the expression of the feminine principle is creative and not destructive. This statement is supported by the WIN research I mentioned earlier, demonstrating that women are against destruction and death and for life and the survival of nature and their children and thus are basically oriented towards the future.

Vandana Shiva is the person who revived the Chipko movement. She says that this movement, in the news again and especially after the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio, was founded over 300 years ago in the Himalayan region. Women at that time embraced their sacred trees so as not to have them cut down, as they were necessary for the survival of their children. These women were future-oriented, silent but active, just like all those women who are part of the WIN research.

To give a few examples included in the WIN research, I would like to mention the international group of 'grandmothers for peace' in North America whose main platform is against nuclear weapons. Future-oriented, they were founded in the Eighties and cooperated with women in countries at war, such as Nicaragua or Palestine.

In eastern and central Europe we found very active women's groups created in the aftermath of wars in Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, to support women and help them return to every-day life, or in Russia groups to protect women's rights and soldiers' mothers as well as the mothers of children affected by the Chernobyl disaster. These are future-oriented groups of women who want to overcome present constraints and sufferings and advance towards a different future. They are fighting now to help the next generations.

This thrust towards the future is also found in the women in Sicily or Calabria (southern Italy) who have been active against the mafia for many years. These are women striving for democracy, fighting to live without fear and in the respect of human rights, for their children. How do women cope in their endeavours to try and save the future of their children, bearing in mind the different contexts and also the different challenges - ranging from poverty to illness, from recession to war and earthquakes? Women everywhere, and specially in situations of danger and struggle, are able to react rapidly and generate solidarity with other women, to face issues that threaten social structures and therefore the future. These women do not wait for support or for financial aid, but simply get on with the job and hence build the future not only for themselves but also for those who will come after them.

For example, women in Mexico and in Armenia combined forces to help orphaned or injured children after the earthquakes that struck their countries. The widows of Rwanda and the mothers of Uganda fought to prevent their children being taken away to become soldiers and are still doing so. In the Gaza strip, for many years the women from Palestine and Israel united to provide refuges for their children and organise cultural activities. And the women of Central America, Latin America and, especially in our times, Colombia, have taken action in many dangerous situations of conflict, if not actually war, in their villages. Once again this emerges from research in an unpublished PhD thesis. The list could go on almost ad infinitum but the common denominator is that these groups are independent, poor and lack support; they are looking towards the future, which means building a different society for themselves and for those following them. Such women are also paving the way for other women, or for themselves, to get into decision making positions such as the women I mentioned in countries likes Rwanda, Liberia, Tunisia, Russia or Slovenia. They are, in different historical moments, as the women who prepared the way for a greater presence of women within the richer countries of today. Such precursors also faced difficulties. Maybe different from the ones faced by women today. At the same time the not so visible commitment of women, brings change that can be seen in the long term also in terms of the development of democracy.

#### 3. Women as builders of a peace culture

Women make an important contribution to society as builders of a peace culture, which Elise Boulding defines as "...put in the simplest terms, a peace culture is a culture that promotes peaceful diversity. Such a culture includes lifeways, patterns of belief, values, behaviour and accompanying institutional arrangements..." This leads to democratic behaviour as well as democratic institutions. Elise Boulding connects peace with action. Peace, she says, involves a constant reshaping process in a constantly changing life-world. For Elise Boulding "this concept of peace is the opposite of stereotyped notions of peace as a dull, unchanging end state". In her work she has looked for signs of "peacefulness" from women in the past and what their potential could be for the present and future.

A recently published book on E. Boulding, "A life for the Cause of Peace", describes her search for the hidden places or spaces where cultures of peace can exist, whether on a local or global level. The important point I wish to underline. in her thinking. is that these are the places where women start change which will emerge later in the public area.

In terms of a peace culture, we should also remember that, from 1800 on, groups of women for peace began to form in England, in northern Europe and in North America, many of which developed into international groups around 1820 to 1830. To quote once more E. Boulding, a cul-

ture of peace is an action concept and as such is closely connected to the democratic building of society. She also writes: "Women were able to envision peace because historically have been outsiders to society who developed new approaches to world order". Thus she points out that women's concept of peace is underpinned by the fact that they are often marginalized and hence outsiders in the building of many societies. This enables them to have a different outlook on life and to develop new approaches to world order that, once again, lead to a democratic world order. This situation clearly emerged in the research I mentioned on women in conflict situations in Afghanistan, or Rwanda or El Salvador, just to mention a few, who are unrecognized both in their own countries and on a broader international scale.

## 4. Women and their contribution to democracy

Hopefully I have given some pointers about how women are contributing or can contribute to tomorrow's democracy. At the same time we have to look at women's culture which is based on that series of values to which women give priority and which prompt those behaviours and choices inherent in their lives, their work, their economic and political commitments when they reach public responsibilities.

An analysis of women and their approaches to life might well indicate alternatives for the future and for democracy different from what is offered by today's complex, ever-changing society, which have different types of conflicts emerging from it.

A very important area where democracy education can be fostered is the work place by women. I will just mention two very different cases. One comes from my work in Brazil for the UN. In one of the textile industries dating back to the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, we found this incredible woman who, with all her domestic problems, was able to force the management to pay due respect to the work of the women employed there, all heads of households in a favela. Indeed it was the beginning in that town, Peteropolis, near Rio de Janeiro, of workers awareness that led to trade unions

The second example is that of women involved in informal work (by this I mean temporary work) widespread in almost all of Europe and certainly in many other parts of the world. Just think of women in Italy who work for the garment trade from home, the women in Sri Lanka and many other south Asian countries working for electronic enterprises in their villages, or women in Romania working at home for companies from western Europe, just to get an idea of the sector. What I am saying here is that a great part of women all over the world work in sectors connected to the community or local culture, giving them apparently more freedom than the hierarchical structures of large enterprises but at the same time raising their awareness of their own rights.

An interesting example is that of Italian women managers in small enterprises who are able to create more horizontal structures in them as they usually come from a family culture which is more respectful of others than the large formal economic structures and are aware of the importance of good relations among workers and with management, thus using also their capacities which I have described as being women's specific capacities.

Another important area fostering democratic behaviour is evident in solidarity groups or small communities. Such communities are triggered by specific needs in society, such as support for

migrant women, for women with children and without men, for women caught up in prostitution or illegal trafficking, etc.

#### Conclusion

My conclusion is that women's role in the future of democracy is to be found not only in women who have reached success in various areas, which shows indeed women's great capabilities, but also in small enterprises, solidarity or social groups, which should be seen as "weak signals" with a strong potential for social change. However, for signals to become visible, women have to become visible first to themselves as well as to others involved in similar activities. At this point we have to ask ourselves some questions.

The first question is: will it be possible to get rid of the idea that women are mainly victims and not social actors?

The second question is: will the visibility and the recognition of women's capacities, at the individual and social level mentioned previously, be able to offer alternative contributions to the future of democracy and how can it be fostered?

My answer is that all women should be helped to recognise their own capacities, enabling them to become what I have called visible to themselves. Even with the growing achievements of women politicians, scientists and academics, more in some parts of the world than in others. Although I have presented in this paper women from various countries having achieved a great success; social systems seem not to realize that they are being enriched by women's capacities — capacities such as flexibility, the ability to listen to those who are different, to live in real time, to create solidarity in times of need, to count on one's own strength without waiting for external support.

If one accepts that the building of a democratic society depends more on citizens than on laws, institutions, and structures, then women have an exceptional contribution to make and it is time to recognize it.

If women do become visible to themselves as well as to others, if weak signals of change are captured and encouraged, women could bring not only contributions but also alternatives to building the future of democracy. Women as recognised actors in society could go on creating networks as they have done for peace or women's rights, and create them on a larger scale. Much is at stake: the future of generations all over the world who, without democracies or with weak democracies, will never enjoy peace, respect for human rights or respect for the environment.

For this to happen, women's networks should be encouraged and strengthened in their efforts to reconstruct the social fabric so often destroyed by violence and war and to make these alternative voices heard by a greater public as well as by women worldwide.

Women have been and still are building wide-reaching networks, many of which are unknown and unrecognised. I want here to describe the vision I have cherished during the many years I've been working with women all over the world and looking towards the future with them. The vision of a world embraced by multiple women's networks created for many different reasons – to save their children, to look after the weak, the ill and the old, to reconstruct their homes, villages and living spaces after war, conflicts and natural catastrophes, or to save the environment. These

networks may seem weak but they have a strong will for survival and are capable of creating this different future that could be women's contribution to the future of democracy. Is it just a dream? I call it a vision with strong indicators in the past and in the present. These networks should be strongly supported also by the women having already reached success in different areas in many parts of the world.

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## The Future Meaning of "I am a (European) Citizen of our Common Globe"

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Today, democracy is an idea and an ideal as well as a social movement and a political system.

They all emphasize the value of human beings and their wellbeing higher than profit or the wellbeing of business

#### **Abstract**

Democracy was defined as "in-between the citizen (the individual) and the society (the nation-state), i.e. being an arbitrator, as well as the connecting-link between them, i.e. protecting both from drifting apart. To envision the future of democracy is so extremely difficult because both, citizens as well as societies, are changing extremely rapidly already today and will change even more rapidly in the future.

Besides many problems for or dangers of democracy today, one seems to be predominant (again): power groups within political entities (not only nation states) pursue goals beyond the two described above ... market fundamentalism in particular or perverted economic liberalism and its particular version in form of the ideology of a very strong power group within one of today's global players.

Notions of time or of "long historical periods" have been quite different over time: peace was defined between days, years, decades and a century, and so were political "regimes". Consequently the question may be allowed, if present market fundamentalism could be compared with a tsunami (was Nazi-Germany a tsunami?) or if and how today's "problématique" and other world-problems are different?

On the basis of these or similar questions (chapters), elements of "futures of democracy" as well as "democracies of the future" are analyzed in view of presently visible or imaginable tendencies and, from them on, glimpses of possible solutions (and necessary research programs) are examined.

#### The notion of the citizen – a European view

The author is fully aware that this is a Western, a European or even a Central European view and that the number of (new) enemies of this Western construct as well as real-life entity "democracy" is rising. He cherishes the premise that the world faces once more a crisis because big powers want to force the rest of the world to act the same way as they do (the very "problématique" of today, but predominantly one of that part of democracy which could be called "inter-state and global" democracy). And one of them is particularly skilled: It combines its hegemonial (nation-state) ambitions with the presently predominant economic theory (or ideology) of economic liberalism (neo-liberalism). This theory originated in the same country but proposed sometimes quite the contrary than this world player does (who could be called a left-over from the 20<sup>th</sup> century). Again and again and all over history powers do not seem to be able to accept that everything human is temporal or even ephemeral, theories and power included.

#### Or in other words:

The first basic question for today and for the future is, how long can economic-political systems or regimes prevail over educated citizens if they restrain basic freedoms like speech, religion or enterprise? The Russian example shows that it was possible for more than 70 years!

From there, the second basic question arises:

Can we define "citizen" in general, only for today or only for the political entity in which we live? And how long would such definitions last in the future (a definition of that other part of democracy; "Vicinity and inner-state-democracy")?

A true citizen never is really afraid. He feels responsible for the system and the system's environment in which he, his family and his friends as well as his company (or the structure which supplies his sustenance) live and work, and cares about the future of all of them.

Europe's classical ideal was Émile Zola's polemic treatise "J'accuse" <sup>1</sup>.

Our shortcoming here is that we are not able to come up with proposals of how to bridge the ever growing hiatus between an individual's capacities and the global necessities.

#### Today's world problématique (and other world-wide problems)

The author further dares to pretend that the following list of present world problems is pretty objective (but not at all exhaustive). Isn't that contradictory? Above he presented a pretty monocausal "theory", whilst the list offers many other "reasons" for the world's crisis. The solution is, that most "problems" are much older than the time span since respective theories were born and that people behaved already much like the theory commands already long before it was formulated ...:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> issue of January 13, 1898, in which Zola vividly engaged pro the Jewish captain Alfred Dreyfus against the French government, accusing Dreyfus of treason in favour of Germany. Zola had to leave the country in order not to be arrested and lived for more than a year in England. Zola was one of the most productive authors ever, a critic of the social conditions of imperialism and capitalism, combined with Fourier-type moderate utopianism and one of the first ever to utilise popular language and dialect.

Poverty and underdevelopment co-exist with excessive and even rapidly growing wealth and lavishness, profits of so far unknown dimensions, blind market fetishism (economic neoliberalism), criminality in general and economic criminality in particular (often exercised by real-life economic "liberals"), decay of virtues, ecological catastrophes and climate changes, terrorism, crypto-religiosity, aimlessness as well as missionlessness of the western wealth-society, lack of ideas of progress (or of "cultural" missions), nation-states with strong tendencies towards all-comprising control under the guise of techno-economic structures like RFID or genetic tests, attempts at world hegemony or at least at regional dominance ...

There is no use in just presenting this "contradiction". We will have to mediate and develop means to its neutralisation, i.e. to optimally globalise freedom, justice and equality (of chances for progress, education, a decent life, honour, etc.) for "every" citizen as well as the very notion of what it means to be "a citizen" (but of what?).

In order to neutralize the negative consequences of the problématique as well as of all the other problems (to "balance" them<sup>2</sup>) or even to turn them into advantages, lots of individual as well as group or social virtues like civil courage, engagement and solidarity are needed. But one also has to have positive feelings when resisting or even revolting and a lot of other (private) virtues ... one has to permit one self and sometimes even to force one self to be a free spirit à la Zola and to speak up in public.

Both parts of the virtual (future) world democracy have to be seen as mutually dependent on each other, though, as from today, it much looks like that the "vicinity and inner-state-democracy" will ever be determined by the "inter-state and global situation". But dependence on the big picture, the world-players, does not necessarily have to stay that way, as week indicators like the forced opening of the World Economic Forum by NGOs have shown.

#### Is market fundamentalism or neo-liberalism comparable with a tsunami?

The revolution of the market fundamentalists is a mighty offensive against "the citizen". It agitates against his democratic participation in decision-making in spheres like politics, economy, security and culture, etc. It wants to break the bourgeois conviction that society is geared by citizens instead of by shareholders, tycoons and other bosses. The market is praised to be "god almighty", just, rewarding and punishing, but in the end surely to the best of all.

And they have been quite successful in the last years because of their strategy and skills in public relations and (fake scientific) think tanks, "buying" lots of "neutral" scientists ... the man on the street argues today already that it is "natural" to take on a second job if his first one isn't rendering enough sustenance to keep up the standard of his family ... till the defamation of unionists and work councils ...

How about a comparison between a tsunami and globalisation? Would the latter also disappear (or loose its strengths) after a while? Is globalisation just like a fashion or is it rather irreversible? Well, it all depends on the notion of time applied as well as on how tolerant one is in view of the value of paradigms: the tsunami paradigm certainly implies many deficits like: though it definitively is a possible strategy for the short run to hide in a well-built house in order to wait till the tsunami is over, what happens if you resurface and discover that the environment in hundreds of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> the notion/word preferred by Franz Josef Radermacher, Balance or Destruction – Ecosocial Market Economy as Key to Global Sustainable Development", Global Contract Foundation, Hamburg, 2004

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thousands of square miles around you is destroyed? – Today, after twenty years of globalisation of the new kind (not to call it imperialism), there is no un-destroyed region on the globe any more and no refuge anywhere ... and outer space is not yet available, if ever...

If tsunamis have been a matter of survival for (hundreds of) thousands, globalisation and its consequences - in detail as well as overall - *in detail* in particular in view of climate and the environment but also in view of continued degradation of living conditions and life-chances for millions of people, *overall* they have become a matter of survival for mankind ... that's why it is good to draw consequences out of such a comparison and to be able to state "globalisation (at least as it was implemented so far) is infinitely worse and much more far-reaching"<sup>3</sup>.

But the antiquity of mono-causality can further be demonstrated by a whole array of other theories as well as realities. First of all multi-layered-ness would have to be mentioned, followed by (the lack of) corporate governance, (weak) civil societies, imbedded-ness, (necessity of the) world in balance, capitalocracy, structural totalitarianism, lack of (world) governance, etc. ... though here is not the place to further elaborate on them.

How about the old experience that someone has to start taking alternative steps? Europe's main task for her next decades should be to develops new notions and forms of 'inner/internal' democracy as well as 'outer/inter-state/inter-political-entity' democracy<sup>4</sup> and offer them to the world for imitation (not outspoken but by living them).

What that could mean for Europe (as "the" spearheading region of the world) will be elaborated after the specification of the two types of democracy mentioned. Notions of democracy have not really been discussed in the latter sense so far but need to be discussed most urgently (with many in-between facets). The difference between the two types of democracy mentioned ties in with the difference between "future of 'today's' democracy" and "(new forms of) democracy of the future" (and parts of the following could also be interpreted as a first design for a vast research program):

#### Which futures for national multilayered democracies and for global democracy?

a. Democracy as an idea historically came into being as an anti-idea: against clergy, feudalism, military and party regimes or against totalitarian ideologies.

The historical as well as *the* present *nation state is "abstract"* in the sense that the average citizen can't grasp most of its logic, e.g. in economic or financial matters, in science and technology or in foreign affairs. Secondly and thirdly and closely related to the first point, the nation state *needs ideologies* (for its own sake as well as for the sake of its citizens). And fourthly, it *is entirely based on its power monopoly* (geared to the inside as well as to the outside).

Today's democracy, potential future versions or forms of today's democracy as well as future new variations face the many challenges mentioned, above all those of the globalised economy as well as those of the globalization of almost all other spheres of life. — Democracy was regarded as the very best form of politics and yet and at the same time, it was and is heavily loaded with severe deficits. That's why democracy is more uncertain than ever or why future structures

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> the best and unbiased witness is probably Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents, New York, 2002
<sup>4</sup> i.e. between nation-states, between two or a plurality of them and (I)NGOs like OPEC or even NATO or ILO or between the European Round table of Industrialists and representatives of the civil society like Renaissance Europe or Attac

will most likely be completely different. Or even: the chances for survival of today's versions of democracy are decreasing since the basic facts, on which they once were built, do not exist any more.

The list of important factors of change reads as follows (but is not exhaustive):

"Political entities" (in particular: superpowers and/or global players) have reached sizes far beyond every classical notion of nation states (e.g. China and India; but the EU as well, with today 461 Mill. citizens, and new ones to come; superpowers have tendencies to act unilaterally). **Size** is one of the major factors of uncertainty: *Size* of populations as well as of finances, *sizes* of infrastructures and trans-national conglomerates (formerly "multinational corporations"), *size* of the world-wide-web, *size* and number of world problems, e.g. the environment, raw material shortages, the thread of A-, B- and C-weapons and the *size* of the hierarchies, e.g. amongst the roughly 200 states on our globe<sup>5</sup>.

A second factor is today's **dynamics**, a third is **complexity**.

Science and technology are *developing so rapidly into such complex structures* that change renders structures and situations obsolete at such a rate that we witness the most unbelievable kinds of a-synchronomities like coalitions between 17<sup>th</sup> century authoritarianism and long-standing democracies, or, and to the surprise to many, even in the European parliament, moderate modern social democrats side by side with ancient Stalinists<sup>6</sup>. And: The situation of decision-making in **science and technology** badly demand *new forms of steering ...* a *forth* factor.

In addition, there are *ideologies* involved. *One is the ideology of justice*. How just states might ever have been, today's worldwide justice, e.g. in regard to the equal worldwide distribution of resources or of the equal worldwide distribution of processing knowledge<sup>7</sup>, is extremely questionable (most recommendable in this respect: Franz Josef Radermacher, op. cit.).

A *second ideology* and, at the same time, one of the central features of civil society, is the *ideology of voluntary actions*. However valuable as well as indispensable it might be at local and regional levels, its worldwide influence on strategic high-level decisions is, most regrettable, almost zero.

However, ideologies like these two are almost the only forces promising to be able to control the further criminalisation of all spheres of life as well as the globe-threatening ecological short-sightedness, since ever bigger entities (global scales) are rendering attempts at their control more and more difficult if not totally illusionary.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> see here, in particular, the listing "World Problems and Issues" in "Yearbook of International Organisations", Vol.5, UIA, Brussels

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> no wonder that the Dutch and the French voted against the European constitution ... they, as most European and other democracies, incorporate most divers views and/or models of democracy (short-range against long-range, sectoral against multi-sectoral, simple against complex or status-quo orientations against change-mindedness, etc.) <sup>7</sup> and one would have to add, amongst many others: human (political and war prisoner's), women's and worker's rights (and equality issues); access to documents (the European "Freedom of Information Act" has been in discussion since 2000); the right to analyse and/or control corporate and state accountability as well as one's own data (informational self-determinism) or the right of economic powers from other world regions to buy into western structures within the theory of liberalism (like the present attempt of the Indian steel tycoon Mittal to take over the Luxembourgian/French Arcelor) etc.

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Most indicative is also the example of the European Ombudsman: this institution on the fringes of classical law belongs to the most well known European institutions. Its intrinsic high degree of voluntarism can be seen in the fact that it is approached in more than half of all complaints via internet.

b. Whatever the idea of "democracy of the future" might be, it should be aware of the list of conceivable risks, doomsday-possibilities and wild cards already existing today. And it should have emergency plans at hand on how to scope with them! – But before this not at all exhaustive list is presented, two central features of today's theory as well as reality have to be mentioned:

- Should a comparison in aggressiveness between democracies and other societies be attempted, the statistical evidence would probably be most shaky because of highly complex definition problems like "What is democratic," what is "fair", what is aggressiveness, what is a conflict, etc."?
- What happened so far and what would happen in the future to "democracies when in danger"? Did they / will they restrict their inner democracy for the time of defence and rejuvenate it after the danger was / will be banned?

Which were the means of defence against "which dangers" so far, which dangers are to be expected or which ones are imaginable? Which means have been proposed so far under the rubric "democratic methods of counteraction"?

- Nuclear winter ... could occur after explosion of a critical number of e.g. atomic bombs;
- B and C warfare;
- Wars of certain "size" (amount of soldiers involved, amount and kind of weapons used, areas involved, and numbers of civilian casualties ... more comprising than e.g. the Vietnam war or the two Iraq wars);
- Tsunamis, hurricanes or rise of sea levels, floating plains like the Netherlands or Northern Germany, flat islands, port cities, etc.;
- Terrorists attack like on 9/11 (or even more devastating);
- Religious fanatism on more than one side (like e.g. in India, where Hindus sometimes are behaving comparable to Muslim fanatics);
- Raw material shortages like e.g. oil, gas or uranium, etc. (Energy-NATO!<sup>10</sup>);
- Access to global commons like water, energy, food, education, information, etc
- "Unbalanced" situations (Radermacher);

- Situations of being unarmed, unprepared for defence or at least that one side imagines that the other is not prepared for defence and consequently ventures aggression;

- US Dollar Crises (growing numbers of financial players are beginning to express their intention to sell their US \$ holdings).

A. and b. have been brought together in Table 1! "a. and b. seen together" allows the conclusion that the perspectives for democracy are dim unless the attempt is ventured, and hopefully suc-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> another attempt could read: individual human rights and autonomy, social justice and freedom (of speech and expression, of belief, of own values, to organize associational and societal activities, to promote own goals, to call on the rule of law, etc.) as well as attempts to assure access for everybody to education, jobs and global human commons like food, water, shelter and informational self-determination

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> see in particular the paper by Wolfgang Merkel, In Case of Doubt: Pro War, in the German weekly Die ZEIT, Hamburg, 17/2006

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> see the German weekly DerSPIEGEL 13/2006 "Der neue Kalte Krieg – Kampf um Rohstoffe", Hamburg (The new Cold War – The Battle for Raw Materials)

cessfully, to conceive a (large – if possible) majority of nations to start immediately to plan for such emergencies globally as well as locally under a global "regime", based on a maximum on voluntary pledges but with possibilities for sanctions, wherever feasible and appropriate (a huge research proposal – sic!).

Table 1

		2006	Problems, Uncertainties, Risks, Doomsday-pos- sibilities & Wild Cards	Counter-measures with "return-to-democracy"- probabilities	X years later after successful problem solving
Tendencies of past and present democra- cies	Local	Size	1	101	1101
		Dynamics	2	102	1102
		Complexity	3	103	1103
		Science & Tech.	4 <b>A</b>	104	1104
	Global	Size	5	105 <b>B</b>	1105 B1
		Dynamics	6	106 <b>B'</b>	1106 B1
		Complexity	7	107 <b>B</b>	1107 B1
		Science & Tech.	8	108 <b>B'</b>	1108 B1
Future democra- cies	Local	Size	9	109	1109
		Dynamics	10	110	1110
		Complexity	11	111	1111
		Science and Tech.	12	112	1112
	Global	Size	13	113	1113
		Dynamics	14	114	1114
		Complexity	15	115	1115
		Science and Tech.	16	116	1116 <b>C</b>

-> Dynamics ->

Integrating table 2 into table 1 increases, above all, complexity. But complexity can not be evaluated independently of the tasks to be solved. In the global situation of 2050/2075 democracy's complexity has most likely grown to "extremes" unknown so far and just suitable for the era's dynamism and the thereof resulting structures.

<sup>&</sup>quot;Local" should be supplemented by "regional"; local would be too small (even if we would talk about a metropolitan agglomeration of some 10 million people) or too uneconomical to have that many parliaments and the superstructure to incorporate all of the necessary substructures.

<sup>&</sup>quot;Size of a Region" should mean between 20 to 40 million people. "World-regions" will be called as such.

Finland is considerably smaller than a region but has remarkable dynamics. She is not yet really "complex", her decision-making is still comprehensible and her S&T-system is by far not covering all sciences and/or technologies nor does it have to, because those, in which Finland has reached a world-leading role, are sufficiently profitable to be able to purchase the missing ones ... "Niesch-theory".

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Argentina is big area-wise (not so others in the same bracket) but neither dynamic nor complex; and she has no big S&T system.

"B" (Europe or the EU) has already some of the features of the new international structure, but "C" will definitively have incorporated most of them.

The EU is big but neither is her dynamism nor her S&T system (benchmarking/Lisbon-agenda) sufficient; and she probably is over-complex! After appropriate measures were taken (how many years later?) ... she will have grown further to, say, 600 million people ... her dynamism as well as her S&T-system regained world-leadership (or is amongst the best) ... whilst her complexity is still too high.

Her final break-through to "C" has not come yet and will not come unless she really thinks global, accepts global responsibility and is able to reconcile her local/regional problems with a majority of the global ones. But the dangers of isolationism and attempts at auto-sufficiency are real, difficult to be kept in mind and difficult to keep the alert against them alive; and many are tempted by them quite heavily.

The potential of that scheme is up to 48 scenarios, if one would dynamize the 16 scenarios described in the vertical row "Problems ...", i.e. supplementing them by "scenarios decades later" after counter-measures were invigorated and showing positive and/or negative results. The format of the present publication restricts us here to the following three:

"A" could be the present situation of middle-sized/complex/dynamic countries like Argentina, Poland or Thailand in particular under the point of view of trying desperately at least to keep the distance in S&T to the forerunners (if not to shorten that distance).

"C" represents the most advanced country (or one of the most advanced), region or global player after a super push (based on whatever method, ideology or reason) e.g. in 2075 (the year of the basic scenario would be 2055, i.e. 50 years from today). Its "Size" is "big" (global), "Dynamics" are "high", "Complexity" would be "extreme" and "S&T" "unimaginable" for today.

"B" (and B') are symbolizing the various stages of Europe today, B1 Europe in 2075, should it not "jump" into "1113 to 1116", i.e. that the hope is there, of course, that Europe (B) would finally turn into "C".

#### Glimpses on solutions

The mentioned four factors (and two ideologies) paradigmatically raise the question of the possibility of new forms of democracy, above all that of a "(international) hierarchy of parliaments" and its power distribution. Could they have a structure like the one in table 2 (which could, at least partially, also function on Internet, virtually and/or simulated ... and which tries to incorporate a multitude of models of democracy) and would some levels have the power to limit e.g. power and/or size of trans-national conglomerates or even of whole branches, size of population, influence of political-religious leaders and of the military, of pollution and of economy (the financial sector)? The principle of this proposal (which can not, of course, be elaborated here in greater / sufficient detail and which owes much to Johannes Heinrichs and Joseph Huber – see the list of literature) is to transform factual power into (limited) legal power.

Table 2

The UN and her agencies								
World Assembly of Parliamentarians ~ 750 all together, ~ 600 delegated from the national parliaments								
30 from each of the specialized parliaments								
Parliament of Sci-	Parliament of The	Parliament of the	Parliament of In-	Parliament of				
entists with the four	Militaries with the	(I)NGOs with the	dustry & Finances	World-regions with				
Subparliaments	four Sub-parliaments	four Subparliaments	with the four Sub-	the four Subparlia-				
Basic Values 11	Basic Values 11	Basic Values 11	parliaments	ments				
Culture	Culture	Culture	Basic Values 11	Basic Values 11				
Political Structure	Political Structure	Political Structure	Culture	Culture				
Economy 12	Economy 12	Economy 12	Political Structure	Political Structure				
•			Economy 12	Economy 12				

This proposal leads to the very most basic question on the future of the UN, the future of the entire present world system of roughly 300 "political entities" (i.e. trans-national conglomerates and mafia-like structures included) or to the question, if such highly structured "systems" <sup>13</sup> could develop new "learning" qualifications (within its own inner structures, decision-making procedures or information flow as well as intra-them)? Or: How could such a system of Sectoral-and Sub-Parliaments be turned into a regime that provokes and enforces disclosure and transparency as well as knowledge and control of the "(in)finite" global space and involves civil society in decision-making?<sup>14</sup>

And then there is, and perhaps lunatic to many readers, the futurist's question: What will happen in general and to democracy in particular when the progress of ICT continues or even accelerates and machines get more intelligent than human beings? Will we then have to include a "Parlia-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> the four Subparliaments are indeed meant to be a hierarchy in the order listed ... not that philosophers or people in ethics are meant to be the clandestine kings or rulers ... each "Basic Value" Subparliament will be staffed by delegates from each of the other three Subparliaments

gates from each of the other three Subparliaments <sup>12</sup> just a few words on "subparliaments": because today's system of political parties is much rather the problem itself than it's solution: subparliaments are an attempt to give a chance of expression and co-determination to a majority of societal groups or opinions, based e.g. on theories of communication ... they form a hierarchy with clear competences for every level and principles for their cooperation ... and subparliaments are applicable nationally as well as inter-nationally / globally

One of the reasons why parties are part of the problem is the ever more excessive lobbyism at all levels, recently denounced anew by Thomas Leif & Rudolf Speth (Hrsg.), Die fünfte Gewalt – Lobbyismus in Deutschland, Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 2006 (The fifth power – Lobbyism in Germany)

<sup>13</sup> resembling in a way Karl Deutsch's "nerves of government"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> and it could be a question worthwhile to be put forward: in as far could the EU (in particular her history and failures, like with the constitutional referendum) be regarded as the very experimentation-field for exactly these questions

One particular point in case is the fact that nothing is really decided in Brussels (in the EU ... to stick to the EU as an example) without the consent of the most powerful European lobby-group called "European Round Table of Industrialists". Consequently, large numbers of civil-society representatives are trying to increase the pressure on the Commission to at least institutionalize the influence of ERTI on the one hand (incorporating into the ERTI also the interests of small and medium size companies) and to create a countervailing force in equally institutionalizing the influence of civil society

ment of Humanoides"? Or will they turn into "entities", dictating their creators, because these couldn't decide on precautious measure in time because of internal rivalries ... as usual ...?

And finally: What does democracy today really mean in federal systems like the US or Germany? It means many things ... – Though it never is "good writing" to use too many "should" and "shall", here is a last non-exhaustive list:

- Limitations to corporate influence and/or lobbying as well as rules for corporate governance (trans-national conglomerates have been denounced as already pursuing own "foreign policies" beyond the states of their origin or where their headquarter is situated);
- Ending the constant widening of the gap between rich and poor (worldwide as well as within nations and/or hemispheres), as e.g. proposed by the Global Marshal Plan Initiative; or control of "tax paradises", as proposed by OECD already quite a while ago, etc.;
- Fencing in the activities of the market fundamentalists; demonstration that their ideas never really worked and that e.g. US governmental interventions are most frequent (that means by the very most powerful representative of that very theory ... though probably not the most trustworthy); or a demand for the end of "capitalocracy" (in which democratic institutions are gradually and legally overturned by capitalism), i.e. that citizens have a chance to know the relationships between them and those who govern them ... whilst in "global times" decisions are taken by anonyma far away and unfamiliar with local or regional circumstances:
- Denouncing today's modern "Imperialism" and "Totalitarianism", i.e. the brutal use of
  military force in order to assure economic doctrine's predominance (official language),
  or: the nineteenth century idea of hegemony of one single nation state (unofficial language).

#### Outlook

Trying to be realistic, it wouldn't be wise to hope or to require the whole world to turn democratic at once. Democracy was and is an Occidental, Western or European idea and is full of requirements terribly difficult to achieve (as well as to explain to those unfamiliar with democracy). If we downscale the West's shared goal to democratise the globe to realistic attempts at democratic progress, the West/Occident might be more successful in the long run, simply because (and that is another belief), advances in modern science and technology are not independent of the underlying culture, the culture of enlightenment, of "sapere aude", the right of every citizen to require satisfactory explanations of whatever seems to him to be unclear or unjustified.

#### Postscript

## The EU as the most innovative amongst all players developing new forms of democracy?

Citing the US-American author Jeremy Rifkin could eventually prevent us from being denounced as "Europe fanatics". Rifkin's analysis of the EU as a much more promising model for solving (world-) problems starts from the fact that the EU stands for peaceful conflict-regulation,

that she tries harder than most others to reduce environmental damages and that general human wellbeing is ranking higher within her realm than the profit of the few (but that is hard to proof!).

In order to be fair to the US, Europe's foreign relations were economically acceptable so far because she had not to thumb her glass because of the US security umbrella. In fact, Europe is on the way to an ever more monstrous "democratic-entity" since many decades ...though the result presently is impressive, it is truly open in the end ...

But it may not be forbidden to end with a list of Europe's democratic goals and, partially already attained, achievements:

- Europe's identity is her diversity (despite the growing "one" official language English and an eventual "constitution");
- Peace for the European region and its neighbours;
- Reduction of her dependency from other parts of the world (e.g. raw materials);
- Prosperity for her member countries as well as for the (wider) region, and solidarity and help for less developed regions of our globe (reconciliation of people and power);
- Progress in culture (e.g. the ongoing necessity to rebalance liberty and equality/social solidarity), standard of living, environmental protection, science-technology-education (e.g. the Lisbon vision / strategy) as well as in insights into individual's as well as mankind's purposes;
- Development of a (cultural) vision / an agenda for Europe or of Europe within the Occident (which includes responsibility for future European and Non-European generations);
   Europe as partner, never as competitor, especially not to the US or other global powers / players;
- Security within Europe as well as for the world;
- Development of an alternative European model of democratic Globalisation.

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#### India, China and Future of Democracy

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#### **Abstract**

India and China are the major developing powers. Through their soft power they may provide inspiration and images of the future for the developing world. They also have compatibility, due to shared problems with other developing countries. I explore the possibilities and distinguishing features for each country: India as a diverse, post-colonial representative government, and China as a leading candidate to step into a new political future beyond representative government

#### Introduction

This paper examines the two major rising powers of the early  $21^{st}$  century, China and India, and their role as inspiration and images of the future. Today we are witnessing the rapid growth of their economic, political and military influence and the corresponding growth of their soft power. The amount of media attention given to these two countries is stunning given their rapid economic growth at a time when developed economies have stopped growing. Some questions engaged in this article are the following: Will China and India offer a model for government, and if so what will it look like? In which regions will their models be most influential and what are the emerging issues that are important to track?

Given India's long tradition of a liberal representative government it may stay on this course. There are several important characteristics distinguishing the Indian model. First it has been dealing relatively effectively, with large language, ethnic, religious and communal divides. Second India is firmly in the developing world despite its recent economic growth. For instance, it has features like a large poor and agrarian population and has a large and poorly integrated territory. This makes it more likely that its solutions are more applicable to the many developing states which are the same countries often referred to as "emerging democracies". Thus these states which need better governance structures- and therefore are experimenting in this area- are likely to find a better match in the well established Indian model rather than the existing US model or the currently developing EU one. Based on this I argue here that India has the potential to be a strong source of inspiration for liberal, representative governments in the developing world and in the "emerging democracies": geographically speaking, in Africa, Central Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and Indonesia and the Philippines.

At first glance China seems to be an unlikely candidate for political inspiration despite its rapid economic growth. The conspicuous lack of a liberal, representative democracy and China's Communist regime are the most commonly cited reasons. While these arguments are very valid, on the other hand we are also seeing a passionate desire for political participation in China. In addition, PRC's historical support for anti-colonial, pro-independence struggles allows China to enjoy respect and legitimacy in many parts of the developing world. Therefore many minds may be open to be inspired by Chinese models. The very lack of a liberal, representative government

that is fundamentally bound with technologies of the past may be an overlooked advantage when considering the possibility for people to successfully "leapfrog" into a new political future. That means that the Chinese people also have a fair chance to incorporate current technologies to better approximate true democracy than our currently dominant representative government.

A very important basic point is that China and India are likely to be major inspirations for the future of everything, including governance, replacing the US and to some extent also Europe. Many non-OECD nations consider living standards and political systems of the First World to be unachievable, and thus choose to identify with and derive images of their future from Third World major powers. China and India may significantly and disproportionately, shape what Democracy means in the future, for citizens of many non-OECD nations. For many people of the developing world "Democracy" with a capital "D" is a vague, open term that is yet an elusive ideal, a vessel waiting to be filled with meaning. While the OECD is very powerful, the non-OECD world is more than three-fourths of the world's population and this article focuses on democracy in this part of the world.

#### The Emergence of a Democracy market

Elections are costly affairs. At the basic operational level they require setting up of tens and hundreds of thousands of voting booths all over the country, ballot preparation, verification of identities and processing millions of voters. Collecting and counting all the votes and the publication of the results must be done in high security. This estimate does not include the mass mobilizations of voters, election campaigning parades and advertisements, and the need to provide free, public information to citizens. These costs compound for nations with poorly integrated travel infrastructures, high need for security against illegal electioneering, and ethnic tension. Take for instance, India in 2004, it cost \$245 million to conduct national elections,

"Elections in India involved complex political, mobilizational and organizational logistics that remain unparalleled in the world. In the May 2004 national elections, for instance, there were 5435 candidates from 230 registered national and state-level political parties. Of the estimated 650 million voters, approximately 56%, or 380 million people, actually cast their votes. The Election Commission employed almost 3.5 million personnel to administer the elections and an estimated 2 million civilian police and security forces were deployed for order maintenance during the elections. The direct cost of deployment and organizing the election amounted to approximately \$245 million.<sup>2</sup>"

In no way am I suggesting that the large costs of representative government legitimate authoritarianism. Yet the current levels of technology in the private sector could be used in order to reduce the 380 million pieces of paper that need to be distributed all over the country, voted upon, and finally processed at a counting facility. IT, cell phone, and other innovations that have transformed the private sector and the executive branch, are yet to be applied in important processes of representative government. In recent years there is a strong emerging trend towards innovation in this area.

These innovations are necessary to make the costs of representative government economically affordable and environmentally sustainable. Making voting affordable, less polluting, and more


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> All of North America plus all of Europe (including Eastern Europe) make up a little more than one billion people out of 6.4 billion people of the world. Haub 2004

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Verma 2005

secure, is one important way of promoting and supporting representative government around the world, in a non-militaristic manner. The free countries of the world number 89 nations, 46%, and partly free countries number 58 (30%)<sup>3</sup>. In recent history the trend has been for these numbers keep increasing, and the emerging democratic nations of Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Africa provide a growing market for democracy-related products<sup>4</sup>. It may become not only economically important for manufacturers and consultancies of leading democracies to secure the democracy market, but also, politically and symbolically as nations like the United States and India compete for the golden throne of democracies. Let us examine this democracy market further, starting with voting.

#### The Voting Machine

Voting is at the core of current notions of democracy. In order to reduce the gargantuan operating cost, in 2004, India conducted the world's first national electronic vote. "After experimenting with locally manufactured electronic voting machines (EVMs) since 1999, India's Election Commission decided to go all-electronic in 2004, using 1,075,000 EVMs, each of which can record up to 3,840 votes." Given it was the first attempt, it was remarkably successful. The majority of the machines functioned well, although a small percentage of the "Indian machines malfunctioned at 1,800 voting booths (out of 1 million), and voters needed to cast their ballots again."



Source: Election Commission of India

Electronic voting refers to a machine that stores information in its chip, rather than a paper-based one. It is not an IT or cell phone enabled system. Voters still needed to go to a voting booth to press a button manually. Today, Indian voters are predominantly rural poor workers, many of whom are illiterate. EVM is a simple, succinct machine. It has a list of candidates and an input module, connected to a storage unit. Both the name of the candidate and their campaign symbol are available for the voter to see for whom they are voting. It is

designed with past election frauds in mind, where hired thugs would violently take over voting booths and stamp as many votes for

their candidate before the arrival of the additional police<sup>7</sup>. To counteract such frauds the EVM only allows one vote to be cast every five seconds.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Freedom House Survey 2005

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Lindberg 2006. By June 2003, 44 of Sub-Saharan Africa's 48 states had conducted what are often referred to as "founding" elections, typically marking a transition from a long period of authoritarian rule to fledgling democratic government. Thirty-three of these countries had gone through a second election cycle, twenty had completed three uninterrupted cycles, and seven had held four or more consecutive elections.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Wilkinson 2005

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Wiener 2004

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Verma 2005

There are many benefits to the introduction of the EVM. The costs saved from human labor and paper is significant. Also the privacy of the vote is important as retributions and other methods of fear are still present. The control unit and the balloting unit are separated during storage making it more difficult to tamper. It is easily transported with a specially designed battery pack for potentially severe conditions.

Bharat Electronics Limited, based in Bangalore, and the Electronics Corporation of India, Hyderabad, are the main producers. Each company supplied about 500,000 EVMs. Several countries had already expressed interest in these machines in 2004 and both companies have plans to market their products in South Asia and Africa, not to mention Europe and the US. As one EVM is said to be about \$300, one million machines translates to approximately \$300 million in turnover. With the record of the first national electronic vote and the title of the world's largest democracy, these companies have a good marketing brand and edge. As exporting products related to representative government makes commercial, political, and environmental sense, this path of promoting representative government seems to be a sustainable and growing trend. Indian companies may innovate a diverse array of democracy related products which allow India and other Third world nations to conduct representative government with less financial burden using simple and hardy technologies.

The US is also developing voting machines although they have not been used at the national level. At the most basic level these machines are designed to be networked allowing votes to be instantly collected via intranet. Due to security issues, such as online transmission and viruses, they are still under development. However, their applicability outside the developed world is questionable even when these machines become available. Most of the non-OECD world is still not networked outside one or two major cities not to mention the requisite security. Plus there is the issue of cost. "Our (US) machines are far more complicated and expensive—\$3,000 versus \$200 for an Indian machine. The U.S. voting machines are loaded with Windows operating systems, encryption, touch screens, backup servers, voice-guidance systems, modems, PCMCIA storage cards, etc. They have millions of lines of code; the Indian machines hardly any at all."

At this point in time, these Indian EVMs that is one step, but one big step, ahead of paper voting is more applicable to most of the newly democratizing world. It is affordable, and a significant cost-saving improvement that does not assume the IT infrastructure of the wealthy nations.

#### **E-Courts**

India's E-courts are starting to play an important role in making India more democratic. Currently, while Indian citizens officially have a right to a fair trial, this is often not what is practiced. One important factor is operation, not intention. Many people are kept in jail, waiting for the trial<sup>10</sup>. There have been numerous cases where citizens judged not guilty spent more than one year in jail awaiting the trial, and other cases where the waiting period was longer than the actual sentence. Democracy and citizens' rights are compromised, not because of intentional incarceration, but by cause of operational inefficiency. There are too many litigations and trials are not efficient enough. This problem is exacerbated in economically poor areas.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> BBC News 2004

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Weiner 2004

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Indian Express July 22, 2002

In order to counteract this problem, several state courts introduced electronic court systems. Through electronic databases of past cases, electronic filing of petitions, and video conferencing technologies, several state courts increased their efficiency reducing the number of pending cases significantly<sup>11</sup>. Many testimonies are made in prison, reducing security risks not only to the judges and other court staff but also to those citizens serving as witnesses. As the defendants do not see them witnesses need not fear retaliation. This also reduces transportation fees and makes testimony giving economically feasible for citizens with less monetary power. Rather than waiting the entire day for their hour to give testimony, citizens can simply say what they have to say in front of the camera and then go home and back to work. Using IT-related tools, pending cases were reduced from 160,000 to 20,000<sup>12</sup>.

The Supreme Court, which is also electronic now, is based in New Delhi. The travel and lodging costs in the Indian capital are not affordable to many Indians, not to mention the opportunity cost of the work time lost and risk of being fired. Therefore the Supreme Court has set up video conferencing equipment in the capital of every state, decreasing financial barriers for citizen access to the nation's highest court. India, like many countries, suffers from the phenomenon that the wealthy get better and faster justice and the e-court system is one step towards fair trials for all.

Actually the E-Court system started to be used in Singapore in the late 1990s, and the Indian system is explicitly modeled after the Singaporean precedent. However, there are several reasons that Indian E-Courts are important. First, Singapore's e-courts are designed to meet the increasing litigation needs of the wealthy bustling city. Most non-OECD nations are unlikely to think that such infrastructure is affordable, but rather as a luxury for wealthy nations<sup>13</sup>.

New Delhi has digested this idea and re-applied it to own needs, which better resembles the needs of other non-OECD nations. Indian E-courts serve to integrate its large and poorly connected territory, and offering access to justice for groups to whom it was previously unaffordable. This aspect was completely lacking to Singapore's E-courts as it was unnecessary- Singapore is a wealthy, small island nation. The pro-poor orientation and the function of integrating difficult-to-travel landmasses have important applications for other non-OECD nations.

India is in a unique position in this respect. It is an advanced nation with high IT capabilities, while also carrying a large poor population. The international humiliation that poverty has caused Indian governments and the values of socialism and equality written into the Indian Constitution, direct Indian administrations to pay attention and to care for their poor. For instance, the Singh administration recently announced a plan to secure stable employment for at least one member of every rural family<sup>14</sup>. Finally, the sheer numbers of this rural, poor population and their electoral clout make it impossible for these groups to be neglected.

India can benefit from exporting such systems as a consulting service to other democratic nations with geographic difficulties. There are numerous such nations, for instance, Indonesia and Philippines in Asia, and many African countries. This can be done in the name of pro-poor justice and democracy, while being commercially beneficial to Indian coffers and symbolically positive

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Indian Express July 3, 2002

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> The Statesman 2005

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> The Edge Malaysia 2003. Discusses how Malaysian court judgments were electronically available in Singapore before it was available to Malaysian lawyers themselves. What makes economic sense in fast paced Singapore is liked to a scene out of Star Trek for Malaysian readers.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Hindustan Times 2005

for Indian democracy. These factors make it very likely for India to carry on further in this direction into the foreseeable future<sup>15</sup>.

These trends point towards a development of a democracy market. The voting machine section discussed one example of an Indian innovation that applies contemporary technology to voting. The following E-Courts section dealt with an example of a service in which India is likely to be a strong provider. If such trends continue, India may become a better, more equal democracy through innovation of goods and services, and become a model for aspiring democracies through their export.

#### A Model for Democracy: More than Machines and Services

Starting with the gradual economic reforms of the 1980s, India has marked stable economic growth. With the further opening of the economy in 1991, India's size and rapid growth has caught the world's attention. Along with the People's Republic of China, India is poised to be a global power of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Its growing energy demand affects the world oil market, is a top IT power, and boasts powerful multinationals in various sectors, from ONGC in oil and gas, to manufacturers like Asian Paints to the world famous TATA Group.

Yet, even while making the world attention focus on its growing economy, India keeps insisting it is the world's largest democracy. It is true that governing one billion people with no common language, of at least six different religions, and of such diverse ethnicities <sup>16</sup> is an impressive feat. Especially for a developing nation that upon its emergence from British colonization, was torn into Pakistan and India in a bloody civil war. Rather, India "escaped the fate of all those multiethnic, multicultural and multilingual developing states which in recent years have disintegrated or are caught in perpetual civil unrest amid accusations of partiality".<sup>17</sup>

Governing one billion people is a challenge for New Delhi, and a lot of power has been given to the state governments. Soon after independence, language independence movements pulled the nation in different directions, and there were serious misgivings about threats to national unity. Still, these states were reorganized from the British colonial boundaries to language-based states, by the Reorganization of States Act of 1956. This allowed English and the state language to be used for the major modes of communication within most states, although it is usual to have postings in three or more languages in urban areas. "The Reorganization of States Act of 1956 sets up linguistically homogeneous state units, thereby recognizing the validity of language as a basis for forming a distinct group. India has thus provided an exemplary model for resolving the language problem." India created a historical precedent for other linguistically diverse nations with colonially imposed non-linguistic boundaries, that allowing regions significant autonomy by language does not entail the division of the country into smaller pieces.

Other than language, religion is another major bone of contention for diverse nations with pious peoples. The Western model that places religion outside of government and place secularism firmly at the center of the government has been met by resistance in many countries with religious citizens. Understanding that religion was crucial in splitting British India into Muslim

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> I've intentionally left out discussion of e-governance. Many nations already provide government related information and limited services via their government webpage.

<sup>16</sup> Hasan 2005

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Misra 1999

<sup>18</sup> Hasan 2005

Pakistan and India at independence, religion has had a place in Indian government. While superficially, religion in Indian government seems to be the same as that of the United States, there is an important difference,

"These polyethnic rights were expressed through the policy of secularism defined as neutrality of the state to (rather than separation from) religions. "The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them" (Article 15 (1)). The expression of religious identities was not prohibited in the public sphere. In striking contrast to the ongoing French debate concerning religious symbols in state schools, the Indian state has funded educational institutions of the main religious denominations. In Nehru's words, Indian secularism "does not obviously mean a state where religion as such is discouraged. It means freedom of choice and conscience, including freedom for those who may have no religion."

Such religiously neutral policies are quite different from the irreligious or even anti-religious models of the West. They are more acceptable to the majority of the world, which is notably religious. In the many post-colonial states that are working to govern religiously diverse groups, a government that allows religious policy is important, rather than a government that is separate from and must be blind to religion.

In addition, recent developments made alliance maintenance essential for the Congress Party and the BJP. In the 2004 elections, one major reason the BJP lost so many seats to the Congress Party was due to their neglect in alliance maintenance<sup>20</sup>. On the governing Congress side, the current power the leftist and communist parties are wielding over the coalition is another good example. The tendency is towards local groups gaining voice at national levels.

Finally, there are strong stipulations for minority protection at least by developing world standards. For instance 1/3 of all legislative seats must be held by women. This may sound low in this age of equality but compare this with statistics in the US, where the percentage of parliamentary seats held by women is 14%<sup>21</sup>. Unlike the United States, and many other European countries, India has had a female Prime Minister and powerful political figures in Jayaram Jayalalitha, India's first elected female chief minister. Also, a minimum number of seats are reserved for tribal people and other minorities.

These factors allow the Indian model to better embrace religious, linguistic, and other diversities, while giving enough power to the majority to entice them to engage the liberal representative system rather than choose repression, military or otherwise. The Indian model has survived and engaged in problems other post-colonial states are facing, such as ethnic and communal tensions. Its representative government has struck a delicate balance between disproportionate minority power and problematic majoritarian rule offering a solid model for use by other nations.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Adeney and Lall 2005

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Wilkinson 2005

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 2003

#### Can a model of Government come from China

The PRC has impressed the world with its rapid economic growth. Indisputably, China is the fastest growing economy in the world. While economically impressive, China does not have a liberal representative government and at first glance, it seems unlikely that China can become a model of governance. However, in the combination of the lack of representative government and the rapid growth and dynamism in other areas, there may be space for a possibility of a Chinese model of governance.

In the late 18<sup>th</sup> century representative government was an important design innovation towards true democracy. Given the technology of the time, sending a local representative to a bicameral legislature was the closest approximation of democracy that was feasible and economically viable. It was impossible to inform the majority, not to mention a substantial minority, of the major issues of the day.

Since then, the number of people needing representation skyrocketed and most people are no longer farmers. Yet considering the magnitude of such changes, our liberal representative government has undergone little change. People are endeared to it, and yes, it is a very good system. Even more significantly, having a liberal, representative government is fundamental to the identity of many nations, for instance the US, Britain, and other major powers.

Today, this importance attached to liberal, representative government is serving as a barrier in developing the next step, a closer approximation of democracy. With newspapers, telephones, internet, and most recently, the high-powered cell phones, it is possible to inform and hold governance with a substantially larger group of citizens. Still, due to familiarity of our government, and the elected representatives some of whom have gained privileges by the design of government, there is substantial inertia and resistance to change.

A very important basic point is that the PRC does not have a compelling, endeared model that it needs to get rid of *in the present* before it can step into a different political future.

One major change necessary to representative government is argued in Anticipatory Democracy<sup>22</sup>. Voting and current democracy is fundamentally geared towards a mass society. A silent majority, a mass exists, and politicians extract their preferences through votes and implement it as the national consensus<sup>23</sup>. In this way the current system of government is fundamentally geared towards running a mass consumption, mass production society.

The current age of individualization and diversification is pushing this system to its limits. That silent majority has now broken into fragments based on race, gender, sexual orientation, and income level. There are now, environmentalists, scientists, agriculturalists, Christians, and many other groups making competing and contradicting demands on the government. In order to accommodate and engage a changing world the government needs to change.

The issue of citizenship tied to voting is also becoming contentious. Migrant workers in places like New York City and Hong Kong cannot vote in the government that most affects them. In New York, there has been a movement towards sharing the right to vote in mayoral elections

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Toffler. Anticipatory Democracy

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002

with residents and other non-citizen tax payers. In Hong Kong, Filipina workers need to influence Manila, which in turns engages Hong Kong into protecting these workers rights and interests. As globalization proceeds, this issue may become most problematic in the centers of the developed world like New York and Hong Kong, LA and Tokyo.

While there was a visible, but limited increase in freedom starting with Deng Xiao Ping's policies of loosening of state power over the economy, the Tiananmen Square incident showed this did not extend into the political realm. It is only very recently that people started real mobilization, as seen in the anti-Japanese protests of April 2005. In 2005, the 21<sup>st</sup> century, there was the internet. Especially because speech is very controlled in real life, cyberspace is very active with opinions. In the real world, through cyberspace, individuals are now self-organizing at surprising speed. One look at South Korea- when Koreans learned President Roh Moo-Hyun's impeachment was politically motivated, people mobilized in a matter of hours to protest<sup>24</sup>. Similarly, although less rapid, anti-Japanese protests in the PRC were self-organized.

There is one key difference between South Korea and China. In South Korea the goal is to place and keep their representative in power<sup>25</sup>. In contrast, in the PRC, popular demands are tied to policy<sup>26</sup>. This bypasses the issue of representatives, who in turn must enact policy. This is one way in which the PRC may leapfrog over, seemingly more democratically developed and equally technologically engaged, liberal representative government of South Korea. Self-organizing based on policy is a much more effective and timely way than the representative one, which entails waiting four years until the next presidential elections.

I say this without overly glorifying developments in the PRC. It is true that being anti-Japanese and nationalistic is officially encouraged in China. However, major nation-wide mobilization which shakes the entire country is *not* condoned, especially given the rising levels of protests in general. The CCP was unhappy and uncomfortable by the magnitude of the mobilization, and some even feared that the regime would be toppled upon being criticized for accommodating the Japanese too much.

Either way, it is clear that the 2005 protests pushed the envelope for governance. Even though party officials wanted to control the attacks to consulates and other Japanese symbols, they were unable to. By following the official doctrine of anti-Japanese nationalism, they put the authorities in a position where the officials could not stop the protesters without seeming pro-Japan, and thus contradicting their own doctrine. This put the CCP in a difficult position. They had to choose between allowing popular mobilization or their anti-Japanese policy, the source of their legitimacy.<sup>27</sup>

Until very recently, the PRC was a secluded nation mostly known for its exoticized culture and its human rights abuses. Suddenly, it transformed into a giant economy. Overnight China became a powerful economic tsunami hitting most of us by surprise. Even today's most powerful nation, the United States, is reacting very strongly and emotionally to this major rising power. In this world where compartmentalization is increasingly failing to work, it would be far from surprising if China also created a powerful political tsunami that sweeps the world.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> New York Times April 2, 2006

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Hanguk Ilbo / Korea Times, 2004

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Cai 2005. This article illustrates one example portraying how peaceful protests are not linked to representatives, but to an implementation of policy.

Established trends and emerging developments seem to point to a successful jump into a political future. It may be a political system that is based on policy-based mobilization by self-organized citizens. The legal status of these people would not matter, but rather that they have a compelling case that starts mobilization. Or it may be something totally different. Whether or not these developments result in a Chinese model of democracy that incorporates current technologies is open, but if it does develop, it will certainly be a powerful one that inspires governments in many parts of the world.

#### Chinese Government as a Model

As a leading developing country, the PRC shares a remarkable number of problems with most post-colonial states, many of which are also "emerging democracies". The two main traits are its authoritative and overgrown state apparatus, and citizens demanding greater participation. This is pointing towards a pressing need for a mechanism wherein the elite and the people can accommodate each other, i.e. a working model of governance. Due to these shared problems, a Chinese design solution may have many open minds to be inspired in these regions. Increasingly close ties between China and Africa, Middle East, and South Asia give further support.

The lack of a liberal, representative government may make the idea of political legitimacy and China fit poorly together in the mind of first world readers. However, in Africa for instance, China does have a lot of political clout since its positive involvement in anti-colonial struggles since the 1960s<sup>28</sup>.

Chinese policy of non-intervention is much more popular than the Euro-American one of humanitarian intervention. The context of colonial legacy and recent independence frames Western intervention negatively to many nationalist elites<sup>29</sup>. China has been engaging Africa politically and economically through training African businessmen and officials, establishing scholarships for African students, and sending nurses and doctors<sup>30</sup>. Offering education opportunities and better health are important at a more basic level in promoting real gains towards democracy.

Similarly, Chinese power has been increasing in the Middle East. Iran and the PRC moved close rapidly with Iran purchasing arms from China, and selling much needed oil and gas to China. In addition, the Saudi monarch visited China for his first official visit outside the Middle East. Given the fallout in close ties between the US, Saudi leaders are said to be in search of a new strategic partner, and energy-hungry China seems to be a strong candidate for the oil kingdom<sup>31</sup>.

Chinese influence is also increasing in developing Asia. China has boosted relations with Indonesia, the most populous Muslim nation, with which it had historically suffered poor relations<sup>32</sup>. Even in South Asia, often characterized as the backyard of the South Asian giant, India, China is acquiring influence. Many of the smaller South Asian nations are worried about Indian dominance. Both Pakistan and Bangladesh have tense relations with India, and China has come out as the strong supporter of an anti-India axis of Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal within the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)<sup>33</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Power and Interest News Report 2005

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Power and Interest News Report 2005

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Power and Interest News Report 2005

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> The Wall Street Journal Asia 2006

<sup>32</sup> New York Times. March 14, 2006

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Power and Interest News Report 2006

#### Conclusion

This paper discussed how and why India and China could act as models of government. It also discussed that these two countries are most likely to inspire government in the developing world because their design innovations are solutions to problems shared in the developing, post-colonial world of emerging democracies. India seems to most likely continue with its model of liberal, representative democracy. Trends point towards innovation in areas of governance related to diverse and large societies with innumerable ethnic, racial, religious, and language identities. On the other hand, PRC has the possibility of leapfrogging into a new political future due to combination of popular will towards participation and the lack of a liberal, representative government.

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# **Whither Democracy?**Reflections on the Prospects of Democracy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century

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"To be rid of our illusions, if it does not break our courage, is a liberating experience."

John Macmurray, Conditions of Freedom. 1949

#### Abstract

From many perspectives, democracy is doing well. When an increasing number of countries elect their governments by universal suffrage and so many pundits exude confidence, what could possibly go wrong? This question is worth exploring, especially in light of Foresight Canada's Rule No. 1<sup>1</sup>, "Context is King!"

Section I asks, "Will democracies as we now know them be able to adapt to the fundamental changes which the 21<sup>st</sup> Century will bring?" Our reluctant conclusion is that they will not.

Section II offers the hope that a fresh understanding of democracy as a developmental human project can create a new path forward. We are hopeful pessimists – hopeful about the ultimate success of the project laid out here, and pessimistic about the ease of the journey.

#### I The Growing Crisis – An Inability to Cope

The situation of humanity in the face of global transformations can be summarized in two sentences: "Societies are unprepared. Governance is ill-equipped." In the main, contemporary governance is obsolete and unable to deal fittingly with rapidly mutating problems and opportunities.

Yehezkel Dror,

The Capacity to Govern,

A Report to the Club of Rome, 1994

It is not obvious that Yehezkel Dror is right. If he were, surely at least one government somewhere in the world would be acting accordingly. It would be making serious investments that (i) prepare its people to see their historical situation afresh and come to understand that the  $21^{st}$  Century will be fundamentally different from the  $20^{th}$ ; (ii) begin to make the profound adaptations the  $21^{st}$  Century will require; and (iii) prepare those who govern to do so in startlingly different ways. The fact that no government is now doing so suggests that Dror is wrong. As we shall see, the fact that so many governments actually think they are now preparing for a changing future suggest that Dror is right. If right, he is tragically right.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Rule No. 1 is "Context is King – the historical conditions set the rules." Rule No. 2 is, "While we are not directly responsible for the condition of the historical conditions, we are responsible for reading the river of change, steering and paddling." Rule No. 3 is, "Humility is warranted; false confidence is fatal."

We now know that cultures die when they cannot sense, think through and cope with fundamentally new developments in their situation in history. Is it possible that *democracies cannot cope* with the emerging conditions of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century? This is the core question.

#### **Democracy as Commonly Understood**

The common understanding of 'democracy' – a form of government in which citizens have the right to choose those who then have the right and obligation to govern. Note that two ambiguities hide here. First, the class of persons recognized as *citizens* may change over time. Second, citizens may choose to be self-governing or to be governed by their chosen representatives.

In spite of the romantic appeal of the self-governing democracies of ancient Athens and the New England colonies, we will set the second ambiguity aside. Few of today's democracies are small and concentrated enough to allow for effective face-to-face governance of the whole community. For the moment, some form of representative democracy is the norm.

Regarding the first, it is clear that over time the class of those who have been included as *citizens* has changed greatly. In 6<sup>th</sup> Century BCE Athens, women and slaves were excluded; adult males included. In 1215, at Runnymede, it did not occur to the King or his Nobles that the franchise the latter were forcibly expanding might ever extend to their peasants, let alone their women.

But we can now see that even in the 13<sup>th</sup> Century, the democratic cat was struggling out of the feudal bag. Then, the individuating pressures that came to define Industrial consciousness and culture were already expressed in Gothic architecture and in the invention of perspective. By the mid-15<sup>th</sup> Century, the printing press demanded literacy. Since reading is an individuating act, the emergence of persons as individuals with inherent dignity and rights was not far behind. This emerging sensibility was both contributor to and further developed by the Reformation and still-life art in the 16<sup>th</sup> Century. In the 17<sup>th</sup>, it was expanded by the rise of science, Shakespeare's plays, Thomas Hobbes' political philosophy and the invention of nation states. By the 18<sup>th</sup> Century, it was generally agreed that *universal suffrage* was the norm. That this phrase meant white men while excluding blacks, women and aboriginals was not lost on the excluded. So the struggle for the franchise continued.

By 1906, Finland included women – among the first to do so. This milestone of human development is rightly celebrated. By the end of the  $20^{th}$  Century, it was generally agreed that only universal suffrage can be deemed to be truly democratic; that all adults have the right to participate in determining who shall rule them.

This last phrase is deliberately blunt. It is meant to stop us and encourage reflection.

The fact is, democracy has come to be defined as *a means of choosing who will govern*. Much less has been said about how those who govern shall behave. In many ways the shift from a Godgiven sovereign to the sovereignty of the people has left us pretty much where our ancestors were – governments still govern; they still perceive, understand, decide and act for us, while citizens still support and obey. We still have little real and effective influence over what they do for or to us. As of old, the behaviour of governments is still largely dependant on the whims and character of those who govern and those who act in their name.

Now it is true that Bills of Rights, Freedom of Information Acts, Ombudsmen and miles of administrative laws have tilted the field of play somewhat towards citizens. But only optimists,

very rich persons and large corporations see the field as at all level. Once in office, there is virtually no way for ordinary citizens to hold a democratic government accountable, short of defeat in the next election. Imagine a marriage in which the only check a wife has on her husband's behaviour is divorce. If her only weapon is the atom bomb of divorce, she is helpless against all incursions into her life, save the most dire. She has no way to stop the little hurts, the ridicule and even abuse. Today, in a liberal democratic society, no self-respecting person would stand for such an arrangement. In this light, it seems strange that we still accept such a relationship with our governments; that we do not expect from them the same recognition, respect and humanity we assume from friends and lovers.

But the fact is we do not have such expectations of our governments. Rather, we concentrate on enabling all adults to determine who will govern in relatively free and fair elections, and then learn to live with the results.

The primary result is that in today's democracies, governments seldom do what a substantial majority of citizens clearly *do not want.* 

What, then, do most citizens *not want*? The overwhelming majority of citizens everywhere do not want their world to be torn asunder or their lives made more harsh and meagre. This visceral, but largely inchoate, desire does not show up on the list of the top-of-mind issues sought by pollsters. But it is very real, nonetheless. It sets an un-crossable line. Beyond this, what all citizens *want* is a better life for themselves and those they love, *as they now imagine it*. This last phrase is crucial.

It is clear to us from over forty years of practice, that when asked about the future, ordinary citizens project a world that is essentially the best that they now know, with the problems airbrushed out and the resulting holes filled with money. It is not merely implausible to the vast majority, it is inconceivable to them, that the future they face could be fundamentally different from the world they now know. Citizens do not escape their inherited cultural frame of reference, mostly because they do not know they have one, let alone what it is.

Put formally as a syllogism, the point is that democracies valorize consensus, while consensus views systematically fail to notice system breaks. It follows that democracies fail to notice system breaks.

In 2006, the inability to stand outside one's culture and view it as one of the many forms human culture has taken over the last 100,000 years is shared by virtually everyone on the planet, including leaders of government and opinion. As a result, democratic politics shares this much with all pre-democratic politics – it is played out within inherited and unconsciously held cultural frames; the core arguments are never about these frames of reference and how they might change and even now may be changing. In short, governments and their citizens are hemmed in by an unseen, but nevertheless effective, fence that marks the space for possible action. Thoughts of profound cultural evolution and transformation are simply a non-starter.

To make matters worse, even though they share a deep cultural frame, as politicians know, real agreement among citizens as to just what 'a better life' includes and excludes is rare. Seldom does a whole population come to a genuine consensus on what they want. As a result, democratic governments and opposition parties invest huge amounts of energy in trying to figure out what combination of goodies will attract a plurality, if not a majority. The not-quite-focussed nature of democratic elections, with their accent on essential continuity, simple solutions and

immediate gratification, is not an accident. It flows from the inability to escape an invisible assumption of Industrial consciousness and culture – life is a function of the production and consumption of goods and services. And this view, in turn, is now greatly influenced by today's media.

This is not the place to explore the effects of modern advertising and global media on our lives. It is enough to note that virtually all advertising reinforces either a pre-adolescent conformity or an adolescent sensibility. The messages are either "Buy it now; everyone else does" or "Indulge and reward yourself now, you are worth it." Note the 'now.' In both cases the future is discounted. Today's media provides little or no support for the emergence of a self-critically self-aware, systems-thinking, gratification-deferring, post-egoist identity. Rather, Industrial societies and their markets need citizens who exhibit either conforming or emotionally adolescent selves.

It is not the least surprising, therefore, that throughout the late-modern Industrial world, retail politics has become a form of marketing. We are no longer citizen-owners of a democratic community, with a responsibility to sustain and even enhance it. Rather, in the name of our democratic rights as citizens whose voice must be heard, we demand our own gratification now. So while pre-modern societies struggle to preserve some form of cultural cohesion, late modern Industrial societies fracture into smaller and smaller groups, each of which becomes a demographic to either pursue or neglect as our leaders plot their strategy to obtain power in the next election. The dream of *all of the people* is fading. Decisions are made by loose coalitions, within the unseen parameters of Industrial consciousness and culture.

The net result is that there is no population of citizens anywhere in the world that is willing to elect a government that runs on any other platform than some version of this one, "Elect us and we will make the world you already know work even better for you." About this, both the Left and the Right are in agreement. What divides them is not the underlying and unconsciously-held societal project, but what is now to be included as 'better' and who is to be included in 'you'.

The hard reality is that the capacity of today's democratic governments to sense, think through and cope with profound and traumatizing conditions that require a cultural transformation is virtually nil. There simply is no market for such heroic history-altering action in either identity-based conformity or the adolescent retail politics of the early 21<sup>st</sup> Century. As one Alberta politician puts it, "*Politicians don't lead parades, they join them.*"

When the times require behaviours from us as citizens that are seen to be both difficult and unattractive by most, then the prospects for democracy are not bright. In saying this, we are not casting aspersions on ordinary citizens or suggesting that  $2^{nd}$  order, reflexive, self-critical consciousness and thought is easily achieved. It is not. But both the novelty and difficulty of such awareness strengthen our argument.

Put formally, the central thesis of this paper is this:

As long as democracy entails a universal franchise and most adults continue to live within and by unseen and unconsciously held late modern Industrial assumptions, there is little prospect that democratically elected governments will be able to cope with emerging conditions that would require us to deviate substantially from the ways of seeing, thinking and living with which we are deeply familiar. If the 21<sup>st</sup> Century demands such novelty, democracies are in deep trouble.

So the most important question becomes, "Is the 21st Century truly a time of profound, historyaltering cultural change, evolution and transformation?"

#### The Emerging Character and Requirements of the 21st Century

In our view, the 21<sup>st</sup> Century is and will be such a time. Any version of business as usual will no longer do.

What follows draws upon a Foresight Canada 2005 foresight research report.<sup>2</sup> It set out two essential messages. One is good news, the other is not.

First the bad news: The global changes now washing over us and all persons are far more profound than is commonly understood. Ours is one of the few periods of history during which a truly history-altering cultural mutation and deviation is  $^3$  slowly taking place. Therefore, it is increasingly likely that the future for which Canada $^4$  and other OECD nations are planning – a future that essentially extends Industrial Culture and consciousness to the ends of the earth – will not be the actual future we will get.

Now the good news: There is opportunity here. It is possible for Canada (or Finland or...) to become the most influential mid-sized nation in the world, if we could come to commit ourselves to the new work of understanding and capitalizing on the long-term societal change, evolution and transformation in which we now find ourselves in ways that no nation now advocates or practices. Canada (or Finland or...) can become the world's first 21<sup>st</sup> Century nation – the leading country that is aligning all that we are and do with the best that we are coming to know about the nature of evolution, truth, authority, persons, communities, science, wealth creation and reality itself.

It follows that the most pressing strategic question that emerges from this paper is this:

"Is the official reading of history: that we face an essentially familiar future – a reading that underlies and informs virtually all intention, action and planning in every sector of Canadian, indeed Western society – grounded and sound or is it an understandable, but future-threatening, case of overshoot – continuing to believe and behave as we have in the past long after the conditions that justified such behaviour have changed?"

The threat of this question is deepened by the fact that, as of now, we in Canada have no basis for deciding – other than our cultural biases and personal convictions. The reason is that it is no one's ongoing responsibility to ask, explore or answer this question with authority. In fact, we

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Strategic Opportunities and Challenges Facing Canada and the World in the Early 21<sup>st</sup> Century, Ruben Nelson and David Harries, Foresight Canada, July, 2005. Not yet released as a publication.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The verb is critical. Central to our claim is that we are already 200 years into a cultural transformation that will take another 200 years to play out and that, as whole societies, we are not yet aware of this fact. Think of living in Europe in 1400, a time we now call the Renaissance. Given the changes in human consciousness and technology that had already taken place, we can now see that it was only a matter of time before what we call an Industrial culture would emerge. Yet, no one ran around in the 15th Century claiming to live at the birth of a new age. The old realities were too obvious and the new almost wholly invisible to 15th Century eyes. So it is with us.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> What is said here of Canada, for good and ill, can also be said of most late-modern societies. The strategic opportunities and threats of this moment of history are democratic – they include us all. We speak only of Canada. We do not presume to speak for others. However, we know that there are tens of millions of citizens who would welcome our acknowledgement of the character of this moment in history.

know of no research centre anywhere in the world that is charged with responsibility for understanding and shedding light on what we call the *cultural framing question*. Nowhere is there a government that takes this question with the seriousness that it deserves. All assume that a *better* version of what they already are, will serve them well tomorrow. Try as we might, we found no example of officially sanctioned futures researchers who were grappling in a sustained way with what we call the *cultural framing* question. No scan suggests that our cultural project may need to change in the face of long-term profound societal change, evolution and transformation. Indeed, most scans do not even attend to changes in human consciousness. This underlying issue is also absent from all of the many lists of the top ten or twenty problems facing us in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

We observe that the future of humankind depends on the positive outcomes to three great uncertainties – two of which are clearly in our own minds, hearts and hands to determine. Asked as questions, they are:

- (1) Will the core project that informs and animates whole societies remain as it is now or will a new cultural project emerge? Our point is that this question is not a live question in any society. Rather, the vast majority of future-oriented work assumes and does not challenge the deeply held cultural project of its own society. When they say, "Our way of life is not negotiable", both bin Laden and George W Bush speak for virtually all 6.5 billion of us. Even 'sustainable development' is becoming code for, "How do we keep the present game going?" To this end all else is sacrificed.
- (2) How generous will the physical environment of the planet be to humankind? That the generosity of the planet has been a critical factor in the success of Homo Sapiens is beyond doubt. What is not clear is how much longer this will be the case and the degree to which this question is in our hands. The fact is, it may already be too late. But if it is not, then human action may yet be effective. While we do not despise what is being done today, we note that everywhere it lacks any widely-supported sense of urgency. The message from every democratic government to its citizens is still, "We have work to do, but there is no need to disturb our lives. So sleep on while those of us in authority fix what is wrong." There is no question in our mind that this will change. However the timing is open for speculation will it be before or after the evidence for global or continental ecological disaster is unmistakable?
- (3) Will the quality of leadership offered by powerful and influential nations be informed by 20<sup>th</sup> or 21<sup>st</sup> Century realities? Given the above, it is not surprising that no country, as yet, is led by persons who grasp, have digested and welcome the fact that ours is one of those few times in human history during which a truly profound deviation from the established societal norm is taking place. This is even less surprising, given that no generation of leaders, anywhere, has been raised with this instruction, "Remember, when you are in mid-life, at the height of your capabilities, you will have to learn to do something no generation has ever done before see the whole set of cultural presuppositions on the basis of which your achievements rest and evaluate their adequacy to your future in light of the changes that are taking place both within and around you."

Rather, everywhere, our leaders speak of tomorrow, while their dreams and those of their citizens, are shaped by the concepts, metaphors, logic and assumptions of yesterday. This cross-threading between the future our leaders offer and the one actually emerging among us is, in our view, the source of much of the distrust, distress, dissatisfaction and mental illness that is becoming a world-wide phenomenon. While citizens cannot articulate clearly what

they want, the intuition is growing everywhere that "something has gone wrong". While many can and do achieve brave things in small pieces, such accomplishments do not and cannot add up to an adequate response to the strategic challenges of our times.

We have said that as it stands today, no culture, including our own, has the capacity to see, think through and act coherently as a culture in the face of the conditions that are emerging within and around us. Rather, every country is still trying to force the new wine of its emerging situation into the old wineskins of its existing culture. As things stand now, no culture has been, or is, prepared for profound change that is emergent and non-linear. To the extent that ours is a time of such change, we, too, are unprepared.

However, if ours is a rare time of profound societal change and we are becoming aware of this fact, then this knowledge creates obligations – as knowledge has always done. As the American poet, Drew Dellinger, says in his *Hieroglyphic Stairway*, "What did you do once you knew?"

So we face a truly strategic challenge: If it is no longer acceptable to assume and work within the familiar and comforting cultural frame of reference of Industrial consciousness and culture, what is to be done?

In our view, it is this: At least one country must take up the work of becoming the first nation to openly transform itself into a truly post-Industrial society and economy. This will involve exploring, mapping and learning to utilize the emerging metaphors, logics and frames of reference that are even now transforming us. In Canada this is defined as the *Creating Tomorrow Foundation Challenge*. Which country will be the first to take it up?

Tragically, if we continue to engage in our normal democratic behaviour – waiting until the signs of profound societal and environmental change have become so obvious any one can see them – there will not likely be time to save human existence as reasonably prosperous, graceful and humane.

In light of all of the above, it appears that, unfortunately, Yehezkel Dror is far closer to the mark than any democratic government would have us believe. Sadly, neither ethnically-based identity politics, nor those of modern retail democracy have the capacity to accurately assess our place in history or to lead us, first, into the truth about it and then through the pain and despair of the desert of that truth into a truly new and more promising future. Rather, if you scratch under the paint of the brave talk of innovation and change, you find an age-old conviction, "We can compete our way to the future through more innovation; that a better version of what we already are we serve our tomorrows well." Would that this were true; tragically, it is not.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> See www.creatingtomorrow.ca

#### II Democracy as a Developmental Project

The only way to grow is up!

Michael Nelson
1980

We introduce this Section by summarizing our argument with a different metaphor. For the first time in history, the conditions we in the West face require that, as whole societies, we grow up into a full adult maturity. As societies it is no longer enough for some to achieve a deep maturity in a society that is overwhelmingly pre-adolescent or adolescent in its dominant consciousness, thought and behaviour. Rather, the 21<sup>st</sup> Century requires that we develop an ever-deeper personal and societal maturity – to the point that we become self-critically self-aware. Only a self-critically, self-aware post-egoistic and gratification deferring consciousness is able to even make sense of, let alone respond to, the culture-frame breaking conditions that are emerging in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Sadly, today, no society meets this standard; to our knowledge none yet aspires to it.

Given the inability of democracies as we now know them to cope with profound historic change, a new understanding of democracy is needed. The transformation we require will include, transcend and transform, rather than replace, our established understandings. Our commitment will still to a universal adult franchise remains; but this feature will no longer be definitive of democracy.

Put simply, the human journey, both individual and societal, can be seen as moving from dependence with its core virtue of conformity, to independence with its core virtue of freedom, to interdependence with its core virtue of mutual respect informed by self-critical awareness.

Mutual respect is that quality of human consciousness, thought and conduct that senses, acknowledges, includes, attends to and responds to an "other" appropriately – for who or what it truly has been, is and can yet become. Respect entails a future-orientation. In the face of respect, all life flourishes; as persons we are truly alive. When respect is withheld, we wither. In a world as dynamic and complex as ours, only a self-critically, self-aware mutual respect will do.

If we re-conceive democracy as a historic developmental project that tracks this journey, what will follow?

- Mutual respect, informed by self-critical self awareness, will be seen as the new heart of
  democracy. Developing these capacities will be seen not only an inherently good thing to
  do, but, as we have seen, as an achievement that is required of us if the human species is
  to survive beyond and thrive throughout the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.
- Democracy will be seen as a capacity of human persons, groups, societies and cultures
  that admits of degrees. We can speak of more or less democratic situations and of shallow vs. deep democracies. The point of human development is to always be moving towards the latter. So our families, communities, churches and corporations can be properly
  said to be more or less democratic to the degree they are more or less respectful and selfcritically aware.

- An ever-deeper democracy will be accepted as both the source of and a requirement for human life that is full and truly sustainable. It is a necessary condition, a sine qua non. In this light, the development of a "freedom-loving people" is an achievement to be honoured. But, contrary to our present imagination of our work of history, it is not the end of the road. The new work this new century requires of us is that of transforming ourselves from freedom-loving to mutually respectful and self-aware people.
- All democracies will be judged by the degree to which all of its processes, relationships, action, patterns of thought and perceptions in every area of life are respectful both public and private. It may not sound like much to say that henceforth we will *respect*, rather than *protect*, the environment or that nurturing human *respect*, rather than demanding human *rights*, will now be our focus. However, these shifts are as transforming as learning to call adult females *women*, rather than *chicks*.
- As with persons, we will expect every society to be democratic in a way that is consistent with its present stage of development on the overarching human journey. As with persons, no society will be encouraged to forever be just what they already are. As with persons, all societies will be called and expected to engage in the continuing work of moving on towards a stage of maturity which they have not yet achieved. As with persons, we will be more concerned with the direction of the journey than the speed of progress, and we will be alert to the dangers of trying to move too quickly.
- The work of becoming more democratic will never be done. An ever deeper democracy can always be achieved if we will but do the work and pay the price.

These things are easy to say, but we know of no nation or international development body that is now able to shape its foreign or internal development policy, let alone its social and economic policy, in these terms.

#### **Closing Comments**

These, then, are core elements in our historical situation, as we see it:

Relative to our stage of development as human beings and whole cultures, the evidence is growing that the 21<sup>st</sup> Century will be more demanding of us than any in history. In 2006, there are 6.4 billion persons on Earth who through no fault of their own still overwhelmingly expect and are working for a future that cannot be achieved. By and large, their leaders share their illusions. We are, truly *in over our heads* and well beyond, "*Houston, we have a problem.*"

Our situation is dangerous. However, the human story need not end in tragedy. It is neither mysterious nor surprising that up to now no civilization has ever been able to see, let alone alter, its most deeply held unconscious assumptions about itself and the world around it. Few have even been faced with this challenge as a requirement for their continued survival. To date, all who have; have failed. Consider that there is no warrant in any spiritual or intellectual tradition for accepting responsibility for shaping the on-going evolution of one's whole culture. Rather, every tradition assumes the culture and teaches humane living within it. We are urged to *feed the hungry* and *clothe the naked*. For most, even the thought of accepting human responsibility for the on-going evolution of the culture is not merely unthinkable; it is heretical and ungodly.

Nevertheless, our situation is not hopeless. As noted above, while it is not widely understood, we are already 200 years into the work of transforming and moving beyond Industrial consciousness and culture. A new sensibility can be seen in dozens of places, including the philosophy of science, post-Newtonian science, modern liberation struggles, hermeneutics, humanistic psychology, literary criticism and intimate human relations. Tens of millions of people are already struggling out of their inherited world-views and committing themselves to the journey of living as co-creators of their own bodies, lives, families, communities and cultures. That there is no robust infrastructure to support this work globally, only points to work to be done; that none of us know how to "do whole countries" only means that as with NASA in 1961, we must learn our way into the future.

In order to sustain hope, the *Creating Tomorrow Foundation Challenge* must be embraced – by 2020 at least one country must openly, knowingly and responsibly have committed to the journey of becoming more deeply democratic; and this commitment will be seen as a major dimension of being the pathfinder of the future – the world's first country to align itself with the emerging character and requirements of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. That at least one country will make this commitment, we are confident. But which it will be is unknown. Is taking up this challenge your work and calling? We hope so. It is ours.

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# Futurists as Pioneers in Handling Participativity and Aggression in a Post-Socialist Democracy

#### Erzsébet Nováky – István Kappéter

#### **Abstract**

In the 20th century the key-problem of the democratic development was the equal participation of women and men. In the 21st century the main tasks of democracy are the increase of collaborated participation of laymen as well as specialists and balanced handling of aggression. The Eastern-Central European, especially the Hungarian experience shows that in countries where during national socialist and communist dictatorships the majority lost civil moral, the opportunity to reorganize parliamentarian democracy is not enough. New methods are needed to rebuild democracy.

In the course of finding new ways the experience of futurists and psychiatrists can be utilized. Futurists can help to increase the future orientation of laymen and can ensure the prevalence of democratic principles by developing and using participatory methods in the outlining and creating future alternatives. By applying methods elaborated by psychiatrists in caring for "difficult persons" futurists can contribute to the human and effective handling of aggression present in our society.

The study reports on some Hungarian results in the field of participativity and on the handling of aggression. We saw that participation increased the involvement of wider public in exploring and creating the future. As a result, the process itself becomes more democratic and the final outcome reflects better the stakeholders' preferences and the probability of realization increases. In psychiatry it is obvious that mentally ill people are not essentially different from other human beings. All beings have to use constructive aggression in social life, and people cannot handle each other without constructive aggression.

#### The brief history of Central-Eastern European countries

The multinational troops of the Austrian, Russian and Prussian Empires won over the bourgeois army of Napoleon. Still the revolutionary ideas of freedom, fraternity and especially the exigency of creating independent nations as communities speaking their own languages had a great influence. After 1848 in Hungary and in the whole region there was a great demand to get rid of the Middle Ages bounds and to create civic nation states. Revolutions and reformist movements were the means used to achieve these aims but finally agreements were reached with the heads of empires and their supporters. In many countries cooperation between the royal families having greater international experience and familial relationships with each other and the democratic parliaments representing the bourgeoisie of their own countries were established.

The bourgeois class increased in wealth due to the developing industry and trade and thus at the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup>-20<sup>th</sup> century they did not wish for revolutionary changes but rather enjoyed their status in the residing peaceful order. However, the industrial age worsened the situation of the already poor, especially workers and poor peasants, whose circumstances became even more miserable than it had been in the Middle Ages. Safety of life and property based on Christian

values, that provided an acceptable life even for peasants, was gone. In order to lay aside intensifying workers' movements, which were getting stronger and stronger, the powerful states led the world into a world war.

After the World War I in the least developed empire, namely Russia the less diligent masses led by communist intellectuals won over, reviving the traditions of old Eastern dictatorships accompanied by modern tools. The international intellectuals were not popular and thus Stalin sent them away and he created a cruel dictatorship. In the communist era many could live reasonably well with relatively little work, "only" the opposition and some ethnics were handled mercilessly and innovators were suppressed. The Western great powers created a peace that they believed would save them from the communist influence as well as hinder the cooperation among small nations. They supported Hitler who while talking about the communist enemy, created a dictatorship very much similar to the communist one. The German military potential was more dangerous than the Soviet one and finally during World War II the Western powers could only win over Hitler by cooperating with the communist army.

After the World War II, our region became dominated by the USSR. Theoretically, small states reserved their independence but in practice the Soviet management service directly controlled all areas of life with great violation. As this was hard to bear, in 1953 Germans rebelled. They were taken over. In 1956 the Polish could change the dictatorship a little in their country and make it more human. Having seen this example, in Hungary all ethnic groups and all social classes cooperated to wipe the communist system out of the country. The revolution of 1956 was an enthusiastic cooperation of the Hungarian nation so that everybody who participated gained hope in people. It seemed that real democracy without suppression could be realized. But Soviet leaders could not tolerate giving independence so the revolution was defeated with great forces. In Western countries, only the general public was great admirer of this war of independence, the leaders did not offer help, they only accepted refugees. In 1968 the Czechoslovak leaders tried to reform the communist dictatorship, but they also had to yield to military forces. After 1956 the Hungarian communists cruelly vindicated the revolutionists, but at the same time they started to consider the situation of the majority and intended to offer acceptable conditions, they were more appreciative with the more intelligent subjects who were ready to learn.

The revolutionary youth of the 1960s was convinced both in the West and in the East that revolting can only cause problems while opportunism can provide a relatively comfortable life. Overlooking corruption here and there became the norm.

From the 1970s the internal economic weakening of the USSR made it possible for the citizens of the states under its control to take some careful steps of independence and look for relations at civil democracies. In Yugoslavia the systematic killing of Hungarians ceased, as in the opposition of Croats and Serbs within the confederation both of them tried to win the Hungarians as partners. In Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Soviet-Ukraine the use of Hungarian language was not forbidden anymore and it was allowed for Hungarians to make their better living at their original residences. The conditions were imposed, however one could not speak about former cruelties and had to acknowledge that communists got special treatment. In the USSR the anti-democratic circumstances were less and less tolerated by masses. Leaders recognized that the former politics could not be continued. They gave up the communist order, their only ambitions were to maintain their favourable economic situation.

After 1990 the controlled states, among them Hungary as first, regained their independence in an essentially peaceful way. The citizens of these states had gained some superficial information

about market economies and they imagined it to be better than it really was. *The transition caused huge disillusionment in all European ex-socialist countries*. Due to its internal conflicts Yugoslavia fell apart, lived through genocides and later American bombardments. *The traditional form of democracy was introduced in all Central-Eastern-European countries, it gave greater independency but life did not improve for the majority of the population and it also turned out that they did not profit from it.* 

#### The birth of futures studies in socialist countries

In socialist countries leaders tried to secure economic development by strict planning. *These plans were always created without consulting stakeholders*. Planned economy as it was called was very rigid and did not provide the possibility to answer questions regarding long-term consequences.

In the 1960s all around the world a greater attention was paid towards the future: how can we solve the globalising social, economic and environmental problems? Scientists coming from different academic backgrounds started to deal with the short- and long-term future, searching for ways to answer the increasing problems of today. In more and more countries groups of scientists – so called futurists – dealing with the future professionally were emerging. Using scientific tools they analysed the theoretical and methodological questions of exploring the future, they analysed important tendencies shaping the future and possible alternatives of social-economic changes: outlining catastrophe-type scenarios as well as acceptable and desired ones. The catastrophic versions attracted greater attention than the ones pointing towards positive changes, but still the world did not respond to this call for change dynamically enough.

In Hungary, futures studies emerged relatively soon. Professor *Géza Kovács* offered for his students his first seminars dealing with scientific research of future alternatives in 1968, the same year when the Club of Rome started its activities in the futures field. From this seminar developed the Group on Futurology, where the world models of the Club of Rome were analyzed (drawing consequences related to Hungarian development), possible future trends and processes were explored (with special attention to the human creative factor) and in the 1970s possible future images for Hungary by the end of the millennium were outlined.

After many structural changes independent Futures Studies Department was founded at the Corvinus University of Budapest directed by *Erzsébet Nováky* in 1992. Still, there are uncertainties among university teachers concerning the scientific status of futures studies, but students recognise its importance and acknowledge its status; furthermore many of them pursue futures studies and some even chose to become futurists themselves.

The Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) founded in 1825 reserved its respect during all the different regimes. Within the IX<sup>th</sup> Section of Economics and Law – including sociology, demography, political and military sciences at the HAS – the Committee on Future Research was founded in 1976, which clearly reflected that Hungarian scientific circles approved of futures studies and acknowledged it as a scientific field. The Committee on Future Research of the HAS is the highest level association of Hungarian researchers and educators working in the field of futures. Its aim is to strengthen future-oriented thinking in Hungary and to support the foundation and the work of the creative community of futurists based on common responsibility and cooperation for the future.

In many other European socialist countries the emergence of futures studies could be observed in the late 1960s, early 1970s. At the turn of the millennium we have analysed in retrospective the characteristics of futures studies in the European ex-Socialist countries (*Nováky, Ramba-Varga, Kőszegi-Kalas*, 2001).

# Recognising the importance of participation and dealing with aggression in democratic systems

We still have memories how a rather democratic system in Hungary could not resist the power of Nazi dictatorship between 1940 and 1945. After the fall of the USSR in 1990, the system once again became democratic. Based on our historic experiences we could not keep the illusion that a civil democratic system can provide an acceptable life for all the population of the country.

The traditional scientific tools futurists used to draw up the future and its possible alternatives were not strong enough anymore. There was an evident need for change in our way of thinking and our line of development. The most important factor seemed to be the involvement of stakeholders in the process of creating future alternatives in order to provide personally, professionally and emotionally acceptable images of the future. It also became evident that on the one hand democratic transition does not guarantee a safety belt against destructive aggression while on the other hand constructive aggression was not accepted no matter how important it is in saving our natural resources which are indispensable for us to live as well as our other resources which could provide an agreeable lifestyle for us.

We have discovered the importance of linking participativity with dealing with aggression while analysing educational alternatives. Parliamentary democracy cannot keep under control the masses having lost their religious and moral values, and while got used to being taken care by the state. Corruption and other means of destructive aggression sustain a situation where poverty of a significant part of the population is increasing. Those who cannot find work because of not being used to creative work or because they were forced to abandon it, make life unsupportable through their violent and illegal activities. The control of the central authority is not coherent, it is unnecessarily malignant and vengeful but not effective against poverty, while on the other hand it cannot confront those who got illegally rich.

We are pleased to see that young people enthusiastically study futures studies and that we can educate them through active involvement in the formation of future alternatives. We have followed the tradition of our department: to analyse with special attention to the human approach. One of us, István Kappéter, who has been studying professions dealing with psychic functioning since 1950 and has gained great experience in treating and rehabilitating patients with grave psychotic illnesses, joined the futurist work at the department in 1991. He was pleased to have this opportunity, as during his psychiatric and rehabilitating work he has experienced that balanced interest in the future is a key-factor for psychic health, and that the psychological and psychiatric problems are more and more important for humankind. Futurists recognised that the future is mainly shaped by humans and thus Erzsébet Nováky were pleased to cooperate with a psychiatrist who considers the analysis of possible future alternatives important. We recognised the importance of future-orientation in mental health. (Nováky-Hideg-Kappéter, 1994). We promoted for other futurists to recognise the importance of non-conscious human actions that affect the future to a large extent.

# About participatory futures studies and its Hungarian results

In futures studies participativity means (*Nováky*, 2004) forming possible future alternatives together with all stakeholders (futurists, experts, future-oriented non-academics, NGOs and TNCs), whose future is researched, who are expected to contribute to its realization and finally who are expected to live in the future shaped through this process. Without knowing their opinion about the present and their expectations towards the future, a futurist only works for his/her own drawer and can not fulfil its profession: guiding the future image of the society and its different groups in a positive direction. For this reason futurists cooperate with different groups of the society. In this process futurists need to be open to non-professionals, to their problems, questions and ideas concerning the future, and futurists need to take their expectations into consideration when outlining possible future alternatives. While non-professionals need to trust futurists that they will truly pay attention to their opinions and use their creative ideas. They believe that future alternatives will be more grounded due to this cooperation.

The opinion and the expectations of the public concerning the future are in the focus of forecasting activities as today we are living in an instable period. Ex-socialist countries are in the hard process of transition, while their citizens are learning the rules of democracy. On the whole globe we are expecting to see important and partly dangerous environmental and social changes. Thus there is a great instability and there are many reasons for uncertainty. *People tend to recognise that they need to get involved in the shaping of their future to a greater extent.* More and more of them *claim participation* (for example through movements) and many of them are also ready to do the work for this.

Based on the expectation of individuals and smaller and bigger communities the role of subjective factors shaping the future has increased. The development tendencies evaluated by using classical forecasting methods and objective data are not straightforward as both external and internal conditions are instable. Thus greater attention should be paid to forces and motivating factors embedded in individuals, civil organisations, local leaderships and movements. It is also important to explore how these forces react to instability, to what extent they want to influence their own future and that of their environment, to what extent they are willing and able to plan the future, devote time and energy to it and if they are capable of forming useful future alternatives. We can gain information about their ideas through getting to know how these individuals and communities interpret reality and what kind of future expectations they have. In using participatory methods we can get a new and efficient form due to the developments and networks enabling the direct flow of information.

It is logical to suppose that in the future stable periods will be even less frequent. Throughout history changes have become deeper and more radical. Expectedly the pace of changes is going to grow in the future and thus the role of participative futures studies will increase. Based on intensified changes those analytical-forecasting methods excluding the participation of non-experts are not suitable anymore. All of us need to learn how to live in a dynamically changing world, adapt to new situations and to the evolution of diversity. Futurists as well as non-experts need to articulate their ideas about the future more professionally and they need to cooperate in harmony to improve the future in order to make decision-makers accept the results of futures studies.

In Hungary the methods of participatory futures studies have been successfully implemented in various fields: first in the years 1995-96 in the field of education and vocational training; later in the field of regional development where the process of grounding regional development projects of a small region and a city was aided by these methods; finally long-range future alternatives of national social-economic development were also outlined.

Education is our common responsibility – including students, parents, teachers and other employees. We teach our students how to make value judgments and form their future expectations. Many of them do not choose the profession of futurist but anyhow they will need the knowledge of how to form future alternatives and strategies. In the field of Hungarian vocational training alternatives and variants of the future were defined by using participatory future methods (Hideg-Nováky, 1998). In this process functional actors of the vocational system were asked about how they think about the present and future of vocational training. Also local experts, namely teachers working in vocational schools were asked to take part in a two-round experts' survey. As a next step we processed all the incoming professional and non-professional opinions (based on a representative sample) separately with the aim of exploring the differences in the participants' opinion. Based on this we defined a "characteristic" opinion for each group. Then we analysed the results to find the logical equivalences, similarities and differences within the future alternatives in order to connect them in a network based on the most important factors for the future of vocational training (educational system and its functioning, the content of training, labour market competencies, etc.). Regarding the development of Hungarian vocational training complex alternatives and variants were defined based on this network of factors. As an outcome of the participatory methods, two main alternatives for the future of vocational training were articulated: according to the first one, education is a leading force, while the second one describes a rather adapting educational structure.

The public Delphi method was used to collect opinions from the population about the implementation of *the regional development plan of a small region* – a settlement called Tuzsér and a small region called Felső-Szabolcs (*Nováky*, 2000) – and *a town* called Kiskunfélegyháza (*Nováky*, 2003). Our aim in both cases was to involve local inhabitants who felt responsibility for the future of their dwelling environment. In the settlement the answer rate of questionnaires was 30%, while it reached 75% in the town, which deserves attention as it was achieved thanks to long discussions with participants and not by offering extra reward.

Regarding the outcomes of the questionnaires dealing with forecasting of the small region's future, we have developed three consecutive questionnaires in which we listed different possible events of the future. Among them only few events were regarded as probable in the short-term future and most of them were economic. Most events including economic, social, technological and ecological ones were forecasted to happen within the next 25 years. Based on these opinions expressed on the grass-root level three types of alternatives were defined: an economic development type, a social development type and a social-economic development type. None of these options induced enthusiasm or a will to cooperate among non-professional individuals.

In the public Delphi process developed for exploring the town's future, we involved a phase for evaluating the present situation. In the first round we asked participants to evaluate economic processes from three aspects: from global, European and at national level that influence the development of the town in question. The work of the local government and the civil sphere were also included in the evaluation. We confronted subjective personal expectations and opinions about local living conditions in order to outline development alternatives. We have finally come up with four different scenarios: the alternative of successful future, the alternative of low self-

respect, the alternative of hope and the alternative of unsuccessful future. The commitment of inhabitants towards these alternatives is clearly reflected by the given titles.

It is proved that in both surveys the remarks, suggestions and articulated future expectations coming from the grass-root level had contributed to the definition of the development plans to a great extent. Especially in the field of natural environment interest and anxiousness were expressed and at the same time innovative suggestions were given which even contained new elements for official establishments. Unfortunately, many of the inhabitants involved in the surveyed felt rather helpless in contributing to the development of the region but they trusted municipalities to be competent enough to flourish these regions.

Participatory futures methods were also used to create *acceptable future alternatives of the Hungarian social-economic development* (*Nováky*, 2001). The main characteristic of the method applied is that we consciously linked objective possibilities with subjective wishes searching for acceptable and unacceptable scenarios of the future: we explored the relations between possible future trends defined by current economic and political developments and the anticipations and expectations of individuals and social institutions. Concerning the theoretical framework we applied a combined approach: on the one hand the top  $\rightarrow$  down approach was introduced (based on processes of policy and economy) and on the other hand the bottom  $\rightarrow$  up approach was used (based on the attitude of individuals and social institutions towards the future). It had enabled us to analyse the possibilities offered by the economic and political conditions and those articulated by anticipations and expectations parallel.

The outcomes obtained by applying the participatory futures methods were directly used in order to motivate the future-shaping activities of stakeholders, increase their consciousness and harmonize their actions. It gave them the feeling that they are not isolated as other share similar problems and act in a similar way. By using these methods more people were involved in the decision-making process so those making decisions and those living in the created reality came closer to each other. Thus the quality of decision-making is expected to improve as the public feels a greater motivation while decision-makers are more aware of their responsibility of making decisions and implementing these tasks. In our opinion the gained results can be used indirectly in order to develop the future of a broader environment as well as grass-root ideas and activities have an impact on the future of the broader environment and influence other groups as well.

In both cases of exploring the future of vocational training and acceptable social-economic alternatives, the information provided by professional and non-professional groups could be connected organically while avoiding the loss or reduction of information coming from either group. In the projects of regional development futurists did not intervene as professionals in the future work involving non-professionals in order to get acceptable answers (as this intervention would have changed opinions). The reason for this can be found in the responsible attitude of grass-root level participants and in the characteristic of participatory method, namely that it can effectively contribute to the exploration of the future (*Nováky*, 2006).

# The importance of dealing with aggression in democracies

In the 20<sup>th</sup> century dealing with aggression was not handled properly. The situation is also bad in civil democracies. As it is very well known we meet destructive aggression on a daily basis. According to a 1998 survey in the USA it was proved that 80% of population had suffered destructive aggression in his/her life. This proportion is expected to worsen. The situation is even worse in former socialist countries.

On the base of practical experience as nurse, as special teacher and as psychiatrist one of us, István Kappéter experienced that the mentally ill people and the so called normal people are not so different they are thought. He realised that it is a great error that people having not experiences with mentally ill ones believe that mentally ill people cannot be influenced by normal methods. People generally think that we must not be aggressive with mentally ill people because they do not know what they do, the aggressions will not have any effect on them. They believe that for mentally ill people need only medicines and then they will be nice and inactive participants of the societies. It is true that today we have a lot of effective medicines those diminish psychotic tensions, but the medicines can never change the personality. The combined method of ancient milieu therapy (providing interesting work and normal-like living of lives for the patients and different group and individual psychotherapies based on psychoanalytic concepts which means that we accept constructive aggressions of the patients and we use also constructive aggressions with them without hurting their human dignity) help most of the mentally ill people to live practically normal lives. We have to realise that the ones who try to treat mentally ill people without aggression and to educate children without aggression are naïve and cause a lot of dangers (Kappéter, 1996, Hárdi, 2000). It does not mean that we have to be cruel and are allowed to give place for our unconscious unnecessary revenges.

The twofold measure in jurisdiction, which had had a very human idea to protect children and mentally ill causes its inefficiency. Those being "acquitted" for crimes they committed in a condition deteriorated by the psychosis could not know how long their isolation would last, and they have not enough legal protection. The majority of criminals are hated as if they were enemy, and are treated without enough empathy. The usual jails have much more bad than useful effects; the death penalty does not have enough impact. Even if it is much more expensive, it is still a necessity to build up a quite new system of jurisdiction.

After the terror attacks of 11<sup>th</sup> September, 2001 *there was a great debate on terrorism and aggression on the World Futures Studies Federation listserv*. In this debate very much opposing opinions were expressed. Everybody promoted a different opinion about what should be done and everybody could present strong arguments in his/her favour. We suggested applying in the same series the methods that are used in psychiatry against aggression. The first step is to let the relatives of victims to mourn. Authorities should do all the necessary preventive actions to render terrorists attacks more difficult. It is also indispensable to apply all reasonable aggression in order to prevent terrorists from planning and realizing such attacks. However, it is very important not to let unconscious revengeful guide us but rather our professional knowledge in order to impose effective, nevertheless kind controls. Only after using the above mentioned measures, we can begin to convince terrorists and those fighting against terrorism about our good will, and then we have to start to analyse the reasons of the terrorist attack. As a next step *with love and humanity we have to educate terrorists to try to reach their aims, which they feel are justified, not through terrorist actions, but by other methods.* Finally, we have to develop an educational system that does not educate youth to become terrorists (*Kappéter*, 2003).

We must not be so naïve that to try to control terrorist attacks without aggression. But we must not be so naïve that to hope to put an end of terrorism by killing all the terrorists. We must no more be so naïve to believe that we will be able to differentiate mentally ill ones and treat them without the help of experts order-maintaining authorities. It is a fact that less and less neurotic patients occur, and more and more patients with anxious disorders, and with borderline personality disorders occur, and not even the best psychiatrists can say whether who among them is mentally ill, who is only problematic. And these people are more dangerous than the neurotic ones. In addition the assertion of human rights of mentally ill people is much worse than that of the criminals or terrorists.

Ervin László, founder and leader of the Club of Budapest, which originates in the Club of Rome but takes a more practical approach, *has also recognised how badly aggression is handled today*. He also sees that we have to do everything in order to get rid of terrorism, but that it cannot be realised through counter-terrorism. Counter-terrorism can only motivate more people to take the place of died terrorists.

A special effective solution for treating aggression is offered by an emerging and enforcing school of psychiatry, the dynamic psychiatry. This school of psychiatry is willing to undertake the treatment of those suffering not obviously from mental disorders, and nevertheless they cause suffering to others. The dynamic psychiatrists apply the psychoanalytic method initiated by *Sigmund Freud* at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and the milieu-therapy that has been around for sever thousands years, dynamically adapting to the needs of patients and the social conditions. Their results are better than those of traditional psychiatrists in the field of treating and rehabilitating schizophrenic and affective psychotic patients. They undertake the treatment of borderline personality disorders and addictive problems with very good results (*Ammon*, 1994). Among them, some have treated criminals and groups of Jews and Palestinians in England with good results: participants were coming to understanding and loving each other. In Israel two psychologist women were able to treat 13-15 years old children whose aim had been to die as a martyr for the sake of their nation, and they wee able to convince this children that they will be able to fight with nicer methods and gave up looking for martyrdom.

# Conclusion

- 1. In Central-Eastern Europe the economic, social and political circumstances various times changed and its peoples suffered a lot.
- 2. After 1990 we live in democracies, but most of us are disappointed.
- 3. The destroyed civic moral inhibits the beneficial usage of parliamentarian democracy.
- 4. Everyday people have become able to articulate its ideas about the future and are willing to participate in the process of future creation.
- 5. Due to participativity, the future shaping became more democratic and more useful forecasts can be made.
- 6. All living beings need constructive aggression.
- 7. Greater and greater is criminality, its controlling is hindered by the measures (ie. one for mentally ill people, and another for others).
- 8. A time order of handling terrorists with constructive and not cruel aggression at the beginning and educating and healing them later has been proposing.
- 9. Psychiatrists and futurists have to collaborate.

We find it justified that the cooperation between professionals working in the field of psyche and professionals working in futures research is mutually beneficial. *The economist futurists can elaborate what are the necessities for humankind to live further, and the psychiatrist futurists can elaborate what kind of constructive aggressions are needed to realise them.* The cooperation of the two fields is inevitable both about participativity and aggression (*Kappéter-Nováky*, 2002). This cooperation can support the avoidance of world catastrophe and sustain the development of the reasonably increasing humankind.

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# Age-Cohort Shift and Values Change: Futures for Democracy in Korea

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#### **Abstract**

The notion of "Asian Values Democracy" has been paid much attention to by numerous intellectuals as a contesting image of futures as well as an alternative to Western liberal democracy. The Asian values democracy debates, however, heavily rely on the theory of cultural autonomy. As a result, it exposes its limit to illustrate contemporary Asian political systems and their futures. On the theoretical level, we premise that culture is not a static substance; rather it is always subject to change through cultural exchanges and especially by technological developments. On the case level, we explore how the new development of technologies and their diffusion affect values change, particularly, the democratic values of the younger generation in Korea. Based upon the analysis of Korean age-cohorts with their new social and political experiments, we envision four alternative futures of Korean democracy. In the final section, we attempt to test whether such experimental phenomena in Korea can serve as an alternative model for futures of democracy in Asia.

#### Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War so-called "Asian Values Democracy" debates have flowered among many intellectuals in response to the global export of liberal democracy. It is a time during which Time magazine commented: "Asia's Different Drum: As they continue to prosper, increasingly self-confident Confucian society in East Asia are challenging Western liberalism with their own ideas of democratic virtues." Futurists were no exception in this trend and some began to pay much attention to Asian values, especially Confucianism (and other traditional values) as contesting images of futures.

The heart of Asian values democracy suggests the departure point in every political system should be in accord with indigenous cultures and traditional values. It has been suggested that cultural difference contributed to the differing practices of democracy between Western and Eastern countries (Pye 1985, Huntington 1996, Helgesen & Li Xing 1996, Tu 1996, Fukuyama 1998). However, the "cultural relative of democracy" contains several weaknesses to explain contemporary Asia as well as its future trajectories. Firstly, it overlooks the dynamic characteristics of culture. Culture is not a fixed body that does not change; rather culture is a substance that changes constantly through internal and external interchange with other differing cultures. In fact, many recent studies show that values, norms, and attitudes are changing in contemporary Asia. The recent development of technologies and their wide diffusion drives these transformations in the region. Korea, where rapid political and social changes occur at a formidable speed with great dynamism, is probably the best example of this transformation. The country is acting as a huge laboratory for futures of Asia by becoming a testing ground for various social and political experiments.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Time, June 14, 1993

The purpose of this paper is to identify the limits and problems of a cultural explanation of Asian democracy by showing that culture, including beliefs, values, and norms, are changing considerably in Asia. Taking Korea as a case study, we will focus on how the new development of technologies and their diffusion affect values, particularly, the democratic values of the younger generation in Korea who will be playing a leading part in the future of Korea. We will also explore alternative futures of Korean democracy by analyzing Korean age-cohorts with their new social and political experiments. Finally, we will examine whether such experimental phenomena in Korea can serve as an alternative model for futures of democracy in Asia.

# Limits of the Cultural Explanation for Asian Politics

Since the early 1990s, a new concept of Asian values has emerged. Devan and Hall assert that the theory of Asian values as an alternative to Western liberal democracy gained momentum after the end of the Cold War (Devan 1994, Hall 1999). It is also said that the new Asian value hypothesis was a result of the confidence gained from the high economic growth of East Asian countries. Huntington pointed out that "today East Asia attributes their dramatic economic development not to their import of western culture but to their adherence to their own culture." The economic success of East Asian countries in the 70s and 80s and the global spread of liberal democracy after the collapse of communism in the 90s were two major drivers igniting the debates on the compatibility between western liberal democracy and Asian values. The debate reached its peak when the Korean president Kim Dae Jung ("Democracy is destiny") publicly criticized Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew ("Culture is destiny") in the mid 90s.

The debate between Kim Dae Jung and Lee Kuan Yew basically represents the argument between the notion of universal modernization and the concept of cultural relativeness. Peoples who advocate universal modernization assume that the ideas and principles of liberal democracy are hardly compatible with the values and norms of Asian culture. By highlighting undemocratic elements in Asian traditions, they emphasize that Asian values are the main obstacle to the development of liberal democracy in the region. Even a cultural relativist like Huntington once said that Confucianism is an obstacle to developing liberal democracy in Asia while indicating "Confucian democracy" is a contradiction in terms. Nonetheless, the universalists believe that Asian perceptions liberal democracy will be ultimately absorbed by Western values as the modernization process takes place in Asia. By contrast, people who advocate the cultural relativeness of democracy focus on the positive aspects of Asian values that might contribute to facilitating the practice of liberal democracy in the region. Some highlight the possibility of Confucian democracy as an alternative to Western liberal models while criticizing the self-centered aspects of the individualistic West. Tu Wei-Ming even interpreted the Asian values debate as a process of building Asian modernization in distinctive way (Tu, 1996).

The above two perspectives on the relationship between Asian values and liberal democracy heavily rely on the theory of cultural autonomy. However, this cultural assertiveness exposes its limitations to illustrate contemporary Asia. Firstly, even though some Asian countries share the common experience of modernization, individual responses to western democracy may be different in each country. Therefore, the possibility of a common cultural identity due to the cultural diversity of Asia is a somewhat hasty conclusion. Secondly, the Asian value debates overlook

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Huntington (1996)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> see Kim (1994)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Huntington (1991)

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the dynamic characteristics of culture. Culture is not a fixed body that does not change. Rather, culture is a substance that changes constantly through internal and external interchange with other differing cultures. More importantly, the increased speed of technologically-induced social changes presses cultures toward new arrangements of beliefs, attitudes, behaviors, and norms.

So, will culture matter with futures of political systems and democracy in Asia? Our tentative answer is yes, it will matter. Nonetheless, many recent studies reveal that values, norms, and behaviors are changing significantly in contemporary Asia. The way of life that emphasizes family values, respect for authority, and the communal collectivism is diminishing in Asia now. It is especially visible among the younger generation in the region in that they differ considerably from the older generation in terms of values, norms, and behaviors. We argue that the rapid development of new technologies and their wide diffusion is a major driving force for this change, and it is well observed in Korea. With the younger generation as a central figure, adaptation and utilization of new technologies are leading dynamic social and political transformations in contemporary Korea. In the next section, we will discuss what is happening in Korea now. Korea: A Lab for Futures of Democracy?

Over the last half century, Korea has been transformed from an agricultural society to an industrial society, and most recently from an industrial society to an information society. Now Korea awaits the imminent arrival of the dream society. The full range of government support in developing information and communication technology and its infrastructure since the late 1990s played a crucial role in Korea to become an ICT stronghold. Given this background, Korea is now becoming a testing ground for newly developed ICT technologies and equipments. A recent article in the New York Times evaluates Korea as follows:

[Korea] is the world's most wired country, it is rushing to turn what sounds like science fiction into everyday life...South Korea, perhaps more than any other country, is transforming itself through technology. The interconnectivity has changed the way and speed with which opinions are formed, about everything from fashion to politics. South Koreans use futuristic technologies that are years away in the United States; companies like Microsoft and Motorola test products here before introducing them in the United States.

The development of new technologies and their wide use enabled citizens to change media and politics in Korea. Yeonho Oh, the founder and the CEO of OhmyNews, describes this new phenomenon as "the marriage of democracy and technology." According to Oh, "citizen participatory Internet journalism called OhmyNews started first in Korea with the slogan 'every citizen is a reporter.' The slogan is not only about changing journalism, but about changing all of so-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Some recently argue that the age of the information society is approaching an end, while a new type of society is emerging. A Danish futurist, Rolf Jensen calls this new society the "Dream Society." See detail Rolf Jensen, The dream society: How the coming shift from information to imagination will transform your business. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1999, Ernest Sternberg, The Economy of Icons: How business manufactures meaning. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1999, p. 5, B. Joseph Pine II and James H. Gilmore, The experience economy: Work is theatre and every business a stage. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1999, p. ixf, Virginia Postel, The substance of style: How the rise of aesthetic value is remaking commerce, culture and consciousness. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2003, p. 39, Daniel H. Pink, "The MFA is the new MBA," Harvard Business Review, February 2004, p 21f. Norimitsu Onishi, "In a Wired South Korea, Robots Will Feel Right at Home" available at <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/02/world/asia/02robot.html?ex=1144641600&en=143fe822a7de0e16&ei=5070&enc=eta1">http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/02/world/asia/02robot.html?ex=1144641600&en=143fe822a7de0e16&ei=5070&enc=eta1</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> "Korean Netizens Change Journalism and Politics - The marriage of democracy and technology," available at <a href="http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article-view.asp?no=201423&rel\_no=1">http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article-view.asp?no=201423&rel\_no=1</a>

ciety." The best example of technology affecting politics is probably the outcome of the 2002 Korean presidential election. Internet and mobile phones played a crucial role in aiding liberal candidate Roh Moo Hyun to get elected. Another dramatic example regarding the impact of technology on politics was the impeachment of President Roh in 2004. Again, citizen mobility arose on the Internet and the citizens were able to save President Roh from being impeached. The New York Times put the incident this way:

After the opposition-led National Assembly impeached President Roh Moo Hyun, a consensus began forming on the Internet that the move was politically motivated — two hours after the vote took place... That quickly led to mass demonstrations...That kind of thing had never happened in Korea before. Everyone is connected to everyone else, so issues spread very fast and kind of unpredictably.

Korea is probably the first country to encounter both the blessings and the illnesses of the development of information and communication technologies. Futurist's long dream of 'direct democracy through electronic democracy' might come true in Korea. However, in this paper, we will focus beyond the impact of information technologies and the information age on the value formation of Korean youth. In the next section, we will examine a newly emerging generation, a generation in which everything is based on image and content.

### Korean Age-Cohort Shift and Values Change

This section examines the impact of socio-economic changes—in particular the recent development of technologies — on value systems of the Korean people. It will focus on their influence on democratic values, particularly on the younger generation of Korea. In order to do so, we utilize Age-Cohort Analysis, which many futurists favor when analyzing different generations. Age-Cohort Analysis is based on an assumption that "people born during a certain time interval tend to have certain common experiences that mark them from people older or than younger than they — experiences that they carry with them as strong influences on their beliefs and behavior throughout their entire lives." The members of an age-cohort, therefore, share specific events and common features, i.e., beliefs, values and norms in their lifestyle.

As we noted earlier, Korean society has experienced rapid political, social, and economic transformation over the past half century. It is, therefore, one of the best cases to test the age-cohort shift and the value changes in each cohort. Many recent polls and surveys in Korea show that the rapid socio-economic change caused by various factors has changed traditional Korean values. Aside from macro-events or incidents in a certain period of time, we will argue that the cultural impact attributed by development of technology has a strong influence on their beliefs and behavior. For instance, social environmental changes led by technological developments such as

<sup>8</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Norimitsu Onishi, "In a Wired South Korea, Robots Will Feel Right at Home" URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/02/world/asia/02robot.html?ex=1144641600&en=143fe822a7de0e16&ei=5070&emc=eta1

<sup>10</sup> Dator and Seo (2005)

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the wide diffusion of TVs, Walkmans, MP3s, personal computers and the Internet, electronic games, and mobile telephones cause significant impact on the sensibility of children and teenagers. 11

While mass media and marketing research firms are producing many different kinds of neologisms referring to specific age cohorts, it seems to be more appropriate to distinguish the various relevant age-cohorts in Korea according to the following five groups: Veteran (1921–1933), Modernizer (1934–1953), Baby Boomer (1954–1971), Generation P (1972–1981), and Generation C (1982–). Each cohort is assorted and labeled by not only major events and incidents they shared, but also the degree of new technological adaptation and the skill with which they use new technology.

The Veteran Cohort (1921–1933) were born and lived under the Japanese colonial rule, and went through chaotic ideological divides in the post-independence period and the devastating Korean War. Most of the male members of this cohort participated in the Korean War and thus hold dreadful memories of War and strong anti-communist sentiments. This cohort, having experienced such tumultuous times, tends to pursue social order and political stability. Almost none of the Veteran cohort use the Internet, while some use mobile phones. They have been educated to respect authority, emphasize collectivism over individualism, and believe that hierarchy must be maintained in society in order to secure order and stability.

The Modernizer Cohort (1934–1953) played a leading role in Korea's economic development and modernization in the 70s and 80s. During the developmental period under the authoritarian rule, individualism and liberalism were harshly repressed. Thus, the Modernizer cohort believes that their individual freedoms and rights were sacrificed for the sake of the nation's modernization and economic prosperity. They are, however, proud of Korea's economic success and political democratization. Given these experiences, the modernizers tend to prefer incremental transformation to rapid change of the existing economic and political systems. Regarding the skill of adapting and using a new technology, some of the modernizers are familiar with using the Internet, and most of them use mobile phones. In the cultural sense, the modernizers are accustomed to social hierarchy and the slogan of communal harmony and believe that traditional Korean culture and values should be maintained in order to keep Korean identity.

The Baby Boomers (1954–1971) make up the largest portion of contemporary Korean society and thus presently dominate Korean economics and politics. They witnessed firsthand the democratization of Korea, and played a major role in the information technology revolution. <sup>12</sup> Represented as the "386 generation," some members of this cohort participated in student activist movements and the anti-authoritarian protests under the authoritarian regimes in the 70s and 80s. For them, achieving a liberal democracy was the ultimate goal, so many members of the Baby Boomers are reform minded and politically progressive. In fact, Korea is now experiencing a drastic political and socio-economic change as Baby Boomers with very different values and beliefs entered into the political and economic arena. The entry of the Boomers into politics with

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> For instance, a generation having grown up watching TV is apt to have an aesthetic sense that cannot be satisfied with ordinary shows; those who have grown up with Walkman tend to seek their own personal taste and liberty. The MP3 generation is more familiar with sharing things with other individuals than TV and Walkman generations.
<sup>12</sup> Gun Ko argues that the rapid diffusion of the Internet and the mobile telephone in Korea is largely due to the Baby Boom generation. According to Ko, they entered their 20s and 30s during the early and mid 1990s when the Internet and mobile technology was sweeping the world. Their young, technology-oriented minds easily absorbed the new technology, Weekly Chosun, October 23, 2003, available in Korean at <a href="http://weekly.chosun.com/wdata/html/news/200310/20031021000030.html">http://weekly.chosun.com/wdata/html/news/200310/20031021000030.html</a>.

the election of President Roh in 2002 is the best example how much age-cohort shift could affect the entire society. Having massive support from Korean youth in their 20s and 30s, the reform minded Boomer politicians are leading the reforms resulting in considerable policy differences. Nevertheless, the Boomers still tend to be culturally liberal and favor hierarchical human relations such as relations between elders and those younger than them.

Generation P (1972–1987) is a neologism that was recently coined by a Korean marketing research firm to distinguish its marketing target. According to a report made by the firm, "Generation P" refers to a paradigm-shifter that gives rise to social changes with Passion, Power, and Participation. The report takes political democratization since the end of 1980s, wealth by economic development, and the full flowering of an information society in Korea as contributing factors to the growth of Generation P. 13 The report also observes that Generation P express their emotions and thoughts freely, and tends to destruct fixed ideas and taboos with creative minds and behaviors so that they are strongly inclined toward individual characteristics. At the same time, this cohort holds a strong desire to share and tends to construct a human-network both online and offline. 14 In other words, Generation P knows how to make their own culture and is always searching for their own character and uniqueness.

In fact, this is the first cohort that has no experience with anti-democratization student protests during their college years. Generation P grew up in a relatively abundant material environment, and has no memories of war and scarcity. What particularly makes Generation P different from other older cohorts is that the members of this cohort are very skillful adapters of new technologies and the efficient use of those technologies. They are always searching for something new and seeking changes and tend to test new technologically-oriented products as "early adapters". The biggest difference is that they believe they can change their own society. 70% of this cohort sees that "the recent social change is desirable." 80% of this cohort said, "I can change our society through active participation." Moreover, they believe various opinions should exist for the purpose of social development and pursue horizontal human relations that highlight sharing and diffusion, rather than being bound up in the fetters of hierarchical human relations represented by Confucianism.<sup>15</sup> A recent survey attributed this value change to the development of new communication technologies and its wide diffusion in Korea. The new communication technologies also brought out the extension of the private sphere to young Korean people. In other words, each individual builds his or her own world in Cyberspace and tend to continue to maintain it. For instance, the mobile phone is a medium that allows individuals to create private space whenever and wherever. As a result, traditional values of respect for authority and hierarchy are rapidly giving way to individual freedoms and rights in younger cohort in Korea.

Generation C (1988–) is the cohort "who attach great importance to contents and creativity, dream of becoming a celebrity, love to take photos with digital cameras and are open to social and technological changes." The letter C stands for "a broad range of concepts including creativity, contents, control, celebrity, camera and change. Members of Generation C can produce, display and distribute to millions of Internet users worldwide their own images, creations and

<sup>13</sup> Cheil Communication Inc, "Generation P 80%: I Can Change Our Society" available in Korean at  $\underline{\text{http://www.cheil.com/cheilfile/cheilhome/report/910\_P-generation.pdf}}^{14}\ Ibid.$ 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> "Digital Generation Leads New Marketing Patterns," The Korea Times, January 25, 2005, available at http://www.trendwatching.com/about/inmedia/articles/generation\_c/digital\_generation\_leads\_new\_m.html

contents via blogs, the proliferating online personal showrooms." Trendwatching.com describes the emergence of Generation C in Korea this way;

Witness how millions of professionals and digerati occupy blogland, sharing their insights and creative achievements with an ever growing audience, while many younger members of GENERATION C choose to open up their own showrooms on younger and funkier platforms like Cyworld... this South Korean phenomenon now provides more than 10 million South Korean citizens (25% of the entire population) with their own cyber-outlet, where self made poems, stories, songs, photos, videos and what have you can be shown off to other GEN C members and producers, agents, talent scouts and employers alike. Pleasant Cyworld detail: as users can liven up their space with funky digital decorations, or spice things up with videos and music, bought with acorns, Cyworld's currency.<sup>18</sup>

Generation C grew up in a full-grown democratic and diversified environment while the Baby Boomers and Generation P grew up in disciplined societies with limited individual freedom. The core members of Generation C, in particular "have benefited from a more liberal education system functioning in a more democratized teaching environment." The liberal educational environment along with the democratic and diversified social environment in Korea since the late 1980s greatly contributed to Generation C developing substantive creative minds.

Along with the rise of a liberal environment in Korea, the recent developments of image technologies, devices, and software stimulate Generation C to create and display their own creations. Having material affluence and technological skills with creativity, "Generation C increasingly could afford to access professional hardware, software, and online distribution channels, enabling them to show images, sound, and video in ever more powerful ways." Moreover, Generation C began to create their own personal media by using various technologies and methods. Interestingly, Generation C tends to use their personal media mostly to have fun and entertainment, rather than use it for acquiring information and knowledge. More significantly, the frequent utilization of image devices and software is changing the values and attitudes of Generation C to judge things on the basis of "like and dislike" rather than "good and bad" while giving prominence to "feelings and emotions."

## Four Alternative Futures for Korean Democracy

It is observed that the liberal environment along with the development of new technologies and their wide diffusion have caused value changes in Korean younger cohorts, especially for Generation P and Generation C. Within the next two decades, Generation P and Generation C will become a significant demographic majority in Korea. Given this recognition, we might anticipate a society— as well as a democracy — that will be very different from today. Nevertheless, we refuse to simply predict "the future" which will be brought by the entry of these new generations into politics with different values. Rather, we suggest several alternative futures with consideration of the many possible variables because social evolution — no matter how small and tribal a society — is not a linear process. In order to deal with several alternative futures of democracy

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> For further information about Generation C see "Generation C" available at <a href="http://www.trendwatching.com/trends/GENERATION C.htm">http://www.trendwatching.com/trends/GENERATION C.htm</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Lee (2003—2004)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> "Digital Generation Leads New Marketing Patterns," The Korea Times, January 25, 2005, available at <a href="http://www.trendwatching.com/about/inmedia/articles/generation-c/digital-generation-leads-new-m.html">http://www.trendwatching.com/about/inmedia/articles/generation-c/digital-generation-leads-new-m.html</a>

in Korea, we will utilize "Alternative Futures," which is one of the most powerful theories and methods for Futures Studies. It enables us to envision many different futures, not just a prediction of "the future." As a method, it provides a template of four generic alternative futures: "Continued Growth," "Collapse," "Disciplined Society," and "Transformational Society," along with identification of the specific features, actors, and driving forces in each alternative direction. <sup>21</sup> In this way, we developed four alternative futures—although there are many—regarding the futures of democracy in Korea. These are described below.

# 1) Representative Democracy

Despite the substantial development of sciences and technologies and their wide diffusion for the last two decades, the marriage between technologies and institutional reforms did not last long. Although ordinary citizens once had used various technologies in their political participation, lack of leadership among citizens groups and an unhealthy development of civil societies brought about the failure of building a direct participatory democracy in Korea. As a consequence, representative democracy continued to grow along with its problems in this society. Political parties and professional politicians still dominate Korean politics, but they are inefficient, self-centered, corrupted, and often fail to represent the views of the public. Nonetheless, there seems to be no alternative to the representative democracy, resulting in the collapse of civil societies in the middle of 2010. Accordingly, ordinary citizens are increasingly becoming politically apathetic.

# 2) Disciplined Democracy

Democracy is not denied as a political form in this society. However, the society aims for "good government" rather than a democratic government. Economic prosperity and social harmony led by "moralistic good government" under the controlled democracy is considered the ideal political form in this society. Thus, the government tends to enforce what it thinks is right and dissenting voices are ignored. Maintaining stability and order is the top priority, thus there are allowed limited individual freedoms and rights for the sake of communal values and interests. Values such as respect for authority, obligation, social discipline, and collective loyalty are highlighted over individual freedom and rights. While emphasizing traditional values, citizens are subject to state authority in many aspects of their lives. Political power is dominated by a few elites and they believe that the government must take preference toward economic growth in order to meet the materialistic desire of their people. Economic growth, therefore, is given priority over political and social development.

# 3) Return of the Autocracy

The society is led by a government with unlimited political power that is held by a single individual without any defining ideology. The single individual came to power through a military coup d'état after a decade of social chaos due to corrupted, inefficient, and self-centered political parties and politicians. For the past decade, the political leaders both in the government and the national assembly in Korea were neither autonomous nor capable of managing internal conflicts. As a result, the Korean military, which was once fully depoliticized and returned to civilian control, has regained its political power through a series of military coups. The leader of the military propagates over and over again that his regime deals with national chaos and seeks to secure the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> The Alternative Futures Theory and Methods has been developed and elaborated by Jim Dator. See Dator (1992) and Dator (1981)

country from external threats, namely North Korea, China and Japan. The military regime attempts to survive out of the fear the people have for the government and tries to control all the broadcasting and narrowcasting in the country.

# 4) Recreational Democracy<sup>22</sup>

Development of sciences and technologies for the last two decades provided unprecedented room for people to spend their time on entertainment and leisure. In particular, the wide diffusion of information and communication network technologies in the Information Age has destroyed the dominance of knowledge and information by a few rich people and political elites. Now, knowledge and information are ubiquitous and are more equally distributed. In spite of various efforts and experiments for institutionalizing "direct democracy" by utilizing sophisticated networked applications that have been invented in the past two decades, citizens had failed to establish a complete direct democracy. The representative democracy succeeded to survive in Korea alongside with several supplementary devices that were designed to encourage civil participation. As a result, citizens are now more involved in nearly every decision-making process.

The nature of political representation has evolved into more like "volunteer work." The professional politicians are no longer required and the artificial separation between politics and private life has disappeared. As a result, individuals have more power than "volunteering representatives (so-called politicians in previous ages)" and many citizens engage in politics as recreational politicians or volunteer. With the entry of Generation C into the society, policies for diverse cultural activities, entertainment, welfare and environment bring more citizens into volunteer political works.

More significantly, the development of new types of images and audiovisual communication technologies over the past two decades led citizens to communicate with each other through all five senses. Citizens, therefore, do not tend to think deeper but put less effort into thinking, while citizens do not tend to pay much attention to old traditions and majority ideas. As a result, "the great era of the '-isms'" is over as people had trouble believing in the great, impersonal ideologies and promises of happiness for all,"<sup>23</sup> which belong to the industrial and information ages. As the Danish Futurist Rolf Jensen had foresaw in the late 1990s, "politician's dialogue with citizens is about specific issues or the emotional questions-filling in all the blanks left empty by the ideologies... Recreational politics evolves on a practical level with active participation."<sup>24</sup>

## **Concluding Remarks**

Korean society has been transformed over the past half century, and continues to evolve even today. The age-cohort analysis in Korea reveals that the younger cohorts differ greatly from the older cohorts in terms of beliefs, values and norms. Korean cohorts from the younger spectrum lean toward political progressiveness and cultural liberalism, while the older cohorts are more politically conservative. Now cherishing individual freedom and diversity are becoming important values for young Korean people. The Korean youth question the core Asian values of conformity, authority, stability, solidarity and are easily suspicious of collectivism. Therefore, Con-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> The term "Recreational" is borrowed from a Danish futurist Rolf Jensen's "Recreational Politics. For detail, see Rolf Jensen, The Dream Society: How the coming shift from information to imagination will transform your business. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1999, pp. 185-187

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 185

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Ibid., pp. 185–187

fucianism (or Asian values as contesting images of futures of democracy) should be reconsidered.

We also found that technological development plays a crucial role in these value changes. In particular, the emerging Generation C in Korea is highly likely to bring about a quite different landscape in Korea's future. Generation C is more accustomed to images and sounds than texts, and began to communicate with each other by using all five senses. It is uncertain what kind of impact they will bring on the future of political systems and democracy, but it is certain that the world will be very different from today when they enter into politics in the next two or three decades.

Korea is now transforming from the information society to the Dream Society. Can the Korean experience be a future model of Asian democracy? Among the four alternative futures of democracy, it appears that the preferred future for China and Singapore is the "disciplined democracy." However, it is uncertain whether Asian people will continue to tolerate authoritarian regimes if they can no longer carry out economic development (Thompson, 2000: 651). The Chinese Communist Party, for instance, repeatedly proclaims "the right to development" and proposes that individual rights and freedoms can be sacrificed for the sake of China's economic development. Here is the dilemma. China and Singapore may need to ride on the tsunami of the Dream Society if they are to continue to have economic growth and be prosperous in the future. The political economic system in the Dream Society will be dependent on creativity that requires guaranteed full-fledged freedom of expression and a full degree of individual freedom. In this vein, it is extremely doubtful to see the emergence of Generation C in the "disciplined democracy."

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# **Democracy is institutional gardening:** a hundred years is a short time

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#### **Abstract:**

Democracy demands time and care

The seeds of democracy are sown by means of censuses

The starving can not be held responsible for democracy

*The ability to read and write is a precondition for democracy* 

In many countries and entire cultures a reformation is a condition precedent for democracy

Democracy without a legal system and citizens' rights was long just a stage set

Democracy does not work in artificial states

Democracy must be globalised and globalisation democratised

Whole continents can reject democracy on the national or global level

The hegemony of money devours democracy's chances

Income differences gnaw at democracy from within

Defending and exporting democracy can undermine the foundations of democracy at home The question of destiny for European democracy begins with the demographic structure and concerns sharing

These theses express what I shall write about and how.

#### **Democracy demands time and care**

With the Eduskunta, the parliament of Finland, celebrating its centenary with much retrospection, the idea was mooted in its Committee for the Future that for the sake of balance there should also be an attempt to look 100 years ahead. Many were sceptical; after all, how can we know anything about what things will be like in 2100? Many things will be different then, especially in science and technology, but as regards democracy there is no certainty in the minds of some and no doubt in the minds of others. Perhaps some nations and people will have been brought within the sphere of democracy, some who live under democracy will have rejected it and some weakened it, but a large part will have strengthened it.

There are countless theoretical definitions of democracy and just as many practical applications, because people's participation in collective decision making can be implemented on so many levels and in so many functions. It can be practised in the family, in people's small immediate community, in local government, regional administration, the state, on a broad regional level and even in international organisations.

Politics creates a foundation for a society's norm structure and its most important task is to create a meaning for people's lives. A change of policy in principle – changing over from a dictatorial or authoritarian model to democracy – has been and still is a major change in every country.

The view taken in political research is that profound policy changes of this kind must be encouraged to take root in people's behaviour, attitude and identity through socialisation and education. The handsome name that Johan P. Olsen gives this work is "institutional gardening" (March and Olsen 1983, p. 292).

What is the state of democracy in the world and the trend of change in political development right now? Is democracy advancing? There are three internationally known indexes of democracy: Freedom House/political rights and civil liberties, Polity project/indicators of institutional democracy and autocracy and Vanhanen/democratisation index. All of them indicate that since 1975 the world has been strongly democratising, at least on the formal level. A quarter of a century ago, one state in four was a democracy, whereas that figure is now already half. Over 60% of the people in the world are living in democracies, but there are still large regions of the globe where democracy is virtually nonexistent. All in all, how democracy has been arrived at in various parts of the world is a long story and a complex matter. Achieving democracy will not be a straightforward, quick or easy thing to do in the next quarter of a century. It is difficult to say anything about the situation in a hundred years' time. It will depend on the world's political stability and economic development.

Democracy is an institution of power, for exercising and sharing it. Even in good, politically stable and prosperous societies, consent to share power is given only grudgingly. The USA adopted a democratic constitution early and splendidly in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, but its practical implementation has been slow. In the New World, democracy has not developed at the same pace as the economy, science and technology. Just getting rid of slavery took nearly 100 years, which is quite a long time considering that even Imperial Russia had abolished serfdom earlier. The emancipation of women took nearly 150 years in the USA and it would be close on 200 years before the right to vote did not depend on skin colour. The French Revolution was founded on principles of liberty, fraternity and equality. Also there it took a long time before the principles began to be applied in practice. It likewise took a long time before these principles spread to other parts of Europe. It was only in the 19<sup>th</sup> century that serfdom and feudalism were abolished in many countries.

In a democracy, the majority is very important. In many democracies, 50% of the population, i.e. the women, were long deprived of political rights – in Europe right up to the end of the Second World War. In 1906, Finland became the first country in the world to give women full political rights, which they also exercised. Generally speaking, women in developed countries have had to wait 50-60 years longer than men for the right to vote. Switzerland is a developed country by any yardstick, and yet it was only in 1990 that the last canton there gave women the vote; in other words, it took 100 years for one half of the population to be recognised as the equals of men.

Ever since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, sovereign states have been the basic unit of political organisation. Efforts, inspired by Enlightenment thinking, to reform the autocratic models of government in European states on the basis of the ideals of freedom and equality began about one and a half centuries later. In the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century nationality was introduced as an additional criterion of organisation. The European states and the USA adopted the capitalist economic system in the latter half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Thus a modern democratic political system took shape in Europe and the USA. It is ideally a nation-state inhabited by a people who share a fairly uniform set of values, confess the Christian faith and strive for economic growth. It took centuries to build the model. It spread from Europe and the USA initially to the British Empire and South America, but to hardly anywhere else. It was only after the Second World War had ended and colonialism had disappeared that efforts began to spread it to developing countries,

first in the name of modernisation and nowadays as exporting democracy and a state-building process.

Looking at the matter rationally, but also from an ethical-humane perspective, we can see that the demand for rapid democratisation is unreasonable. Given that they are poor, illiterate and in many cases still live in tribally based institutional structures, would the citizens of states that have made a sudden shift to democracy and are often artificial formations be able to embrace a political system developed to suit conditions in Europe and North America, and would they want to? A length of time comparable to what it took us to build our institutions must be reserved for change.

Retrograde steps have been and are made in democracy. Entire nations have collapsed suddenly. How do we know that this can not happen in the future? Every new generation has to learn civilisation and also democracy over and over again. Democracy is not passed on through genes nor inherited.

It is difficult to export democracy. The Finnish philosopher J.V.Snellman, the bicentenary of whose birth is being celebrated this year, said in 1842: "The fact of the matter is simply that not all political systems are right at all times and for all nations. That is also something on which all of the most prominent political scientists are unanimous. The history of all states demonstrates that their political system has developed constantly and this is closely linked to the educational standard of the nation at any given time. Only the mindless could demand that, for example, the Turks or the present-day Egyptians should arrange their political system according to the American model or that, on the other hand, the Americans would be happier under an autocratic system of government than they are under the present one. On the contrary, every thinking person who knows anything about the civilisation and societies of these nations is convinced that a change of political system of this kind would be just as impossible as it would be short-lived even if it could be implemented." (Snellman 2001, 192)

Germany and Japan are almost the only examples of democracy having been successfully exported. The starting point for everything is to alter the country's own circumstances in the direction of democracy. Striving for economic growth and stability has proved the most effective independent driving force and incentive for change. A recent example of this is EU membership, which encouraged the countries of Eastern Europe to make the changeover to democracy with exceptional speed.

China, which was one of the first socialist countries to embark on the road of radical economic reforms a quarter of a century ago, has not opened its door to political reforms. Despite rapid economic growth, the political modernisation that China is carrying out does not include democracy. It is feared that rapid economic growth may even have slowed the rate at which political freedoms are embraced. The country is officially a socialist market economy, for which reason political power is exercised by a closed communist party and economic power is in the hands of technocrats.

In 1930 the economist John Maynard Keynes speculated what democracy would look like a century later in his essay: "Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren". He began by painting a glowing picture of a world in which wealth and money are no longer important and genuine liberty prevails: "We shall once more value ends above means and prefer the good to be the useful". But he also cautions: "The time for all this is not yet. For at least another hundred years we must pretend to ourselves and to everyone that fair is foul and foul is fair; for foul is useful and

fair is not. Avarice and usury and precaution must be our gods for a little longer still. For only they can lead us out of the tunnel of economic necessity into daylight." (Keynes: C.B. Macpherson: 1966, pp. 369–372)

Towards the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when the capitalist countries had achieved the level of prosperity and democracy of which Keynes spoke, international borders began to be opened in the economic sector and the mechanisms through which the economy operates were changed. The economy was freed from political direction. Globalisation quickly penetrated societies. When states were giving up their national powers to regulate the economy, they decided, however, to develop some new kinds of regional and global systems of governance. This development is interesting from the perspective of democracy. Does it increase or reduce democracy if power is transferred from national-level democracy upwards to global bodies, in which some of those who exercise power are not democracies and some even dictatorships? In any event, global governance is a political reality and the demand for democracy will be at the heart of debate for the next few decades. However, it is clear that global democracy will not be something that appears in any form over the short term. It may even be impossible to achieve global democracy in the sense of classical national democracy. Some even ask whether democracy is even essential in global governance. Aren't good and well functioning other institutions, which safeguard prosperity, economic growth and wellbeing, enough?

# The seeds of democracy are sown by means of censuses

Democracy is a system created by people. Human rights and human dignity are the starting point for everything. For people to have rights and obligations, their existence must be recognised. They have to be registered in books and files. Large numbers of people in some nations in the world have never even once been recorded in census lists.

Ownership and recognition of it are the other side of censuses and at the same time a step towards democracy in their own right. Democracy is weak if the concept of ownership is unclear in a society of if the legal order is indeterminate. Africa is a continent where democracy so defined lacks a foundation (de Soto 2000). In Russia, the concept of ownership is still rather unclear. After the material come immaterial rights. A hundred years is possibly a short time for ownership to establish itself as a part of the legal order and people's stable lives.

# The starving can not be held responsible for democracy

If a family or a people are starving, the first and in practice only task of each and every one of its members is to get food. On the national level, it cannot be assumed that the starving will take to the barricades to oppose dictatorship and defend democracy. In a global democracy, the starving are those whose affairs on the global level democracy should take care of. When hunger persists, democracy makes hardly any progress for decades. It has been estimated that a prerequisite for the success of democracy is per capita GDP of at least \$5,000. Most of the present developing countries fall short of this figure.

## The ability to read and write is a precondition for democracy

Africa is the poorest and least developed continent on the globe, a place where people can not even read and write. It will take decades to build a well functioning school system. Raising the whole of Africa to the level of democracy by this criterion will probably take half a century or so. There are similar problems elsewhere as well. It is estimated that one in four over-15s in Brazil can neither read nor write. Yet Brazil is seen as one of the rising countries of the future. The goal looks good for the economy, but the lack of literacy will make democracy a distant dream. It will not advance economic development, either.

# In many countries and entire cultures a reformation is a condition precedent for democracy

A feature that democracies have in common is that the state and politics are separated from religion. The main religions are old, but their original doctrines have been reformed over the centuries to adapt to social development. In many countries religion has never had a strong position in the political exercise of power. In several countries democracy was embraced only after a religious reformation.

In the Arab countries, where Islam is the dominant religion, there is not a single democratic state. There is no model for building a democracy in an Islamic culture. There is no experienced-based knowledge of what kinds of political, administrative, religious, cultural and other problems have to be solved in order for a genuine democracy to be able to take root. Some have thought of Iraq as a model for an incipient democratisation of the Arab countries and the Islamic world. An essential long-term fundamental question is: How will the relationship between religion and legislation be resolved? When Saddam Hussein was in power, religion and the state/law were separated. Now religion has been elevated to a level on a par with the law or even above it.

It is not possible to make the transition to democracy if a state and its most important instrument of power, the law, can not be separated from religion. Half of the population, i.e. women, can not be excluded from political rights by invoking religion. Democracy without this kind of religious reformation is formal. Changes take place slowly in this sector. For example, 100 years was a short time in the Christian Reformation.

From the perspective of religion and in general people's fundamental beliefs, India, the world's biggest democracy, is important. However, it is difficult to see how its democracy will deepen unless the religion-and beliefs-based Hindu caste system is given a kind of "reformation". It can not be accepted in a democracy that a child is regarded as having been born without rights.

# Democracy without a legal system and citizens' rights was long just a stage set

The democracy researchers Larry Diamond and Joshua Muravchik stress that building democracy has to begin from below, from the local level. Genuine political parties must be created and freedom of speech increased. The foundation for national democracy is created that way. It is not merely a stage set for elections in which the winners have been decided in advance.

According to some estimates, only 17% of the people on the globe now live in countries that enjoy freedom of the press. It is a long way from this to democracy.

It is already being admitted pretty openly in the debate in the developed countries that democracy has been exported selectively and has been formal. The developed countries' own economic or political interests have guided discussion of democracy and its export. The most critical voices claim that the major western powers have used democracy as a pretext to get the world under their control and direction. Democracy is said to be today's instrument for hegemonistic aspirations.

Military coups, dictatorship and civil wars have been typical consequences of attempts to export and root formal democracy. The USA has had to notice this in South America in the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and Europe in Africa. Haiti is an example of both continents' failed exporting of democracy. The country was originally a French slave state and then for two centuries a dictatorship supported by foreign forces. Independence, which began in 1804, has not had much meaning, but neither has the democracy exported there by force. The Haitians are one of the world's most severely undernourished peoples. Dictatorships have succeeded each other.

Recognition of even formal democracy can be a floundering process. If democracy has been achieved, i.e. elections are held in a country, this does not yet guarantee that the ruling elite or the exporters of democracy will accept it. The most difficult situation from Europe's point of view is in North Africa. When an Islamist movement won the Algerian elections in 1991, the military, supported by the French, seized power. A long civil war, the end of which is still not in sight, began. There were fears that a similar situation would come about a few years ago in Turkey. When an Islamist party, the Justice and Development Party led by Recep Erdogan, won in Turkey's last general election, the President of the Convention then drafting a constitution for the European Union, former French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, said that Turkey did not belong to Europe and that its accession to membership would mean the end of the EU. Negotiations for membership began nevertheless.

How, ultimately, do western democracies relate to extreme movements winning elections in countries where there has never been a functioning democracy? Although they do not meet the criteria for honest polls, the Iranian elections did give us some hints about what is in store. In many countries elections have become a means of strengthening the power of archconservatives – in this case extreme Muslims. Many important liberal parties were eliminated in the Iranian elections in February 2004 and reformist newspapers were closed down. There is a danger that also more widely in the world formal democracy is being used to eat away any chances of genuine power of the people and equality gaining in strength. When the radical Islamist Hamas party, which does not recognise the state of Israel, came to power with the support of the majority of the Palestinian electorate in 2006, the western countries withdrew their aid and support from Palestine. The party has not renounced terrorism. What will be our response to a possible situation in which the major oil producers, on which the whole prosperity of the West depends, hold free elections in which terrorism-sponsoring or extreme Islamist parties come to power?

How should we respond to democratic transitions to dictatorship? Should democracy on the national and global level have the right to defend itself?

## Democracy does not work in artificial states

When the forum chosen for democracy is a state, this in itself can be an impediment to democracy from the outset if the state is not a natural one. History shows us many examples of this. The serious problems of artificial states — with their borders defined on a drawing board — have eventually been solved through violence. It will probably not be possible to avoid this in the future, either.

In Europe, the Balkan wars are examples of the problems of artificially created states. In Asia, India is a state created on imperialism's drawing board that has achieved democracy, but whose problems have not been eliminated. Most of the African states were shaped on the drawing board in the 1960s when the European colonial powers had departed. The borders in many cases are nearly arbitrary. It will be really difficult to build democracy bound to a genuine state.

# Democracy must be globalised and globalisation democratised

Despite its problematic nature, democracy has made rapid advances on the global level. It is only a few years since hardly anyone other than idealists spoke of global matters in the same sentence as democracy. Now the matter is on the agendas of the USA, the G-7, the UN, EU, IMF, the World Bank – and after them many other official and prestigious global actors. What does this talk of global-level democracy mean? To simplify the matter, on the one hand democracy must be exported to everywhere in the world and rooted as a part of the exercise of power on all levels, and on the other globalisation must be democratised; in other words, first and foremost the global economy must be brought under democratic guidance.

Examined in the light of history, democracy has not been a fundamental element in the power systems of traditional states nor in the way power is exercised in them. Nor have power relationships in world politics even been determined following a democratic model or the theory of democracy; instead, they have been the result of military and economic power resources.

The demand for democratic regulation of globalisation has brought structural and practical problems to the fore. First of all, global regulation does not touch an existing democracy that is founded on the region or state in which its source and target live. As a territorially limited entity, a state can not be an actor in global governance. Democratic and legitimate global governance can not be derived from democratic governments alone. Third, in globalisation the public or people, i.e. the ruled, varies. In a national democracy the people, the source and target of democracy, has conformed to the borders of a particular area (generally a state). People feel they belong to a certain area and are its people, the nation in whose name they exercise independent power.

Global democracy suffers from institutional and functional weaknesses. National governments have rarely published information concerning their decision making in relation to global affairs or their exercise of power. Global affairs are not usually election themes and only quite exceptionally have these affairs been made the subject of, for example, a referendum. In Europe, the

European Union is virtually the only global actor that has even partially adopted publicity and popular consultation in its activities. European parties have been created in the EU, although the parties are organised on a national basis.

The most influential institution of world governance, the G-8, is not a result of democracy. Its charter members, seven industrial states that are democracies, held their meetings to prepare global economic and political decisions. The G-8 represents only eight countries and about 10% of humankind. The ways in which it deliberates and makes decisions and how it implements them are excluded from publicity.

Although the world can be governed without democracy, a good economy and good governance presuppose responsible and accountable institutions. That, in turn, demands democratic control. In the final analysis, what is involved is trust between the rulers and the ruled. Despite the aspects outlined in the foregoing, the three possible actors in global democracy are: 1) states, which represent their enfranchised citizens, 2) political entities which have themselves organised their own activities and are part of a worldwide civil society and 3) the people, i.e. the assumed world citizens.

States will continue to be the world's most important actors for a long time to come, because they control armies and other security apparatuses as well as legislative power. They are the aircraft carriers of present-day democracy.

In a global world, differences between countries with respect to capacity are a reality that all must take into account. Our starting point in the 21<sup>st</sup> century must be the world order's structure of states that took shape in the 20<sup>th</sup>. The military security system built by the USA during the Second World War and the Cold War, and which extends to all continents and was designed to protect western democracies, has served the interests of all of the world's democratic states since the Cold War ended. Since it is the USA that is in fact responsible for the supply of global public security goods, its leadership role is the focus of especially great expectations and demands. The USA builds alliances, operates worldwide with the help of regional treaty systems, implements multilateral agreements concerning disarmament and non-proliferation, organises humanitarian interventions and shares intelligence on terrorism. It has taken decades to create that global security system and it has been built on a Euroatlantic foundation, for which reason Europe and the USA have a shared responsibility for its future and development as a multilateral foundation for a political leadership system for global governance.

In the late 1990s politics made an irreversible transition from an era of national politics to a postnational stage. Opening up the borders of national markets and creating global markets presuppose a globalisation of politics. What is essential is to build a set of global ethics, in which people are conscious of belonging to a common humankind, in which they share a common destiny. In a hierarchical and unequal world, responsibility resides especially with those who lead the biggest and richest states and companies or with those who have the best knowledge-based opportunities to lead. However, that is not enough. Global ethics applies also to ordinary people in rich countries.

In practice, assessed in the light of the situation today, the task can be categorised as almost impossible in practice, but as a realistic goal over a 100-year time span.

# Whole continents can reject democracy on the national or global level

The gradual and slow way in which democracy takes root and fateful setbacks should be borne in mind. Fascism and communism came to power in 20<sup>th</sup>-century Europe. In the 1930s four of Europe's major old civilised countries, the Soviet Union, Germany, Italy and Spain, slumped into what from the whole world's point of view was a destructive totalitarianism. Democracy was not restored in the southern European countries Spain, Portugal and Greece until the 1970s. In the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century Russia has taken only a few steps along the road of democracy.

The countries of Eastern Europe were not allowed to decide their political system after the Second World War – Soviet tanks took care of that. Many of the buds of democracy remained frozen for half a century. When the communist system could not cope in economic competition with capitalism and democracy, the Soviet Union disintegrated and the countries of Eastern Europe were liberated from communism. Many of them wanted to change over to democracy, because their goal was to join the EU. This as such rapid transition to democracy has not happened without friction or setbacks, either.

Recognising the fragility of European democracy in recent history, also the future will require a careful appraisal of how power in our continent – including the European Union – will be shared and how we intend to share it. The international press took note of what the former EU President Romano Prodi said immediately after he had won the Italian general election by 24,000 votes. He proposed a core of four countries – Italy, France, Germany and Spain – in the leadership of Europe. A major country – Britain – that had preserved its democracy during the Second World War was not envisaged as a component of Prodi's core, nor was any of the new member states. The only small countries considered eligible were the EU charter members Belgium and Luxembourg. Prodi excluded the Netherlands.

Formal democracy was achieved widely in Africa in the 1960s. The countries of that continent also sent representatives to take up posts in UN bodies. What has followed since then is stagnation and in many countries dictatorship or autocratic rule – often under the wings of formal democracy and with the UN closing its eyes.

Another possibility that must be taken into consideration when assessing the future of global democracy is that globalisation itself could collapse again. That is what happened to the previous wave of globalisation. By the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century we had advanced far in globalisation, but when the economy slumped we abandoned it. If people do not see the benefit of globalisation and do not trust those who exercise power on their behalf, the same thing could happen again. At present, no attempt is being made to regulate globalisation, but without regulation globalisation will neither advance nor succeed. However, what genuine global public goods are must first be clarified and agreed on.

# The hegemony of money devours democracy's chances

Political researchers have in recent decades been concerned that politics has given up, disarmed itself in the face of the market's hegemony. There is a belief that politics lacks independent power when the economy determines things that are more important than the care of collective affairs. In Europe this expresses itself in political passivity on the part of people and falling voter turnouts. Voting is not seen as having relevance. In Finland 2% of citizens actively participate in party activities and 8% are members of political parties. In measurements of esteem, the Eduskunta has been ranked near the bottom of the table for several decades.

The present decline in the legitimacy of politics is a long-running trend. It began even before it became apparent in the early 1990s. Why? In the 20<sup>th</sup> century and especially after the Second World War, fear of communism and the existence of a rival socialist system forced the elite in Europe to maintain a dependable and efficient political system. Democracy was respected and cherished. When the threat of socialism disappeared and the Soviet Union disintegrated, the incentive to develop the political system was no longer there. There was no need to compete with anyone. The market usurped power. A stripped-down model of democracy was adopted. Capitalism has hardened and the size of the companies that have succeeded in competition as well as the power of their top executives have grown.

Francis Fukyama described the triumphal march of capitalism in his book The End of History and the Last Man (Fukyama 1992). He was right, at least where the short term is concerned, in that the market economy won out. By contrast, he did not foresee or mean that what could also happen was that a triumph of capitalism would weaken western democracy's opportunities to function and its credibility.

The power of money blights also the rising democracies of Asia. China was described in the following terms in the periodical Foreign Policy in spring 2006: "A generation ago, the offspring of the ruling elite took up positions in the government or military; today, they go into business"... In real estate, where peasants regularly earn less than 5% of the value of their land while developers pocket 60%, with the remainder going into local government coffers. Privatization, too, offers insiders a chance to hit it rich by gobbling up state assets on the cheap. A recent study showed that 60% of privatized state enterprises were sold to their managers. As a result, 30%t of all private-firm owners are now party members." (Minxin Pei 2006)

In his 1930 essay already mentioned, Keynes estimated that for at least the next century people would, in the name of economic growth, have to yield to undemocratic means and methods in order to achieve prosperity. Democracy researchers found 75 years later that the world is still compelled to tolerate a lack of democracy in the name of economic growth (Inglehart and Welzel 2006). There are still many countries and peoples like this. A difficult question is still the same one that Keynes asked in the beginning of the 1930s: for how long must we, in the name of economic growth, tolerate a lack of democracy and human rights and what guarantee is there that when the moment to change over to democracy arrives, the ruling elite will take the decisive step?

# Income differences gnaw at democracy from within

Income differences have become sharper in almost all democracies and in democracies that are just dawning they prevent democracy from advancing. In the USA, 5% of households own 60% of the wealth. Growth in income differences has been very steep since socialism ceased to be a rival. Also China has adopted this feature of capitalism. According to Foreign Policy, the World Bank and the Chinese government suggest that income inequality has increased at least 50% since the late 1970s. Less than 1% of Chinese households control more than 60% of the country's wealth. The situation is the same in India, the economy of which is now the world's fourth biggest immediately behind the USA, China and Japan. The Indians are growing wealthier. Some 300 million are counted as belonging to the middle class, but India is still home to 40% of the world's poorest people. At the same time as this giant of contrasts is living in an era of rapid changes and transitions, income differences are increasing, efforts to wipe out illiteracy are not succeeding and it is not believed that the caste system will be eliminated for a long time to come.

In their classic study Politics, Economics and Welfare (1992) Robert Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom found that income differences and inequality are intertwined with inequality in political decision making. If voting, freedom of expression and good administrative procedure are made human rights that safeguard the functioning of democracy, then a fairer division of income and wealth must also become a right. Without this, democracy is a distant goal. The matter has been discussed also since states deregulated markets, thereby strengthening their capacity to steer the course of politics, and accepted growing income differences.

The Finnish democracy researcher Tatu Vanhanen's theory of democratisation is based on the idea that sharing the resources from which power springs between several powerful groups (hierarchies) leads to democracy. He says that the struggle for political power "means that in a social environment in which important power resources are divided evenly between competing groups, political power is likewise divided equally (democracy), and in a social environment in which important resources are strongly concentrated, political power becomes concentrated in the hands of a few (autocracy). This strong regularity manifests itself in all human communities, transcending all racial, cultural, developmental and regional boundaries, although some fluctuation due to historical and cultural factors does exist. Democracy's strong dependence on sharing of resources leads to the conclusion that the best strategy for strengthening the social foundation of democracy and improving the social prerequisites for democracy in non-democratic societies is to implement the kinds of social reforms that share power resources between the different population groups. In order to achieve this goal, educational opportunities should be opened to all population groups, land reform should support the creation of family farms and the economic system should be changed to a market economy."

According to Vanhanen, the foundation of democracy is a balance and competition between hierarchies, not their elimination. Likewise interesting is the fact that Vanhanen, unlike many others (e.g. Albert Somit and Steven Peterson), believes that the destruction of Saddam Hussein's centralised power apparatus has improved the prerequisites for democracy in Iraq. The resources from which power derives are now divided more broadly among competing groups (Shias, Sunnis and Kurds). The Shia majority no longer submit to the dictatorship of the Sunni minority. They have acquired a taste for power and freedom and would defend the position they have achieved, if necessary with arms. Then the Sunnis would have to be satisfied with some kind of democratic power sharing. (Vanhanen 2006)

# Defending and exporting democracy can undermine the foundations of democracy at home

Terrorist attacks directed at western democracies have been determinedly responded to in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Both in the USA and Europe, defending democracy has led to a pre-emptive war being waged against terrorism, and this has partially undermined citizens' trust in their own political and administrative leadership. The history of democracy in the developed world reveals the inescapable fact that democracy is not a prerequisite for economic and social progress and good development, but more a result of these things. The difficulties of exporting democracy have had negative reflections also on the exporting countries' own democracy.

A few fundamental questions open up the problem of exporting democracy from this perspective. Although the 20<sup>th</sup> century is often called the century of democracy, it was unclear until its final decade whether all models of society could promote democracy or even destroy it. For example, a variety of social models, of which socialist democracy was one, continued to be studied at Finnish universities until the end of the Cold War. It was only after that period that Finnish political leaders began styling socialist systems non-democracies or dictatorships.

Exporting democracy can not be detached from history. By what right, for example, do European states demand that Africa suddenly embrace democracy, given that for centuries they kept the entire continent under their colonial rule and plundered its wealth. After the Second World War, Europe left it to cope within rudimentary artificial frontiers, although most Africans have continued to live in tribal systems to this day. Western democracies are not easily able to shake off the White Man's Burden.

Although democracy seems to have emerged as the victorious dominant system now that the Cold War has ended, it is not the reality everywhere. When democracy is talked about from today's perspective, what is in mind in practice is the OECD countries. However, these represent only a minority of people: three-quarters of humankind live outside the OECD countries. The most important country outside the OECD is China, which is not only an economic power, but also strong politically. It is already evident that it is creating strong ties to not only Asian countries, but also Africa and the Arab world, precisely with the future in mind. It is perfectly natural that developing countries will seek a model to be followed also in social affairs from China as well as from the OECD countries. China is happy to present its own model to others. The growth substrate for collective values in Asia is better than for western individual-centred values.

When exporting democracy is being assessed, attention easily turns to its quality and depth in the exporting country. Critics ask: How can it be argued that democracy is the best social model when the citizens of the countries exporting it have such little faith in it that only 30 per cent of them bother to vote? In 2005 while 80 per cent of people thought democracy was the best form of government, 65 % per cent did not believe that their country was ruled by the will of the people (Gallup International). The figures were highest in advanced and stable democracies, countries in which voter turnout and party membership were falling.

Although several countries have exporting democracy on their agendas nowadays, it is also the focus of criticism. In support of his critical stance, Vice President Thomas Carothers of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace think-tank invokes the lesson of exporting democracy in the 1990s. The Carnegie researchers condense their experiences as follows: "...outsiders are usually marginal players. They become the central determinant of political change only if they

are willing to intervene massively, impose a de facto protectorate, and stay for an indefinite, long term." (Carothers 2002)

Quite the same themes are being discussed in many European countries. The latest phase of exporting democracy and human rights in the 21st century concerns the entire prosperous western word. If Carothers' prediction comes true and democracy is exported by force of arms, it might be the end of our own democracy and an Orwellian picture of the future will become reality.

# The question of destiny for European democracy begins with the demographic structure and concerns sharing

A major challenge facing the future of European democracy is intertwined with its demographic development and how its economic prosperity develops relative to the regions surrounding Europe. The scenario for the development of Europe's demographic structure is clear. If the present demographic forecasts prove accurate and the European Union does not open its borders to migration, Europe will lose its power of renewal. Investment will not flow into Europe, which will lack consumer demand and growth dynamism. It will also become more difficult to maintain infrastructure. The problem of a downward spiralling in standards of living can be solved in three ways: 1) by increasing the birth rate and restoring natural reproduction to its former level, 2) by opening borders to immigrants or 3) by doing both.

Another major challenge facing the future of European democracy relates to the development of the global environment and a third to the stark differences between the cultures of Europe and those of the surrounding countries. These two questions are intertwined. Already now, drought and shortage of water are plaguing especially North Africa. Global warming is forecast to exacerbate the situation. The situation is not as bad on the northern side of the Mediterranean. In addition to this, the Mediterranean is a border between Christianity and Islam, a democratic and a non-democratic political system as well as slow and fast population growth. European democracy will be put to the test when drought and the shortage of water worsen and the countries of North Africa are unable to find a solution to the spiral of poverty. How will Europe respond to the problem of poverty and prosperity and, in the worst case, the human catastrophe to which it will give rise? The present youth unemployment in North Africa is a good example of the slowly developing social threat of poverty. Most of the world's unemployed people are growing up to the south of the Mediterranean. There are tens of millions of them. Looking at the matter from the angle of European democracy, we have to ask where these young people will direct their energy.

From the perspective of Europe's economy and democracy and also ethically, it would be desirable for the Mediterranean to unite rather than divide. Europe needs young workers and innovators. Europe should open her borders. The more robustly this is done, the more strongly Europe will change. It will mean that the Christianity-based foundation of European democracy will change and nationality will lose its relevance as the foundation of national democracy. Europe's present political decision makers will have to ponder the most profound foundations of democracy and adopt a position on nationality and what liberty, fraternity and solidarity mean in relation to new immigrants. Is religion part of European existence? Does democracy mean equal rights for all irrespective of religion and birth or only for native citizens? What does nationality mean? If new population groups come to Europe, their religion will be different. They will speak different languages and have a different cultural identity. Will immigrants be given the same political, economic and social rights as the indigenous population? It is obvious that the effects

of both alternatives will be dramatic. Giving immigrants full civil rights and applying democratic principles to immigrants or discrimination against them, i.e. denying them democratic rights, will change political configurations in European countries.

What is ultimately involved in democracy is people's opportunity to influence their own lives. They must be able not only to influence the formation of their own country's government, but also to participate directly in some of the regional and global processes that affect their lives. All of this presupposes, in addition to the basic institutions of democracy, also personal autonomy. As John Stuart Mill puts it: "If a person possesses any tolerable amount of common sense and experience, his own mode of laying out his existence is the best, not because it is the best in itself, but because it is his own mode." (Mill; Acton 1972, 162–163)

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